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ABSTRACT
Taking the cases of five complementary therapies in the United Kingdom, the study seeks 
to explain why some complementary medical practitioners are statutorily regulated while 
others remain unregulated. It also asks why regulation has taken the form that it has.
The analytical framework used draws on sociology, economics and political science. The 
study examines whether statutory regulation is best explained as the result of the 
mobilisation of complementary medical practitioner groups, actions by the state, or 
interactions between individual policy actors. It tests the explanatory value o f demand 
theories of professionalisation, supply theories of professionalisation, and personal policy 
network analysis. It also examines the role of ideas in shaping policy.
While practitioner groups in all five therapies were professionalised not all actively pursued 
statutory regulation. In the cases of osteopaths and chiropractors mobilisation by 
practitioner groups appears to explain their success in gaining statutory regulation. The 
state’s concern to regulate risk appears to have been crucial in the decision to introduce 
statutory regulation for acupuncturists and herbalists. In all cases, individual policy 
entrepreneurs and policy advocates, including HRH the Prince of Wales, played a crucial 
role in shaping the policy process. The medical model of professional self-regulation 
dominated policy ideas. Alternative regulatory models were seldom debated.
The study discusses the implications of the findings for the future o f professional 
regulation of CAM practitioners and healthcare professionals generally. It concludes by 
suggesting that despite its limitations personal policy network analysis might usefully be 
applied in other contexts.
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NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY
The field of CAM policy is littered with acronyms to be deciphered (see list of 
abbreviations). To make things more confusing several organisations which feature here 
have changed name during the period o f study. This can make it difficult for the reader to 
follow the involvement o f groups in the policy process over time. This brief introductory 
note describes these name changes and explains the terminology adopted in the study 
which follows.
The Prince’s Foundation for Integrated Health began life as the Foundation for Integrated 
Health following the work of The Prince of Wales’s Initiative on Integrated Medicine. It 
has since changed its name to the Foundation for Integrated Medicine, the Prince of 
Wales’s Foundation for Integrated Health and most recently to The Prince’s Foundation 
for Integrated Health. Here I refer to it as the Foundation for Integrated Health 
throughout or simply the Foundation.
The Prevention of Professional Abuse Network (POPAN) has rebranded and is now called 
Witness: against abuse by health & care workers. This name change occurred after the main 
study period therefore POPAN is used throughout.
The Council for Professions Supplementary to Medicine (CPSM) was abolished and 
succeeded by the Healthcare Professions Council (HPC) in 2002 following the Health 
Professions Order 2001. Depending on the period under scrutiny the appropriate tide is 
used. The Council for the Regulation of Healthcare Professionals was created by the NHS 
Reform and Health Care Professions Act 2002 following the recommendations of the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry (Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry, 2001). It was almost 
immediately re-branded as the Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence (CHRE) 
partly to avoid confusion with the HPC. It is referred to by this latter tide throughout.
The Department for Education and Employment established a network of national training 
organisations to establish standards for skills and qualifications. Healthwork UK was 
appointed in 1998 by the government to work in the health sector and included a specific 
remit to support the needs of CAM practitioners (Department of Health, 2000b). 
Healthwork UK along with other national training organisations was disbanded around 
2002 to be replaced by Sector Skills Councils. Skills for Health was established in April 
2002 and licensed by the Secretary of State for Education and Skills as the UK Sector Skills 
Council for health in May 2004. It is funded through the four UK health departments, the 
Sector Skills Development Agency, the Education Act Regulatory Bodies and NHS,
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independent and voluntary employers. Many of the responsibilities of Healthwork UK (and 
also some of the staff) transferred to Skills for Health including responsibility for national 
occupational standards and other competency frameworks (Lane, 2006). Given these are 
distinct organisations the respective tides are used.
Over a longer period of time, CAM practitioner groups have changed names frequently, 
sometimes following a merger or split with another part o f the profession. For the most 
part the name they are currently known by is used. Table 4.3 gives an overview of the main 
organisations and their incarnations for the five therapies studied here.
Government departments are reorganised at regular intervals. The Department o f Health 
and Social Security was split into its component parts on 25th July 1988. Since then the 
Department of Health has avoided any departmental mergers but has undergone major 
internal reorganisation. Devolution has changed its scope. Responsibility for health services 
is now devolved to the Welsh Assembly and to the Scottish Parliament. Professional 
regulation however is reserved to Westminster and therefore applies to the United 
Kingdom as a whole (Greer, 2004). For example consultation on recent regulatory 
proposals has been conducted by the Department o f Health in England on behalf of the 
four UK health departments. Here the analysis is o f regulatory policy for CAM 
practitioners in the UK, though as with many policy networks it is Anglo-centric.
C h a p t e r  1
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
The history of medicine is the story of a dynamic and changing set of healing practices. The 
definition of medicine and the state’s role in it have changed over time and differ between 
cultures (Porter, 1989; Jiitte, 1996). The introduction of statutory regulation o f the medical 
profession in western Europe in the 19th century secured the position of doctors and their 
control over medical practice. The boundaries between conventional medicine and 
alternative medicine created at that time were largely a result of the successful mobilisation 
of doctors’ interests. Unlike their counterparts in many other western European countries 
alternative medical practitioners in the United Kingdom (UK) continued to practise legally 
but were not regulated by the state. Over the course of the 20th century nurses and other 
health care professionals gained statutory recognition. Only towards the end of the century 
did any complementary and alternative medical (CAM) practitioners gain similar state 
sanctioned self-regulating powers.
There is a wide range of terminology used to describe different approaches to medicine. 
Complementary medicine is commonly used but other synonyms such as alternative, 
traditional, unconventional, holistic, parallel, eastern, or folk medicine are also found. Their 
antonyms include biomedicine, orthodox, conventional, allopathic, or scientific medicine. 
The term ‘complementary medicine’ is a relatively recent designation for a range of healing 
practices that have in some cases been practiced for hundreds of years. Prior to the mid- 
20th century such therapies were often referred to as ‘primitive medicine’ in colonial settings 
and ‘fringe’ or ‘marginal medicine’ in western contexts.
Some terms carry additional meaning in that they are utilized either by proponents or 
critics. The term ‘complementary medicine’, which has become increasingly used since the 
1980s, emphasizes the use of treatments as an adjunct to or supplementary to conventional 
medicine. The term ‘alternative’ medicine suggests its use substitutes for and excludes 
utilization of conventional medicine. The term ‘complementary and alternative medicine’ 
(CAM) is widely used in scientific and policy-related discourse and has been defined as “a 
broad set of health care practices that are not part of that country’s own tradition and are 
not integrated into the dominant health care system” (World Health Organization, 2000). 
The term CAM will be used throughout this study.
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Popular demand for CAM therapies is high and rising. The number of people training in 
and practising CAM therapies is growing, and there is increased interest among 
conventional health care professionals in the integration of CAM therapies within their 
own practice. In this environment policymakers have been prompted to question the 
adequacy of existing regulation (or lack of it). The policy response in the UK has been to 
introduce statutory self-regulation for certain CAM practitioners and to encourage robust 
systems of voluntary self-regulation for others. The model o f regulation adopted is similar 
to that introduced for doctors in the 19th century: a professionally led council that sets 
standards and registers practitioners with powers to sanction registrants who fail to meet 
ethical and practice standards. Given CAM’s own ambivalence (at times antagonism) to 
orthodox medicine it is perhaps surprising that they should be regulated according to 
institutional arrangements developed for the regulation of the medical profession — 
especially as those institutional arrangements themselves are being challenged.
1.2 Research questions
The focus o f this project stems primarily from my own interests in the politics of health 
care, regulation and international comparisons o f health care markets and systems. I am 
interested in how CAM practitioners have moved in from the fringes of medicine, where 
they operated for much of the 20th century, to occupy a more central position in modem 
health care policy. I wish to explain why some groups of CAM practitioners have gained 
statutory regulation. This study differs from much of the existing literature on 
complementary and alternative medicine (CAM), which is dominated by studies focused on 
the efficacy and effectiveness of therapies, consumer utilisation and health beliefs, the 
micro level of practice and intra-professional ethics (see Lew-Treweek, Heller et al., 2005 
for a collection o f papers on CAM).
The focus of this study is the process of policy-making that has led to these regulatory 
developments. The main research question to be addressed in this study is:
• Why has the regulatory process for CAM practitioners in the UK taken the 
form that it has?
In particular,
•  Why are some CAM therapies statutorily regulated and others not?
• What model of regulation is used to regulate CAM practitioners in the UK, 
and why was this model chosen?
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The statutory regulation of osteopaths and chiropractors, the proposals for statutory 
regulation of herbalists and acupuncturists, and the progress towards voluntary regulation 
by homeopaths are analysed in this study in an attempt to answer these questions. Action 
has been taken recently to regulate CAM products following the EU Directive on 
Traditional Herbal Medicinal Products (2004/24/EC). There continues to be policy debate 
about the safety and efficacy of CAM products in the UK parliament (Hansard, 26 October 
2006). It is practitioners not products, however, that are the focus of this study.
The study analyses oral and written evidence to the House o f Lords Select Committee on 
Science and Technology on Complementary and Alternative Medicine, official government 
publications, submissions to the Department of Health consultation on proposals for the 
statutory regulation of acupuncture and herbal medicine, reports of the Regulatory 
Working Groups and other published documents by key stakeholders. These documentary 
data are supplemented by in-depth semi-structured interviews with key individuals. Chapter 
6 sets out in greater detail the methodology employed.
Most studies of regulation in other sectors of the economy have adopted an economic 
perspective, analysing how governments intervene in the market for particular goods and 
services. There has, however, been increasing recognition o f the value o f multidisciplinary 
approaches and their application to the study of regulation (Baldwin and Cave, 1999). They 
are often better able to answer those questions that are not traditionally the subject of 
regulation research, such as why a particular measure was introduced. Public opinion and 
private interests have been identified as key drivers of regulation alongside market failure 
(Hood, Rothstein et al., 2001). In contrast, the professional regulation literature is mainly 
sociological in approach, and has focused on professional identity and authority and how 
this is constructed. Accordingly the study adopts a multidisciplinary approach to the 
analysis of professional regulation. It applies concepts from political science, economics 
and sociology to an analysis o f the regulatory process.
1.3 Outline o f the study
Following this introduction, chapters 2-4 set out the context for the study. Chapter 2 
describes the market for CAM in the UK. It depicts a rapidly expanding market in both 
CAM products and practitioner services, and highlights the implications for regulation. 
Self-regulation is just one of many options available to policymakers. Chapter 3 reviews a 
range of regulatory approaches and how they might apply to CAM practitioners. It 
highlights the key features of a number of different regulatory approaches that are used in 
other countries to regulate CAM practitioners. Contrasting approaches have emerged
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internationally for historical and cultural reasons. Chapter 4 describes the historical 
background to professional regulation in the UK from the late 19th century onwards. It 
describes key events in the professionalisation of CAM practitioners prior to the 1990s, as 
well as highlighting examples o f other health care professionals.
Before presenting the results of the empirical analysis Chapter 5 reviews the theoretical 
literature and sets out the analytical framework to be used. Sociological theories about the 
nature of professionalisation, the economic literature on occupational closure, and political 
science theories of the policy process are reviewed. In response to an emergent theme of 
risk, the literature on risk regulation is also included.1 The chapter briefly reviews concepts 
used in other empirical studies of the professionalisation of CAM practitioners. The 
literature is organised into demand theories o f professionalisation, which argue that 
professionalisation is the result of mobilisation by occupational groups, and supply 
theories, which argue that professionalisation is a result of state actions. Each are reviewed 
for their potential to provide a framework for explaining the regulatory process. The 
chapter concludes by presenting the analytical framework to be employed in the study. 
Chapter 6 describes the methodology for the study. It justifies the use o f qualitative 
methods for answering the research questions and explains the selection o f therapies on 
which the study focuses. It describes the selection of documents and interviewees and how 
qualitative software was used during the analytical process.
The empirical analysis is presented in Chapters 7-10. The analysis focuses on the regulatory 
process surrounding five CAM therapies: acupuncture, chiropractic, herbal medicine, 
homeopathy, and osteopathy. Chapter 7 uses demand theories of professionalisation to 
explain why some CAM practitioners have achieved statutory regulation. It analyses 
whether CAM practitioner groups were organised and mobilised in pursuit of statutory 
recognition and, if so, what motivations lay behind these demands.
Chapter 8 uses the supply theories of professionalisation to examine the role of the state in 
determining which CAM therapies are granted statutory self-regulating powers. It identifies 
the strategies that the state has used to regulate these groups and analyses the arguments 
used to justify the regulation o f CAM practitioners.
In order to explore more fully the dynamics of the regulatory process Chapter 9 uses an 
adaptation of policy subsystem analysis to explain why certain therapies are statutorily 
regulated. It examines the role of individuals in shaping regulatory policy, including state 
actors, representatives of CAM practitioner groups, consumer representatives, academics
1 The scope of the review and the final analytical framework were partly informed by preliminary analysis o f  the data.
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and representatives of orthodox medicine. Use is made of policy maps that depict the 
affiliations of and inter-relationships between individuals at different stages in the 
regulatory process to identify ‘policy entrepreneurs* who have influenced the process.
Chapter 10 examines the type o f regulation that has been introduced for CAM practitioners 
and seeks to explain why this model has been adopted. It examines the debates among 
CAM practitioners, the state and other members of the policy network about how to 
regulate, and the functions and structure o f regulatory bodies. The concept of policy 
paradigms is used to explain why certain policy ideas dominate.
Chapter 11 discusses the implications of the empirical findings for wider policy discussions 
about the future of professional regulation. It also discusses the strengths and limitations of 
the analytical approach, and considers its wider application to other health policy research. 
The chapter draws together the conclusions of the study and highlights areas for further 
research.
1.4 Why is the regulation o f CAM practitioners an important 
issue?
Growth in public demand for, and use of, CAM products and services has certainly been 
an important factor in the growth of research and policy interest in CAM. There is a large 
market for CAM therapies in the UK (Thomas, Nicholl et al., 2001; Thomas and Coleman, 
2004) and demand has been increasing worldwide (Eisenberg, Davis et al., 1998; Institut 
fur Demoskopie Allensbach, 2002). This is likely to continue as the prevalence of chronic 
diseases, for which CAM is believed to offer relief, rises (Long, Huntley et al., 2001). 
Although the majority of CAM services are currently paid for by patients and provided in 
the private sector (Thomas, 1995; Thomas, Nicholl et al., 2001), there is increasing pressure 
to make CAM therapies more widely available through the NHS (Smallwood, 2005). Public 
funding of CAM therapies is likely in future as further research into the efficacy o f CAM 
becomes available (Vickers, 2000), and attitudes of medical practitioners change (Lewith, 
Hyland et al., 2001; Schmidt, Jacobs et al., 2002).
The regulation of CAM is already the subject of policy and research activity, though there 
has been more attention on products than on practitioners (Shaw, 1998; Standing 
Committee on Health, 1998; Ernst and Dixon, 2004). The World Health Organization 
(WHO) has published numerous reports on the legal status of herbal medicines worldwide 
(World Health Organization, 2001; World Health Organization, 2005), and published its 
own Traditional Medicine Strategy in 2002 (World Health Organization, 2002). The 
European Union (EU) introduced a Directive on Traditional Herbal Medicinal Products
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(2004/24/EC) which came into force in Member States on 1st November 2005. A separate 
Directive governs the licensing of homeopathic medicinal products (92/73/EC). In the 
United Kingdom the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) is 
responsible for licensing medicines including herbal medicines. It also monitors adverse 
drug reactions through the Yellow Card Scheme which was extended to include unlicensed 
herbal products in 1996.
Growing interest in the regulation of CAM practitioners is likely given the wider debate 
about the future of health care professional regulation in the UK. Changes in the health 
care workforce and the need for greater flexibility in the skills of and tasks performed by 
health care practitioners have exposed the limitations of existing structures of regulation 
(Department of Health and Royal College of General Practitioners, 2002). Yet it is the high 
profile failures in the system that have precipitated discussions about reform. In particular, 
the events at Liverpool Children’s Hospital in Alder Hey and the Bristol Royal Infirmary, 
the publicity surrounding the arrest and conviction of Dr Harold Shipman, and the 
activities of Rodney Ledward and Richard Neale eroded public confidence in professional 
self-regulation (Irvine, 2003). The reports o f the Bristol Inquiry (Bristol Royal Infirmary 
Inquiry, 2001) and the Shipman Inquiry (Department of Health, 2004b) have challenged 
the approach to professional self-regulation, calling for greater public scrutiny and 
independent disciplinary procedures. Government reforms are still to be finalised following 
the reports of two internal reviews (Chief Medical Officer of England, 2006; Department 
of Health, 2006c).
Professional regulation is also under discussion in Europe, where a revised Directive on 
mutual recognition of professional qualifications has been passed (2005/36/EQ. The 
requirement under EU law that there should be free movement of professionals within the 
EU means that professional regulation is no longer solely a matter for nation states. 
Differences in the legal status of CAM practitioners between Member States mean that free 
movement and the right to establish a business are not currently upheld for CAM 
practitioners. Although there have been no legal challenges to date, the European Court of 
Justice could be asked to rule on such matters in future. Previous interpretations of EU law 
have posed significant challenges to national self-determination or subsidiarity in regard to 
health care policies (Mossialos and McKee, 2002).
1.5 Aim s and objectives
The main aim of the study is to present an account and an explanation of why the 
regulatory process for CAM in the UK has taken the form that it has since 1990. The
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results of the empirical analysis will add to a growing body of research on professional 
regulation (Davies, 2004) and CAM (Heller, Lee-Treweek et al., 2005). The study uses an 
innovative analytical approach, ‘personal network analysis’. Most health policy research 
focuses on issues of ‘high politics’ involving Ministers and senior civil servants, where the 
interests of the orthodox medical profession often dominate. Here I examine the policy 
process in a small, low visibility sub-sector where interest groups are in a state o f flux, 
where individuals play a central role, and where there are only a few state actors involved 
(generally mid- to low-ranking civil servants).
It is expected that the findings of the study will inform policy discussions about how to 
regulate CAM practitioners and the future of health care professional regulation more 
generally in the UK. An enhanced understanding of regulatory developments in relation to 
CAM practitioners in the UK could also inform debates on this subject within the EU and 
elsewhere.
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C h a p t e r  2
2 TH E MARKET FOR COMPLEMENTARY AND ALTERNATIVE
M EDICINE
2.1 Introduction
There is a popular perception that use of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) 
grew rapidly during the 1990s. Although there are no longitudinal studies to prove this, 
cross sectional data presented below indicate this to be the case. Rising public demand and 
the associated growth in the number o f people practising these therapies has brought new 
regulatory challenges. Before going on to describe the developments in regulation and 
analyse the regulatory process in later chapters, we begin with an overview of the market 
for CAM in the UK.
Section 2.2 describes the prevalence o f use of CAM and summarises key demographic 
variables of those who use it. Conventional health care in the UK is mosdy funded through 
general taxation and provided by public providers within the National Health Service 
(NHS), though there is growth in private provision. Section 2.3 describes the extent to 
which CAM services are publicly funded and the availability of CAM through the NHS.
This study focuses mainly on those people who provide CAM therapies. Section 2.4 
provides an overview of the different types of practitioners, together with estimates of their 
number. The chapter concludes by highlighting the regulatory issues that the growth in 
CAM raises for policymakers.
2.2 Who uses CAM?
The British public’s perception is that CAM use is increasing (78% of respondents in a 
BBC poll) (Ernst and White, 2000) and yet there is no systematic research evidence to 
support this view. Despite the fact that there have been numerous population surveys of 
CAM use, none has been conducted using a consistent survey instrument to give a trend 
over time. Studies in the United States found an increase in one-year prevalence of use 
between 1991 and 1997 (33.8% vs. 42.1%) (Eisenberg, Davis et al., 1998) but similar 
prevalence levels in 1997 and 2002 (36.5% vs. 35.0%) (Tindle, Davis et al., 2005). The Sub- 
Committee on Complementary and Alternative Medicine of the House o f Lords’ Select 
Committee on Science and Technology reported that it had “heard much evidence to the 
effect that we are now experiencing a rapid increase in the use of CAM across the Western
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World [r/V]” whilst acknowledging that much of the specific information did not refer to 
the UK (House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, 2000a, para 1.14).
There have been several systematic reviews, population surveys, and surveys o f specific 
patient populations on use of CAM. There has even been a review of unpublished studies 
(Ong and Banks, 2003). The following section summarises the results of studies published 
since 1980 and identified in PUBMED,2 in order to present a fuller picture of use of CAM.
2.2.1 Systematic reviews
The published systematic reviews are international in scope. Harris and Rees (2000) 
identified 12 studies o f CAM use among the general population of which only Yung, Lewis 
et al. (1988) and Thomas, Fall et al. (1993) surveyed a UK sample (Harris and Rees, 2000).
Yung, Lewis et al. (1988) analysed data from the 1986 Cardiff Health Survey, a self 
completed questionnaire sent to a random sample o f the electoral register (n=4268). 2.6 
percent of the sample reported having used CAM (not on the NHS) during the last year 
(Yung, Lewis et al., 1988). Thomas, Fall et al. (1993) surveyed a random sample of the 
electoral register as part o f a pilot study in 1993 (n=676). They estimated that 8.5 percent 
of the population had visited a CAM practitioner in the previous 12 months whilst a 
quarter had used an over-the-counter remedy during the same period (Thomas, Fall et al., 
1993).
Ernst (2000) identified a total of 12 studies up to and including 1997 only two of which 
were of UK populations (Ernst, 2000). Vickers (1994) reports the results of Thomas, Fall et 
al. (1993) (see above). Emslie, Campbell et al. (1996) conducted a postal questionnaire of a 
random sample of the adult population in the Grampian Region of Scodand (n=500). 29 
percent of respondents reported ever using at least one of eight named therapies. Ten 
percent reported having used reflexology whilst as many as 35 percent had used osteopathy 
(Emslie, Campbell et al., 1996).
One systematic review of the prevalence of use by children was identified (Ernst, 1999). 
This included one study from the UK which found that 21 percent o f parents o f children 
attending paediatric clinics in South West England (n=521) had used CAM (Simpson, 
Pearce et al., 1998). The prevalence was lower among parents in the community sample 
than in the hospital sample (15% vs. 25%).
2 The following search terms were used: MESH headings ‘complementary therapies’ and ‘Great Britain’ and any field 
containing ‘utili*’ OR ‘use’. The abstracts o f original articles were reviewed to identify studies which reported prevalence 
estimates either in the general population or among specific patient groups.
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A systematic review of usage of complementary therapies in rheumatology identified four 
studies in the UK. Overall prevalence of CAM use among rheumatology patients was high, 
ranging from 60 percent to 71 percent (Ernst, 1998b). These figures included use of 
supplements and diets.
A systematic review o f use o f CAM by cancer patients identified two studies in the UK 
(out a total o f 26 studies). The prevalence of use of CAM reported was 32 percent and 16 
percent in the two UK studies published in 1993 and 1994 respectively (Ernst and 
Cassileth, 1998).
2.2.2 Other population surveys
A further five studies were identified which reported results of population surveys that 
asked about use of CAM. Murray and Shepherd (1993) found that 41 percent o f inner 
London general practice patients who responded to a postal questionnaire had used CAM 
in the past ten years (n=372). The most common therapies used were osteopathy (14%), 
homeopathy (13%), massage (11%), acupuncture and herbalism (both 9%) (Murray and 
Shepherd, 1993).
Ong, Petersen et al. (2002) report the results of a survey of adults aged 18-64 years in four 
southern counties of England in 1997 (n= 14,868). 7.8 percent of respondents had 
consulted a CAM practitioner in the previous three months. Women were significantly 
more likely to report visiting a CAM practitioner than men (9.5% vs. 5.5%) and CAM users 
were more likely to be from non-manual social classes. Use was lowest among those under 
35 years old and highest among those aged 35-44 years (9.2%) (Ong, Petersen et al., 2002).
Ernst and White (2000) report the results of a national telephone survey with a random 
sample of adults in 1999 (n=1204). 20 percent of respondents reported using CAM at least 
once during the last year. Chiropractic was the least popular therapy and herbal medicine 
the most popular (6% vs. 34%). CAM use was highest among women (59%), employed 
people (63%), 35-64 year olds, and higher social classes. There was regional variation with 
the lowest prevalence in the West Midlands (16%) and the north of England (11%) and the 
highest in Wales (32%) and the south east of England (23%) (Ernst and White, 2000).
Thomas, Nicholl et al. (2001) report the results of a survey of a geographically stratified 
random sample of adults in England in 1998 (n=5010). 28.3 percent reported ever visiting 
a practitioner of one o f six named therapies. 10.6 percent of respondents reported doing so 
within the last year with a mean of 4.5 visits. This is equivalent to 4.2 million adults making 
22 million visits in 1998. Consistent with previous research they found use was higher 
among women (Thomas, Nicholl et al., 2001).
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The most recent estimates of CAM use in the UK were obtained from data collected in 
March 2001 from the Omnibus Survey (a regular multi-purpose survey carried out by the 
Office for National Statistics) (n=2761). Thomas and Coleman (2004) estimate that ten 
percent o f adults had visited a CAM practitioner to receive treatment in the past 12 
months. An estimated 6.5 percent of adults had used one of the five therapies examined in 
this study. In contrast to previous studies men and women used therapies in equal 
proportions. The study also reported that the majority of CAM use was for an illness or 
condition for which conventional medical advice had previously been sought (62%) 
(Thomas and Coleman, 2004).
2.2.3 Sub-population surveys
From a patient safety perspective it is important to understand whether patients who 
consult conventional health care also use CAM therapies. There have been numerous 
surveys of CAM use among specific patient populations in the UK. Studies have analysed 
use among children in secondary and tertiary hospital settings (Johnston, Bilbao et al., 
2003; Molassiotis and Cubbin, 2004; Cincotta, Crawford et al., 2006; McCann and Newell, 
2006), attendees in general practice (Featherstone, Godden et al., 2003), members of the 
National Asthma Campaign (Ernst, 1998a), chronic pain sufferers (Haetzman, Elliott et al., 
2003), patients attending general rheumatology and orthopedic (non-fracture) clinics 
(Chandola, Young et al., 1999), peri- and post-menopausal women (Vashisht, Domoney et 
al., 2001), cancer patients (Rees, Feigel et al., 2000; Lewith, Broomfield et al., 2002; Harris, 
Finlay et al., 2003; Scott, Kearney et al., 2005), patients presenting at tertiary clinics with 
Systemic Lupus Erythematosus (Moore, Petri et al., 2000), and dermatology patients 
(Nicolaou and Johnston, 2004).
Prevalence estimates reported in these studies ranged from 25 percent to 59 percent. For 
example 28 percent of patients attending a musculoskeletal clinic had used CAM, the most 
popular treatments being acupuncture, homeopathy, osteopathy and herbal medicine 
(Chandola, Young et al., 1999). 59 percent of asthma patients recorded some use of CAM, 
with those having more severe asthma reporting higher use than those suffering less 
severely (Ernst, 1998a). 48 percent of patients with lupus reported use o f at least one CAM 
therapy in the past six months, with relaxation, massage, herbal medicine and lifestyle diets 
the most common (Moore, Petri et al., 2000). 22.4 percent of women diagnosed with breast 
cancer had consulted a CAM practitioner in the past 12 months, while 33.2 percent 
reported using an over-the-counter remedy, the most common therapies were 
massage/aromatherapy, chiropractic/osteopathy, relaxation/yoga/meditation and spiritual 
healing (Rees, Feigel et al., 2000).
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These surveys indicate that the use of CAM therapies by patients in receipt of conventional 
medicine is common.
2.2.4 Discussion
Existing research does not verify that there has been an increase in demand for CAM 
services. What it does show is that an estimated ten percent o f the general population visit 
a CAM practitioner at least once in a given year and around six percent of the population 
use acupuncture, chiropractic, herbal medicine, homeopathy, or osteopathy.
Levels of use vary within the population. Greater use of CAM in higher socio-economic 
groups may reflect the cost of therapies and their lack of availability on the NHS (see 
below). It may also reflect differences in health beliefs and preferences among different 
social groups. The recent finding that men are as likely to use CAM as women (Thomas 
and Coleman, 2004), if not due to differences in study design, could be explained by 
changing social attitudes among men towards health in general and CAM in particular. 
CAM use is highest among the middle aged. If this is a cohort effect we might expect CAM 
use to rise in future among the older age groups.
Many of the published surveys were conducted in NHS clinics, indicating a growing 
interest and concern within conventional health care about the use patients are making of 
CAM. Conventional health care providers are being encouraged to elicit information about 
use of CAM therapies when taking medical histories, and research into the interaction 
effects is being conducted (see for example Cupp, 1999; Thompson Coon, Pittler et al.,
2003). Systematic research on the utilisation of CAM by different patient groups could be 
used: (i) to identify priority areas for research on efficacy of CAM treatments versus 
conventional treatment; (ii) to indicate where research on interaction effects is needed; (iii) 
to help target educational programmes for conventional health care providers, and; (iv) to 
identify areas where integrated services might be most fruitfully developed.
The popularity of CAM has also led to demands that it should be made more widely 
available on the NHS. The next section looks at how CAM is currently paid for and the 
extent to which it is available through the NHS.
2.3 H ow  are CAM services financed?
There are at least four main sources of health care funding that can be identified: public 
funding (e.g. through general taxation or national insurance contributions), out-of-pocket 
spending, private health insurance premiums, and charitable or voluntary donations. Unlike 
most other types of health care, CAM therapies are predominantly privately financed.
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23.1 Public financing
Within the NHS some CAM therapies such as homeopathy and acupuncture are direcdy 
provided, while others such as osteopathy and chiropractic are privately provided but may 
be funded through local purchasing arrangements. Herbal medicine is almost exclusively 
private, usually paid for by the consumer.
There are currently five homeopathic hospitals providing homeopathic treatment within 
the NHS. Homeopathic hospitals were incorporated into the NHS at the time of its 
establishment. Many NHS pain clinics offer acupuncture. Some CAM therapies such as 
aromatherapy and massage are provided to inpatients as part of integrated cancer care or 
palliative care in NHS hospitals (Lewith, 2000; National Institute for Clinical Excellence,
2004).
Primary care provision of CAM therapies is provided in-house by sessional complementary 
therapists, by general practitioners (GPs) or other members of the primary health care 
team, on referral to a local independent complementary therapy clinic, or by 
complementary therapists in an adjacent complementary health centre (Luff and Thomas, 
2000). One in two primary care practices in England offered some access to CAM in 2001, 
compared to 40 percent of practices in 1995 (see Figure 2.1). More practices were 
providing CAM therapies in-house, with no increase in the proportion of practices making 
referrals. The proportion of practices with an independent CAM practitioner working in 
the practice doubled between 1995 and 2001 (6.1% to 12.2%). It was more common for 
practices to provide acupuncture and homeopathy through members of the primary health 
care team and manipulative therapies, e.g. osteopathy or chiropractic, through independent 
practitioners (Thomas, Coleman et al., 2003).
Funding for these services may be from local NHS budgets, from a registered charity or 
charitable trust, or paid on a fee-for-service basis by patients out o f pocket. In 2001 the 
proportion o f services provided through primary care practices in England for which the 
patient had to make a partial or full payment rose to 42 percent from 26 percent in 1995 
(Thomas, Coleman et al., 2003).
Public funding of CAM is largely dependent on the decisions of those responsible for local 
NHS budgets. Between 1991 and 1997 GP fundholders and health authorities made these 
decisions. Since 1997 purchasing has been the responsibility o f primary care groups or 
primary care trusts (referred to here as primary care organisations).
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Figure 2.1 Percentage o f GP practices offering access to CAM services by therapy
type in 1995 and 2001
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In 1994, a survey of health authority public health directors (n=171 response rate 57%) 
found 67 percent of health authorities purchased one or more CAM treatments. The most 
common were homeopathy and acupuncture followed by osteopathy, aromatherapy and 
chiropractic. Only ten health authorities had an established policy on complementary 
therapies, with a further ten in the process of developing a policy (Adams, 1995).
In a survey of primary care organisations in 2000 (60% response rate) 58 percent reported 
that they provided access to CAM via primary care (Bonnet, 2000). The most commonly 
provided therapies were acupuncture (73%), osteopathy (43%), homeopathy (38%), 
chiropractic (23%) and aromatherapy (18%). This is similar to findings of an earlier study 
of health authorities (Adams, 1995). A survey of primary care organisations in 2003/4 in 
England estimated that 43 percent were providing access to three or more CAM therapies 
(Wilkinson, Peters et al., 2004). The most common therapies to which access was provided 
were acupuncture, osteopathy, homeopathy, massage, aromatherapy, and reflexology.
2.3.2 Private financing
The majority of CAM services in the UK are paid for privately (out of pocket). In a 
Scottish survey only 21 percent of respondents had received treatment free of charge 
(Emslie, Campbell et al., 1996). A 1998 survey found that 79 percent of CAM visits in 
England were paid directly by the patient, with a mean annual expenditure of £108 per 
paying user (Thomas, Nicholl et al., 2001). The self-reported amounts spent on CAM by
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patients vary enormously. In a 1999 BBC poll CAM users were found to be spending on 
average £13.62 per month on treatment, but 37 percent were spending less than £5 per 
month (Ernst and White, 2000). Half o f asthma patients spent less than £50 on CAM in 
the preceding year, while eight percent spent over £100 (Ernst, 1998a). Among women 
diagnosed with breast cancer the mean average CAM consultation cost was calculated as 
£10.66 (Rees, Feigel et al., 2000). The majority of consultations for children cost less than 
£20 per visit (Simpson and Roman, 2001).
In 1998 total out-of-pocket expenditure on six established therapies (acupuncture, 
chiropractic, homeopathy, hypnotherapy, herbalism and osteopathy) was estimated at £450 
million in England (Thomas, Nicholl et al., 2001). Industry reports estimate that spending 
on CAM (including over-the-counter products) was £640 million in 2000, with practitioner 
visits accounting for about three-quarters o f market value (Market Assessment 
International, 2000).
There is no published data on how much private health insurance companies spend 
reimbursing the costs of CAM therapies. Private health insurance products that cover CAM 
therapies are widely available, and at least one insurer has established links with a provider 
of CAM therapies (Foubister, Thomson et al., 2005). Data from population surveys is now 
old. In 1988 fewer than one in five of non-NHS CAM consultations were covered by 
private health insurance (Yung, Lewis et al., 1988). In 1986 90 percent of adults in Cardiff 
who had used CAM reported that no contribution was made to the costs by private health 
insurance (Yung, Lewis et al., 1988). Among a sample of women with breast cancer who 
reported using CAM in 1997, nine percent had their CAM consultation funded by the 
NHS, 14 percent were covered by health insurance, while three-quarters had to pay out-of- 
pocket (Rees, Feigel et al., 2000).
2 3 3 Discussion
There is some access to CAM directly within the NHS, mostly provided by doctors and 
other statutorily regulated practitioners. Few CAM practitioners are directly employed 
within the NHS. Although there has been a small increase in the number o f osteopaths and 
chiropractors located within primary care since they were statutorily regulated, they 
continue to work as independent practitioners. It is not clear whether regulation is a barrier 
to increased integration.
Neither is it clear to what extent NHS funding of CAM services will increase in future, 
despite the arguments put forward to support this (Smallwood, 2005). Access will depend 
on purchasing decisions taken at a local level, as well as recommendations at national level
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by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE). Differences in 
purchasing policies between NHS purchasers depend on organisational priorities and the 
level of autonomy over budget allocations. The current lack of regulation of CAM 
practitioners may also be a barrier to greater NHS funding of CAM (NHS Confederation, 
2000).
Most CAM practitioners work in the private sector where only minimal trading standards 
apply. Consumers must assess qualifications and prices in this market where caveat emptor 
applies. As practitioners are free to set their own prices the prices faced by consumers are 
highly variable. Furthermore, most consumers cannot rely on a referral from a GP but 
chose a practitioner on the basis of a recommendation from a friend or relative. 
Consumers currently lack access to reliable information on training/qualifications on which 
to base an informed choice. Regulation could help address these information asymmetries.
Data on costs is limited and lacks the detail necessary for use in cost-effectiveness studies. 
Any future attempts to undertake cost-effectiveness studies in the area of CAM will require 
more accurate ways of measuring the costs (as well as the benefits) of treatments than self 
reported surveys of aggregate out-of-pocket spending (Hulme and Long, 2005). Future 
studies could usefully collect data on price-per-consultation, consultations-per-episode of 
care, quantity and price of recommended products or remedies purchased from the 
practitioner or over-the-counter.
2.4 W ho provides CAM services?
The majority o f CAM treatments are provided by complementary therapists, with other 
health professionals accounting for 20 percent of treatments (Emslie, Campbell et al., 
1996). There has not been a systematic data collection of the number of people practising 
CAM in the UK since 1999. In the UK anyone is free to practise whether they are a 
statutorily regulated health professional or not.
Figure 2.2 gives an overview of the estimated numbers o f practitioners in 1999 for each of 
the five therapies to be examined in this study. The majority of those who practise 
acupuncture are statutorily regulated professionals or medical acupuncturists whereas 
among those practising homeopathy the majority are non-medical or lay homeopaths. The 
study did not identify any statutorily regulated professionals practising herbal medicine. 
There are also people who practise CAM on either a paid or a voluntary basis with or 
without training but who are not registered with either a statutory or a voluntary 
professional body. It is, therefore, almost impossible to obtain data on the number of these 
practitioners.
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Figure 2.2 Estimated number of practitioners for selected therapies in 1999
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2.4.1 Statutorily registered health care professionals
Some health care practitioners such as doctors, nurses, midwives and physiotherapists 
provide CAM therapies as part of their care for patients both in the NHS and outside it, 
for example in hospices and the private sector. A report for the Department of Health 
estimated that there were 9,300 statutorily registered health professionals practicing some 
form of CAM. The report acknowledged that due to the paucity of data it was possible that 
there were up to 20,000 practising (Mills and Budd, 2000).
There are a number of dedicated associations for statutorily registered health care 
professionals practising CAM therapies such as the British Medical Acupuncture Society 
(BMAS), the Faculty of Homeopathy, the Acupuncture Association of Chartered 
Physiotherapists (AACP) and the British Academy of Western Acupuncture (BAWA).
The BMAS currently has 2,500 members including doctors, nurses, midwives, health 
visitors, physiotherapists, osteopaths, chiropractors and podiatrists. It provides training at 
foundation level to approximately 450-500 trainees per year. In 2002 a BMAS audit found 
that between 50 and 60 percent of those who had done the training were using 
acupuncture techniques six months later. A smaller proportion went on to do further 
training towards accreditation (Cummings, 2005). In 1999 the BAWA which mostly 
represents nurses reported 250 members. In 1999 the AACP had 1,600 members by 2003 it
1
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was reported to have 2,650 members (Acupuncture Regulatory Working Group, 2003). 
There was over 50 percent growth in the number of statutory health professionals 
registered with one of these three organisations between 1997 and 1999 (Mills and Budd, 
2000).
The Faculty of Homeopathy has an international membership of over 1,400 (Faculty of 
Homeopathy, 2005). Membership is open to all statutorily registered professionals. The 
Faculty provides training courses for a range of practitioners including doctors, veterinary 
surgeons, dentists, pharmacists and nurses.
There are 60 doctors who hold dual registration with the General Medical Council (GMC) 
and the General Osteopathic Council (GOsC) (Clarke, 2005). The British Osteopathic 
Association (BOA) continues to represent the interests of doctors practising osteopathy. 
The General Chiropractic Council (GCQ currently has only 2 members who hold dual 
registration with the GMC (General Chiropractic Council, 2005d).
There is active interest in CAM among nurses and significant numbers with training. In 
2000 the Royal College of Nursing Complementary Therapy Forum had as many as 10,000 
members (Mills and Budd, 2000). An in-depth study by the NHS Confederation into CAM 
provision in one health authority in 1996 found that 34 percent o f midwives and 18 
percent of nurses were providing CAM services (Trevelyan, 1998). In a survey of staff 
providing cancer care in Southampton (the majority o f whom were nurses), 21 percent 
reported having training in some form of CAM (Lewith, Broomfield et al., 2002). Yet the 
practice of CAM therapies by nurses and midwives in hospital settings is currently 
unrecorded and unmonitored.
2.4.2 Registered CAM practitioners
Two surveys were conducted in 1997 and 1999 by academics at Exeter University 
commissioned by the Department of Health. These provide the only comprehensive 
estimates of the number o f (voluntarily) registered CAM practitioners in the UK. In 1999 
there were an estimated 49,000 CAM practitioners, up from 40,000 in 1997, though it was 
thought that the true number might exceed 60,000 (Mills and Budd, 2000). The numbers o f 
practitioners of acupuncture, chiropractic, homeopathy and osteopathy grew steadily 
between 1997 and 1999 (up nearly 40%). The numbers o f less well-established therapies 
such as Ayurveda more than doubled.
In osteopathy and chiropractic registration is now mandatory. The GCC had 1,950 
registrants and the GOsC 3,451 registrants at 20 January 2004 (Department of Health, 
2004a). This compares to the 203,398 registrants of the GMC (Allsop, Jones et al., 2004).
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Before statutory regulation, the King’s Fund Working Party on Osteopathy identified eight 
registering bodies with an estimated membership of 2,000 osteopaths, o f whom about 200 
were members of more than one organisation (King’s Fund, 1991). The chiropractic 
profession had less than 1,000 members, most of whom were covered by one of three 
voluntary registers (King’s Fund, 1993).
In acupuncture, herbal medicine and homeopathy where registration is voluntary estimates 
are more difficult. Many practitioners who practise multiple therapies may be listed on 
more than one register and several associations have more formal overlap o f membership.
The Department of Health estimated that a joint council for herbalists and acupuncturists 
would have a total of 3,700 registrants. The British Acupuncture Council (BAcC) currendy 
has over 2,500 registered acupuncturists (British Acupuncture Council, 2005). The Herbal 
Medicine Working Group based its cost estimates for a Herbal Council on the basis that 
1,300 herbal practitioners would register (Herbal Medicine Regulatory Working Group, 
2003, para 598). This may be a conservative estimate given that are between 1,000 and 
3,000 traditional Chinese medical practitioners, some of whom are members of small 
associations such as the Association of Traditional Chinese Medicine (about 400 members) 
(O'Farrell, 2004).
There has been growth in the number of non-medical homeopaths. The number of 
registrants with the Society o f Homeopaths grew from 41 shortly after its establishment in 
1981 to 165 in 1990, 708 in 1999 and 1476 in 2004 (Morrell, 1999; Council of 
Organisations Registering Homeopaths, 2003). Although the Society is the largest o f the 
registering bodies the Council for Organisations Registering Homeopaths (CORH) has 
nine other member organisations that register homeopaths. The Homeopathic Medical 
Association (250) and the Alliance of Registered Homeopaths (249) are the other largest 
registering bodies. The Association of Natural Medicine, the British Register of 
Complementary Practitioners, the International Register o f Consultant Herbalists and 
Homeopaths, the International Guild of Professional Practitioners, and the Fellowship of 
Homeopaths have less than 50 homeopathic members each (Council o f Organisations 
Registering Homeopaths, 2003). Besides the numbers of registered practitioners there are 
other indicators of growth.
An analysis of entries in the Yellow pages between 1992 and 2002 showed that seven out 
of the ten classifications with the largest increase in entries were in professions catering for 
beauty and body image, alternative therapy and stress relief (Yell, 2004). Entries by 
aromatherapists grew by 5200 percent (the single largest classification change in the entire 
census, having first appeared in 1993), reflexology by 829 percent and the Alexander
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Technique by 724 percent. Chiropractors entries rose by 157 percent, herbalists by 123 
percent and acupuncture practitioners by 83 percent. These data do not necessarily 
represent actual growth in practitioner numbers but are indicative o f commercialisation of 
CAM practice.
Data on university-based courses also indicate growth in practitioner numbers. The 
number of students accepted to study complementary therapies3 grew by around nine 
percent per annum between 2002 and 2004 and by as much as 21 percent between 2004 
and 2005 (UCAS, 2006). However, the ratio of applications to acceptances fell over this 
period with only 2.4 applications for each place in 2005. These courses are easier to get on 
than other subjects allied to medicine. Table 2.1 shows the number o f CAM-related courses 
offered by higher education colleges and universities in the UK in 2005. The majority of 
courses lead to a Bachelor’s degree in science (BSc). Better data is needed on the number, 
length, and content of courses currently offered in further and higher education and 
through private course providers in order to develop appropriate regulation and course
accreditation.
Table 2.1 Number of courses available in UK higher education colleges and 
universities for five CAM therapies, 2007
Subject Number of courses available (details)
Acupuncture 9 (3-4 years full-time Hon BSc) often part of traditional Chinese medicine 
training
Chiropractic 3 (5 year full-time Hon M Chiro, 4 year full-time Hon BSc, 1 year full-time 
foundation year)
Herbal medicine 8 (3-4 years full-time Hon BSc with or without foundation)
Homeopathy 3 (3-4 years full-time Hon BSc with or without foundation)
Osteopathy 6 (4 year full-time Hon BSc, 5 year full-time Hon BOstMed, 4 year full-time 
Degree BOst)
Source: Author’s compilation using data from (UCAS, 2006)
There is anecdotal evidence that mono-therapeutic practice is in ascendance and multi- 
therapeutic practice in decline. The increasing demands of university courses and 
registration requirements mean that more practitioners specialise in a single therapy and 
work full time. There is also a perception that fewer practitioners work from home and 
instead work in commercial group practices. More than 20 years ago almost half of 
registered CAM practitioners whose primary practice was in one of six therapies 
(acupuncture, chiropractic, homeopathy, medical herbalism, naturopathy and osteopathy) 
practised a second therapy and a quarter practised a third therapy (Davies, 1984). In 1984 
the highest levels of full-time practice were among chiropractors and osteopaths (88% and
3 Based on the UCAS classification system (JACS) subject code for complementary medicine (B3) which includes osteopathy, 
chiropractic, chiropody, Chinese medicine, herbalism, acupuncture, aromatherapy, hypnotherapy and reflexology.
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86% respectively) and the lowest levels among acupuncturists and homeopaths (Davies, 
1984). It is likely that CAM therapies with less developed professional structures have 
higher levels o f part-time working.
2.43 Discussion
A large and increasing number of statutorily regulated health care professionals who work 
in the NHS practise CAM. There is currently no systematic record kept of training or 
practice o f CAM therapies by staff working within the NHS. The Kerr/Haslam Inquiry 
into cases of sexual abuse by psychiatrists actually recommended that:
procedures andpolicies should be put in place . . . to ensure that all N H S organisations are 
aware of the therapies being undertaken by all staff.. .[and specifically that] no member of 
the health care team should be permitted to use or pursue new or unorthodox treatments 
without discussion and approval by the team (such approval to be recorded in writing) 
(Department of Health, 2005c, p293).
It is not clear that NHS providers have put in place such policies. NHS providers that 
employ staff who practise CAM therapies on patients should consider the implications for 
clinical governance.
Existing data is limited to the number o f CAM practitioners. A more comprehensive 
census is needed which would collate data on the demographics (e.g. age and gender of the 
workforce), working terms and conditions (e.g. part-time, full-time, self-employed), setting 
'e.g. solo or group practice, co-located with conventional medical practice, community or 
jipatient), therapeutic range (e.g. mono-therapeutic vs. multi-therapeutic), geographical 
'ocation and income of CAM practitioners. Data of this sort would enhance understanding 
of the changing patterns of practice and the nature o f the workforce. Without such 
information it will be difficult to design regulation or estimate the costs and impacts of 
different options.
2.5 D iscussion
The widespread use of CAM by the population, and especially by people with diagnosed 
medical conditions, makes it all the more surprising that practitioners are largely 
unregulated. There are increasing numbers of CAM practitioners and growth is likely to 
continue given the expansion in higher education courses in complementary therapies. 
Commercial private schools and course providers will continue to offer more flexible 
training options where there is demand for these. These trends present a challenge for 
those who wish to see standards of training monitored and course providers accredited.
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Availability of CAM in primary care is increasing, and large numbers of statutorily regulated 
professionals are practising CAM within the NHS. The increased integration of CAM raises 
questions about the lack of regulation to which CAM practitioners are subjected, and the 
absence of standards of training for doctors, nurses, midwives and dentists practising 
CAM. The lack of regulation might also put some NHS providers in breach of their clinical 
governance requirements.
The majority of treatments are paid for out of pocket by users to independent practitioners. 
In some areas NHS purchasers have used their local flexibilities to provide access to 
integrated services or to fund referral to CAM practitioners. There remain large variations 
in access to CAM across the UK and between socio-economic groups. The lack of 
regulation means that many local NHS purchasers are reluctant to formalise availability of 
CAM services. Consumers and local purchasers must assure themselves of the quality and 
training of those they seek care from or contract with.
Given the size of the market in CAM services described here it is perhaps no surprising 
that the issue of regulation is firmly on the policy agenda. Patient demand is likely to grow 
in future and practitioner numbers to expand. In the next chapter we explore some of the 
regulatory options and how these might apply to the regulation of CAM practitioners. The 
chapter uses examples from other countries to illustrate some of the different approaches 
to the regulation of CAM.
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C h a p t e r  3
3 MODELS OF REGULATION
3.1 Introduction
The growth in the market for CAM services is not unique to the United Kingdom. The 
World Health Organization (WHO) estimated the global value of the trade in herbal 
medicines and other traditional and complementary medicinal products at over 
US$ 60 billion in 2003 (Bodeker, Ong et al., 2005). The indications are that use of 
practitioners is also widespread in other developed countries (Institut fur Demoskopie 
Allensbach, 2002; Eisenberg, 2003; Andrews and Boon, 2005). WHO has called on 
governments to implement national policies on traditional medicine and complementary 
medicine (World Health Organization, 2002, p5). Specifically, it has suggested that 
legislation and regulation for herbal products and practice of therapies be introduced, 
together with policies on the education, training and licensing o f providers. While some 
countries have had legislation in place for many years (e.g. Germany) others have only 
established the legal basis for the practice of CAM more recently (e.g. Norway). The 
approach taken in different countries varies.
There are a range of regulatory options available to policymakers. A number of authors 
have examined their application to health care in general (Saltman, Busse et al., 2002; 
Walshe, 2003) but not to the regulation of CAM practitioners. The main body of this 
chapter examines the range of strategies that could be adopted for the regulation of CAM 
practitioners. These are illustrated with examples of how regulation is applied in a number 
of countries.
The chapter begins with an overview of recent international developments in the regulation 
of CAM practitioners.4 It discusses the regulation o f CAM practice in Germany and 
Norway in more detail. Section 3.3 presents a framework of regulatory strategies. Each 
regulatory strategy identified in the framework is then examined in more detail in sections 
3.4 — 3.10 using examples from the UK and other countries to illustrate. We will return to 
these strategies in the concluding chapter where I discuss the regulatory options for 
policymakers in the UK.
4 Although there have been interesting developments in the regulation o f CAM products internationally particularly herbal 
medicines, the focus here is on practitioners.
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3.2 International experience
Recent regulatory activity in a number o f countries has generated information on and 
policy discussion about how other countries regulate CAM practitioners. In the mid-1990s 
the Australian government commissioned a review of occupational regulation o f CAM in a 
number of other countries (Bensoussan and Myers, 1996). In 2002 the Irish government 
commissioned a report which included an analysis of the regulation of CAM practitioners 
in a number o f countries (O’Sullivan, 2002). The most extensive published assessment of 
regulatory alternatives by policymakers in relation to CAM was conducted in Norway, prior 
to changes in the law which were introduced in 2003 (see below). There have also been two 
reports commissioned by the European Union (EU) on the legal aspects o f CAM 
(Monckton, 1998; Erdsal and CAM-CANCER Consortium, 2005).
In contrast to the UK where CAM practise has been ‘tolerated’ under common law, in 
countries with civil or Napoleonic law, unless explicitly permitted, the practice o f medicine 
has been illegal by anyone other than licensed medical practitioners. Legislative changes 
have been introduced in Netherlands (1998), Belgium (1999), Portugal (2003), and 
Denmark (2004). These have put CAM practitioners on a different legal footing. Germany 
has had a regulatory framework in place for many years for CAM practitioners as well as 
standards of education and training for conventional medical practitioners who practise 
CAM. These arrangements are discussed in more detail below together with Norway which 
has introduced legislation more recently.
3.2.1 Germany
In Germany use of CAM is widespread and somewhat more integrated with conventional 
medicine than in other European countries. Non-medical CAM practitioners 
(Heilpraktikerf are regulated by the state on the basis of the Heilpraktikergesefy which was 
introduced in 1939 and modified in 1974, 1997 and 2000. There are very few formal 
requirements for Heilpraktiker. In order to qualify for a licence the applicant must have 
completed primary education, have German or EU citizenship, must be at least 25 years of 
age, and must provide a clearance certificate and a medical certificate confirming that there 
is no indication of a physical or mental health problem or of drug abuse which would limit 
the applicant’s suitability to perform CAM.
No formal proof of qualification is needed, but applicants are required to pass an 
examination at a local public health office (which operates under the supervision o f the
5 The six leading Heilpraktiker associations have a combined membership of over 20,000, representing about 90% o f all 
Heilpraktiker (Fachverband Deutscher Heilpraktiker, 2006).
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respective federal state). Applicants must prove that they have sufficient knowledge and 
abilities to practise as Heilpraktiker,; but this mainly means that they have to show that their 
treatment does not negatively affect public health and that they know the legal limits to 
their practice (World Health Organization, 2001). Candidates are tested on basic clinical 
knowledge and skills, biomedical understanding of the body, and on legal regulation of 
their profession.
The law (Heilpraktikergeset^ ) specifies that applicants who wish to specialize in one form of 
CAM or Heilpraktiker who want to specialize after having obtained a licence should be 
tested on their knowledge of that specific therapy. However, there are few standards or 
rules which specify what knowledge is required. According to WHO estimates (2001) about 
ten percent of Heilpraktiker have never received any formal training in CAM.
In addition to CAM treatment, Heilpraktiker can offer a variety of basic medical services 
such as blood sugar tests and electrocardiograms. However, they are legally prohibited to 
prescribe prescription-only medicines, give or provide anaesthetics or narcotics, practice 
obstetrics or gynaecology, treat venereal diseases and diseases which require notification, 
issue death certificates, perform autopsies, or X-ray. The rationale behind this is to protect 
patients against fraud, malpractice and misleading information.
Since 2003, it is compulsory for medical faculties to include training in naturopathy and 
physical therapy in the curriculum (Dobos and Michaelsen, 2002). However, the 
compulsory training units are short (14 hours of seminars and 28 hours of lectures over 
two semesters). Doctors can also acquire specialist qualifications (Zmat%be%eichnungen) in 
acupuncture, allergology, naturopathy, physical therapy, balneology and special pain 
therapy. Training requirements are regulated in the Code of Training produced by the 
regional medical associations based on guidelines provided by the Federal Medical 
Association (Muster-Weiterbildungsverordnung). There is always a mandatory period of practice 
and an official curriculum of procedures and skills to be learnt (Dixon, Riesberg et al.,
2003). In naturopathy for example, doctors are required to undertake either six months 
training in a hospital specialized in CAM, or to work three months in a practice under the 
supervision of an office-based doctor with CAM specialization and participate in an 
additional 160 hours of seminars (Bundesarztekammer, 2005).
Doctors are only allowed to use a CAM title (e.g. acupuncturist, homeopathic doctor) if 
they hold the respective qualification. However, there are no legal restrictions on doctors 
offering any form of CAM without qualification. Doctors are liable for their actions and 
may be sued for malpractice by the patient. In cases of severe malpractice the Medical
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Chamber (Ar^tekammer), the self-regulatory body for doctors, may take legal action against 
a doctor.
3.2.2 Norway
The report prepared by the Norwegian government on the regulation of alternative 
medicine distinguished between negative regulation and positive regulation. Strategies 
considered under negative regulation included the application of criminal law or 
compensation law, the withdrawal o f licence/authorisation to practise, registration 
privilege, and supervision of professional activities. Examples o f positive regulations given 
were those that recognise and encourage certain activities, such as the right to register, 
opportunity to be accredited, right to reimbursement for patients, practitioners and 
businesses, and right to treatment. Finally, they identified what they termed ‘non legal 
measures’ which included educational measures (e.g. information bank, research and 
development programme), organisational measures (e.g. collaboration projects), and 
economic measures (e.g. financial support for production of information, for local 
government and county councils, for research and co-operative projects between 
alternative and conventional medicine) (Alternative Medicine Committee, 1998).
In 2003 the Norwegian government introduced new legislation to regulate CAM 
practitioners and abolished the prohibition of ‘quackery’. The Act No. 64 o f 27 June 2003 
relating to the alternative treatment of disease, illness etc., and regulations specifying its 
implementation, came into force in 2004. They provide a legal mechanism for registering 
voluntary self-regulatory bodies and their members. Previously under the Medical 
Quackery Act of 1936, the practice of medicine by anyone other than registered 
practitioners6 was illegal.
To qualify for registration, a practitioner must be a member of a professional organisation 
that is ‘approved’ by the Norwegian Directorate for Health and Social Affairs. In order to 
receive approval, associations must have education and training requirements, a code of 
ethics, and standards of practice. Provisions must also be in place regarding a practitioner’s 
duty to provide information to patients, protection of data, a patient’s right to complain, 
and sanctions against members. Associations are required to have at least 30 members and 
must be registered in the Central Coordinating Register for Legal Entities.
CAM practitioners do not need a licence to practise but practitioners are encouraged to 
register on a voluntary basis with the newly established Bronnoysund Register Center. Only 
those CAM practitioners who are registered may use the title ‘registered’. Applicants must
6 Since 1988 chiropractors are considered licensed health care personnel and are regulated under the Health Personnel Act.
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be either self-employed, employed by a registered employer, or a partner in a registered 
general partnership (registration refers to the status as a legal entity). They must also be 
insured for any financial liability to patients. In order to maintain registration members 
must submit documentary proof that they meet these requirements and pay an annual fee 
set by the Ministry of Health.
Sections 5-7 of the Act specify that CAM may only be practiced if the purpose of the 
treatment is to alleviate or moderate symptoms, the patient is old enough to give his 
consent to alternative treatment under the Patients’ Right Act, the treatment is authorized 
by a medical doctor, or if no other treatment is available. Under existing legislation CAM 
practitioners are not allowed to use controlled medications in treatment, surgery, injections, 
anaesthesia, and other methods of diagnosis and treatment restricted to physicians. Serious 
health hazards and diseases defined in the Communicable Disease Act are only to be 
treated by specific health personnel, such as doctors and nurses.
The new Act also requires that marketing of CAM be carried out in an objective and factual 
way and in a manner which helps to safeguard the patient’s safety. The therapist’s name, 
address, telephone number and other necessary contact information must be clear in any 
marketing.
These two examples illustrate that there are different ways in which the state can act to 
influence the actions and practice of CAM practitioners and conventional medical 
practitioners who practise CAM. The remainder of this chapter analyses a series of 
regulatory options and considers how they might apply to the regulation of CAM practice. 
Examples of regulations from the UK and elsewhere are used as illustrations.
3.3 Regulatory strategies
Regulation has been variously defined. Selznick (1985) defines regulation as “sustained and 
focused control exercised by a public agency over activities which are valued by a 
community” suggesting it is more than legislation (Selznick, 1985). Baldwin and Cave 
(1999) identify three ways regulation can be understood:
i) as a specific set o f commands;
ii) as deliberate state influence
iii) as all forms of social control or influence (Baldwin and Cave, 1999).
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The definition of regulation used here is close to (ii) above, that is actions taken by the state 
intended to influence the behaviour o f independent actors (in this case CAM practitioners). 
Regulation may seek to influence who is able to practise (licensing), the titles they use, how 
they advertise and market their services (false claims), the quality o f education and training 
(accreditation), the quality of the services they provide (trading standards), how they 
interact with patients (codes of ethics and practice), the price they charge, and the 
information they provide to consumers (disclosure).
In order to examine the range of regulatory options and how they apply to CAM 
practitioners I use the following classification: command and control, self-regulation, 
incentives, market harnessing, disclosure, direct action, rights and liabilities, and public 
compensation (Baldwin and Cave, 1999). Table 3.2 provides an overview of the regulatory 
strategies with examples for illustrative purposes. As was discussed above other countries 
have adopted different regulatory strategies. These examples, together with those from the 
UK, are used to illustrate the eight different approaches to regulation set out in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 Regulatory strategies and their application to the regulation of CAM
practitioners
Strategy Example
Command and control (legislative rules) Anyone who has not completed a medical degree is 
prohibited from practising medicine including CAM.
All CAM practitioners are required to have personal 
liability insurance by law or face penalties/sanctions.
Self-regulation CAM practitioners establish a professional body which 
defines and enforces standards of practice.
Incentives Professional fees and tuition costs for accredited 
courses paid by CAM practitioners are tax deductible.
Market harnessing controls Public purchasers specify standards in contracts with 
CAM practitioners.
Disclosure All CAM practitioners required to display valid certificate 
of insurance.
Direct action CAM training courses are state sponsored
Rights and liabilities laws The patient has a  right to a duty of care. Consumers 
can sue a  CAM practitioner for negligence.
Public compensation No fault liability scheme for anyone harmed by 
treatment given by registered CAM practitioners.
3.4 Com mand and control
Command and control regulation can be understood as “The exercise of influence by 
imposing standards backed by criminal sanctions” (Baldwin and Cave, 1999, p35). 
Regulation in this context may be enabling (i.e. demand certain positive action to be taken)
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or prohibitive (i.e. make certain activities illegal). In relation to professionals legislation may 
be used to protect designated tides, limit the use of reserved procedures, require 
registration or to provide legal backing to disciplinary codes.
In several European countries the practice o f CAM by non-medically qualified practitioners 
is illegal. These systems have been classified as monopolistic (Monckton, 1998; Bodeker 
and Kronenberg, 2002) or exclusive (World Health Organization, 2002). Recently, 
prohibitive regulation has been replaced in a number of these countries by a more 
permissive regulatory environment. For example, the practice of CAM was decriminalized 
in the Netherlands in 1998 following the Health Care Profession Bill 1993. In 1999 the 
Government o f Belgium adopted a law recognizing homeopathy, chiropractic, osteopathy 
and acupuncture, and which allows for the addition of other CAM therapies in future. In 
2003 Norway passed legislation to permit the practice o f medicine by registered CAM 
practitioners, though with some limits. The Portuguese parliament passed legislation in July 
2003 to regulate the practice o f acupuncture, homeopathy, osteopathy, naturopathy, 
phytotherapy and chiropractic, which had previously been illegal for non-medical 
professionals (Erdsal and CAM-CANCER Consortium, 2005). Prohibition of the practice 
of medicine other than by registered health professionals remains in force in Austria, 
France, Italy and Spain, although in most countries CAM practitioners operate without 
prosecution (Erdsal and CAM-CANCER Consortium, 2005).
The Medical Act 1858 and its subsequent revisions did not prohibit the practice of 
medicine in the UK but only the use of the title ‘registered medical practitioner’. However, 
a number of general laws in force in the UK have implications for the practice of CAM. 
The following were highlighted by the Department of Health in their submission to the 
House of Lords’ Select Committee (Department of Health, 2000b):
•  The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974: duty to ensure the health and 
safety of people affected by activities undertaken on premises;
•  The Food Safety Act 1990: controls the sale and supply o f non-medical 
products for human consumption;7
• Trade Descriptions Act 1968 and Consumer Protection Act 1987: apply to 
professions making claims for the goods or services they sell;
•  Charities and Companies Acts (if they are registered as charities or limited 
companies or both);
7 The implementation o f the EU Directive on Traditional medicinal products into UK law means that some products 
previously regulated under the Food Safety Act are now considered medicines.
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•  London Local Authorities Act 1991 requires the licensing o f premises used 
for activities which include acupuncture, massage, and other special 
treatments;
•  Cancer Act 1939 and other similar legislation: prohibit non-medically 
qualified individuals from prescribing controlled drugs, claiming to cure or 
in some cases treat specific illnesses and medical conditions (e.g. cancer, 
diabetes, epilepsy, glaucoma, tuberculosis and venereal diseases), and from 
performing specific medical acts such as abortion.
In addition, the Osteopaths Act 1993 and the Chiropractors Act 1994 created the General 
Osteopathic Council (GOsC) and the General Chiropractic Council (GCC) respectively. 
Legislation requires that they maintain a register, gives legal backing to disciplinary 
procedures and provides protection of titles.
3.4.1 Protection o f title
Legislation can be used to restrict the use of designated or protected titles to certain 
professionals who meet defined statutory requirements. Also called ‘certification’, it has 
been defined as when:
some authority or agenty is empowered by statute to certify individuals to the public as 
having satisfied particular educational and training requirements judged...to indicate 
competence in a particular range of professional services... [it] typically involves exclusive 
legal appropriation of a generic occupational description, usually in conjunction with such a 
term as ‘registered’ or ‘certified’ (Wof son, Trebilcock et al, 1980, p203).
Anyone using the reserved or protected title who does not meet the specified requirements 
can be prosecuted. Protection of title overcomes problems of information asymmetry, 
where patients have less information than the provider does about the quality o f the service 
or at least the qualifications of the provider. Consumers can be confident that a practitioner 
using the protected title meets the required standards o f training. In contrast to licensing 
(see 3.4.3 below) it allows free entry to the market for uncertified practitioners. This may 
have advantages in ensuring a competitive market but if the costs o f error are high, as they 
are in health care, certification may not provide a sufficient guarantee of quality (Wolfson, 
Trebilcock et al., 1980). There are a number of examples o f the use of protected titles in 
relation to CAM practitioners. Both ‘osteopath’ and ‘chiropractor’ are protected in the UK, 
the title o f ‘Chinese medicine practitioner’ is restricted in Hong Kong, and only doctors
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who have taken formal qualifications may use the title o f ‘acupuncture doctor’ or 
‘homeopathic doctor’ in Germany.
Tides are often reserved for use by ‘registered’ or ‘certified’ practitioners. In Norway, it is 
the association rather than the individuals that are registered in law (see 3.2.2 above). 
Individual members of the ‘approved’ associations may then apply for registration (on a 
voluntary basis) in order to call themselves a ‘certified’ practitioner. A similar model was 
implemented in Denmark in June 2004 and is being introduced in Ireland following the 
recommendations of the National Working Group on the Regulation o f Complementary 
Therapists (Erdsal and CAM-CANCER Consortium, 2005; Department of Health and 
Children, 2006).
3.4.2 Reserved procedures
The concept of reserved procedures refers to procedures that may only be performed by 
categories o f professionals authorised to do so by law. The performance of these acts 
without authorisation is a criminal offence. This is often referred to as regulation of the 
scope of practice, or protection of function. In most countries there are reserved 
procedures for doctors or other registered health professionals. These commonly include 
prescription and administration of drugs, death certification and other official 
administrative duties, surgical and obstetric procedures (including abortion), treatment of 
venereal or communicable diseases, administration of anaesthetics, X rays, and other 
diagnostic procedures.
There are a few examples of where CAM practitioners have reserved procedures. In 
Denmark CAM providers are not permitted to use needles except under the supervision of 
an allopathic physician (Erdsal and CAM-CANCER Consortium, 2005). In the UK the use 
of powerful herbal medicines (as defined under SI 1977/2130) was restricted to ‘herbal 
practitioners’, though this term was not defined, making the law difficult to enforce 
(McIntyre, 2001). These rules have been amended by subsequent legislation which 
implements the EU Directive on traditional herbal medicinal products (2004/24/EQ  into 
UK law (SI 2005/2750; SI 2005/2745; SI 2006/395). Under Section 12(1) of the Medicines 
Act 1968 herbalists are also permitted to make up unlicensed herbal remedies to meet the 
needs of individual patients following a consultation. Again, because herbalists are not 
defined in law it has not been possible to enforce this as a reserved procedure.
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3.43 Licensure
Market entry of providers can be controlled through the issuing o f licences that require 
certain standards to be met. Licences can be rescinded after a certain period or if a 
complaint against the provider is upheld. The law may require someone to hold a licence in 
order to undertake a particular activity (such as a driving licence) or consume a particular 
good or service (such as a TV licence). Licensure is used in relation to the supply of goods 
or services to limit the number of entrants in to a particular market. Licences may be issued 
for a product, a provider or the premises where the provider operates.
Legislation may require that the names of all those individuals wishing to provide a 
particular service are entered in a register. Entry to the profession can thus be controlled, in 
essence de-barring non-registered practitioners. By giving registered practitioners an 
exclusive right to practise, this in effect creates a system of licensure.
Because of the legal situation in the UK, CAM practitioners may freely practise medicine 
without a licence under common law. Practitioners are required to register in order to use 
protected titles (see above). In other countries, CAM practitioners are required to obtain a 
licence in order to practise by either passing a licensing exam or holding a recognised 
qualification. For example the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare in Japan issues 
licences to CAM practitioners who pass a national examination after graduating from an 
accredited school or training institution. In China practitioners have to pass a licensing 
exam designed by the Health Department and administered in the provinces. On successful 
completion of the exam the local health department issues a certificate which specifies any 
limits to the scope of practice, and permits the practitioner to practise within that area. In 
Germany, as we have seen, to be licensed as a Heilpraktiker practitioners must pass an exam 
at one of the public health offices which operate under the supervision of the states 
{Lander).
Some registering bodies require re-licensing or re-certification by providing proof of 
participation in continuing medical education. Chiropractors in Alberta, Canada, have to 
provide proof of participation in continuing education every three years in order to 
maintain their licence to practise.
In England, many local authorities have enacted bylaws which require the premises in 
which acupuncturists practise be licensed, usually under the same regulations which require 
tattooists to be licensed. The British Acupuncture Council (BAcC) publishes a Code of 
Safe Practice which some local authorities use as the basis o f their standards (British 
Acupuncture Council, 2004a).
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3.4.4 Disciplinary procedures
In many countries the responsibility for setting standards, monitoring compliance and 
disciplining practitioners is delegated to a self-regulating body (see 3.5 below).
The disciplinary procedures may, however, have legal backing and be linked to certification 
or licensing. Often disciplinary procedures for sanctioning practitioners who fail to meet 
standards are only exercised in extreme cases o f professional misconduct or in response to 
an allegation of misconduct. The sanctions available range from warnings, suspension or 
removal from a register or removal o f licence. I f  a violation is serious the matter may be 
referred to the police and enforced through the courts using fines or even imprisonment. 
Standards may be monitored using information from consumer complaints, inspection, 
peer review or practice audit (Wolfson, Trebilcock et al., 1980).
In the UK, both the GOsC and the GCC will invoke a disciplinary process if a practitioner 
receives a criminal conviction or is accused of unacceptable professional conduct. They will 
also investigate cases where a practitioner is believed to be professionally incompetent or 
whose physical or mental condition impairs practice or makes them unable to practise 
properly (Allsop, Jones et al., 2004). The process for screening complaints, investigating 
and adjudicating on cases differs among statutory regulators. Both the GCC and the GOsC 
have recourse to a range of sanctions including erasure or suspension from the register, 
conditional registration or giving a warning/caution to the registrant (Allsop, Jones et al.,
2004). In Norway, CAM practitioner associations seeking registration are required to have 
in place statutes which include ethical rules and professional responsibilities.
3.5 Self-regulation
Self-regulation is when a group of individuals (or firms) exert control over the behaviour 
and activities of their membership, or when an organisation or association develops “a 
system of rules that it monitors and enforces against its own members” (Baldwin and Cave, 
1999, p39). There are a number of ways in which approaches to self-regulation vary:
• Level of state intervention: self-regulation may be subject to government 
oversight or structuring;
• Legal enforcement of standards and rules: regulation may operate in an 
informal, non-binding and voluntary manner or may involve rules which are 
enforceable in a court of law (Baldwin and Cave, 1999, p i 26);
• Extent o f functional delegation: all or only some regulatory functions may 
be delegated to the self-regulating body;
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•  Scope of application: regulations may apply to all those in the sector or only 
those who join an association voluntarily.
In countries where the practice of CAM is not illegal for non-licensed practitioners, there 
are numerous voluntary professional associations which set and monitor standards of 
practice, including codes of ethics. In Victoria, Australia there is consensus that standards 
o f practice for conventional health care practitioners who incorporate CAM therapies into 
their practice should be established through guidelines and codes of practice rather than 
legislation. In the UK, there is a bewildering array of voluntary professional associations 
purporting to represent CAM practitioners most of which set some requirements for 
membership (see Chapter 4).
Baldwin and Cave (1999) identify a number of ways in which governments might constrain 
self-regulation: statutory rules, oversight by a governmental agency, systems in which 
ministers approve or draft rules, procedures for public enforcement of self-regulatory rules 
and mechanisms of participation or accountability (Baldwin and Cave, 1999, p i26). 
Statutory self-regulation can be characterised as the establishment of an independent 
agency (the regulator) whose rules of operation are set down in statute, whose membership 
is dominated by representatives of the providers, and whose decisions are subject to appeal 
in the courts or another superior public agency (Ogus, 2002). Statutory self-regulation has 
also been called “enforced self-regulation” (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992, pplOl-132).
Self-regulation is found in a number o f sectors, including the press (e.g. Press Complaints 
Commission), financial services (e.g. Financial Services Authority), and advertising (e.g. 
Advertising Standards Authority) (Baldwin and Cave, 1999, p i25). Professional groups 
such as lawyers and teachers have also traditionally enjoyed devolved responsibilities for 
regulating their own affairs. Wolfson, Trebilcock et al. (1980) argued that the decision to 
delegate the administration of regulation to professionals should only occur if there are 
“high costs of error, information, and enforcement and a need to reinforce trust between 
practitioners and clients” (Wolfson, Trebilcock et al., 1980, p212). It is not evidence that 
these all hold in the case of CAM practitioners.
Internationally enforced or statutory self-regulation has been almost universally applied to 
medical practitioners. The relationship between state and profession which relies on trust 
has come under increasing strain as information on performance has become more widely 
available and both the costs and quality of services subject to greater scrutiny (Tuohy, 
2003). Statutory self-regulation is also the most common model of regulation for CAM 
practitioners internationally.
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Statutory self-regulating bodies for specific CAM therapies have been established in the 
UK (the GOsC and the GCQ, Hong Kong (the Chinese Medicine Council), India (the 
Central Council of Indian Medicine and the Central Council o f Homoeopathy), and 
Singapore (the Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners Board). Ghana (in 2000) and 
South Africa (in 2004) have both introduced legislation to establish umbrella statutory 
councils to register and license traditional health practitioners (Dixon, 2007 forthcoming).
3.6 Incentives
The use of financial incentives by the state to affect the behaviour of individuals, groups or 
firms can be seen as a form of regulation. This is usually through the imposition of 
negative or positive taxes, or by deploying grants and subsidies from the public purse 
(Baldwin and Cave, 1999, p42). Negative taxes would be the levying of higher taxes on a 
good or service in order to reduce the demand for that good or service. Positive taxes are 
used to encourage activities that are seen as socially beneficial, ensuring levels of 
consumption of goods or services with positive externalities, or lowering financial barriers 
to items which are necessary or essential goods. Positive taxes can be in the form of tax 
allowances (an amount of income or expenditure exempted from tax), tax relief 
(expenditure allowed to be deducted from gross income before tax is charge), or a tax 
credit (a deduction form an individual’s or household’s tax liability) (Commission on 
Taxation and Citizenship, 2000, p259).
There is little information available on the extent to which incentives are used to influence 
the behaviour of providers or consumers o f CAM services. In some countries, out-of- 
pocket health care expenditures are tax deductible. It is possible that if a broad definition 
of ‘health care’ is used that money spent on consultations with CAM practitioners could be 
included. In the UK membership fees to join professional associations are tax deductible, 
as are the fees paid to statutory regulators, so CAM practitioners are able to benefit from 
these subsidies.
3.7 Market harnessing controls
There are a number of regulatory mechanisms which use the market to effect the 
behaviour of firms, rather than impose bureaucratic controls. These include competition 
laws, franchising, tradable permits and contracting. Neither franchising nor tradable 
permits are directly applicable to the CAM market. Franchising is used in naturally 
monopolistic markets such as broadcasting and railways. Tradable permits are generally
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used to limit the overall number of producers, thus creating a market in permits. Licensure 
is used to control access to the market in professional services (discussed above).
3.7.1 Competition laws
Competition laws may be used to ensure sufficient competition in order that adequate 
services are provided, or to prevent anti-competitive behaviour particular in monopolistic 
or oligopolistic markets. The enforcement of these laws usually relies on court actions 
being brought by other firms or by government competition authorities.
In most countries, as in the UK, practitioners are self-employed or operate as small 
businesses so the market tends to be highly competitive. However, the creation of a single 
register controlled by the profession together with protection o f title means that the 
profession holds a de facto monopoly o f services. There have been a number of 
investigations and reports by competition authorities into the market for professional 
services in the UK (Monopolies Commission, 1970; Office of Fair Trading, 2003). A self- 
imposed advertising ban by registered medical practitioners was challenged by the 
competition authority (Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1989a) as were restrictions 
on advertising by professionally registered osteopaths (Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission, 1989b). The Commission recommended that:
advertisements should be in accordance with the principles of the British Code of Advertising 
Practice, should contain nothing which would reasonably be regarded as likely to bring the 
profession into disrepute, and should not be such as to abuse the trust ofpotential patients 
or exploit their lack of knowledge (Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1989b).
The GOsC has followed these recommendations and included in its code of practice that 
“All advertising must be legal, decent, honest and truthful and must conform to the current 
guidance, such as the British Code of Advertising Practice” (General Osteopathic Council, 
2005). The GCC has issued similar guidance (General Chiropractic Council, 2005a).
3.7.2 Regulation by contract
Contracts between the government (or its agencies) and private parties can be used to 
achieve certain regulatory objectives. By using their spending power and specifying terms 
and conditions in contracts they are able to exercise control over the activities of private 
parties (Baldwin and Cave, 1999, p46). In addition patients enter contracts with private 
providers of services and employers enter into employment contracts with employees, all 
of which are legally enforceable.
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Practitioners who are regulated or licensed are not automatically eligible for reimbursement 
from public or private insurers. Contracts with providers and with members (i.e. insurance 
policies) can be used to determine the requirements that must be met in order for CAM 
practitioners to be eligible for payment. In the USA both public and private insurers specify 
limits to the amount, type o f benefit or type of provider (e.g. only medical doctors who 
also provide acupuncture) which they cover (Dower, 2003). Despite chiropractors being 
licensed in every state, about 50 percent o f health maintenance organisations and 75 
percent of private health insurance plans cover chiropractic services (Meeker and 
Haldeman, 2002). Public insurers also use their purchasing power to specify what services 
are eligible for reimbursement. For example Medicare cover includes chiropractic and 
massage therapy for back trouble, and biofeedback for muscle re-education. Acupuncture 
is currently under consideration (Bodeker, Ong et al., 2005).
In Germany sickness funds only reimburse visits to a doctor not to a Heilpraktiker, the 
exception being partial reimbursement of some Heilpraktiker costs by the state-run financial 
assistance scheme for public officials including teachers, policemen, etc. Many private 
insurance plans cover visits to a Heilpraktiker and complementary insurance packages may 
offer coverage for naturopathy including Heilpraktiker treatment.
In England, Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) are currently responsible for purchasing services 
and holding contracts with providers, including with homeopathic hospitals and with 
integrated primary health care providers, where these exist. In addition, some NHS 
providers have employment contracts with CAM practitioners. A patient who buys 
treatment from or pays for a consultation with a CAM practitioner in the private sector 
enters a contractual relationship which is legally enforceable (Department of Health, 2000b, 
pi 04).
3.8 Disclosure
Rules governing disclosure, data protection, confidentiality and content of information (in 
particular advertising, labelling and marketing) are all well-established regulatory tools. 
Regulation concerning the disclosure of information may be either prohibitive or enabling. 
For example, regulation might prohibit the disclosure of misleading or false information, or 
require mandatory disclosure of information to consumers on price, composition, quantity, 
or quality. Rather than requiring producers to disclose information the government, 
regulator, or consumer associations may provide information to consumers directly (see 
below).
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Prohibition of false marketing claims for health products and services apply to CAM 
practitioners. In Germany regulations prohibit Heilpraktiker from claiming to treat 
communicable diseases. In Norway, regulations for advertising by CAM practitioners were 
set out in new government regulations. In the UK, under the Cancer Act 1939 it is a 
criminal offence to ‘advertise’ (by any written or oral statement) offering to treat, to 
provide a remedy for, or to give any advice in connection with the treatment o f cancer 
(Trading Standards Institute, 2006). In addition the Advertising Standards Authority 
upholds a voluntary code of practice (the British Code of Advertising, Sales Promotion and 
Direct Marketing) which contains specific rules governing health claims.
Positive disclosure acts are also common. Practitioners may be required to disclose 
sufficient information to the patient to enable them to make a fully informed choice. In the 
UK any health professional, including CAM practitioners, should disclose information 
regarding risks, possible side effects and treatment alternatives, and gain specific consent 
for procedures which are more intrusive (Stone and Matthews, 1996, ppl78-9).
Regulations may also require CAM practitioners to publish information on qualifications 
held, length o f training, membership of any professional bodies, price o f services, or proof 
o f valid insurance cover for liability. Such information may be deemed important to ensure 
that consumers can compare services and judge the quality of the service being provided. 
In Portugal registered CAM practitioners are required to display information concerning 
the price, duration and prognosis of therapies (Erdsal and CAM-CANCER Consortium,
2005).
3.9 Direct action
The direct provision of goods or services using government resources is common for 
public goods (that is goods and services which have large externalities and are non-rival and 
non-excludable). In some countries health care has been provided under this model, 
whereby the state owns the facilities and employs those who provide health care services. 
In the UK, CAM services are not usually provided in this way. An exception are 
homeopathic services which were nationalised when the NHS was established in 1946, (see 
Chapter 2). In China, Korea and Vietnam traditional systems of medicine are fully 
integrated as part of the public systems of health care (Bodeker and Kronenberg, 2002; 
World Health Organization, 2002).
Another form of direct action is the provision of public education. Courses may be 
provided directly through state funded universities or higher education programmes. The 
quality of the training provided is usually subject to external standards, accreditation and
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inspection. For example in Japan all institutions and colleges providing CAM training must 
be authorized either by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare or the Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.
The government may also provide information directly to patients and the public. The 
Department of Health in England has funded a patient guide to complementary therapy by 
the Foundation for Integrated Health (Pinder, 2005). Otherwise consumer organisations 
are the main source of independent information about CAM practitioners, providing 
information on where to find a qualified practitioner and what questions to ask (Which?, 
1999).
3.10 Rights and liabilities laws
This form of regulation works by distributing rights to consumers and giving providers 
associated liabilities. The potential costs o f damages act as a deterrent to harmful activities. 
Insurance against damages may reduce the incentive of the providers to comply, as they 
will not face the costs of potential damages. However, if the costs of insurance are very 
high it is more likely that cases will have to resort to the law, and damages be paid by the 
producer.
Under common law in the UK, all practitioners have a duty of care towards their patients 
(Department of Health, 2000b, p i 04). A patient therefore has the right to sue a practitioner 
for negligence. In such a case a patient must prove that the practitioner owed the patient a 
duty of care, that this was breached, and as a result the patient suffered (Stone and 
Matthews, 1996). There is, however, a dearth of specific CAM-related case law. This may 
be due to the low number of cases that are taken to court (practitioners would rather settle 
out of court), or because of other factors which make CAM practice less litigious. Possible 
reasons might include the high levels of trust between patient and practitioner, low 
occurrence of adverse outcomes, or the difficulties of establishing the burden o f proof that 
a particular outcome was caused by a specific treatment.
Even if a patient is successfully able to sue, if no assets are held they will not receive any 
compensation. Insurance is mandatory for CAM practitioners in Iceland, Norway, 
Portugal, and Sweden.
3.11 Public com pensation
These are no fault liability schemes under which the complainant gives up the right to sue 
in return for compensation. The aim of these schemes is to reduce litigation costs. No 
specific examples were identified relating to CAM.
54
3.12 D iscussion
This chapter has identified a vast range of regulatory options available to policymakers 
which could be used to regulate CAM practitioners. Regulation is commonly understood to 
involve legislative action or use of other statutory instruments by the state. Employing a 
broader definition has highlighted the way in which governments can also use their 
economic power, for example through tax incentives, contracting or direct action, and can 
control or encourage the provision of information through rules o f disclosure. Many of 
these other strategies are used to regulate the practice of CAM in other countries. In the 
UK CAM practitioners are subject to the provisions of general regulations but these 
strategies have not been used specifically to regulate CAM. As we shall see in subsequent 
chapters, policymakers have limited debate to the introduction o f statutory self-regulation 
for specific CAM practitioners. It is puzzling that given the potential of some o f these 
alternative strategies they have not been given due consideration.
There is a wealth o f international experience of how to regulate CAM practitioners. Several 
countries, including Norway, which have either introduced or plan to introduce legislation 
to legalise and regulate the practice of medicine by non-medical practitioners established 
Commissions or independent reviews to examine international experience. It is surprising 
that neither the House of Lords’ Sub-Committee nor the UK government commissioned 
any systematic exploration of approaches to the regulation of CAM practitioners in other 
countries to inform its deliberations and proposals.
While examples from other countries are useful to demonstrate the possibilities, direct 
translation o f such regulations is unlikely to prove successful. CAM traditions vary widely 
between countries, even within Europe. For example anthroposophic medicine is widely 
practised in both Germany and the Netherlands while in the UK it remains a minority 
therapy not usually included as a distinct category in surveys. The legal status o f CAM 
practitioners also reflects the wider legal system. In countries with civil or Napoleonic law 
unless explicidy permitted in law the practice of medicine is illegal for anyone other than 
medical practitioners. In contrast in countries with common law traditions the legal 
environment has historically been more permissive o f CAM practise. Models o f regulation 
must therefore be consistent with the general legal structure, and historical and cultural 
norms.
I come back to consider some of these alternative strategies in the concluding chapter. The 
next chapter reviews the historical development of professional regulation in the UK and 
how this has shaped the regulation of CAM.
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C h a p t e r  4
4 TH E HISTORY OF HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONAL
REGULATION
4.1 Introduction
The recent history o f the regulation of complementary and alternative medical (CAM) 
practitioners examined in this study is the latest chapter in a story which stretches back at 
least to the mid-IQ* century. Prior to the 1850s provision of health care in Britain was not 
formally regulated by the state (Porter, 1989). There were many small-scale business 
entrepreneurs practising medicine and charging for their services. Medical pluralism 
flourished. As Lindemann (1999) observed:
The landscape literally swarmed with them [practitioners] in every conceivable form: 
physicians, surgeons, midwives, cunning folk, bone setters, dentists, Uthotomists, 
hathmasters, apothecaries, pastors and ordinary people who busied themselves with medicine 
either as part of their normal household chores or as expressions of good neighbourliness 
(Lindemann, 1999).
At this time the term ‘quack’ was commonly used to refer to those who peddled miracle 
cures at exorbitant prices (Porter, 1983). Later it would come to be applied to anyone 
practising medicine outside the medical orthodoxy o f biomedicine (Wahlberg, 2005).
The Medical Act 1858 granted statutory powers to doctors to self-regulate their profession. 
Prior to this the Royal Colleges had exercised regulatory powers over their members, but 
membership was voluntary. The Act did not restrict the common law right to practise 
medicine and CAM therapies continued to flourish. Despite efforts to prevent other health 
care occupations from securing similar legal protections pharmacists, dentists, opticians, 
nurses and midwives, and professions allied to medicine successfully gained statutory 
regulation over the course of the 20th century. It was not until the early 1990s that any 
complementary medical practitioners gained statutory regulation.
The events studied here did not come out of the blue, but followed on from earlier 
attempts to gain statutory regulation by the osteopaths, the chiropractors and the herbalists. 
Before providing an account of the experiences of each of the five therapies to be 
examined in this study - acupuncture, chiropractic, herbal medicine, homeopathy and 
osteopathy - the chapter highlights the main events in the history of health care 
professional regulation.
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Section 4.2 briefly summarises the experience of the medical profession in 1858 in 
overcoming differences within the profession between the elites represented by the Royal 
Colleges and the provincial practitioners. Section 4.3 traces the struggles that other health 
care practitioners experienced to achieve their own legislative protections in the face o f 
medical opposition. Finally Section 4.4 provides an account o f the activities o f CAM 
practitioners prior to the 1990s and identifies the key historical milestones in their 
development as a profession.
4.2 H istory o f m edical regulation
4.2.1 The Royal Colleges
In the period prior to the Medical Act 1858 voluntary self-regulation was dominant The 
Royal College of Physicians in London was created by Royal Charter in 1518 by Henry 
VIII. By 1550 there were three corporations in London: the Society of Apothecaries, the 
Barber-Surgeons Company, and the College of Physicians, which flourished or faded 
depending on monarchical patronage (Lindemann, 1999). The Royal College of Physicians 
London served a number of purposes as a learned society, a representative organisation, 
and a sanctioning agency (against malpractice and illicit practice). In this early period o f 
regulation physicians used the Parish Constable to enforce rules and impose sanctions, 
stating that “none shall practice Physick without License of the College, on pain of 
forfeiting five pounds a Month”. Exemption was made for “Persons having Knowledge in 
Herbs, etc.” who were permitted to treat sores and administer oral medicines (Fox, 2002).
The Royal Colleges also specified the expected standards o f knowledge and training 
required by practitioners. For example the Royal Charter of the Barber-Surgeons of 
Edinburgh in 1506 stated:
... that no manner of person occupy or practise any points of our said craft of surgery... 
unless he be worthy and expert in all points belonging to the said craft\ diligently and 
expertly examined and admitted ly the Maisters of the said craft and that he know 
Anatomy and the nature and complexion of every member of the human body... for every 
man ocht to know the nature and substance of everything that he works or else he is 
negligent (cited in Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh, 2005).
Royal colleges have continued to play a significant role in ensuring the standards of 
training. Since September 2005 the Postgraduate Medical Education and Training Board 
has assumed some o f these responsibilities (Department of Health, Scottish Executive et 
al., 2003).
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Despite the strength of the Royal Colleges many practitioners continued to practise 
medicine outside the scope of the Colleges. An early challenge to the Royal Colleges came 
from an apothecary. In 1704 the House of Lords ruled in favour of William Rose and 
deemed that apothecaries could also practice medicine though they were not permitted to 
charge for attendance so depended on the drugs they dispensed for their income (this is 
explored further below) (Lindemann, 1999). As Lindemann notes, “members o f medical 
corporations by no means monopolized (or even dominated) the medical marketplace. 
Literally thousands o f non-corporate practitioners thrived” (Lindemann, 1999, p i 74).
4.2.2 The Medical Act 1858
As we shall see in later chapters the lack o f consensus among CAM practitioners is often 
cited as a barrier to statutory regulation, yet the medical profession was not united prior to 
the achievement of statutory regulation (Muirhead Litde, 1932, p3). Disputes within the 
Company of Barber-Surgeons (established in 1540) resulted in the surgeons breaking away 
and forming the Company of Surgeons in 1745. Interests in statutory regulation were also 
divided between specialists and general practitioners, the elite based in London and doctors 
working in provincial towns and cities, and those trained at universities and those trained at 
private schools. This fragmentation within the profession resulted in lengthy debates prior 
to the Medical Act 1858.
The medical reform debate raged throughout the 1830-50s. The British Medical 
Association (BMA),8 originally founded as the Provincial Medical and Surgical Association 
in 1832, created the Medical Reform Committee to lobby on behalf of its members for a 
unified examining and licensing authority (Muirhead Little, 1932). The first Medical Reform 
Bill was introduced in 1840. It proposed that the tide ‘qualified medical practitioner’ be 
conferred only on those with qualifications in all the major branches of medicine. These 
proposals were opposed by the Royal Colleges who wanted to maintain specialist practice.
The Act to establish the General Council of Medical Education and Registration 
(shortened to the General Medical Council (GMC) in 1951) empowered nineteen 
universities and nine medical corporations (i.e. the Royal Colleges) to grant licences to 
practise medicine under the supervision of the GMC (Eckstein, 1960). The Act 
strengthened and unified the medical profession after several centuries o f internal divisions 
epitomised in the disputes between the Royal Colleges. As Stacey (1992) notes:
8 In the context o f professional regulation it is useful to note the difference between representative bodies and regulatory 
bodies. For example, the British Medical Association is the representative body acting as a trade union for doctors, 
whereas the General Medical Council is the regulatory body responsible for registering qualified practitioners.
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[The Act] led to the development of a self conscious occupation aiming for control of work 
situation and client, controlling its own labour supply and its own remuneration.. .the 
Council was in a position to establish standards of intraprofessional conduct backed up by 
disciplinary procedures, and thus to begin to develop a national ystem of medical ethics 
(Stacy, 1992, pp 18-19)
Entry to the register initially required an arts degree and four years o f professional practice. 
There were as many as 22 different diplomas permitting registration (in addition to the 
numerous domestic and overseas degrees permissible for those already in practice) (Chief 
Medical Officer o f England, 2006). These transitional arrangements permitted 
‘grandfathering’ enabling those who were currently practising to enter the register without 
having to re-qualify. In 1867 ten medical subjects were made obligatory for teaching and 
examination, but these only became mandatory for registration in 1886. The Medical Act 
1886 also established the requirement that registrants should have dual qualifications as a 
surgeon and physician.
The establishment o f the GMC and a medical register was a political victory for those in 
the medical profession who had lobbied for medical reform. Registration created a 
monopoly over public and statutory duties, with exclusive rights to work in government 
medical services and paved the way for greater political influence o f the medical profession 
(Eckstein, 1960). The Medical Act 1858 was a compromise between the interests of 
different factions within the medical profession. It was the beginning, rather than the 
culmination, of a process of consolidation and unification. Many changes in the 
constitution and responsibilities of the GMC have taken place through successive Medical 
Acts and Orders of the Privy Council, too numerous to detail here (see Stacey, 1992 for a 
fuller historical account of the GMC).
The Medical Act 1858 is portrayed in some historical accounts as a watershed that banished 
alternative medicine to the fringes and contributed to its decline. And yet it did not restrict 
the practice of medicine, only the use of the title ‘registered medical practitioner’. The 
demand for unqualified practitioners continued to flourish in part because those 
practitioners who had been educated in medicine at universities were not widely respected, 
and their practices were unaffordable and inaccessible to the majority of the population 
(Porter, 1989). Non-allopathic therapies continued to be practised both by registered 
medical practitioners and non-registered practitioners throughout this period. More recent 
accounts therefore reject the idea that CAM therapies went into decline during the late 19th 
century and early 20th century (Goldstein, 1999; Johnston, 2004). Such accounts are
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mirrored by histories of the medical profession which date its dominance not to the 
Medical Act 1858 but the NHS Act 1946 (Eckstein, 1960).
4.3 Statutory regulation o f other health care professionals
It is important to remember that at the turn of the 20th century, all practitioners providing 
health care to the public other than doctors were unregulated. Some authors contend that 
“The frontiers between orthodox and unorthodox medicine have [always] been 
flexible...So mobile have been their boundaries, that one age’s quackery has often become 
another’s orthodoxy” (Bynum 1987, cited in Lindemann, 1999). Put another way, today’s 
orthodoxy is yesterday’s quackery. According to Porter (1994):
The boundaries between fringe and core medicine have been contingent, fluid and
negotiable...the distinction between quackery and orthodoxy is essentially social. Quacks
are those doctors excluded from professionalpower andprivilege (Porter, 1994, p65).
Health care professionals that are accepted today as part of mainstream medicine were not 
always considered as such. The gradual extension of statutory regulation to other groups of 
health care practitioners during the 20th century has shaped the boundaries which today 
define what we consider to be complementary and alternative medicine. These brief 
accounts o f the efforts of midwives, nurses, dentists and apothecaries to gain statutory 
recognition provide some interesting parallels with the contemporary experience of CAM 
practitioners.
4.3.1 Midwives
The struggle between midwives and doctors over rights to attend births was fiercely 
contested in the 19th century. In some countries doctors successfully denied midwives their 
independent authority, but their subordination to the medical profession was resisted in the 
UK. This has been well-documented by Ward (1981) and the following draws heavily on 
that account. In 1872 the London Obstetrical Society introduced a certificate for midwives 
who could demonstrate minimum competence, but few women qualified. To rectify the 
situation the Matrons Aid or Trained Midwives’ Registration Society was established in 
1881 (later the Midwives’ Institute {1886} and the Royal College of Midwives {1947}). Its 
aims were to promote the training of midwives, maintain a register of certified midwives, 
and provide professional support. By 1886 the Institute was actively lobbying parliament 
for a Midwives Act and formed a sister organisation, The Association for Promoting the 
Compulsory Registration of Midwives, to facilitate the campaign. A draft bill was prepared 
and presented to parliament in 1890 but lack of interest among (male) politicians meant
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this and further attempts in subsequent years (1891, 1895, 1896, 1897, 1898, 1899 and 
1900) were given low priority in the ballot for Private Members’ Bills, or delayed, or 
defeated (Ward, 1981).
Despite opposition a House of Commons Select Committee was set up to look into the 
issue in 1892. In evidence the GMC supported registration and the report proposed the 
GMC draw up rules for the compulsory registration of midwives. There was a backlash 
from rank and file doctors, particularly provincial doctors, who relied on deliveries for a 
substantial part of their income. They coalesced into a more organized opposition and were 
successful in keeping the Act off the statute books. Medical opposition to the Bill 
culminated in widespread refusal to attend births following a midwife, even when there 
were complications, resulting in a series of maternal and child deaths. These cases received 
publicity in the press and catalysed public support for the situation to be resolved through 
parliamentary approval o f the Midwives Bill (Ward, 1981).
The Midwives Act passed in 1902 made it a criminal offence to practise midwifery without 
certification subject to a fine issued by the courts. A midwife was defined as one who 
practiced ‘habitually or for financial reward’ (this allowed the ‘friendly neighbour’ to attend 
a birth without fear o f prosecution) (Stevens, 2002). A ‘grandfathering’ clause allowed 
unqualified practice to continue until 1910 to enable sufficient midwives to gain training. 
The Central Midwives Board was responsible for maintaining the register, establishing the 
standards for entry to the register (including setting an examination), and had powers to 
remove a woman from the register. Any changes to its regulatory powers were subject to 
approval by the Privy Council (a concession to the midwives who opposed subordination 
to the GMC as proposed in earlier versions of the Bill). Until the establishment of the NHS 
local authorities were charged with the local supervision o f midwives and had to investigate 
allegations before referral to the Central Midwives Board (Stevens, 2002).
43.2 Nurses
The success of the Midwives Act 1902 galvanised the nursing profession. A bill to 
introduce state registration of nurses lay before Parliament annually between 1904 and 
1914. The historic events surrounding the statutory regulation o f nurses have been 
reported elsewhere (Abel-Smith, 1960) and are briefly summarised here.
The nurses were divided over proposals for state registration. The British Nurses 
Association (BNA) led by Mrs Bedford Fenwick thought nursing should only be for the 
daughters of the higher social classes. The BNA established a register where the minimum 
standard for entry was three years of training. Given that of 64,000 nurses in practice only
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20-25,000 had training it is not surprising that the membership of the BNA remained small. 
Meanwhile the Hospitals Association, Florence Nightingale and nursing matrons were 
against state registration. They wanted to ensure access to nursing for all social classes, 
secure recognition for practical training, and resist external interference. The war brought 
social changes, such as women’s right to vote, and saw untrained volunteers working as 
nurses. Concern among professional nurses about untrained nursing staff united them in 
demanding a register.
The Nurses Registration Act was passed in 1919 to establish a General Nursing Council. 
Disputes continued about the rules to admit existing nurses to the register. Consequently 
parliament intervened in 1923 shortly before the register was due to close. As Abel-Smith 
(1960) recounts:
Nearly every major decision in implementing the Nurses Registration A ct was taken not by 
the General Nursing Council but by the Minister of Health or the House of Commons. 
Parliament intervened to preserve the rights of unqualified nurses. The Minister refused to 
enforce the recommended syllabus of training (Abel-Smith, 1960, p113).
As a result of the divisions within the nursing profession the state had to play a proactive 
role in the regulatory process.
4.33 Dentists
Dentistry developed from a medical specialty and its regulation emerged gradually so was 
not opposed by the medical profession. In the early part of the 19th century there was no 
unity, organisation or code of ethics among those who practised dentistry. The first 
organised professional associations were formed in 1856; the Odontological Society 
represented dental surgeons and the College of Dentists of England represented other 
general dental practitioners. The Dental Reform Committee, formed in 1875, lobbied for a 
registration bill which would give the dental profession legal recognition. This was achieved 
in the form of the Dentists Act 1878 which established a Dentists’ Register (operational in 
1879) and granted protection of title. The Act stated that:
a person shall not be entitled to take or use the name of dentist... or dentalpractitioner, or 
any other name, title addition or description implying that he is registered under this Act, or 
that he is a person specially qualified to practise dentistry unless he is registered under the 
A ct (cited in Forbes, 1985).
The Register and regulatory functions were performed by the GMC. With the 
establishment o f the Dental Board in 1921 dentists obtained protection of function,
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something medical practitioners have never achieved. The Board continued to share 
responsibility for educational and ethical control of the profession with the GMC. It was 
only with the creation of the General Dental Council in 1956, following the 
recommendations of the Teviot Committee report (1946) and the Dentists Act 1956, that 
dentists gained full autonomy from the medical profession (Forbes, 1985).
43.4 Apothecaries
The Apothecaries Act 1815 followed a period of agitation during which time the 
boundaries between the activities of apothecaries, surgeons, physicians, and chemists or 
druggists were contested and several draft bills and proposals were debated. Apothecaries 
were widespread throughout the country and offered the only affordable means for the 
poor and lower classes to receive medical care; they were akin to a general medical 
practitioner. Trained apothecaries, represented by the Society of Apothecaries, felt they 
were being encroached upon by chemists and druggists who were taking over the 
dispensing of drugs and compounds, including those prescribed by physicians, and 
undermined by unqualified and unskilled people trading as apothecaries (Holloway, 1966).
Restrictions on the right of apothecaries to charge patients for attending (dating from a 
case taken to the Lords by the College of Physicians in 1703) meant they had to obtain 
their income from charging for the drugs dispensed. Early proposals by the General 
Pharmaceutical Association attempted to restrict dispensing rights to apothecaries. The 
Associated Faculty proposed that educational standards should be set for all practitioners 
of medicine, and that qualified practitioners should be required to register, in an attempt to 
elevate apothecary to a profession. The Associated Apothecaries and Surgeon-apothecaries 
proposed to allow practitioners to charge for attendance (a concession the physicians were 
unwilling to accept).
The Apothecaries Act 18159 reflected the interests of the College of Physicians in that it 
subordinated apothecary under the direct supervision of the College and reinforced its 
characteristics as a trade rather than a learned profession. The Act allowed those already 
practising to continue to do so. New practitioners had to pass an exam following a five year 
apprenticeship, and present testimonials of medical education and ‘good moral character’ in 
order to obtain a licence (Holloway, 1966, pl25). When the Pharmaceutical Society was 
granted Royal Charter in 1853 it signalled the beginning of the demise o f the Society o f 
Apothecaries.
9 The full title was ‘An Act for enlarging the Charter of the Society o f Apothecaries in the City o f London, granted by His 
Majesty King James the First, and for better regulating the Practice o f Apothecaries through England and Wales’.
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Throughout the 19th and early 20th century, non-medical health care practitioners have 
sought state protection for their practice through an Act of Parliament. Such legislative 
activities have often brought them into conflict with the orthodox medical profession as 
well as other health care practitioners particularly where occupational boundaries overlap. 
These accounts of the struggles within and between professional groups have many 
parallels among CAM therapies as we shall now see.
4.4 History o f the regulation o f complementary and alternative 
m edical practitioners
The 20th century saw the introduction o f a number of new therapies to Great Britain and a 
proliferation of private schools and colleges. Practitioners established their own 
professional associations (see Table 4.3) and academic journals. Therapies developed their 
own ontology and epistemology and set themselves in opposition to ‘allopathic* medicine. 
The following sections describe briefly the main professional and regulatory developments 
that have taken place in acupuncture, chiropractic, herbal medicine, homeopathy, and 
osteopathy (see Appendix 1 for a brief description of the therapies and their uses).
4.4.1 Acupuncture
There was some interest in acupuncture in the early to mid-19th century when it was first 
introduced to Europe from China and Japan. In England, interest was fuelled by the 
publication of a monograph ‘On Acupuncturation’ in 1821 by a young surgeon called 
James Churchill. By the end of the decade use of acupuncture was fairly widespread in 
private practice and in the great London hospitals (Acupuncture Regulatory Working 
Group, 2003). In spite of this promising start acupuncture went into decline after 1828, and 
was marginali2ed in Britain until a revival in the 1950s and 1960s led by British physician 
Felix Mann, who had been taught the technique in Paris (Saks, 1995; Baldry, 2005). In the 
early 1970s it received widespread publicity for its use in China as an anaesthetic as a result 
of President Nixon’s visit there in 1972, and gained legitimacy with the medical profession 
due to advances in the understanding o f pain (Saks, 1986).
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Table 4.3 Development of voluntary professional bodies for acupuncture,
chiropractic, herbal medicine, homeopathy and osteopathy, year 
established
Profession A ssociated bodies Year established
Acupuncture British Acupuncture Association and Register 1961-1995
International Register of Oriental Medicine 1972-1995
Traditional Acupuncture Society 1976-1995
Register of Traditional Chinese Medicine 1979-1995
Modem Acupuncture Association 1981-
Council for Acupuncture 1980-1995
Fook Sang Acupuncture & Chinese Herbal Practitioners 
Association
1983
British Acupuncture Accreditation Board 1989- present
British Acupuncture Council 1995-present
European Federation of Modern Acupuncture 1996-present
British Medical Acupuncture Society 1980-present
Acupuncture Association of Chartered Physiotherapists 
British Academy of Western Acupuncture
1984-present
1976-present
Chiropractic British Chiropractic Association 1925-present
Scottish Chiropractic Association 1972-
John McTimoney Chiropractic Association 1979-1981
Institute of Pure Chiropractic 1981-1994
British Association for Applied Chiropractic 1984-present
McTimoney Chiropractic Association 1994-present
Herbal Medicine National Institute of Medical Herbalists 1864-present
British Herbal Union 1940s?-1960
General Council and Register of Consultant Herbalists 
Association of Master Herbalists*
British Society of Chinese Medicine*
1960-1997
Register of Chinese Herbal Medicine 1987-present
International Register of Consultant Herbalists 1943-1997
International Register of Consultant Herbalists and 
Homeopaths
1997-present
Unified Register of Herbal Practitioners 1997-present
Association of Traditional Chinese Medicine 
Ayurvedic Medical Association*
British Association of Accredited Ayurvedic Practitioners* 
British Ayurvedic Medical Council*
1994-present
European Herbal Practitioners Association 1993-present
Homeopathy British Homeopathic Society 1843-1944
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Profession A ssociated bodies Year established
Faulty of Homeopathy 1944-present
Society of Homeopaths 1978-present
Alliance of Registered Homeopaths 2001-present
Homeopathic Medical Association 1985 -present
International Register of Consultant Herbalists and 
Homeopaths
1997-present
Joint Meeting of Organisations Registering Professional 
Homeopaths
1999-2000
Council of Organisations Registering Homeopaths 2000-present
Osteopathy British Society of Osteopaths Pre 1911
British Osteopathic Association 1911*-present
Incorporated Association of Osteopaths Ltd 1925 -1936
Osteopathic Association of Great Britain 1936-1992
British Naturopathic and Osteopathic Association 1961-1998
Guild of Osteopaths 1971-1998
General Council and Register of Osteopaths 1936-1993
College of Osteopaths 1948
Natural Therapeutic & Osteopathic Society 1948
British and European Osteopathic Association 1976
Association of Osteopathic Practitioners 1984
Faculty of Osteopathy 1978
Osteopathic and Naturopathic Guild 1967
Sources: Various including (Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1989b), (Mills, 1993), (Baer, 1984), websites and 
personal communication.
* Details on the history of many of the smaller professional associations was not available.
Mann held regular meetings which gave birth to the British Medical Acupuncture Society 
(BMAS), formally established in 1980. The launch of its scientific journal Acupuncture in 
Medicine’ followed in 1981. The BMAS established regular teaching courses for doctors 
leading to professional qualifications. In 1990 a standardisation of the meridian 
nomenclature was published, further establishing the medical-scientific basis for 
acupuncture practice (Baldry, 2005). It later extended its scope to include nurses, 
physiotherapists, osteopaths, chiropractors, health visitors, midwives and podiatrists as 
members (British Medical Acupuncture Society, 2004). Growth in interest and practice 
among physiotherapists led to the establishment of the Acupuncture Association of 
Chartered Physiotherapists (AACP) in 1984. The British Academy o f Western Acupuncture 
(BAWA) was established in 1976 to teach medical doctors, registered nurses and chartered 
physiotherapists western acupuncture. Today it predominantly trains and represents nurses 
(British Academy of Western Acupuncture, 2000).
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The practice of acupuncture by non-medically qualified practitioners in the UK dates back 
to at least the 1960s, when private colleges opened offering longer and more intensive 
courses in traditional acupuncture. Several societies were formed to represent the graduates 
o f these colleges: the British Acupuncture Association and Register in 1961, the 
International Register of Oriental Medicine in 1972, the Traditional Acupuncture Society in 
1976, and the Register of Traditional Chinese Medicine in 1979. In 1980 these societies 
together with the Chung San Acupuncture Society (CSAS) formed the Council for 
Acupuncture to co-ordinate standards of training and codes of ethics and practice (British 
Acupuncture Council, 2006). In June 1995 the Council for Acupuncture was succeeded by 
the British Acupuncture Council (BAcC) which unified the five member groups.
Traditional acupuncture was originally learnt by people studying in China. In recent years 
teachers have come from China to offer acupuncture courses in Britain (Acupuncture 
Regulatory Working Group, 2003). By the 1990s acupuncture was being taught as a 
university degree. The British Acupuncture Accreditation Board (BAAB) was established in 
1989 to set training standards and accredit training institutions. In 2003 it had accredited 
seven teaching institutions offering courses in traditional acupuncture, and four further 
teaching institutions were undergoing accreditation (Acupuncture Regulatory Working 
Group, 2003).
The Acupuncture Regulatory Working Group (ARWG) was established in 2002 and met 
for a period of a year under the chairmanship of Lord Chan of Oxton, a paediatrician and 
the only peer of Chinese decent in the Lords’ until his untimely death in 2006. 
Representatives from four main groups were involved: the BAcC, the BAWA, the BMAS 
and the AACP. It reported in September 2003 (Acupuncture Regulatory Working Group, 
2003). Its key recommendations were that there should be a General Acupuncture Council 
which should regulate the activities of non-statutorily regulated practitioners of 
acupuncture, and extend registration (or listing) to statutorily regulated health care 
professionals who wished to practise acupuncture and use one o f the proposed protected 
tides e.g. ‘acupuncturist’.
As later chapters will reveal the historical divisions between medical and traditional 
acupuncturists have shaped the process of professionalisation and the approach to 
regulation adopted.
4.4.2 Chiropractic
Chiropractic was founded by D r Daniel Palmer in the USA in the 1890s and was further 
developed by his son. It was introduced to Great Britain in the early 1900s. The British
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Chiropractic Association (BCA) was formed in 1925, and opened the Anglo-European 
College o f Chiropractic in Bournemouth in 1965. In 1988 this became the first 
complementary medicine college to offer a validated degree course in the UK.
There are two other schools of chiropractic: the McTimoney Chiropractic School 
(established 1972) and the Witney School of Chiropractic (established 1984) (King’s Fund, 
1993). Graduates trained at the former are generally members of the John McTimoney 
Chiropractic Association (established in 1979) which was renamed the Institute o f Pure 
Chiropractic in 1981 and then the McTimoney Chiropractic Association in 1994. Graduates 
of the Witney School (now the Oxford College of Chiropractic) are usually members of the 
British Association for Applied Chiropractic (established in 1984).
In the early 1980s the BCA made an unsuccessful attempt to gain statutory regulation 
through inclusion under the Professions Supplementary to Medicine Act 1960. In 1991 the 
British Association o f Applied Chiropractic, the BCA, and the Institute of Pure 
Chiropractic, with a combined membership of 785, formed the Chiropractic Registration 
Steering Group. Its aim was to create unified educational standards through the creation of 
a European Council on Chiropractic Education. It reported in 1993.
Following the successful passage of the Osteopaths Act 1993 (see below), the chiropractors 
found support for a similar process to establish statutory regulation through primary 
legislation. A King’s Fund Working Party was established under the chairmanship of Sir 
Thomas Bingham, subsequently Baron Bingham of Comhill and Lord Chief Justice of 
England and Wales 1996-2000, to draw up proposals (King’s Fund, 1993). The proposals 
and a draft bill were published in 1993.
The Chiropractors Bill was proposed to the House of Commons by David Lidington MP 
as a Private Members’ Bill in the 1993-94 session and came fourth in the ballot of 
members. It had its first reading on 16th December 1993. It received its second reading on 
18th February 1994, and was passed after its third reading on 6th May 1994. The 
Chiropractors Act 1994 led to the establishment of the General Chiropractic Council 
(GCC). Transitional arrangements were put in place but from 14th June 2001 ‘chiropractor’ 
became a protected title, and it is now a criminal offence for anyone not registered with the 
GCC to use it. In June and July 2005 three people were convicted for wrongfully using the 
title of ‘chiropractor’ and wilfully misleading the public (General Chiropractic Council, 
2005b; General Chiropractic Council, 2005c).
Chiropractic remains the smaller of the therapies included in this study. Even so the 
profession was historically divided into a number of traditions and schools.
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4.43 Herbal medicine
In  Britain traditions of herbal medicinal use are recorded in published herbal 
pharmacopoeias dating back to the 16th and 17th centuries. Those o f Nicholas Culpepper 
and John Gerard are well known to this day (McIntyre, 2001). Chinese herbal medicine has 
developed over thousands of years and uses combinations of herbs to address a wide range 
of health problems. It is now popular in European societies (Ernst and Dixon, 2004). 
There are other eastern traditions which use herbal medicines, such as Tibb, Kampo, 
Ayurvedic, Maharishi Ayurvedic, and Unani medicine, as well as traditional African 
medicine, though these tend not to be widespread outside immigrant communities.
Herbalists were granted rights to practise medicine as early as the 16th century. The public 
reaction to attempts by doctors to prevent others from practising medicine led Henry VIII 
to enact the Herbalists Charter 1543 which granted rights to all his subjects to practise 
herbal medicine (McIntyre, 2001). It was not until the late 19th century and the widespread 
use o f non-plant substances that the distinction between traditional herbalists and druggists 
and chemists (later to become known as pharmacists) emerged. The National Association 
of Medical Herbalists10 was established in 1864 to represent herbalists, with the expectation 
that herbalists could gain similar professional status as that granted to doctors by the 
Medical Act (McIntyre, 2001). In 1886 an amendment to the Medical Act and changes to 
the Poisons Schedule which would have made herbal practice illegal were both defeated. 
The herbalists attempted to gain a Charter in the 1890s.
In 1923 a Private Members’ Bill to introduce statutory regulation o f medical herbalists was 
defeated at its second reading. McIntyre notes that herbal medicine reached its ‘nadir’ in 
Britain during the 1950s and 1960s following the establishment o f the NHS from which 
herbal medicine was excluded. Bevan was only willing to incorporate herbalists into the 
NHS if they were willing to be regulated by and subordinate to doctors. This deal was 
rejected by the herbalists (McIntyre, 2001). Instead herbalists organised on a voluntary 
basis. The British Herbal Union (renamed the General Council and Register of Consultant 
Herbalists in 1960 and then the International Register of Consultant Herbalists and 
Homeopaths in 1997) established the Faculty of Herbal Medicine in 1949 to provide 
training opportunities for practitioners.
The Pharmacy and Medicines Act 1941 made the practice o f herbal medicine illegal, yet 
there is no record of any herbalists being prosecuted (McIntyre, 1999). The Act was
10 “Association” has since been replaced by “Institute”.
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superseded by the Medicines Act 1968 which overturned the ban. The new Act contained 
two specific sections governing the availability of herbal medicines:
•  Section 12.1 allowed herbal prescriptions to be given without licence 
following a personal consultation
• Section 12.2 exempted over-the-counter herbal products from licensing as 
long as they consisted of simple plant mixtures and no health claims were 
made.
The Act also restricted the use of a list of potent herbs to herbalists.11 These were not 
allowed to be made available to patients over-the-counter without a licence.
The harmonisation of pharmaceutical licensing within the European Union (EU) 
threatened to remove the right to dispense herbs from herbalists in the UK. In response a 
number of professional associations joined together to establish the European Herbal 
Practitioners Association (EHPA) in 1993. The Medicines Control Agency launched the 
MLX 206 consultation document on Harmonisation of UK Medicines A ct mth European 
Medicines Directive in autumn 1994 (Medicines Control Agency, 1994). This proposed that 
only ‘industrially produced’ medicines needed to be licensed (in other words herbal 
preparations were to remain exempt). Successful lobbying, led by the UK government, 
resulted in a separate EU Directive on Traditional Medicinal Products (2004/24/EC) being 
passed in April 2004 which took effect in October 2005 (Ernst and Dixon, 2004). This 
addressed Section 12.2 of the Medicines Act 1968 by requiring industrially produced herbal 
medicine sold to the public over-the-counter to be included on a positive list, and requiring 
manufacturers and wholesalers to obtain licences. It left open the issue of how to regulate 
the dispensing of non-industrially prepared herbal medicines by herbalists under Section 
12.1 of the Medicines Act 1968.
The Herbal Medicines Regulatory Working Group was launched on 1st January 2002 under 
the chairmanship of Mike Pittilo, Vice Chancellor of the University o f Hertfordshire, to 
make recommendations on the regulation of herbalists and unlicensed herbal remedies. It 
was made up of representatives of the College of Practitioners o f Phytotherapy, the 
Association of Master Herbalists, the National Institute of Medical Herbalists, the EHPA, 
the British Society of Chinese Medicine, the Register of Chinese Herbal Medicine, the 
International Register of Consultant Herbalists, the Unified Register of Herbal 
Practitioners, the Ayurvedic Medical Association, the Association of Traditional Chinese
11 Herbalist was later defined as ‘one who exercises his judgment as to the treatment required and accepts legal responsibility 
for his actions’ (McIntyre, unpublished).
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Medicine, the British Association o f Accredited Ayurvedic Practitioners and the British 
Ayurvedic Medical Council.
Its recommendations were published in 2003. The preferred option was to establish a 
CAM Council which would initially register herbal practitioners and acupuncturists but 
could in future regulate other CAM practitioners. A consultation document MLX299 
Proposalsfor the reform of the regulation of unlicensed herbal remedies in the UK made up to meet the needs 
of individual patients (Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency, 2004) was 
launched on 2nd March 2004 together with the Department of Health’s proposals for 
statutory regulation of herbal medicine and acupuncture (Department of Health, 2004a). 
These discussions coincided with the approval for the first degree course in herbal 
medicine at Middlesex University (approved 6th May 2004).
As we shall see, reforms to medicines legislation during the 1990s had a major impact on 
the regulation of herbalists. The different historical roots of herbalists mean they are an 
extremely diverse profession that embraces both western and eastern traditions. These 
differences have continued to make unification of herbalists a challenge.
4.4.4 Homeopathy
Homoeopathy was founded by Samuel Hahnemann (1755-1843), based on the Law of 
Similars (the “like cures like” principle) (National Institutes o f Health, 2006). From its 
German origins in the late 18th century homeopathy proved popular in Britain, particularly 
among the aristocracy (Morrell, 1999), and during the 19th century was taught in medical 
schools. The British Homeopathic Society was established in 1843, the British Journal of 
Homeopathy in 1844, and the London Homeopathic Hospital in 1850. Homeopathy 
continued to be dominated by medical doctors even after the Medical Act 1858. The Act 
was successfully amended so that it did not specify the type o f medicine to be practised.
Medical homeopathy reached its zenith in the mid-1870s when there were as many 120 
homeopathic dispensaries listed in the Homeopathic Medical Directory and 300 
homeopathic doctors registered with the Society (Morrell, 1995; Morrell, 1999). Hospitals 
were established in Glasgow, Bristol and Liverpool. From the 1880s however medical 
homeopathy went into decline. The Faculty of Homeopathy, which offered postgraduate 
courses for medical doctors, was only established in 1944 and incorporated in 1950 
(replacing the British Homeopathic Society). Homeopathy was integrated into the NHS at 
its foundation in 1948.
Some radical homeopathic doctors worried by a decline in the practice o f medical 
homeopathy, broke away from the BHS in the early 1900s in order to teach homeopathy to
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lay practitioners and home prescribers. The short-lived English Homeopathic Association 
attempted to popularise homeopathy among the lower classes.
In the 1970s homeopathy was revived as a radical alternative to allopathic medicine, led by 
two non-medically qualified homeopaths named Maughan and Da Monte. Following their 
death in 1978 a group of lay homeopaths established a College of Homeopathy, followed 
by the Society o f Homeopaths in 1981. Other colleges were established in the 1980s, only 
some of which were ‘approved’ by the Society and therefore whose graduates could gain 
automatic entry on the register (Cant and Sharma, 1996).
The Joint Meeting of Organisations Registering Professional Homeopaths was established 
in 1999 with the express aim to “work together for a single register” (Council of 
Organisations Registering Homeopaths, 2004b). National occupational standards were 
established together with the Faculty of Homeopathy, which were then approved by the 
Qualifications and Curriculum Authority and the Scottish Qualifications Authority. The 
Council of Organisations Registering Homeopaths (CORH) succeeded it in 2000 and 
agreed its constitution in 2002 with the purpose of representing the interests o f those 
whose primary therapeutic activity is homeopathy and who wish to be identified as 
homeopaths (Council of Organisations Registering Homeopaths, 2006). The full members 
of the CORH include three organisations which solely register homeopaths and four which 
are multi-disciplinary groups.
The CORH launched a consultation document in January 2005 on proposals for a robust 
system of voluntary self-regulation (Council of Organisations Registering Homeopaths, 
2005). The consultation closed in March 2005 and received 1,073 replies. The results o f the 
consultation were presented to the CORH Council on 25th April 2005 before 
recommendations were proposed to the AGM on 10th June 2005 (Council of 
Organisations Registering Homeopaths, 2005). The CORH are in the process of devising 
an implementation strategy for the proposals.
As with acupuncture, the historic division between medical and non-medical homeopaths 
persists to the present day and shapes the discussion of regulation. Because non-medical 
homeopathy developed as an alternative to orthodox medicine there is widespread 
scepticism of orthodoxy of any sort among the leadership o f the professional associations. 
This has coloured their views of statutory regulation, as will be shown in the following 
chapters.
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4.4.5 Osteopathy
The practice of osteopathy has its origins in the USA in the 1860s and 1870s. It is based on 
the principles of osteopathic medicine developed in 1874 by D r Andrew Taylor Still in 
response to the ‘excesses of allopathic medicine’, such as the use of strong drugs, bleeding 
and surgery (Baer, 1984). There are some links between osteopathy and the earlier practices 
of bonesetters. Indeed, some practitioners learned manipulative therapy in apprenticeships 
with bonesetters. However, osteopathy in Britain was formally established in the early 
1900s by American-trained osteopaths. Over the next century many schools and 
associations emerged and faded. The picture painted by Baer (1984), on which this section 
draws, is one o f a fragmented profession.
The British Osteopathic Association (BOA) was established in 1911. Six years later the 
British School of Osteopathy was opened offering a four-year full-time course plus part- 
time diploma courses. A competing school was opened in 1921, the Manchester College of 
Bloodless Surgery (later the Manchester College of Osteopathy and Chiropractic). The 
graduates of this school were not eligible to join the BOA and founded their own 
association in 1925: the Incorporated Association of Osteopaths Ltd. Over time the 
Incorporated Association extended its membership to other schools and associations 
(including the South-Western School of Osteopathy 1929, the British College of 
Chiropractors, and the National Society of Osteopaths Ltd 1936). It was renamed the 
Osteopathic Association of Great Britain in 1936.
Only some of these many associations have been actively involved in lobbying for statutory 
regulation. In about 1914 the BOA applied for registration under the Companies’ Act as a 
Scientific Society, but this was refused by the Board of Trade. They petitioned the Privy 
Council in 1931 for a royal charter but were refused due to overly restrictive entry criteria. 
Private Members’ Bills to establish a register of osteopaths were put before the Houses of 
Parliament in 1931, 1933 and 1934. The last attempt in 1936 before the House of Lords 
was supported by the BOA, the Osteopathic Defence League and the British School o f 
Osteopathy. Despite concerns over educational standards the Minister o f Health agreed to 
support the Bill. However, opposition was mounted by the BMA, the GMC, the Royal 
College of Surgeons of England, the Royal College of Physicians of England, universities 
and medical schools, and the BCA, and finally supporters of the Bill withdrew it. A Select 
Committee of the House of Lords, on the advice of the Minister of Health, recommended 
that the osteopathic bodies establish a voluntary register and council.
In 1936 the General Council and Register of Osteopaths (GCRO) was established. This 
umbrella organisation unified the BOA and the Osteopathic Association of Great Britain,
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but the latter dominated the organisation and the majority o f registrants were ‘lay 
osteopaths’.
After World War II the BOA established postgraduate training at the London College of 
Osteopathy (later the London College of Osteopathic Medicine) but entry was restricted to 
medical practitioners, formalizing the distinction between medical osteopaths and lay 
osteopaths.
Numerous other private schools and associations have come and gone during the latter half 
of the 20th century. The decline in naturopathy from the 1950s onwards resulted in an 
increased interest in osteopathy among naturopaths. The British Naturopathic Association 
renamed itself the British Naturopathic and Osteopathic Association in 1961, and their 
college was renamed the British College of Naturopathy and Osteopathy. A schism in this 
college led to the establishment of the European School o f Osteopathy in the 1970s and its 
professional association for graduates - the Society of Osteopaths.
Other registers also sprang up for those not eligible to be on the Register of Osteopaths, 
including osteopathic naturopaths and members of the Society of Osteopaths. The GCRO 
extended eligibility to members of the Society of Osteopaths and graduates of the 
European School of Osteopathy in 1982, and to members o f the British Naturopathic and 
Osteopathic Association in 1988. In 1981 an attempt was made to establish a degree 
programme in osteopathy at the Polytechnic o f Central London, but this failed because the 
Department for Education and Science refused to designate it as eligible for mandatory 
grants (Association of Community Health Councils for England and Wales, 1988).
In May 1986 a Bill was introduced to the House of Commons under the ten-minute rule. 
This established a body of all-party support for statutory regulation of osteopathy (King’s 
Fund, 1991) and laid the way for the events which were to culminate in the passage of the 
Osteopaths Act 1993. The King’s Fund Management Committee announced in the autumn 
of 1989 that they were establishing a Working Party to look into the issue o f statutory 
regulation of osteopaths. The first meeting was held on 5th December 1989. There were as 
many as nine organisations with a registering function “all purporting to represent 
osteopaths” (General Osteopathic Council, 2000b, para 412): the British and European 
Osteopathic Association, the British Faculty of Osteopaths, the BOA, the College of 
Osteopaths, the General Council and Register of Osteopaths, the Guild o f Osteopaths, the 
International Guild of Natural Medicine Practitioners, the Natural Therapeutic and 
Osteopathic Society, and the Osteopathic and Naturopathic Guild (King’s Fund, 1991). 
The Chairman of the General Osteopathic Council (GOsC), Nigel Clarke, admitted “the 
politics of the thing were pretty appalling” (Clarke, 2005). The process generated a great
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deal o f tension, much of which stemmed from the interests of the privately owned schools. 
Divisions depended on where people had trained and which registering body they had 
joined. The smaller professional bodies felt threatened by the largest registering body - the 
General Council for Registering Osteopaths (GCRO). Clarke recounted how they would 
complain that “ [The GCRO are] trying to tell us what osteopathy is but we don’t do it like 
that here” (Clarke, 2005).
The Osteopaths Bill was first introduced into the House of Lords on 17th December 1991 
by Lord Walton of Detchant, a former President of the BMA, the Royal Society of 
Medicine, and the GMC and who subsequendy chaired the House o f Lords’ Select 
Committee Inquiry into CAM. The Bill was amended in Committee by the House of Lords 
and had its Second Reading on 31st January 1992. However, the election was called before 
the final committee stage was passed. The Bill was introduced into the House o f Commons 
in the new session by Malcolm Moss MP as a Private Members’ Bill. It came second in the 
ballot o f members and had its First Reading on 10th June 1992. It had its Second Reading 
on 15 th January 1993.
The Osteopaths Bill passed through its Third Reading in the House of Commons on 7th 
May 1993 and has been described as the “largest Private Members’ bill ever to be brought 
to a successful conclusion” (Standen, 1993). It received government support and was 
guided through the Commons by Tom Sackville MP (Parliamentary Under Secretary for 
State 1990-95).
Osteopaths were perhaps the most active of the five therapies in seeking statutory 
regulation during the 20th century, despite the plurality o f associations and registers. 
Medical opposition appears to have thwarted their earlier efforts, in common with the 
experiences of nurses and midwives as we saw in the previous section.
4.5 D iscussion
As the examples of midwives, nurses, dentists and apothecaries demonstrate, the 
experience of statutory regulation varies between occupational groups. There are significant 
differences in the reasons why regulation is sought, whether regulation is opposed, how 
regulation is structured, and the consequences for the status of the profession. Each 
profession has a unique history. And yet in each case common aspects of 
professionalisation can be identified, such as the formation of professional associations, 
publishing a journal, introducing training schools and courses, and establishing 
accreditation bodies.
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Some health care professionals such as midwives had to fight to achieve the privileges 
granted to doctors, often in the face o f concerted opposition by the organised 
representatives of the medical profession. In other cases, such as nurses, the state acted in 
response to public and political pressure. It had to act to ensure that standards for 
registration were not set too high in order to preserve the interests of the hospital service 
and the public. Other practitioners not discussed here in detail such as physiotherapists 
have accepted a subordinate position to that o f doctors in order that regulation would pass 
(Abel-Smith, 1960; White and Marmor, 1982). Dentistry developed from within the 
medical profession and regulation was therefore not opposed. Dentists won protection of 
function, and regulation continued to be closely integrated with the medical profession. 
The apothecaries won early concessions from the medical profession but their occupational 
jurisdiction was challenged on all sides. Ultimately they lost ground to doctors (general 
practitioners) and to pharmacists. The profession went into demise despite winning 
statutory regulation.
Among complementary and alternative medical practitioners there has also been repeated 
efforts to put Private Members’ Bills before parliament. The osteopaths repeatedly tried to 
gain statutory regulation without success before 1993. These efforts were either thwarted 
by organised opposition from the medical profession or failed because of the internal 
disagreements among practitioners. Doctors have tried to retain their dominance over 
medicine and subordinate other professional groups. At the establishment of the NHS 
when herbalists had the opportunity to become statutorily regulated they rejected it because 
they would have been subordinate to doctors. Homeopathy has been practised as a 
specialty within medicine throughout the 20th century, and yet it has not gained anything 
like the independence or autonomy that dentists have. In fact, medical homeopaths are 
regarded as pariahs by many of their conventional medical colleagues. They have lost 
ground to the non-medical homeopaths whose numbers have grown during the same 
period. The case of apothecary is interesting because it reminds us that professions not 
only emerge but also disappear. There is increasing convergence in practice between 
physiotherapists, osteopaths and chiropractors. Competition over jurisdictional boundaries 
in future may result in one or more o f these professions going into decline or being 
subsumed by another.
The following chapters will explore in more detail the dynamics of the regulatory process 
which have shaped the position of CAM practitioners vis a vis other CAM practitioner 
groups and existing health care professionals. First, however, we turn to the research
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literature to identify analytical concepts that can be used to examine the regulatory process 
that has shaped the regulation of CAM practitioners at the turn of the 21st century.
C h a p t e r  5
5 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
5.1 Introduction
This chapter sets my research questions within the body of existing knowledge. It does not 
present an exhaustive review of the literature, but rather tries to understand how the 
existing body of knowledge can inform an explanation of why regulation of CAM 
practitioners takes the form it does.
The literature reviewed here is mainly drawn from theoretical work and is broad in its 
disciplinary approach, encompassing sociology, economics and political science. Empirical 
papers are reviewed for the purposes o f identifying the analytical approach they adopt 
rather than for their content and findings. Three main bodies of literature are reviewed: (i) 
the literature on professionalism and professionalisation, (ii) the literature on regulation, 
particularly the growing sub-specialty o f risk regulation,12 (iii) the political science literature 
on the policy process and the force of ideas in shaping policy.
Section 5.2 provides an overview of the literature on professions and professionalisation 
and identifies two concepts - demand theories and supply theories o f professionalisation 
(Dingwall, 1999). Demand theories o f professionalisation suggest that statutory self­
regulation results from the mobilisation of practitioners. In contrast, supply theories of 
professionalisation explain regulation as a result of state action.
Section 5.3 reviews both economic and sociological theories which seek to explain why 
occupational groups try to establish professional monopolies or achieve closure. It also 
reviews theories which seek to explain the conflicts that arise between occupational groups 
when making claims to certain activities.
Section 5.4 examines a number of theories which focus on the state’s interest in 
professions. The supply theories of professionalisation encompass a range of social 
theories which view professionals or professional classes as necessary to a functioning 
society or capitalist economy. The section also reviews economic theories which see 
regulation as a response to failures in the market for professional services and the 
regulation literature which sees regulation as the state’s attempt to minimise risks to public 
health.
12 During the data collection phase o f the research a strong theme emerged around the concept o f ‘risk’. Given the frequency 
with which this theme was mentioned in documents and interviews risk regulation was included in the review.
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Theories of the policy process and concepts o f policy subsystems found in the political 
science literature are reviewed in Section 5.5. These theories explain policy as the outcome 
of interactions between members of policy subsystems. Section 5.6 reviews the political 
science literature which seeks to examine the role of ideas in the policy process and 
considers whether ideas have an independent influence on policy change.
The chapter concludes with a presentation of the analytical framework to be employed in 
this study.
5.2 Professions and professionalisation in the literature
The literature on the professions has been dominated by sociologists. It has been the 
subject of interest for a wide range of theorists and empiricists. It ranges from those with 
an interest in professionals’ position in the division o f labour in modern societies (see 
Parsons, 1937) to those who criticise the professionals for their role in sustaining capitalism 
(Poulantzas, 1975).
For much of the 20th century, writers were preoccupied with studying archetypal 
professions such as doctors, lawyers and clergy to understand the essential traits that 
characterise these occupational groups and justify their special status in the economy and 
society. The trait approach has been largely discredited. Trait theories are criticised for 
being atheoretical and ahistorical because they ignore the social and historical conditions 
under which occupational groups attain professional status (Saks, 1986), avoid issues of 
accountability and political power and are descriptive with little explanatory value, 
particularly of changes over time. They accept the definition of profession provided by the 
professional group itself and do not question the possibility that ethical codes and 
monopoly over knowledge may be used by the occupational group to justify their position 
(Haug, 1980).
With the emergence of new professions during the latter half of the 20th century, such as 
engineers and architects, and the growth in paraprofessionals, a more dynamic theory was 
sought to explain the process by which occupational groups become professions. The 
question of ‘what is a profession?’ that had preoccupied sociologists was reformulated into 
‘what are the circumstances in which people in an occupation attempt to turn into a 
profession?’ The term ‘professionalisation’ is used to describe the process of transition 
from occupation to profession (Saks, 1995). Dingwall makes a distinction between ‘demand 
theories of professionalisation’, that is those that see professionalisation as a process driven 
by the occupational groups, and ‘supply theories o f professionalisation’, where professions
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are created because they serve a state interest (Dingwall, 1999). The professionalisation 
literature will be discussed in more detail using this distinction,
5.3 D em and theories o f professionalisation
Demand theories o f professionalisation embrace both economic theories, which argue that 
occupational groups seek statutory regulation in order to create a monopoly for their 
services and thereby extract monopoly rents (high incomes), as well as sociological theories 
based on Weberian ideas of social closure. Much of the empirical research has used 
demand theories as an interpretive framework, analysing the particular trajectory of 
professionalisation followed by different occupational groups. These have also been 
applied to the cases o f CAM practitioners (see below).
53 A Professionalisation and economic interests
Economists from the time of Adam Smith have criticised the organisation of professional 
labour markets, and in particular their impact on the functioning of a competitive market. 
Professional regulation is seen as the cause of market failure (creating monopolies and 
barriers to entry). Smith highlighted the ability of crafts to lengthen apprenticeship 
programs and limit the number of apprentices per master as a means of restraining free 
competition and ensuring higher earnings for persons in those occupations (Ardy-Dubois, 
Dixon et al., 2006).
Economists who consider professional regulation a cause of market failure view it as 
operating in the professionals’ interest (Horowitz, 1980, p i6). By controlling entry and exit 
to the market through systems of licensure they can control the supply of services, set 
higher prices, and thus maximise their incomes. Codes of ethics and standards of practice 
are also used to regulate the numbers of practitioners and the conditions under which they 
can participate in the market, thus raising their income (Ardy-Dubois, Dixon et al., 2006).
In systems where the state has established a role as the dominant payer for health care 
services the monopoly position o f the medical profession has facilitated collective 
bargaining over remuneration and ensured continued upward pressure on physician 
income. In addition to bargaining power over remuneration, the profession has historically 
enjoyed a privileged position within a corporatist policy-making system (Klein, 1990). From 
this perspective professionalisation is driven by occupational groups seeking economic 
gains.
80
53.2 Weber and social closure
Neo-Weberians talk about social closure and the process by which an occupational group 
consolidates its position within the social order (usually with economic benefits for the 
profession). The concept of ‘social closure’ is used by neo-Weberians to describe the 
process by which “legally privileged groups [are] able to monopolise to a considerable 
degree social and economic opportunities” (Saks, 1986, p34). They achieve this by 
exclusion of other occupational groups usually through state licensure (Parkin, 1979). They 
“regulate market conditions in their favour...by limiting access to a restricted group of 
eligibles” (Saks, 1986, p i76). Social closure also occurs because professionals gain control 
over clients (Johnson, 1972), control over the content of their work, and control over the 
conditions under which they practise (Freidson, 1970). The medical profession has been 
characterised in the sociological literature as an ‘ideal type’ profession with significant 
autonomy over its work, dominance over other occupations, as well as sovereignty in 
matters of policy (Frenk and Duran-Arenas, 1993).
Larson wrote about professionalisation as:
the process by which producers of special services sought to constitute and control a market 
for their expertise. . .a collective assertion of special social status and as a collective process of
upward social mobility (Larson, 1977, pxvi).
He thus linked economic gains with social gains in status. He identified different processes 
of professionalisation depending on the social and historical context at the time. Larson has 
been criticised for seeing professionalisation as unidirectional and for ignoring the content 
of work, internal differentiation, and interprofessional relationships (Abbott, 1988).
Following the ideas o f Larson, MacDonald has argued that social closure embraces both 
economic closure and cultural closure: the gaining of respect and status in society. He 
states that “exclusion is aimed not only at the attainment and maintenance of monopoly, 
but also at the usurpation of the existing jurisdiction of others and at the upward social 
mobility of the whole group” (Macdonald, 1995, p29). Thus social mobility and economic 
monopoly are both important objectives pursued by professions.
Others have argued that a process of de-professionalisation has occurred towards the end 
of the 20th century in which the medical profession’s power has been weakened. De- 
professionalisation is believed to result from professions losing their monopoly over 
knowledge, increasingly consumer-oriented patients dissatisfied with self-serving 
professionals (Haug, 1976) and a growth in managerialism which restricts clinical autonomy 
(Gray and Harrison, 2004). The growth in the popularity of CAM has been cited as a factor
81
which contributes to the de-professionalisation process (see for example Salter, 2002). It is 
also claimed that the increasing bureaucratisation and standardisation of orthodox medical 
practice has fuelled demand for CAM (Freidson, 2001, p212).
Neo-Weberian approaches have also been criticised for ignoring the influence of the 
structural and institutional context. Nor do they acknowledge that the state has an active 
role in responding to groups’ claims and in deciding which groups to give legal backing to 
in the form of statutory regulation. McDonald goes further than other demand theories by 
recognising that the success of the professionalisation project depends on “the legislative 
strategies of both profession and state, as well as the skill displayed by the protagonists on 
either side on particular occasions” (Macdonald, 1995, p i3). The role of the state in 
professionalisation is the main focus o f supply theories of professionalisation discussed 
below.
5 3 3  Jurisdictional claims
Abbott (1988) attempts to overcome the limitations of previous work which has tended to 
focus on isolated cases, and instead proposes that professions make up “an interacting 
system, an ecology” of interdependent occupational groups (Abbott, 1988, p33). Abbott’s 
main focus is on ‘interprofessional battles’ and the subsequent shifts in jurisdictional 
boundaries over the content of work. Abbott recognises the force of external factors as 
well as the subjective qualities o f the task in precipitating change (Abbott, 1988, p33), but 
still portrays the state as the audience for professional claims (Johnson, Larkin et al., 1995).
Abbott is not alone in highlighting interprofessional conflict. Tuohy (1976) argues that 
technological changes precipitate ‘boundary disputes’ between professional groups over the 
redefinition of professional property rights. She predicted that in the face of democratic 
pressures, governments would increasingly have to intervene to ensure that decisions are 
informed by both specialised knowledge and lay judgement. Light (1995) argues that where 
dominance over a particular occupational task results in the extraction of monopoly rents 
‘countervailing powers’ will emerge to challenge and recontest the boundaries (Light, 1995). 
He suggests that professional position can be won and lost. Professional dominance viewed 
from a longer historical time period can be seen as one era in a cycle of countervailing 
powers (Light, 1991, p502). Patients, health care institutions, insurers, other professions or 
adjacent occupations may all have countervailing power to professionalism. He argues that 
“the degree of dominance consists of one’s ability to override, suppress, or render 
irrelevant challenges by other parties, either behind closed doors or in public” (Light, 1991, 
p505). In his study o f the professions supplementary to medicine, Larkin (1983) explores
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jurisdictional conflicts. He argues that the success of para-professionals in claiming control 
over individual skills should not be interpreted as a decline in medical imperialism because 
the medical profession maintained “control of the entry o f rivals to the market” (Larkin, 
1983, p i84). Although these theories see professionalisation as a dynamic process in which 
there are turf wars, the outcome o f the process appears to depend largely on the skill and 
mobilisation o f the occupational group, hence inclusion here under demand theories.
Demand theories o f professionalisation form the first part o f the analytical framework (see 
below). Theory suggests that the interest o f occupational groups in regulation stems from 
their desire for economic and social closure and to establish boundaries between their work 
and that of other occupational groups. Chapter 7 explores the extent to which CAM 
practitioners have actively sought statutory regulation.
5.4 Supply theories o f professionalisation
Supply theories of professionalisation depict the creation o f professional groups as serving 
state interests. In contrast to demand theories, they view ‘protective legislation’ as the result 
not of ‘professional agitation’ but rather o f ‘government initiative’ (Johnson, 1972, p29). 
Concepts of the state differ markedly. These divergent views lie at the heart of much social 
and political science debate. Theories about the state’s relationship with professions reflect 
these differences.
5.4.1 State power and social order
Theoretically it is possible to place functionalist, Marxist and Foucauldian theories o f the 
professions within this classification of supply theories o f professionalisation. These 
theories claim there is ‘necessary concomitance’ between professionals and the state (Frenk 
and Duran-Arenas, 1993). In plain English this means that the state and professionals have 
shared interests.
Functionalist social theorists such as Durkheim argued that professions made an important 
contribution to the stability o f modern industrialist society and that social differentiation 
was necessary for the stability of society. Professions were needed to pass on knowledge 
for the benefit of society. As such their role and position in society was not questioned. 
While functionalists provide some justification for the presence of professional groups, 
they do not help to explain the privileged position that some occupational groups hold in 
society.
Some Marxist writers have suggested that professionals are necessary to the sustainability 
of capitalism either by performing tasks o f political repression or supervising the working
83
classes (Poulantzas, 1975; Navarro, 1976). Professionalisation is the process by which new 
occupational classes are given privileged status by the ruling classes, due to their 
importance in sustaining and promoting the capitalist economy. Others argue that capital 
interests will ultimately dominate professional interests and reduce professional practice to 
a series of technical tasks (the process of ‘proletarianization’) (Larson, 1977). 
‘Corporatization’ encompasses the same idea, that professionals are increasingly subjected 
to forms of corporate control, but without the Marxist assumptions (Light and Levine, 
1988).
Foucault’s analyse has given greatest emphasis to the interconnectedness of the rise of the 
modern state and the rise o f professions. According to Foucault (1984) the transformation 
of society from traditional-authoritarian to liberal-democratic in the 18th century required a 
redefinition and quantification of the population (Foucault, 1984). Foucauldian accounts 
suggest that the creation of professions was part of the transformation in society to the 
modern state, and therefore reject the duality between the state and profession depicted 
elsewhere (Johnson, Larkin et al., 1995).
According to these theories the state has historically permitted or facilitated the rise of 
professions because they contribute to social order and stability, serve capitalist interests, or 
play a key role in the modernisation of society. These theories o f the state interest in 
professions are very different from theories of regulation to which we now turn.
5.4.2 Addressing market failure
The classical regulation literature is mostly economic. It has focused on the impact of 
regulation on the market in professional services.
There are a number of reasons why a market in professional services might fail, including a 
concentration of economic power, barriers to entry and exit, heterogeneous services, lack 
of information and externalities. Although most are not unique to professional services, it 
has been argued that the serious information problems and pervasive externalities might 
call for ‘special regulatory intervention’ (Wolfson, Trebilcock et al., 1980, p i 89). In 
particular professionals are often both the agent and the provider of services and therefore 
the relationship relies heavily on trust (see below). These market imperfections mean that 
consumers cannot easily compare the price and quality of professional services. The main 
approaches to the regulation of the providers of services are: licensure and certification. 
Licensure is defined as restrictions on the right to practise while certification refers to 
restrictions on the use o f a reserved title (Wolfson, Trebilcock et al., 1980).
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Others argue licensure overcomes failures in the market for professional services by only 
allowing providers who meet minimum quality standards to enter the market. It is 
preferable to other forms of regulation because it prevents the costs of incompetence 
arising (i.e. the damage does not have to have occurred), it provides a strong incentive for 
providers to comply (loss of licence is the ultimate sanction), it promotes consumer 
confidence (even among small firms), and stops high quality providers from exiting the 
market (Wolfson, Trebilcock et al., 1980, pp 206-7). Svomy (1987) presents evidence that 
licensure induces quality:
The ability to use the government's force to deny a physician the right to practice medicine 
once he or she has engaged in undesirable practices is what favors licensure over certification 
in the production of quality assurance (Svomy, 1987, p500).
However, licensure has been criticised for being inflexible, leading to increased demand in 
substitute markets, reduced access and higher prices due to entry criteria being set too high, 
and may be irreversible (due to the losses inflicted by revoking regulation) (Wolfson, 
Trebilcock et al., 1980). Given these weaknesses it has been suggested that licensure be 
reserved for professional markets where there are high costs of error, high consumer 
information costs and widespread negative third-party effects which are not able to be fully 
compensated (Wolfson, Trebilcock et al., 1980).
Certification, on the other hand, overcomes asymmetries o f information but does not 
prevent non-certified practitioners from practising. There is some debate about whether 
certification is sufficient to ensure quality in the market for professional services.
The idea that professionals contribute to the smooth functioning of the economy are also 
reflected in the writings of sociologists and political scientists. Freidson (2001) claims that 
professionalism is the ‘third logic* alongside commercialism and bureaucracy for the 
delivery of services (Freidson, 2001). Indeed despite the market imperfections, “society 
permits these self-serving practices to persist, in exchange for a guarantee o f a certain 
minimal level of competence on the part o f the professional that serves it” (Horowitz, 
1980, pl6). Light (1991) argues that professionalism is an alternative to either markets or 
hierarchies and is an efficient form of production, especially in complex situations 
involving uncertainties such as health care (Light, 1991). Dingwall (1999) also argues “The 
professional is our means o f reducing uncertainty about important things that we cannot 
easily or economically verify for ourselves” (Dingwall, 1999, plO). In other words trust is 
necessary for exchange to take place. Codes of ethics and high standards of entry support 
this trust relationship.
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Others have argued that the market in professional services is not that different from other 
types of services — “there is no more — and no less — trust involved in buying professional 
services than in buying groceries” (Lees, 1966, p33). The role of the state therefore should 
be to promote competition and to keep markets open for new entrants.
5.43 Public protection and the risk society
More recendy there has been a growing interest in risk in the regulation literature.13 The 
general preoccupation with risks, particularly those to human health, has intensified at the 
beginning of the 21st century. Sociologist Ulrich Beck has characterised modem society as 
the ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992). In his account of modernization in late industrial societies he 
argued that as well as producing goods and services the modem economy produces ‘risks’, 
for example in the form of environmental pollution or social problems. These risks are 
more abstract and invisible, and more difficult to quantify or control than in the past, and 
as a result o f globalisation they transcend boundaries o f class, race and nation state. 
Information about these risks tends to reside with experts and creates uncertainties for lay 
people. Science and industry are seen as both the source of information and as the 
producers of risk. Consequendy the public seeks alternative expertise and knowledge to 
understand the risks that have entered their everyday lives (Tulloch and Lupton, 2003).
These unseen risks can cause social alarm, often fuelled by media reporting o f risk. 
Whether it is the risk of developing Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease from eating infected meat 
(Lanska, 1998), the risks associated with mobile phones and masts (Burgess, 2004), or the 
association o f the measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccine and autism (Hargreaves, 
Lewis et al., 2005) the interaction between the media and scientists has resulted in a 
number of public scares and panics. A number of factors (too complex for any substantive 
discussion here) may be to blame: publication of and publicity for low quality scientific 
studies, poor interpretation of scientific results by journalists, and difficulties of risk 
communication to the general population. Moral panics are nothing new in themselves, but 
governments’ responses to them are.
The regulation literature on risk has focused on the state’s response to risk in society. 
Traditionally risk regulation has been associated with the field o f health and safety 
legislation, but recently has been more broadly defined as “governmental interference with 
market or social processes to control potential adverse consequences to health” (Hood, 
Rothstein et al., 2001, pi). It is claimed there has been a shift towards a precautionary
13 Hazard is a measure o f potential harm and is concerned with (negative) impact, risk is the probability o f an event or harm 
occurring and can be statistical!}' measured, whereas uncertainty is the extent to which the hazard or risk is unknown.
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approach to regulation,14 particularly where risks to human health and the environment are 
concerned. This means that risks that were previously tolerated under a ‘wait and see’ 
approach are now subject to regulation under a ‘just in case’ approach. This trend in 
government and among regulators towards risk regulation has been termed ‘new public risk 
management’ (Black, 2005).
Dingwall (1996) sees professional regulation as “a state project to tidy up the market for 
health care provision in support of its own developing stake in public health” (Dingwall, 
1996, p5). Dingwall points to risk as a significant factor in the regulatory process. For 
example, he claims the formation of the Royal Pharmaceutical Society was not the result of 
the efforts of organized interests of pharmacists, but rather the state response to “moral 
panic about the increasingly potent organic compounds that were becoming available” 
(Dingwall, 1996, p5): in other words, a state response to a perceived risk to health.
Supply theories of professionalisation form the second element of the analytical 
framework. Theories suggest that the state’s interest in regulating CAM practitioners may 
stem from a desire for new professionals groups to contribute to social and economic 
order, to correct market failures or to reduce risk. The state’s interest in the 
professionalisation of CAM practitioners is explored in Chapter 8.
5.5 Policy subsystems
The third element o f the analytical framework seeks to combine the ideas that underpin the 
demand and supply theories of professionalisation. Refinements of interest group theories 
acknowledge an active role for state actors, and focus on interactions between groups and 
among participants within groups. This study uses a novel adaptation o f policy subsystem 
analysis — personal policy network analysis.
5.5.1 Policy communities, issue networks and advocacy coalitions
The assumption underlying pluralism is that power is distributed across various groups in 
society. Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) saw power as part of the social process and argued that 
policy was created dynamically and shaped by individual actors and interest groups 
(Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950). Early interest group analysis tended to assume a direct causal 
effect between interest group influence and subsequent state action. Research focused on 
the level o f group influence (as measured by the resources available to groups), and as a 
consequence neglected the relationships between interest groups and diminished the role of
14 The response to uncertainty can be twofold: firstly to introduce precautionary regulation in case there is later found to be a 
hazard where originally none was assumed to exist (type II error) or to take a conservative approach to regulation and 
allow continued exposure to the hazard rather than introduce unnecessary regulation (type I error).
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the state. Political parties and organized interests were simply seen as a transmission belt 
between the state and society (Hall, 1993). In the health policy literature such theories have 
been used to explain why the state has often given priority to the demands of the medical 
profession (Gladstone, 2000).
Policy subsystems have variously been called communities, networks and coalitions. Early 
concepts of these relationships depicted an ‘iron triangle’ between government officials, 
politicians and interest groups. Such a group of closely linked stakeholders with 
homogenous ideas and interests has been termed a ‘policy community’. However, these 
fixed and stable relationships provide a somewhat over-simplified version of real-world 
policy-making. The complexity of policy-making is wonderfully captured in this description 
by Heclo (1974):
a ma^e where the outlet is shifting and the walls are being constantly repattemed; where the 
subject is not one individual but a group bound together; where this group disagrees not only 
on how to get out but on whether getting out constitutes a satisfactory solution; where, 
finally, there is not one but a large number of such groups which keep getting in each other’s 
way (Heclo, 1974, p308).
Heclo (1990) identified looser associations of interested parties which he termed ‘issue 
networks’ (Heclo, 1990). The work of Heclo and others suggests that the allegiances and 
alliances forged between interest groups, and the strength of these, are important to explain 
eventual policy outcomes.
Marsh and Rhodes (1992) set out ideal types of policy communities and issue networks at 
either end of a spectrum, differing in membership, level of integration and resources 
(Marsh and Rhodes, 1992) (see Table 5.4). Smith argues that the nature of relationships 
within a policy subsystem will depend on the level of state autonomy. Where the 
government depends upon groups for implementation, particularly those with important 
resources to exchange, policy communities are more likely. In contrast, in areas of lesser 
importance to government, o f high political controversy, or in new issue areas where 
interests have not had the time to establish institutionalised relationships, issue networks 
will develop (Smith, 1993).
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Table 5.4 Dimensions of policy communities and issue networks
Dimension Policy community Issue network
M embership
Number of participants Very limited, some conscious 
exclusion
Large
Type of interest Economic/professional Wide range of groups
integration
Frequency of interaction Frequent, high quality Contacts fluctuate
Continuity Membership, values, 
outcomes persistent
Fluctuating access
Consensus All participants share basic 
values
A degree of agreement but 
conflict present
R esources
Distribution of resources within 
network
All participants have 
resources. Relationship is one 
of exchange
Some participants have 
resources, but limited
Distribution of resources within 
participating organisations
Hierarchical leaders can 
deliver members
Varied and variable distribution 
and capacity to regulate 
members
Power There is a  balance among 
members. One group may be 
dominant but power is 
positive-sum
Unequal power. Power zero- 
sum
Source: (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992)
Sabatier (1988) develops these concepts further and argues that within any policy 
subsystem there will be a number of competing advocacy coalitions made up of “people 
from various organizations who share a set of normative and causal beliefs and who often 
act in concert” (Sabatier, 1988, pl33). The advocacy coalition framework recognises that 
people may have a range of beliefs that are not always related to their formal role within an 
organisation, and who may have membership in more than one coalition.
Research in the pluralist tradition has tended to give primacy to organized interest groups 
and has downplayed the role of the state and the ability of state actors to act autonomously 
(Smith, 1993). Smith (1993) suggests the focus should also be on the interests and activities 
of state actors, because it is through mechanisms o f inclusion and exclusion that the state 
creates insiders and outsiders. He argues that “Past policies, ideology and the way policy is 
made can advantage some groups over others” (Smith, 1993). This is in contrast to the 
Weberian ideal type o f the bureaucrat. It is not simply a matter o f politicians decide and 
officials ‘carry out’. Page (1992), for example, argues that civil servants are policy-makers as 
well as policy executors (Page, 1992, p51). These sentiments are echoed in the work of
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Heclo, who recognises that “administrative actors have been crucial in giving concrete 
substance to new policy initiatives and in elaborating already established approaches” 
(Heclo, 1974, p304).
Freidson, much of whose work focuses on the medical profession, recognises the 
importance of the interaction between occupational groups and the state. He writes:
The foundation of medicine's control over its work is thus clearly political in character, 
involving the aid of the state in establishing and maintaining the professions' pre­
eminence. ..it is by the interaction between formal agents or agencies o f the 
occupation and officials o f the state that the occupation's control over its work is 
established and shaped (Freidson, 1970, p23, my emphasis).
McDonald also writes in a similar vein:
professional/ state interactions are seen as the outcome of actions and reactions on the part of 
the officers of a professional body, their counterparts in other professional bodies and in 
various Civil Service departments. Crucial to that outcome are the legislative strategies of 
both profession and state, as well as the skill displayed by the protagonists on either side on 
particular occasions (Macdonald, 1995, p13).
Neither of these authors actually explore these interactions but instead focus primarily on 
professional activities. These interactions between the state and professions are central to 
the theories that seek to explain the dynamics o f the policy process.
5.5.2 Individuals and the policy process
Rhodes (2002) proposes that research of policy networks has lost sight of the individuals 
within networks. He argues for a constructivist approach that would put people back into 
networks by exploring “the ways in which they are made and remade through the activities 
of particular individuals” (Rhodes, 2002, p400).
A number of approaches have developed which focus on individuals within policy 
subsystems. Each approach has very different assumptions about the role of individuals 
and how decisions are reached. The rational choice approach sees outcomes as the result of 
bargaining between agents in the network (see Dowding, 1991). The personal interaction 
approach emphasizes personal relationships between known and trusted individuals who 
share beliefs and common culture (see McPherson and Raab, 1988). The formal network 
analysis sees the positions and roles that actors perform and the relationships between 
these roles as crucial (see Laumann and Knoke, 1987).
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Sabatier (1988) argues that “ ...institutional models have difficulty accounting for the 
importance of specific individuals who move about from organization to organization 
within the same subsystem” (Sabatier, 1988, pl40). These so called ‘policy brokers’ mediate 
between competing advocacy coalitions in order to establish the basis for consensus.
Heclo (1974) and Kingdon (1984) have also recognised the role of (pro)active individuals 
who were able to seize the opportunity to achieve policy change, called ‘policy middlemen’ 
and ‘policy entrepreneurs’. John (2003) believes individuals also play an important role in 
the selection of policy ideas. He defines policy entrepreneurs as:
activists with a particular interest in the success of the polity though in a less acute sense 
everyone is an entrepreneur who has a stake in the polity outputs and outcomes, the citizens 
who vote for policies, politicians who seek to maximize votes and capitalize on polity 
opportunities and bureaucrats who have a stake in the implementation ofparticular polity 
choices (John, 2003, pp493A).
The approach adopted in this study responds to the call to put people back into networks 
(Rhodes, 2002) and sees influence as related to connections between people. It is similar in 
design to Lewis (2006) in which social networks o f interpersonal ties are the focus (Lewis, 
2006). Unlike many analyses of policy communities, issue networks and advocacy coalitions 
that focus on interest groups the analysis in this study includes state actors and is at the 
level of individuals.
The approach called ‘personal network analysis’ is an adaptation o f existing approaches and 
focuses on individuals. It forms the third element o f the analytical framework (see below) 
and is applied to the regulation of CAM practitioners in Chapter 9.
5.6 Institutions and ideas
Other theories explain policy as the result of either endogenous aspects of the network or 
policy subsystem, or exogenous or structural factors, or both. Analysis that focuses on 
groups has been criticised for ignoring beliefs and structures (which could also be termed 
ideas and institutions). For example, Smith (1993) argues:
In analysing groups and polity-making it is inadequate to focus solely on groups. It is 
necessaiy to take an historical approach which examines the nature of the relationships that 
have developed in particular polity sectors. It is important to examine the mechanisms for 
inclusion and exclusion, the beliefs that are dominant in a polity areas and the structures of 
the polity process (Smith, 1993, p11).
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5.6.1 Structural factors
Structural approaches, such as that of the historical institutionalists, argue that the 
institutional organisation of the polity and economy favours some groups over others (Hall 
and Taylor, 1997). Institutionalists emphasise the importance o f organisational rules and 
social environments in shaping policy (Koelble, 1995). The main argument is that prior 
institutional choices will limit future options. As an explanatory theory it tends to favour 
policy stasis or path dependence over policy change.
Institutional and organisational theories have been applied to the study of regulation (Levy 
and Spiller, 1996) and health care policy (Immergut, 1990; Immergut, 1992; Moran and 
Wood, 1993; Tuohy, 1999a; Tuohy, 1999b; Tuohy, 2003). Political institutions are believed 
to shape the outcomes of interest group activity. As Wolfson, Trebilcock et al. (1980) 
observed “policymakers are rarely if ever presented with a blank slate, and the field o f 
professional regulation is no exception” (Wolfson, Trebilcock et al., 1980, p i 88). Most 
accounts focus on historical institutionalism but there is increasing interest in cultural 
institutionalism, where embedded social norms and values can also shape policy outcomes. 
Institutions, then, may constrain the possibilities for regulation, or at least shape the design 
of regulation.
Institutionalist approaches are criticised for their inability to explain change. March and 
Olsen (1997) argue that “Institutions are usually associated with routinization and 
repetition, persistence and predictability rather than with political change, and flexibility, 
agency, creativity and discretion” (March and Olsen, 1997). While stabilisation may be 
appropriate in the short term if institutions are not able to respond to the changing context 
they may become obsolete. The structural approach downplays interpersonal relationships 
in favour of structural aspects (Marsh and Smith, 2000).
Exogenous factors (such as economic, ideological, political and knowledge-based factors) 
will be important in shaping policy networks, but the networks themselves have a role in 
mediating their influence. Marsh and Smith (2000) propose a dialectical approach to the 
study of policy networks, which recognises a two-way relationship between structure and 
agency, network and context, and network and outcomes (Marsh and Smith, 2000). Power 
relationships within the network are institutionalised by previous policy (structure), but 
members of a network also shape the structures within which they operate. They “choose 
policy options, bargain, argue and break up networks” (p7). This process of structuration 
needs to be incorporated into network analysis. According to Marsh and Smith (2000):
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.. .any explanation of change must emphasise the role of agents, while also acknowledging 
that the broader context within which the network operates affects the interests and actions 
of network members (Marsh and Smith, 2000, p7).
The relationship between networks and outcomes, however, is not unidirectional. Policy 
outcomes shape the context within which future policy issues are considered. They may 
lead to changes in membership or the balance of resources within the network, affect the 
social structure and weaken the position o f certain interests, or may affect agents through 
the process of strategic or policy-oriented learning (Marsh and Smith, 2000).
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) argue that the accumulated evidence suggests that 
“policy beliefs shared by members o f different institutions may be at least as important in 
explaining their behaviour as the institutional rules that apply to members of a given 
institution” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999, pl30). Heclo sees policy as an outcome not 
only of the impact of previous policy but also as a result o f the interrelationships between 
organisations and individual agents o f change (Heclo, 1974).
5.6.2 Ideas
Ideas have been variously defined as policy proposals, new techniques or solutions, systems 
of ideas, or discourse and language (John, 2003). According to Heclo (1974) politics is 
concerned not only with power but also uncertainty, and consequently he believes 
“Governments not only ‘power’...they also puzzle” (Heclo, 1974). In his analysis of the 
development o f welfare policies in Britain and Sweden he conceives o f policy-making as a 
form of collective puzzlement on society’s behalf or a ‘process of social learning’. So the 
flow of ideas (and who controls them) are important to an understanding o f the policy 
process.
The concept of social learning focuses on how policy experience and new information can 
shift officials’ and policymakers’ ideas. Hall (1993) describes how social learning influences 
the policy process:
In order to understand how social learning takes place, we also need a more complete 
account of the role that ideas play in the policy process, .policymakers customarily work 
within a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals ofpolicy and the 
kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the 
problems thy are meant to be addressing (Hall, 1993, p279).
External actors, including researchers and the media, also influence the process of social 
learning (Hall, 1993).
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Kingdon (1984) identified three streams (policy, politics and problem streams), the 
confluence of which is necessary before an issue will be addressed (Kingdon, 1984). 
Problems are usually identified by researchers through analysis of routine data, but may 
also result from a crisis or focusing event or emerge from evaluations and feedback of 
existing policy. Politics includes both visible and hidden participants. The politics stream is 
largely driven by the salience of political events and the ideologies of parties in power. 
Academics and the media are the hidden participants who may generate attention for a 
particular problem or put forward available policy alternatives. Working in the policy 
stream are the civil servants who will decide whether to pluck an idea from the ‘primeval 
soup’. So the identification o f problems and policy solutions and the decision to act result 
from the complex interplay of academics, the media, politicians and civil servants.
Sabatier (1988) argues that policy changes result from changes in the dominant beliefs 
within a policy subsystem. Policy change occurs as elites from different advocacy coalitions 
“gradually alter their belief systems over time, partially as a result of formal policy analyses 
and trial and error learning” (Sabatier, 1988, p i30). He suggests that “there will be greater 
fragmentation of beliefs in recently-formed subsystems than in more established ones” 
(Sabatier, 1988, pl40).
Baumgartner and Jones (1991) argue that opportunities for policy change open up when an 
issue is redefined or there are shifts in institutional control.15 They argue that:
Issue definition is the driving force in both stability and instability, primarily because issue 
definition has the potential for mobilising the previously disinterested. The structure of 
political institutions offers more orfewer arenas for raising new issues or redefining old ones 
— opportunities to change understandings of political conflict. Issue definition and 
institutional control combine to make possible the alternation between stability and rapid 
change that characterises political systems (Baumgartner andJones, 1991,p16).
By focusing on changes in ideas and institutions (‘policy images’ and ‘policy venues’ in their 
terminology) they can explain both stability and change within a pluralist perspective 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1991). Elaborating on these ideas, Baumgartner and Jones (2002) 
argue policy change depends on whether new ideas are reinforced with positive feedback or 
countered with negative feedback. Negative feedback will bring the system back into 
equilibrium, whereas positive feedback will amplify the issue and result in policy change 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 2002). They suggest that positive feedback can accentuate a policy 
trend through cue taking or mimicking by policy actors (the idea of a policy bandwagon or
15 The idea of punctuated equilibrium was borrowed from evolutionary theory to explain periods o f volatile change.
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policy fads and fashions), or as a result o f a shift in attention (due to cognitive limitations 
and serial information processing only one aspect o f an issue may be in focus at any one 
time).
The spread of policy ideas between countries or between sectors has been likened to a 
virus and may challenge existing policy communities and networks. “New ideas have a 
virus-like quality and have an ability to disrupt existing policy systems, power relationships 
and policies” (Richardson, 2000, p i 021). The survival o f a policy network, as in 
evolutionary theory, will depend on the extent to which it can adapt itself or mutate the 
idea (John, 2003).
Hall (1993) contrasts periods of ‘normal policymaking’ with third order changes which 
result in a shift in the policy paradigm (drawing on Kuhn’s idea o f paradigm shift in 
scientific research) (Hall, 1993). Hall cites several factors that might precipitate such a 
radical shift:
accumulation of anomalies, experimentation with new forms of policy and polity failures 
that precipitate a shift in the locus of authority over polity and initiate a wider contest 
between competing paradigms (Hall, 1993, p280).
In the regulation literature some writers assert that the ‘force o f ideas’ may in itself be 
sufficient to shape regulation (see for example Hood, 1994). The force of ideas in steering 
regulatory developments has not been extensively tested on empirical examples but it is 
likely that these factors interact, for example with particular interest groups pushing certain 
ideas (Baldwin and Cave, 1999, p i9).
In a comparative assessment of a number o f risk regimes Hood, Rothstein et al. (2001) 
propose three hypotheses to explain risk regulation regimes: market failure pressures, 
opinion responsive government, and interest driven pressures. They also suggest that ideas, 
policy entrepreneurship, and internal processes of institutions (including formal rules, the 
interests of technocrats, bureaucrats and professionals operating within state institutions 
and the culture of institutions) will have a role in shaping regulatory regimes (Hood, 
Rothstein et al., 2001). They conclude that regulation is the product o f the dynamics o f the 
policy process in which public opinion and attitude to risk play an important role.
The concepts examined here about the role o f ideas and institutions in shaping policy form 
the final element of the analytical framework. Chapter 10 applies this to the research 
question; why was a particular model of regulation adopted for CAM practitioners.
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5.7 Empirical research
The empirical underpinnings of demand theories of professionalisation are weak. Most 
studies have taken single cases and told a narrative story about an occupation’s transition 
from occupational group to profession. For each case attempts are made to generalise and 
find a series of common steps which might be followed by an occupation in transition. 
Litde attempt is made to explain how and why this process occurs. The steps and the 
particular order have varied between studies but usually include: shift from amateur to 
professional or specialisation of work, establishment of training schools (followed by an 
attachment to a university), development of a professional association, public recognition 
and legal support, and finally a code of ethics (Johnson, 1972). This approach assumes that 
there is some evolutionary linear process which all occupational groups will follow 
(Wilensky, 1964) and has been roundly criticised. Firsdy because comparative analysis has 
shown that cases vary in the order these steps are achieved, secondly because some 
occupations are not granted professional status despite completing these steps, and thirdly 
because some occupational groups lose as well as gain professional status (Abbott, 1988). 
Most researchers would agree with Johnson (1972) that “there is no uniform or unilineal 
process of professionalisation which is of universal applicability” (Johnson, 1972).
Baer (1981, 1984) followed the trait approach by looking at professionalisation as an 
evolutionary process. In his analysis of the professionalisation of osteopathy in the UK, 
Baer (1984) acknowledges that although steps such as establishing a voluntary register are 
necessary they are not sufficient conditions for state regulation. Ultimately political and 
economic elites had to be convinced of a need for osteopathy to counter the 
“contradictions of capital-intensive, high technology medicine” (Baer, 1984). A similar 
approach is adopted in the analysis of professionalisation o f acupuncture in the San 
Francisco Bay area. The creation of schools of traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) and 
acupressure are seen as important steps in the process, as well as changes in the knowledge 
base to incorporate biomedical explanations (Baer, Jen et al., 1998).
Clarke, Doel et al. (2004) analyse the process of professionalisation among CAM 
practitioners in the UK using documentary evidence (Clarke, Doel et al., 2004). They 
identify how the costs and benefits of statutory regulation are portrayed in documents 
circulated by nine national associations to their members (representing aromatherapy, 
Chinese herbal medicine, chiropractic, crystal healing, feng shui, lay homeopathy, medical 
homeopathy, osteopathy and radionics). This work links to demand theories of 
professionalisation by assuming that regulation is pursued by the professions (who make 
rational decisions about whether to lobby for regulation).
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Theories of social closure have formed the basis for much work on the regulation of CAM 
practitioners. Most of Saks> work has adopted this theoretical approach including his work 
on acupuncture in the UK (Saks, 1986). Research among medical and non-medical 
homeopaths in the UK also drew heavily on theories of social closure. Cant and Sharma 
(1996) aimed to identify the strategies employed to demarcate homeopathic knowledge 
from other potential providers (Cant and Sharma, 1996).
The concept of ‘jurisdictional boundaries’, put forward by Abbott (1988), has been applied 
empirically in a number of studies. For example, Norris (2001) drew on Abbott’s ideas that 
professionals form an interlocking system in which they compete for work. The analysis 
focused on how different occupational groups involved in the treatment of musculoskeletal 
problems in New Zealand express and produce differences between occupations in order 
to maintain boundaries (Norris, 2001). There has been a delay between the publication of 
theoretical work on the professions and its use in informing empirical studies of the 
professionalisation of CAM practitioners.
Fournier (2002) explores how the identity of a professional aromatherapy practitioner was 
created in opposition to ideas of the naive amateur and the unscrupulous quack (Fournier, 
2002). This draws on theories of social construction. Although it does not mention Abbott 
specifically, it does explore how aromatherapists set jurisdictional boundaries within an area 
of practice that is also occupied by beauty aromatherapists and the lay public.
Three connected studies conducted in Ontario, Canada have combined social closure 
theories with the ideas of jurisdictional boundaries. Boon, Welsh et al. (2003) conducted 
focus groups with naturopathic practitioners, homeopaths and TCM/acupuncture 
practitioners in order to explore the “micro-level dimensions of professionalisation” 
(Boon, Welsh et al., 2003). This study, like others focusing solely on the occupational 
groups seeking regulation, did not attempt to understand the relationship between CAM 
practitioner groups and state actors or other stakeholders.
The second study aimed to identify the strategies employed by leaders of professional 
associations to pursue the goal of statutory regulation (Welsh, Kelner et al., 2004a). The 
focus was on the internal batdes, rather than the relationship with external groups such as 
doctors and government, and looked at how knowledge claims were used to set boundaries 
between good and bad practitioners and to signal externally that practitioners are qualified 
and legitimate. The authors recognised that external factors, such as the actions of other 
health care groups, and the readiness of government to respond to requests for self­
regulation exert an influence on policy.
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In the final study Kelner, Wellman et al. (2004) conducted a series of interviews with 
government officials in Ontario involved in the policy to regulate CAM practitioners. They 
sought views on the role of the state in the professionalisation o f CAM practitioners, as 
well as their attitudes towards further integration of CAM in the public health system 
(Kelner, Wellman et al., 2004b). The approach was still largely based on ideas o f social 
closure. Their interest in state actors was to understand why CAM practitioners had been 
“hampered in their efforts to achieve legitimacy by the general absence of state support” 
(Kelner, Wellman et al., 2004b, p81). The authors explicitly recognize a tension inherent in 
the objectives o f the state (to rationalize health care and get value for money, respond to 
public demands for greater choice of modalities and to protect the public from harm). 
These are described as constraints on the state’s ability to act, as is the influence of 
established health care professionals (especially doctors). They do not analyse the interplay 
of these different interests.
5.8 Analytical framework
The analytical framework consists of four elements: demand theories of professionalisation 
(A), supply theories of professionalisation (B), personal network analysis (Q , and ideas 
(not shown) (see Figure 2.3). Chapters 7-10 use this framework to examine the regulatory 
process in relation to the cases of acupuncturists, chiropractors, herbalists, homeopaths 
and osteopaths.
Common to the demand theories of professionalisation is the idea that statutory regulation 
results from the claims and activities of occupational groups. From this perspective one 
would expect to find that CAM practitioner groups who are statutorily regulated have 
actively pursued regulation in order to obtain economic and social benefits. Chapter 7 tests 
the explanatory value of demand theories o f professionalisation. The chapter examines 
whether the policy process has been dominated by practitioners interested in achieving 
social closure.
Supply theories of professionalisation claim that statutory regulation is the result of 
government initiative rather than the activities of occupational groups. From this 
perspective one would expect to find that the state has introduced regulation o f CAM 
practitioners to meet its own ends. Chapter 8 tests the explanatory value of supply theories 
of professionalisation.
Personal network analysis is the name given here to an approach which analyses the 
positions and roles of actors who are engaged in the policy process and also the
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interrelationships between these individuals. This approach is justified by the characteristics 
of the CAM policy subsystem observed during the initial phase of data collection:
•  CAM interest groups are at a formative stage and relationships are less 
institutionalised than among actors in the wider health policy community.
• Many people promoting the statutory regulation of CAM practitioners 
simultaneously hold positions in several organisations.
•  There are fewer full-time representatives of CAM practitioners than one 
finds among other health care professionals.
This approach assumes that statutory regulation of CAM practitioners is the outcome of 
actions by and interactions between individuals within the policy subsystem. Chapter 9 
tests the explanatory value of personal network analysis.
Finally, Chapter 10 examines the question of how CAM practitioners are regulated. It 
analyses debates about models of regulation within the policy community to identify which 
ideas dominated. Theories about the role of ideas in the formation of policy are used to 
explain why alternative ideas have failed to penetrate the policy network. Before presenting 
the results o f the analysis the next chapter sets out the methods employed.
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Figure 2.3 Analytical framework
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C h a p t e r  6
6 METHODS
“Good policy analysis...takes time and painstaking immersion 
in the details and history of the policy process” (Hood, Rothstein et al., 2001, p i 84)
6.1 Introduction
Among contemporary social policy researchers both quantitative and qualitative research 
methods are widely utilised. Past debates were preoccupied with which approach was more 
objective or rigorous, more valid or reliable. Today acceptance of the place of qualitative 
research in health services research is more widespread (though by no means universal) 
(Dingwall, Murphy et al., 1998), and the focus has shifted on to how to ensure or judge 
high quality qualitative research (Giacomini and Cook, 2000). It is not the purpose of this 
chapter to revisit epistemological debates about the philosophy and methods of the social 
sciences, but rather to provide information to enable the research design and process to be 
traced (and therefore critiqued).
The chapter presents descriptions of (i) the research design and (ii) the analytical process. It 
is hoped that the chapter will provide sufficient information about the collection and 
selection o f data to allow the validity of the research to be judged, and provide enough 
about the analytical process to allow the reliability of the research to be judged.
No research, whether based on numeric data or qualitative data, is fully objective. The prior 
experiences and knowledge, interests, and values of the researcher play a large part in 
guiding the selection of the initial research questions and the themes or statistical 
relationships that are identified as interesting and worthy of further, deeper investigation. 
The chapter therefore begins with an outline o f my own interests, assumptions and 
prejudices.
6.2 Researcher assumptions
Knowledge is essentially based upon a value framework that is held by the researcher and 
shaped by the context in which they operate. It is likely that people’s constructed realities 
are shaped by the dominant views at any particular time or place. Following the work of 
Kuhn, who documented the effect of powerful preconceived ideas on the work of the 
scientific community (Kuhn, 1970), the study assumes epistemological subjectivity. In line 
with Kuhn, I assert that the researcher’s own assumptions are shaped by the wider 
dominant social paradigm.
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Although I have not set up the research setting as I would in experimental research, as the 
sole investigator I have devised and conducted the interviews, selected the documents for 
analysis and coded the data without a second co-researcher, and therefore my personal 
value framework has had an important role in the design, data collection and analysis. 
Consequently I have striven to remain sensitive and open during data collection in order to 
relate to the meanings and perspective of the subjects (as they see it). The perspectives of 
supervisors and advisers have been vital throughout the process to enable me to critically 
reflect on the research design and data, corroborate relevant themes to pursue, and identify 
supplementary themes worthy of exploration that might otherwise have been overlooked. I 
have also tried to remain reflexive at all stages of the research, for example cognisant of my 
effect on the subjects during data collection, and explicit about my reactions during data 
analysis.
One concern for interviewees was whether I had a particular interest or bias in relation to 
complementary and alternative medicine (CAM). My answer was that I was neutral. I come 
from a family o f medical practitioners, to whom I am grateful for fuelling my interest in 
health policy, so am grounded in a conventional medical background. The social paradigm, 
in the United Kingdom at least, remains dominated by biomedicine and this has the 
tendency to promote general scepticism of CAM therapies. However, through close 
personal friends, rather than personal experience, I have seen the beneficial effects of 
seeking assistance from acupuncturists, chiropractors and osteopaths, herbalists, spiritual 
healers and aromatherapy masseurs. I am therefore open to the possibility that CAM can 
contribute to healing and well-being. However, my concern here was not with normative 
questions of whether CAM does or does not work, whether it should or should not be 
funded and available on the NHS, nor if it should or should not be regulated. Thus any 
views on these issues should not have overly influenced my approach to understanding 
how we got to the position we are in today in relation to the regulation of these 
practitioners.
As a result of the research process my own views on whether and how complementary 
medical practitioners should be regulated have crystallized. (These are discussed briefly in 
the conclusions). My own ideas about regulatory approaches were shared with one or two 
interviewees, in an effort to establish whether alternative strategies had been considered or 
debated previously and to gauge reactions. Informally through my own contact with 
policymakers and formally through interviews and supervisions it is possible that my ideas 
have seeped into the policy process. My own views on the regulation of CAM practitioners
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have been further influenced by the research I have undertaken and these are discussed in 
the concluding chapter.
6.3 Justifying the m ethodological approach
The increasingly multi-disciplinary nature o f social policy research is opening up the 
methodological Pandora’s box, with historians, political scientists and anthropologists 
joining economists and sociologists. It presents exciting opportunities for new research 
questions to be answered and for new perspectives on old questions. Political scientists are 
often more interested in why things happen the way they do, in the process o f policy. 
Traditionally social policy research focused on policy content and policy outcomes. The era 
o f public administration was dominated by evaluations of government programmes. Such 
research often made use o f official statistics or other official data generated by public 
institutions (such as hospital episode statistics from the National Health Service). Research 
has changed as the state’s role has shifted from direct provision to contracting out across a 
number of areas of social policy. Value for money audits and studies of performance using 
measures such as consumer satisfaction, financial performance and quality indicators are 
increasingly common.
This study focuses on process rather than on outcomes or the impact o f policy. It aims to 
explain why regulation of CAM practitioners has taken the form that it has in the UK. It 
specifically seeks to identify the factors which contributed to the decision to enact 
legislation to regulate CAM practitioners, and to explain why certain therapies are 
regulated. It also focuses on policy content. It seeks to explain why the particular model o f 
regulation has been adopted.
In order to answer these questions it is essential to get at the narrative behind the policy 
process, to understand what happened during this period from the perspective o f those 
involved, and to analyse their views, opinions and actions. It requires ‘immersion’ in the 
policy debates that took place in order to identify ideas that were held and influences that 
held sway. The study therefore utilises qualitative research methods.
This methodological approach is particularly well suited to the research questions 
addressed in this study because:
•  Depicting process requires detailed description o f how people engage with each 
other;
•  The experience of process typically varies for different people so their 
experiences need to be captured in their own words;
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• Process is fluid and dynamic;
• Participants’ perceptions are a key process consideration.
In common with other qualitative research this study assumes that there is no single 
absolute reality but that there are multiple realities (known as ontological relativity). 
Adopting a constructivist approach, the study attempts to construct reality on the basis of 
data provided by the subjects. In analysing the development o f policy from multiple 
perspectives the intention is to reconstruct the regulatory process. In the analysis of 
decision-makers this constructed reality has been termed an ‘appreciative system’. Vickers 
(1965) defines it thus:
appreciative judgments rejlect the view currently held ly those who make them of their 
interests and responsibilities, views largely implicit and unconscious which none the less 
condition what events and relations thy will regard as relevant or possibly relevant to them, 
and whether thy will regard these as welcome or unwelcome, ijnportant or unimportant, 
demanding or not demanding action or concern ly them (Vickers, 1965, p67).
This appreciative system or assumptive world informs how decision-makers process and 
interpret information and interactions.
Qualitative research methods seem justified in exploring an area o f policymaking that has 
received little or no attention. The intention is not to prove or disprove well-defined 
hypothesis, but rather to reveal insights into the policy process which might have a wider 
resonance for health policy research and to explore ideas about professional regulation. 
Qualitative data can therefore provide the basis for re-constructing the regulatory process.
A major criticism of qualitative research is that it is more challenging to demonstrate the 
reliability and validity of the findings due to the active role of the researcher. A number of 
criteria have been suggested to assist in judging the quality o f qualitative research 
(Giacomini and Cook, 2000). Similar guidelines and suggestions o f questions to consider 
have been put forward elsewhere (Mays and Pope, 2000). The ‘checklist’ approach has been 
criticised for being overly prescriptive and for suggesting that following a series of technical 
procedures confers rigour (Barbour, 2001). While these suggest a number of ways to 
increase the reliability and validity of findings, ultimately the quality o f qualitative research 
is highly dependent on the “skill, vision and integrity of the researcher” (Mays and Pope, 
2000, p i 16).
One suggestion is to have explicit hypotheses a priori. However, well-defined hypotheses 
might suggest that other methods would have been more appropriate. In reality most
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research questions are shaped and refined throughout the research process, and the design 
is adapted as the study proceeds. A second suggestion is to have explicit analytical 
constructs (or codes) prior to the commencement of analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Again if these are too restrictive the researcher may overlook important issues which 
emerge from the data.
Proponents o f grounded theory propose that researchers should use inductive methods to 
identify the themes that emerge from the data (Glaser and Strauss, 1968). Analytic 
induction proposes a number of components for the research process: constant 
comparison, deviant case analysis, and theoretical sampling (Dingwall, Murphy et al., 1998). 
At its extreme the grounded approach, in common with positivists, denies that the 
researcher has prior experiences and assumptions. In this study where I have been the sole 
person conducting both the data collection and analysis it was not feasible to maintain 
complete distance from the data before the commencement of the analysis. In fact most 
research is an iterative process of deduction and induction; a “search for regularities and 
cumulation” (Dingwall, Murphy et al., 1998).
In this study, theory has both informed and been informed by data analysis. (See the 
previous chapter for a description of the development of the analytical framework) A 
number o f issues and themes were identified a priori as being of interest, for example what 
did stakeholders say about the purpose of regulation, the options for regulation, and the 
structures o f regulatory bodies. Others such as professional fragmentation, ideas about risk 
and public protection and the heterogeneity of practice were issues that rapidly emerged as 
key themes from initial reading of the data. These were incorporated and reflected in the 
analytical framework and codes used. The review of the literature which informed the 
analytical framework helped to establish a set of explanatory theories to be tested, i.e. 
demand theories and supply theories o f professionalisation. These were used to structure 
the analytical codes and provided themes around which data analysis was organised.
6.4 Research design
The research uses multiple sources of data (documentary and interview) from multiple 
stakeholders involved in the policy process. It focuses on five complementary therapies 
(acupuncture, chiropractic, herbal medicine, homeopathy and herbal medicine) in order to 
examine the commonality and differences across groups and over time.
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6.4.1 Selection o f cases
The cases examined in this study were chosen in order to represent therapies that are used 
and practised extensively in the UK and the subject of policy discussions about regulation.
There are many therapies practised in the UK that are broadly classified as CAM. The 
House of Lords’ Report identified acupuncture, chiropractic, herbal medicine, homeopathy 
and osteopathy as the so-called ‘Big 5’ because of their widespread use (House of Lords 
Select Committee on Science and Technology, 2000a, p 17). As we saw in Chapter 2 this is 
broadly in line with the findings of population surveys. Consultations with herbalists are 
generally fewer than with other practitioners, but use of herbal medicines is high and 
growing.
Osteopathy and chiropractic were included as examples where statutory recognition is in 
place. Acupuncture and herbal medicine serve as examples where statutory regulation has 
been proposed but which currently have established systems o f unified voluntary self­
regulation. Homeopathy is one of several CAM therapies which has multiple registering 
bodies but is working towards a unified system of voluntary self-regulation. I originally 
envisaged that aromatherapy would be included but it soon became evident that disputes 
peculiar to the Aromatherapy Regulatory Working Group meant access would be difficult. 
It was therefore excluded.
Having selected the cases the next step was to collect data. Two main sources were used, 
documentary evidence and semi structured interviews.
6.4.2 Documentary data
The main sources of documentary data were:
• Written and oral evidence to the House o f Lords’ Science & Technology Sub- 
Committee on Complementary and Alternative Medicine published in two 
volumes (House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, 
2000b; 2000c)
•  The House of Lords’ Science & Technology Sub-Committee on 
Complementary and Alternative Medicine Report (House of Lords Select 
Committee on Science and Technology, 2000a),
• Department of Health proposals on the statutory regulation of herbal medicine 
and acupuncture (Department o f Health, 2004a)
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•  Submissions to the Department o f Health consultation on statutory regulation 
o f acupuncturists and herbalists and the published consultation responses 
(Department o f Health, 2005b),
• Reports of regulatory working groups for osteopathy, chiropractic, acupuncture 
and herbal medicine and proposals produced by the Council for Organisations 
Registering Homeopaths (King's Fund, 1991; King's Fund, 1993; Acupuncture 
Regulatory Working Group, 2003; Herbal Medicine Regulatory Working 
Group, 2003; Council of Organisations Registering Homeopaths, 2005),
• Hansard reports o f debates on the Osteopaths Bill and Chiropractors Bill in the 
House of Commons and on the Sub-Committee Report on CAM in the Lords,
• Reports and publications by the Foundation for Integrated Health.
The process of document identification was iterative. As new members of the policy 
network were identified (see below) associated documentation was added to the data set. 
Documents were also suggested by or provided by interviewees for inclusion. The websites 
o f the main CAM practitioner groups associated with the therapies of interest were 
searched in order to identify newsletters, press releases, publications and statements 
relating to their activities on regulation. A watchful eye was kept on the media and journals 
for articles and letters published by members of the policy network. Finally summaries of 
speeches made by members of the policy network at conferences and seminars organised 
by the Foundation were included.
A challenge of contemporary policy research is that the policy process often continues after 
the commencement of the research study. That was the case here. Originally the 
Department expected to consult on a draft section 60 Order to regulate acupuncture and 
herbal medicine in autumn/winter 2005 (Department of Health, 2005a). At the time of 
publication, there is still no indication of when or even whether the regulation will be 
introduced. The dilemma for researchers in such circumstances is that while it is important 
to include emerging data (in the form of newly published documents), a decision has to be 
taken as some point to stop adding data. Documents were added until June 2006 with the 
publication of proposals for the voluntary regulation o f CAM practitioners by the 
Foundation for Integrated Health (Jack, 2006). A full list of documents included in the data 
set is included at Appendix 2. This was also necessary to ensure internal coding reliability 
by allowing identical searches of key words on all documents. We will return to issues of 
coding when I describe the analytical process below.
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6.4.3 Semi-structured interviews
The documentary evidence was complemented by a series of 19 semi-structured interviews 
with key participants in the policy process.
Sampling strategy
The study used snowball sampling to identify relevant individuals. This approach of 
snowball or chain sampling was used by Peters and Waterman in their research o f high 
performing companies (Peters and Waterman Jr, 1982), and is particularly suited to locating 
key informants. I was interested in identifying key individuals who had been actively 
engaged in the policy process. I therefore began by interviewing the civil servant at the 
Department of Health with responsibility for CAM policy.
During the interview he mentioned 24 individuals and a further nine organisations involved 
in policy discussions concerning the regulation o f CAM practitioners. He emphasised the 
centrality of the Foundation for Integrated Health, so interviews were set up with the Chief 
Executive and the Head of the Regulation Programme. Approaches were made in autumn 
2004 to a further eight interviewees. Seven responded and interviews were arranged before 
the end of the year. All interviewees were asked to name up to three o f the most important 
people involved in the development of professional regulation for CAM practitioners who 
they thought I should speak to. Through this process the perceptions o f interviewees were 
used to verify the selection of key informants.
A further 18 people were approached early in 2005. These were people who were 
mentioned by at least two of those already interviewed. O f these, nine interviews were 
actually conducted. Eight people did not reply despite a further attempt to contact them, 
and one who replied initially was not available for interview due to travel in India and did 
not respond to emailed questions. One of those who did not reply was able to meet at a 
later date and verified the findings of my analysis based on other sources. This suggests 
that analysis of the documentary data was probably sufficient to construct an accurate view 
of other people’s ideas, role and position within the policy network . The non-responders 
were from a range of stakeholders including two academics, two parliamentarians, one civil 
servant and three from practitioner groups. There was therefore unlikely to be a systematic 
bias in the sample of interviewees. A full list o f interviewees and dates are included in 
Appendix 3. It should be noted that no Ministers were identified through this process. This 
is surprising given their authority in most areas of health policy and may simply reflect the 
low priority o f CAM as a policy issue on ministerial agendas.
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Interviews
A preliminary interview schedule was developed in spring 2004. Prior to the first interview 
in summer 2004 the interview schedule was tailored to reflect refinements to the analytical 
framework and the interviewee’s position at the Department of Health. It specifically 
included questions about the level of political interest and civil servant activity, 
identification of influential stakeholders (so-called ‘movers and shakers’), and any 
opposition to regulation. Subsequent interviews were based on key topics including the 
reasons and justification for regulation, how regulation should operate and weaknesses with 
the current approach, and who interviewees’ ‘allies’ and ‘enemies’ were. Specific interview 
questions were developed for each interviewee based around these topics, but tailored to 
reflect the individual’s position (all interview schedules are available on request, a sample is 
included in Appendix 4).
Interviews were digitally recorded and were supplemented with note-taking to capture the 
timing of particularly important points and key phrases. Due to the opportunistic timing of 
one of the interviews and the location of another, recording was not feasible. Extensive 
notes were taken and immediately written up. After each interview the recording was 
checked, the interview process critically reviewed and the interview schedule amended. The 
interviews were semi-structured: if issues came up in a different order this line of 
questioning was pursued before returning to other questions on the schedule. The 
interview style was conversational in order to promote openness from the interviewees. 
Further prompts were used to clarify understanding of specific details and to ensure full 
responses to the questions.
Ethics and consent
At the time the research proposal was developed it was not necessary to gain research 
ethics approval from the university. A Research Ethics Policy which included research 
students was introduced at the university in December 2006. However, given the nature of 
the research it is likely that completion of the research ethics checklist would not have 
resulted in the proposal being considered by the Research Ethics Committee. The nature of 
the research was explained to all interviewees in writing with the invitation to be 
interviewed. Approaches were made by letter or email and included an abstract of the 
proposed research and a copy of my CV for information. Agreement to be interviewed was 
voluntary. At the start of each interview the nature of the research was again explained. It 
was made clear that confidentiality would be respected in the use and storage of data. It 
was also explained to interviewees that the intention was to use attributed quotes in the 
final analysis. Where interviewees requested that parts of the interview were off the record
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this was noted in the transcripts and these portions were not included in the research. An 
undertaking was made that all quotes and attributed comments would be checked with the 
interviewee prior to publication. Verbal consent was obtained from participants on this 
basis. Interviews were recorded and fully transcribed. Direct attributable quotes were 
checked with interviewees via email before submission of the thesis. In most cases the 
amendments made at this stage were clarifications or re-phrasings. Only one interviewee 
asked for one quote to be paraphrased and remain unattributed.
Anonymity is challenging in studies o f the policy process. Firsdy, very often key individuals 
are identifiable because of their formal position (i.e. President o f the GMC), particularly 
where both documentary and interview data are used together. Preserving anonymity for 
things that are said during interviews is more difficult when they are presented alongside 
attributable quotes from the documentary data (such as the published oral evidence to the 
House of Lords). Secondly, personal network analysis focuses on individuals. While the 
analysis does not require the naming of interviewees, information on their position would 
in most cases make identification by the reader very straightforward and therefore make a 
mockery of any claims to anonymity. For these reasons it was important that individuals 
who were interviewed were willing to be named in the thesis. On the other hand, it is 
possible that interviewees were less candid because of this.
6.5 Data analysis
There were four main stages to the data analysis. An initial analysis of the data was 
undertaken to identify key themes. A second more in-depth and structured analysis was 
undertaken to index and code the data. Thirdly all codes were checked for internal 
consistency and recoded if necessary. Finally phrases and quotations were selected that 
most accurately illustrated the views o f particular stakeholders for inclusion in the write up. 
The software programme QSR NIVO (Version 2.0) was used to organise and code the 
data. This had a number of advantages over more traditional methods o f coding which are 
discussed below. Documents available electronically and transcripts were imported direcdy 
into NVTVO. For data not available in electronic format a ‘proxy’ file was created in 
NVTVO (these are indicated by an asterisk in Appendix 2).
Analysis o f documentary data began prior to the interviews in order to identify key themes 
on which to base the interview topic guide. During this first phase a preliminary reading of 
the House of Lords’ Report was undertaken to generate a draft list o f codes. These were 
then used to hand code the oral evidence for key stakeholders. Further codes were 
generated. Documents and transcripts were coded electronically using this initial structure,
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which had emerged from analysis o f the House of Lords’ evidence. Further codes were 
created for new themes or sub themes that continued to emerge.
During 2005 the emergent coding structure was rationalised and reorganised into themes: 
process, risks, ideas, and professional identity. Professional identity later became subsumed 
under a broader code of demand theories and risks under supply theories. These codes 
closely reflect the theoretical concepts that emerged from the review of the literature and 
lie at the heart o f the analytical framework. A final list of codes was thus generated (see 
Appendix 5 for a full list of codes).
In the second phase all interviews were re-analysed and re-coded. Documents were 
searched electronically by keywords and relevant paragraphs coded. Documents that were 
only available in hard copy, including the oral and written evidence of the House of Lords’ 
Select Committee, were also re-analysed. Selected extracts were typed directly into NVTVO 
to allow these data to be searched and analysed together with the other electronic sources.
The third stage involved checking the internal consistency of the codes. This involved 
reading the content of the codes and checking that they matched the definitions. Some text 
was recoded at this stage.
The three lenses of the analytical framework were used to guide the final stage of analysis. 
Firstly, data relating to CAM practitioners were analysed. In particular, codes relating to 
whether statutory regulation had been actively pursued, the benefits and disadvantages of 
regulation, and whether views were divided among practitioners were scrutinised. Each o f 
the codes was analysed separately for each therapy. Secondly, data relating to state actors, 
including civil servants, politicians, members o f the House o f Lords, and Ministers were 
analysed. Codes relating to the strategies employed by the state in relation to the 
professionalisation of CAM practitioners and the justifications for action were analysed. 
Finally data relating to individuals within the policy network were analysed. Each individual 
case was analysed to build up a picture of their role in the policy network, their affiliations 
and relationships with others in the network. Different phases of the policy process were 
analysed in this way, and differences by therapy were also examined. The final piece of 
analysis was focused on codes under the umbrella code ‘ideas’. The main regulatory issues 
and preoccupations were identified, and these codes then analysed in more detail by 
stakeholder (CAM practitioners, the state, orthodox medicine, academics and consumer 
organisations). This also highlighted regulatory issues that were surprisingly not discussed 
by many stakeholders.
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The use of qualitative software had a number of benefits. Firsdy, it provided an efficient 
means o f managing the data, which consisted of some 306 data files (17 o f which were 
minutes o f aromatherapy consortia meetings and were excluded from die set of working 
files). Memo files were used to record the analytical process, emerging ideas and 
background information on stakeholders and interviewees.
Secondly, during the coding phase electronic management of data enabled searches by key 
words (where the full text was available electronically). This was used for example to search 
for ‘accreditation’ and its derivatives when constructing the code relating to the 
accreditation of courses. However this method must be deployed cautiously. The search 
described also picked up an alternative meaning o f the term: the prior accreditation of 
learning for applicants to a register.
Thirdly, during the analytical phase the use of Boolean searches was invaluable. Files were 
organised into sets and document attributes assigned according to document type (see 
Table 6.5) and stakeholder type (see Table 6.6). This information was used together with 
codes to retrieve a subset of relevant data for analysis. For example, a search o f the union 
of ‘Shared Council’ AND ‘Acupuncture’ retrieves everything that was written or said about 
the idea of an umbrella or joint council by organisations or individuals representing the 
acupuncture profession. Initial investment of time to input and code the data electronically 
paid off in the final phase of analysis, when pinpointing and retrieval of data was made 
easier.
Finally, electronic management allows numeric data on the number of times an issue was 
mentioned to be generated. This facility has not been used in this study as the data was not 
drawn from a representative sample. Such information was useful in identifying key 
preoccupations among different stakeholders, and guided the analytical process in this 
respect.
Throughout the analytical process my own ‘hunches’ and insights have no doubt led me to 
focus on certain themes in greater detail. However, the three lenses o f the analytical 
framework provided a clear structure to guide the analytical process. The results of the 
analysis are presented in the following four chapters. The next chapter presents the 
findings of the analysis using demand theories of professionalisation. It tries to reconstruct 
the policy process that led osteopathy and chiropractic to be statutorily regulated in the 
early 1990s, and led to the more recent decision to regulate acupuncture and herbal 
medicine. It examines whether the role played by CAM practitioners can explain the 
regulatory process and its outcomes.
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Table 6.5 Number of data files in working set by stakeholder type
Stakeholder
type Totals
Acupuncture 17
Aromatherapy 0
Orthodox 37
Consumer 24
Herbal 23
Chiropractic 7
CAM 8
State 46
Homeopathy 19
Osteopathy 10
Commercial 2
Academic 12
Foundation 33
NHS 6
POW 28
NA 16
TOTAL 288
NA=not applicable
Table 6.6 Number of data files in working set by document type
Docum ent type Totals
Published document 35
House of Lords 87
Consultation response 18
Speech 28
Memo 31
Hansard 12
Email 7
Interview 22
Minutes 0
Web 13
Media 35
TOTAL 288
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C h a p t e r  7
7 THE DEMAND FOR PROFESSIONAL REGULATION
7.1 Introduction
Demand theories of professionalisation have been used in a number of empirical studies to 
analyse the process by which CAM practitioners have sought to professionalise (see 
Chapter 5). In this chapter I test the value of these theories in explaining why some CAM 
practitioner groups are statutorily regulated. I examine the experience o f five CAM 
practitioner groups: acupuncture, chiropractic, herbal medicine, homeopathy and 
osteopathy. The research draws on documentary data and in-depth interviews with key 
actors (see Chapter 6 for more details of the methodology). The primary focus of this 
chapter is on the professional organisations which represent CAM practitioners.
The sociological literature on professionalisation identifies a series of steps or stages that 
occupational groups pass through before obtaining statutory regulation. These include the 
establishment of professional organisations, university-based higher education courses, 
accreditation procedures for training courses, voluntary registering bodies, and a code o f 
ethics. Earlier empirical research attempted to identify these steps in order to establish 
whether a particular occupational group was a ‘profession’. It is not the intention here to 
determine which CAM practitioner groups are professions, given the limitations previously 
identified with the trait approach. Section 7.2, however, briefly examines the extent to 
which each CAM therapy has professionalised: that is, whether they have professional 
associations, training courses, voluntary registration, and codes of ethics and conduct.
According to demand theories of professionalisation the ultimate goal for occupational 
groups is occupational closure achieved through statutory regulation. Section 7.3 analyses 
whether CAM practitioner groups have actively sought statutory regulation as demand 
theories of professionalisation would predict.
Theory suggests that occupational groups seek occupational closure because of the 
associated economic benefits and social status. Section 7.4 examines the reasons why 
certain CAM practitioner groups sought statutory regulation. Section 7.5 identifies what (if 
any) disadvantages CAM practitioners associate with statutory regulation.
The final section discusses the extent to which demand theories of professionalisation, and 
an analysis which focuses on the activities of occupational groups, help to explain the 
regulatory process.
115
7.2 Professionalisation strategies am ong CAM practitioner 
groups
The main features of professionalisation are the establishment of professional associations, 
training courses (often formally accredited or university-based), voluntary registration with 
agreed standards of education, and a code of ethics. As this section shows all o f the 
therapies in this study have professionalised to a large extent. For more detail on the key 
developments in the history of each therapy the reader should refer back to Chapter 5.
7.2.1 Professional association(s)
All of the CAM therapies discussed in this report have at least one established professional 
association, usually more. The timing of their establishment and primary objectives differ 
widely. For example the British Homeopathic Society (later the Faculty of Homeopathy) 
was established in 1843 to support the development o f homeopathic medicine among 
registered medical practitioners. Its role was largely academic, akin to the one played by 
Royal Colleges for other medical specialities. In contrast, the National Institute of Medical 
Herbalists established in 1864 to represent qualified herbalists had a more political role 
(Denham, 2000). The association was in part a reaction to the Medical Act 1858 and the 
threat of legislation which would have outlawed herbal practice.
Some of the associations were set up to promote education and training in previously 
unknown therapies. For example the British Osteopathic Association (BOA) and the 
British Chiropractic Association (BCA) were established in the early 1900s to provide a 
membership organisation for graduates of the newly founded training colleges. Other 
associations provide training for and represent the interests of practitioners who are also 
practicing as statutorily registered health care professionals. For example the British 
Medical Acupuncture Society (BMAS) was established in 1980 to promote the use and 
understanding of acupuncture within medicine. Finally, some associations were created 
through mergers of existing associations (e.g. the British Acupuncture Council {BAcC} in 
1995) or as a confederation of associations (e.g. the European Herbal Practitioners 
Association {EHPA} or the Council for Organisations Registering Homeopaths 
{CORH}).
A number of attempts have been made to establish a single professional association to 
represent complementary practitioners (e.g. British Register o f Complementary 
Practitioners) but none has successfully registered a majority of CAM practitioners.
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7.2.2 Training courses
Another common feature of professionalisation is the existence o f formal institutionalised 
training in schools and colleges, often with external validation. In pragmatic terms, external 
validation enables students to access public subsidies available for tuition costs on 
recognised courses.
The majority of traditional medical practitioners worldwide are trained as apprentices, yet 
in the UK most CAM practitioners are trained in a formal educational setting. Until 
recently, the majority of courses were offered by private schools and colleges resulting in a 
lack of consistency and common standards (Foundation for Integrated Medicine, 2000, 
p88). It is only relatively recently that training schools have sought validation for their 
courses from higher education establishments. Higher and further educational 
establishments have been receptive due to pressure to expand their student numbers.
According to the General Chiropractic Council (GCC) “all the chiropractic education 
establishments ... have a degree programme validated by one of the UK universities” 
(General Chiropractic Council, 2000b, para 480). For example the Anglo European College 
of Chiropractic is an associate college of the University of Portsmouth and the McTimoney 
College of Chiropractic’s degree courses are validated by the University of Wales.
The first university based degree in herbal medicine started at Middlesex University in 1994 
(McIntyre, 2004). Subsequent growth in the number of degree programmes has prompted 
herbalists from a variety of different backgrounds to work towards a common core 
curriculum for a four-year university course (House of Lords Select Committee on Science 
and Technology, 2000a, para 6.24). Acupuncture, osteopathy and homeopathy also have 
externally validated courses.
Many CAM practitioner organisations have their own system of accreditation. 
Accreditation is primarily a mechanism led by professional associations to support 
automatic registration o f graduates. In a report funded by the Department of Health, Mills 
and Budd (2000) recommended that accreditation should be independent and should be 
carried out by a single accreditation body responsible for inspecting and approving training 
courses using agreed educational standards (Mills and Budd, 2000). At the time of the 
House of Lords’ Select Committee on CAM, acupuncture, chiropractic, herbal medicine, 
homeopathy and osteopathy all had accreditation systems in place and were ahead o f other 
CAM therapies in this regard (Department o f Health, 2000d, para 23).
Osteopathy and chiropractic implemented accreditation as part of the system of statutory 
regulation. The independent accreditation system set up for non-medical acupuncturists in
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the form of the British Acupuncture Accreditation Board was held up as an example of 
good practice by the Lords’ Sub-Committee (House of Lords Select Committee on Science 
and Technology, 2000a, pp 59, 62) and is “very highly regarded” by the Department o f 
Health (OTarrell, 2004). Since 2002, the EHPA has an accreditation board to assess 
training standards reflecting the different traditions o f Western, Chinese and Ayurvedic 
herbal medicine (Lampert, 2001). Homeopathy has been trying to establish accreditation 
procedures for some time. The CORH published proposals for accreditation in January 
2005 but these have not yet been implemented.
7.23  Voluntary registration
Many professional associations develop a voluntary register o f members in order to 
provide information to the public about the qualifications and standards of practitioners. 
Entry on the register is usually dependent on meeting specified entry requirements 
(including minimum training or qualifications) and complying with certain standards of 
practice. Each of the therapies examined here had a number o f voluntary registers in 
operation at the beginning of the 1990s. Osteopaths and chiropractors formed a single 
register as part of the implementation of statutory regulation. Chiropractors had already 
made progress towards a single register through the formation of the Chiropractic 
Registration Steering Group in 1991. Osteopaths had established the General Council and 
Register of Osteopaths in 1936 on a voluntary basis, following failed attempts to establish a 
single register through legislation.
For herbalists a single register was seen as something that would come with the 
introduction of statutory regulation. In 1993 a number of herbal practitioner groups came 
together under the umbrella of the EHPA, others have joined subsequently. Each 
association continues to hold separate registers.
Non-medical acupuncturists created a single voluntary register with the establishment of 
the British Acupuncture Council (BAcC) in 1995. The Council unified five registering 
organisations who had been members o f the Council for Acupuncture since 1980.
Non-medical homeopaths are in the process of establishing a single voluntary register. The 
Joint Meeting of Organisations Registering Professional Homeopaths (later known as the 
Council for Organisations Registering Homeopaths {CORH}) was established in 1999 to 
“work together for a single register” (Council of Organisations Registering Homeopaths, 
2004b).
Registration usually requires a practitioner to meet explicit standards of education and 
training and comply with a professional code of ethics.
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For the osteopaths, the process of developing unified standards was facilitated by the 
King’s Fund Working Party on Osteopathy. Common standards for education and training 
were seen as an important prerequisite to seeking statutory regulation (General Osteopathic 
Council, 2000a). The Chiropractic Registration Steering Group established standards of 
education which it hoped would be recognized across Europe. These standards fed into the 
King’s Fund Working Party on Chiropractic established in 1992.
The Guidelines for Acupuncture Education published by the BAcC were used by the British 
Acupuncture Accreditation Board as the basis for accreditation of courses. These 
standards, however, were not recognised by groups representing statutory health 
professionals practising western acupuncture or by the many groups representing 
traditional Chinese medical practitioners. More recendy acupuncturists from different 
traditions have been working together to develop National Professional Standards.
Non-medical homeopaths worked with Healthwork UK to develop National Occupational 
Standards (later transferred to Skills for Health).16 The process of developing the standards 
involved joint working between associations and precipitated the formation of a common 
council to establish a single national register for homeopathic practitioners. The publication 
of the national occupational standards has been described as “a major leap forward” and “a 
watershed” (Society of Homeopaths, 2000b, para 676).
Representatives of the western herbal medicine professional bodies worked with Skills for 
Health, a government licensed body responsible for training standards, to define standards 
for the practice of herbal medicine (2002-2003). The standards were subsequendy revised 
to include Chinese and Tibetan traditional medicine. The standards are intended to 
establish “a consensus on acceptable standards for herbal practitioners in their clinics” 
(European Herbal Practitioners Association, 2006).
7.2.4 Code o f ethics and conduct
As well as requiring educational standards, voluntary registration is usually linked to 
compliance with a professional ethical code upheld by a complaints or disciplinary 
procedure. In a 1997 survey of CAM practitioner groups the Consumers Association found 
that all required members to abide by a code of practice and/or ethics and/or professional 
conduct, and umbrella groups made this a requirement for their member organisations 
(Bloomfield, 1997).
16 National occupational standards were originally part of a wider government initiative, led by the education department, to 
improve standards in further education. National Training Organisations were established to facilitate agreement on 
common standards for practice, education and training.
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Both the GCC and the GOsC set and published codes o f practice as part o f the process of 
implementing statutory regulation. The Council for Acupuncture, the precursor to the 
BAcC, agreed a Code of Ethics and a Code of Practice, although it was unable to agree 
educational standards (British Acupuncture Council, 2000). Members o f the BMAS are 
subject to the Society’s code of practice which “sets out the professional duties and clinical 
standards expected of members” (British Medical Acupuncture Society, 2004).
Table 7.7 CAM therapies and the extent of professionalisation
Homeopathy Chiropractic Osteopathy Herbal
medicine
Acupuncture
Professional
association(s)
V V ✓ ✓
Training courses 
with external 
validation
s s s s V
Accreditation
procedures
© ✓ s s s
Single voluntary 
register
© ✓ s © V
Agreed national 
standards
✓ ✓ s ✓ V
Code of ethics, 
conduct or 
practice
© s s © ✓
Statutory self­
regulation
X s s © ©
Key:
s  In place 
* Not in place 
© In development
The EHPA reported in 2000 that it was in the process o f “agreeing a common code of 
practice enforced by stringent disciplinary measures” (European Herbal Practitioners 
Association, 2000a, para 20), but other herbal traditions such as Ayurveda insisted on their 
own code of ethics. So although there is a draft Code of Ethics and Complaints Procedures 
for herbal practitioners, there is still no agreed code in place. The CORH began the process 
of establishing a code of ethics for non-medical homeopaths in 2000 by identifying 
common elements from each of the codes in use by the different registering organisations 
(Council of Organisations Registering Homeopaths, 2004a). A draft code of ethics and 
practice was published for consultation in November 2004. Despite having in place codes
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of ethics, conduct or practice, many o f the voluntary registering bodies lack accessible 
complaints procedures and transparent disciplinary procedures.
By the end of the 1990s each of the five therapies had put in place or had in development 
most of the key organisational traits associated with a profession (see Table 7.7). 
Practitioners in all o f the therapies, therefore, were to a great extent professionalised. But 
did CAM practitioner groups pursue this final stage o f professionalisation? Did they all 
actively seek statutory regulation as demand theories of professionalisation would predict?
7.3 Seeking statutory self-regulation
All CAM practitioner groups examined here have taken significant steps to professionalise. 
Demand theories of professionalisation would expect these groups to pursue statutory 
regulation as a final step in the process. This section reviews the evidence that organized 
CAM practitioner groups have been actively mobilized in pursuit of statutory self­
regulation. There are a number o f possible legislative routes open to CAM practitioners. 
Firsdy through a single Act of parliament (either a Private Members’ Bill or a government- 
sponsored bill) create a new council. Secondly by Order o f Council be included in the 
Healthcare Professions Council (HPC) (or prior to 1999 the Council for Professions 
Supplementary to Medicine). Thirdly under Section 60 of the Health Act 1999 form a new 
Council.
As we saw in Chapter 4 some CAM practitioners made attempts in the past to gain 
statutory regulation similar to that enjoyed by the medical profession. None o f these were 
successful. Here I examine the contemporary activities o f CAM practitioner groups in the 
five therapies chosen for inclusion in the study in order to establish whether they have 
actively sought statutory regulation.
Both osteopathy and chiropractic were successful in gaining statutory regulation in the early 
1990s. The perception o f key stakeholders was that the impetus came from within the 
professions themselves. For example a Department of Health official said that 
“Osteopathy was the leader...they’d been trying since before the last war to gain some 
form of statutory recognition” (Brown, 2004, para 139). He recounted that “there were a 
number o f different osteopathic organisations.. .they came together in one umbrella group. 
And that group, its remit was essentially to prepare for statutory regulation” (Brown, 2004, 
para 151). The Chair of the Herbal Medicine Regulatory Working Group (HMRWG) also 
thought that “if you look at osteopathy and chiropractic...the driver actually came from 
within the professions themselves...They saw regulation as a way to improve the 
standards” (Pittilo, 2004, para 45).
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The main osteopathic groups were active in the 1980s to gamer support for their call to 
statutorily regulate the profession. In 1986 they successfully had a bill introduced to the 
House of Commons under the ten-minute rule which served to establish all-party support 
(King’s Fund, 1991). It was ultimately the establishment o f an independent working party 
by the King’s Fund that galvanised support for the profession’s demands.
The King’s Fund Management Committee announced in the autumn of 1989 that they 
were establishing a Working Party chaired by Sir Thomas Bingham, later Lord Chief Justice 
of England and Wales, to look into the issue of statutory regulation of osteopaths. The first 
meeting was held 5th December 1989. The Working Party drafted a Bill which was first 
introduced into the House of Lords by Lord Walton on 17th December 1991. It was 
amended in Committee by the House of Lords and had its Second Reading on 31st January 
1992. However the election was called before the final committee stage was passed. The 
Bill was introduced into the House of Commons in the new session by Mr Malcolm Moss 
MP as a Private Members’ Bill. It came second in the ballot o f members and has its first 
reading on 10th June 1992. It had its second reading on 15th January 1993. The 
Osteopaths Bill passed through its third reading in the House of Commons on 7th May 
1993 and has been described as the “largest private Members’ Bill ever to be brought to a 
successful conclusion” (Standen, 1993). This led the way for other CAM practitioner 
groups.
In 1989 when the King’s Fund were establishing the Osteopathy Working Group they 
considered whether to address chiropractic at the same time. They decided against this but 
agreed that once the work with the osteopaths was finished they would look at the 
chiropractors (Maxwell, 2005), which they subsequendy did in 1992. In 1990 the BCA had 
already begun to hold regular meetings with the Department of Health, and in 1991 formed 
the Chiropractic Registration Steering Group to unify the profession in advance of 
attempts to secure statutory regulation (Hutchinson, 1994). They were also active in trying 
to win over the medical profession, and keen to have independent endorsement for 
proposals to regulate them.
In 1993, with the King’s Fund report published, chiropractors were well positioned to 
lobby parliament to support a Private Members’ Bill. David Lidington MP came fourth in 
the ballot and introduced the Bill to the House of Commons on 16th December 1993. 
Lord Walton, a member of the King’s Fund Working Party, introduced the Bill to the 
House of Lords (Hutchinson, 1994). It had its second reading on 18th February 1994 and 
passed its third reading on 6th May 1994. The passage o f the Chiropractors Act 1994 was
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according to the GCC the “outcome of more than 20 years campaigning by the 
chiropractic profession” (General Chiropractic Council, 2000a, p 93).
Herbalists have also been active in seeking statutory regulation (European Herbal 
Practitioners Association, 2000a, para 20). In evidence given to the House of Lords in 2000 
they indicated that they would be making an application for statutory self-regulation 
“within the next few months” (European Herbal Practitioners Association, 2000b, para 
714). The process has in fact been slower and taken a somewhat different route. The 
EHPA was formed to unify the profession, a necessary precursor to seeking statutory 
regulation (McIntyre, 2004). It explicidy acknowledged that the aim of their 
professionalisation activities (described above) such as establishing a core curriculum, an 
accreditation board, drafting a code of ethics, introducing disciplinary procedures and a 
scheme of continuing professional development was “to establish the conditions which 
could support an application for statutory self-regulation for herbal medicine” (Lampert, 
2001). Having established support among its members, the EHPA had “preliminary 
discussions” with the Department of Health in December 2000 (Lampert, 2001, para 3).
As shown above non-medical acupuncturists have professionalised more completely than 
either herbal medicine or homeopathy. The BAcC’s unified system of voluntary registration 
and the British Acupuncture Accreditation Board were held up as examples of best practice 
in the House of Lords’ Select Committee Report (House of Lords Select Committee on 
Science and Technology, 2000a, p 60). Yet in contrast to the herbalists, these activities were 
not viewed as preconditions for statutory regulation. Michael O ’Farrell, Chief Executive of 
the BAcC, claimed “we haven’t lobbied for regulation at all. We’ve been supportive of 
regulation, we’ve concentrated on having our own voluntary self-regulation” (O'Farrell, 
2004, para 235). It seems that only after having been identified by the Foundation for 
Integrated Health as a profession suited to statutory regulation the BAcC began informal 
discussions, both within the profession and with others including the Department of 
Health, about the options. They set up a Regulation Action Group with expert advisers to 
look at the issues in more depth (British Acupuncture Council, 2000, para 769).
Following the recommendations of the House o f Lords’ inquiry and the government’s 
response, which agreed that acupuncturists should move towards statutory regulation, the 
BAcC participated actively in the work of the Acupuncture Regulatory Working Group 
(ARWG) (British Acupuncture Council, 2004b, para 6). Throughout the process they 
responded to events and proceeded only with the support o f their members. The BAcC 
leadership have been very concerned to “carry the membership” in moves towards 
statutory self-regulation, in part because initial debates showed that opinion was
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“somewhat divided” (British Acupuncture Council, 2000, para 769). The BAcC undertook 
a consultation with its members in 2001 on the issue of statutory self-regulation, 
culminating in a vote which mandated the leadership to “pursue a suitable route to 
statutory self-regulation”. The Chief Executive was eager to stress that “at each stage 
there’s been no pushing” (O'Farrell, 2004, para 235). They were not pro-active in seeking 
statutory regulation at any point.
Among the five therapies analysed here non-medical homeopaths have perhaps been the 
least active in activities to secure statutory regulation for their profession. Statutory 
regulation has been considered a possible ‘next step’ but the main priority o f the 
practitioner groups has been the establishment of a single voluntary register and 
accreditation board (Society of Homeopaths, 2000b, para 676). The House of Lords’ report 
also recognised that the homeopaths were the “least enthusiastic”, but urged them to 
consider the benefits of statutory regulation (House o f Lords Select Committee on Science 
and Technology, 2000a, p 51). Although the Department o f Health had no plans for the 
statutory regulation of homeopathy in spring 2004, they were open to the possibility if 
approached by the profession (Sidwell, 2004). Non-medical homeopaths appear to remain 
reticent. In their response to the Department o f Health’s consultation on statutory 
regulation for acupuncture and herbal medicine, the CORH wrote “ ...the homeopathy 
profession may consider, at some point in its future, whether it also wishes to explore 
whether statutory self-regulation would be a route it wishes to take” (Council of 
Organisations Registering Homeopaths, 2004b, para 18). Maggy Wallace, Chair of the 
CORH, although personally keen that homeopaths should not miss the chance presented 
by the government’s actions to regulate acupuncture and herbal medicine, admitted that the 
homeopaths probably were not ready for such a move (Wallace, 2004, paras 93-99).
The views expressed by organized representatives of practitioner groups and in their 
official documents indicate that chiropractors, osteopaths and herbalists were actively 
pursuing statutory self-regulation. However, acupuncturists and homeopath have not 
actively sought statutory self-regulation. The next section analyses the benefits of closure 
put forward by practitioner groups.
7.4 The need for a profession
So far, in examining the relevance of the demand theories of professionalisation to the 
development of regulation of CAM practitioners in the UK, we have established that all 
therapies had professionalised but only some actively sought statutory self-regulation. 
Demand theories claim that occupational groups seek statutory self-regulation in order to
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gain the benefits associated with closure and monopoly. Closure is achieved when the 
practice or use of title is restricted in law. This section analyses CAM practitioners’ views 
on the benefits associated with economic and social closure.
7.4.1 Economic closure
Economic theories would expect economic benefits o f professionalisation to be of most 
interest to practitioners. There are a number of ways in which statutory regulation could 
generate economic benefits for CAM practitioners:
1. By limiting entry the profession are able to control supply and charge higher prices 
for their services.
2. If  certain functions are protected this gives the profession a monopoly over this 
service.
3. Protection of tide means that consumers can be confident that those advertising 
their services are qualified and may result in increased demand.
4. CAM services provided by regulated practitioners are more likely to be included in 
reimbursable benefits covered by private health insurers, to be funded by or 
integrated into the NHS.
5. Conventional practitioners are more likely to refer patients to regulated CAM 
practitioners.
None of the practitioner groups direcdy mentioned that higher personal income would be 
a benefit of statutory regulation. The costs of regulation were, however, a major concern 
(see Section 7.5.4).
Herbalists were the only group of CAM practitioners seeking protection of function under 
statutory regulation. Statutory regulation would grant exclusive dispensing rights o f certain 
potent herbs. This would strengthen the economic position of herbalists allowing them 
exclusivity over herbal remedies and preparations. Andrew Chevallier, former President, o f 
the National Institute o f Medical Herbalists, and Senior Lecturer in Herbal Medicine at 
Middlesex University talking on behalf of herbalists stated that:
... We expect that i f  we should achieve statutory self-regulation, then registered professional 
herbal practitioners would be able to continue using those herbs. That would be a major 
incentive for herbal practitioners to be registered (European Herbal Practitioners 
Association, 2000b, para 728).
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Practitioner groups hoped that statutory recognition would increase public confidence in 
the profession. For example osteopaths expected that regulation would give members of 
the public “who hitherto may have been reluctant to consult an osteopath the confidence 
to do so” (General Osteopathic Council, 2000a, p i02). David Tredinnick MP claimed this 
had already happened “The increase in the demand for chiropractic and osteopathy is 
evidence of the benefits of placing osteopathy and chiropractic on a statutory basis.” 
(Tredinnick, 2000, p290). Few other statements were as explicit that public confidence 
would translate into increased demand for services.
Many CAM practitioners thought statutory regulation would give them greater access to 
public funding. There was an expectation among chiropractors and osteopaths that greater 
access to NHS funding would follow statutory regulation, either through new employment 
opportunities or increased contracting. During oral evidence to the House of Lords' the 
General Osteopathic Council stated that “We would envisage the provision of osteopathy 
would ultimately be established across all practices within a PCG [primary care group] so 
that a comprehensive service becomes available to the NHS” (General Osteopathic 
Council, 2000b, para 427). But progress has been slow creating frustration. The General 
Chiropractic Council stated that:
...we have not been able to move some things forward as fast as we would like to. We are 
as anxious as the osteopaths profess themselves to be to work with the N H S to make 
chiropractic accessible to a wider public (General Chiropractic Council, 2000b, para 488)
Despite the experience of osteopathy and chiropractic, other practitioner groups continue 
to mention increased opportunities for integration and funding under statutory regulation. 
For example the Chief Executive of the BAcC thought statutory regulation would give new 
acupuncture graduates “the opportunity if they wish to more easily work in the NHS” and 
“encourage the decision-makers and the private medical insurers to think more objectively 
about the members that are regulated professionals” (O’Farrell, 2004). The Society of 
Homeopaths saw a single national register of practitioners with agreed standards as the 
basis for defining NHS access (Society of Homeopaths, 2000a, p 219). The Foundation for 
Integrated Health also suggested:
Some of them [CAM practitioners] see the ben fits; they can take pride in being part of an 
organised profession and there’s also the aspect ofpotentially being able to work within the 
N H S or in an integrated way (Jack, 2004, para 337).
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Most groups recognized that lack o f evidence o f efficacy and cost effectiveness was also a 
major barrier to funding from the NHS. Interestingly this was not seen to be an issue for 
private health insurers.
Some stakeholders believed that integration of CAM within the NHS was more likely once 
practitioners were statutorily regulated. For example the BAcC saw a single register of 
acupuncturists as a means of “facilitating the integration of acupuncture into mainstream 
healthcare” (British Acupuncture Council, 2004b, para 29). Osteopaths also saw regulation 
as necessary for integration. The General Osteopathic Council (GOsQ stated that:
We hope...that the statutory regulation of osteopathy m il allow the profession to gain 
increasing acceptance, so that it will become more available to members of the public as an 
integrated part of the nation’s healthcare system (General Osteopathic Council, 2000b, 
para 411).
Chiropractic professional associations were particularly keen that the government should 
take seriously the “integration o f regulated, non-orthodox medicine into the NHS” (British 
Chiropractic Association, 2000, p 31) and felt that with professional regulation and 
evidence in place there was no longer an impediment to this happening (College of 
Chiropractors, 2000, p 412). Herbalists believed the way to satisfy public demand for CAM 
therapies on the NHS was to employ practitioners who work within a code of ethics 
(European Herbal Practitioners Association, 2000a, p 79).
In acupuncture and homeopathy, where significant numbers of statutorily regulated health 
care professionals already practice therapies within the NHS, there were worries that 
proposals for statutory regulation of lay or traditional practitioners would diminish or 
undermine present integration (Faculty of Homeopathy and British Homeopathic 
Association, 2004). The BMAS believed that “the progress made in integrating acupuncture 
into modem health care, and the potential to further that integration will be seriously 
impaired under the proposals as drafted” (British Medical Acupuncture Society, 2004, para 
62). These practitioners were keen to resist further regulation or additional training. The 
Medical Director of the BMAS asked:
Are you going to achieve more public protection kg more regulation of these people who are 
already regulated. Or are you going to diminish integration of a useful technique? That is 
the balance I  am not sure about (Cummings, 2005, para 256).
As well as precipitating changes in the official policies o f the NHS, regulation was also 
expected to influence the behaviour of referring physicians. Guidance issued by the British 
Medical Association (BMA) in 1999 made it clear that general practitioners (GPs) are able
127
to delegate treatment to CAM practitioners who are non-statutorily regulated (General 
Practitioners' Committee British Medical Association, 1999). However, GPs still retain 
responsibility and liability for the patients’ care. GPs therefore require some means to judge 
the competence of those to whom they delegate care. It is therefore not surprising that 
osteopathy and chiropractic are among the therapies most frequently referred to by GPs. 
Herbalists believed increased referrals would follow statutory regulation (Register of 
Chinese Herbal Medicine, 2000; Herbal Medicine Regulatory Working Group, 2003, para 
504). Other practitioner groups were less interested in referrals, preferring perhaps to 
ensure that patients had the right to directly access their services as at present.
Arguments about the link between regulation and referrals were also made by conventional 
health care professionals. For example those doctors who wish to refer their patients with 
greater ease to CAM practitioners argue that statutory regulation (or at a minimum a single 
voluntary register) is vital. The Chair of the NHS Alliance, a representative organisation of 
primary care organisations and those who work in primary care, admitted “professionals 
inside the conventional camp” have said to CAM practitioners “You really have got to 
{regulate} if you want us to refer our patients to you. Otherwise we don’t quite know what 
the quality control is” (Dixon, 2005b, para 15). For official bodies such as the Royal 
College of General Practitioners, “regulation... makes it much easier...to issue guidelines, 
to make patient referrals and to make more use of the CAM therapies that are available” 
(Royal College of General Practitioners, 2000b, para 1508). Ministers echoed the views of 
the medical profession “Without proper self-regulation it is very difficult for many GPs 
and people across the health service to feel confident in terms of CAM therapies” 
(Department of Health, 2000c, para 1883).
According to the views of the leaders of CAM practitioner groups, o f the five possible 
ways in which regulation can generate economic benefits examined here, greater access to 
NHS funding is the most important to practitioners. Other commentators are sceptical that 
statutory regulation will result in any such benefits (Stone, 1996). The next section 
examines the perceived social benefits of occupational closure.
7.4.2 Social closure
The sociological literature gives more emphasis to the desire for status and recognition by 
occupational groups seeking statutory self-regulation. In this section we review whether a 
desire for status lay behind the demands for statutory recognition made by CAM 
practitioner groups. According to the Department of Health “Status is associated with both
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public trust and confidence in CAM practitioners and with recognition from orthodox 
medicine” (Department of Health, 2000d, para 69).
For some CAM practitioners status is about equality with the medical profession and other 
health care professionals. The Faculty of Homeopathy talked about regulation creating “a 
level playing field” (Faculty o f Homeopathy, Homeopathic Trust and British 
Homoeopathic Association 2000, para 659). The Chief Executive of the Foundation for 
Integrated Health recounted the arguments he had often heard practitioners make:
We believe strongly that our profession has something to offer and that if  we were statutory 
regulated on the same basis as doctors and nurses we would be their equal, wouldn’t we?’
... We want to be their equal’ ... We believe we are their equal’ and that would be the 
icing on the cake to scry Yes, we are their equal’ (Fox, 2004).
The Department of Health made it clear that, “if  it [CAM] aspires to be an equal player 
with other forms of NHS treatment it must meet the same standards required of them” 
(Department of Health, 2001a).
Practitioners are willing to make sacrifices in return for enhanced status. For example 
acupuncturists see the potential additional costs of statutory regulation as “a fair price for 
the enhanced status” (Acupuncture Regulatory Working Group, 2003). Osteopaths have 
“tolerated it [the lengthy process o f registration] because they do actually want the privilege 
of self-regulation as a profession” (General Osteopathic Council, 2000b, para 445). They 
were “willing to go the extra mile” in order to “associate themselves with the highest 
standards in healthcare” (Brown, 2004).
Improved professional status and respect is presented as one of the benefits o f regulation 
(Budd and Mills, 2000). Many of the responses to the consultation on the statutory 
regulation of herbal medicine and acupuncture supported regulation as a means to 
“enhance the status o f the herbal medicine and acupuncture professions” (Department of 
Health, 2005b). The GOsC believes that “statutory regulation has enhanced the trust and 
respect afforded us [osteopaths] by the medical profession” (General Osteopathic Council, 
2000b, para 423).
There are others outside of CAM who turn the argument on its head, claiming that the 
government should not ‘regulate rubbish’ because it gives legitimacy to therapies that have 
no basis in science and no evidence of efficacy. For example the Royal College o f General 
Practitioners wrote, “It also seems important that regulation is not seen as attributing 
credibility to otherwise incredible forms of treatment” (Royal College of General 
Practitioners, 2000a, p 303).
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The ability to create a strong cohesive professional identity and maintain the reputation of 
the profession is important to practitioners. The process of professionalisation was felt to 
significandy contribute to a strong professional identity (British Acupuncture Council, 
2000, para 765). The herbalists thought that “separate councils would allow individual 
herbal traditions to develop their profession and foster coherence” (Herbal Medicine 
Regulatory Working Group, 2003, para 180). Representatives of the acupuncture 
profession felt the need to achieve “a coherent and cohesive acupuncture profession prior 
to any collaborative or joint enterprise” with herbal medicine (Acupuncture Regulatory 
Working Group, 2003, para 166). Most practitioner groups felt professional identity could 
actually be undermined by the creation of a joint council or an umbrella CAM Council.
Reputation is maintained through enforcing a code of ethics or practice. Statutory 
regulation is seen to give ‘real teeth’ to the process by enabling the profession to strike an 
errant practitioner from a register and prevent them from using the professional tide 
(General Osteopathic Council, 2000b, para 416). Statutory regulation gives professions a 
means by which to safeguard their reputation and dissociate from unqualified and poorly 
trained practitioners (Ayurvedic Medical Association, 2000; Faculty of Homeopathy, 
Homeopathic Trust and British Homoeopathic Association, 2000).
Professionalisation and statutory regulation are supported by CAM practitioners for a 
number of reasons relating to economic and social closure. For CAM practitioners the 
major benefits of closure were the opportunity to treat NHS-fiinded patients, either on 
contract or integrated as part of the health care team, and the status and recognition from 
other health care professionals.
Support for statutory self-regulation was not universal. The final section analyses the extent 
of opposition to statutory regulation.
7.5 O pposition to regulation
A number of concerns about the impact of statutory regulation were expressed by CAM 
practitioner organisations. These included restricting patient choice or access, reducing 
autonomy, stifling creativity and innovation and driving practitioners underground because 
of the costs of registration. These consequences were not viewed as inevitable but rather as 
dangers associated with “a heavy handed or abrupt approach”, thus it was urged that 
“regulation should be introduced progressively and in consultation with representative 
therapist groups” (Royal London Homoeopathic Hospital, 2000, p i 95). Reputedly 
practitioners frequendy voiced concerns about over-regulation (Fox, 2004). This section 
looks at the major reasons for opposing regulation in more detail.
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7.5.1 Restricting choice and access
Some CAM practitioner groups were worried that statutory regulation would restrict access 
and choice for patients by limiting the right to practise to registered practitioners. These 
concerns were fuelled by the experience of osteopaths and chiropractors. Some existing 
practitioners who applied for entry on the new registers under grandparenting schemes 
were refused registration. The chiropractors who were excluded from the register 
continued to practise as cranio-sacral therapists. It is likely some practitioners will find 
themselves excluded when new registers are created even if there is automatic entry on the 
basis o f qualifications. The possibility of exclusion from a statutory register was a worry to 
practitioners. Exclusion has serious consequences, restricting one’s ability to practise, use 
the protected title and earn a living. Students in training were also anxious that their 
qualifications might not be accredited by the new council (Hansard, 6 May 1994).
The Chair of the ARWG said that “There was a real concern that there would be hurdles 
that were difficult for people who were safe practitioners who had practised over a long 
period of time to go over” (Pittilo, 2004). Members o f the BMAS were concerned that if 
entry criteria to the new acupuncture register were defined by non-medical acupuncturists 
the right of statutorily regulated health professionals to practise acupuncture or use the title 
‘acupuncturist’ might be restricted (Cummings, 2005, para 82).
7.5.2 Domination and loss o f autonomy
Many CAM practitioners work in single-handed practice and are attracted to the work 
because of the freedom and autonomy it allows them. According to Michael Fox, Chief 
Executive of the Foundation for Integrated Health, many CAM practitioners hold the view 
that “We want to work on our own” and some that “We don’t need regulation” (Fox, 
2004).
Concerns were expressed that statutory self-regulation might result in the therapy (and 
therapists) being dominated by orthodox medicine. The Institute for Complementary 
Medicine (ICM), a registered charity set up to provide the public with information about 
complementary medicine and which administers the British Register o f Complementary 
Practitioners, was particularly vociferous in its condemnation of the House of Lords’ 
recommendations to statutorily regulate acupuncture and herbal medicine. It claimed that 
this would result in CAM practitioners coming “under the direct control of the medical 
profession” and being reduced to “the level o f auxiliaries” (Baird, 2001, para 51). Such 
ideas are supported by academics. For example Saks (1998) interprets the (positive) change 
in the attitude of the medical profession towards CAM as an “attempt to maintain its
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hegemony through incorporation and subordination” (Saks 1998, cited in Williams, Jack et 
aI, 2004).
Concerns about domination are perhaps not without cause. The Faculty of Homeopathy 
while supporting the statutory regulation of non-medical homeopaths stated that they 
should be registered as homeopathic practitioners because they “do not do the same jobs” 
as homeopaths with medical training. They did not make it clear how these homeopathic 
practitioners would differ but the implication was that they would operate at a lower grade 
(Faculty of Homeopathy, Homeopathic Trust and British Homoeopathic Association, 
2000, paras 651-3).
Furthermore, as voluntary self-regulating professions, CAM practitioners have been used to 
a high degree of professional autonomy, including the ability to determine the content of 
their practice. Statutory regulation was associated with a potential loss of autonomy (British 
Acupuncture Council, 2000, para 769). A common view was that CAM practitioners would 
have to “sell out”, by giving up their holistic approach and accepting a narrower scope of 
practice, in order to gain support for statutory regulation (Stone, 2005b, para 53). Today’s 
osteopaths and chiropractors are considered more acceptable by allies of biomedicine 
because they “have given up the claims (which they made strongly for 100 years or more) 
that their treatment would cure or alleviate almost any disease in any part of the body” 
(Healthwatch, 2000, pi 22). Acceptance of a role complementary to biomedicine appears to 
be important in gaining the support of orthodox medicine for regulation.
Statutory regulation was seen by many therapists as a threat to autonomy and provoked 
fears of subordination to medicine.
7.53 Stifling creativity and innovation
A further negative aspect of regulation is the threat that standardisation of practice poses to 
CAM practitioner’s individual creativity and the ability o f therapies to innovate (Williams, 
Jack et al., 2004). The current diversity o f practice in CAM arises because treatment is 
individualised for each patient and there are a range of philosophical underpinnings within 
each therapy. In Stone’s view “This plurality would almost certainly be lost in a statutory 
scheme, which would gravitate towards the most established or dominant schools of 
thought to the exclusion of opposing views” (Stone and Matthews, 1996). The current 
trend of diversification of practice with new sub-specialities constantly appearing would 
certainly be curtailed by statutory regulation.
The Department of Health was aware of practitioners anxiety: “ ...there was some concern 
about stifling creativity and practising in a more individual kind o f way... I think for some
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practitioners they found it a little bit threatening’* (Sidwell, 2005, para 160). In the 
proposals for the statutory regulation of herbal medicine and acupuncture the Department 
of Health addresses the issue of how statutory regulation would preserve diversity. They 
highlight that a “shared Council would support practitioners who work across professional 
boundaries, while preserving and respecting individual traditions within the herbal medicine 
and acupuncture professions” (Department of Health, 2004a, para 53). The EHPA were 
keen to ensure that the structure of the new council would grant “the individual disciplines 
and traditions sufficient autonomy, control and influence over the education and 
registration standards o f their respective traditions/modalities” (European Herbal 
Practitioners Association, 2004, para 13). Different traditions and approaches existed in 
chiropractic prior to the Chiropractors Act 1994. In the closing debate on the Bill, Tom 
Sackville MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Health, reassured practitioners 
that “Increasing each chiropractor’s sense of belonging to a single profession should not 
make practitioners fearful of losing their identity as particular types o f chiropractor” 
(Hansard, 6 May 1994).
7.5.4 Cost o f registration
By far the largest concern, measured in terms of the number of times and range of 
stakeholders that mentioned it, was the cost of statutory regulation. Practitioners were 
concerned both about the expense of setting up statutory regulation and the cost of 
registration fees under a new system (British Acupuncture Council, 2000, para 769; 
Acupuncture Regulatory Working Group, 2003, para 33).
Members of the ARWG were “very concerned about the cost”. It was more of an issue 
than “philosophy or the design of a CAM Council” (Chan, 2005). Concerns about the costs 
of statutory self-regulation were also prominent in the discussions of the HMRWG (Herbal 
Medicine Regulatory Working Group, 2003, para 164). Due to the small number of 
herbalists the cost per capita o f running a statutory regulatory body would be high (about 
£468 per annum compared to £290 for doctors and £60 for registrants of the Health 
Professions Council). Herbalists argued that “It is not in the interests o f either the public or 
practitioners for members of the herbal medicine profession to be charged 
disproportionately higher fees than other healthcare professionals” (Herbal Medicine 
Regulatory Working Group, 2003, para 164).
The GOsC advised other CAM practitioners to “consider the relative size of the 
profession, and whether or not there is sufficient resources and infrastructure within that 
profession to cope with the demands of statutory regulation” (General Osteopathic
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Council, 2000b, para 413). They stressed that costs of operating a regulatory body would be 
hiigh for a small profession (General Osteopathic Council, 2000b, para 466; General 
Osteopathic Council, 2004b, para 18). Concerns about the cost of introducing statutory 
regulation were also voiced by practitioners and students of herbal medicine and 
acupuncture in response to the consultation by the Department of Health (Department of 
Health, 2005b). Costs continue to be discussed as implementation plans are drawn up for a 
mew voluntary register for homeopaths and a statutory register for acupuncturists and 
herbalists.
For statutorily regulated practitioners the costs of dual registration are a concern. They are 
reluctant to pay an additional fee to a new council regulating CAM therapies on top of the 
fees they already pay to the General Medical Council (GMQ or other statutory regulator. 
The Faculty of Homeopathy, representing medical homeopaths, argued there should be 
‘“no charge for those already statutorily regulated to appear on the CAM Council list” 
(Faculty of Homeopathy and British Homeopathic Association, 2004). The BMAS lobbied 
that the fee for their members to join a statutory register of acupuncturists should be no 
higher than £30 per annum. They argued that “the proposed costs o f regulation...will act 
as a major disincentive and barrier to the practice of acupuncture by regulated health 
professionals in the NHS” (British Medical Acupuncture Society, 2004). In an attempt to 
assuage the concerns of the western acupuncturists the ARWG put forward the idea that 
acupuncturists, who were already statutorily registered by another body, could be listed for 
a nominal fee and have the right to use the protected title.
Anecdotally many CAM practitioners practise more than one therapy. A statutory register 
for each therapy would mean that “multi-disciplinary practitioners would have to pay four 
or five sets of registration fees” (Williams, Jack et al., 2004). A federal structure or umbrella 
council was seen to have advantages for these practitioners (Prince of Wales's Foundation 
for Integrated Health, 2005) although important multidisciplinary practice is likely to 
diminish over time. With the move towards full degree courses in acupuncture, herbal 
medicine and homeopathy, recently qualified practitioners are more likely to remain 
specialised in one therapy in future.
The professional associations were also concerned about cost. Uncertain about their own 
future role, they were particularly worried that if the costs o f registration were too high 
practitioners would be less willing to become members o f a professional association 
(Department of Health, 2005b). The ARWG report speculated that “As their [associations’] 
fees would represent the optional part o f the overall package, it is likely to be the voluntary 
membership of the association which will suffer if the combined cost burden becomes
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onerous” (Acupuncture Regulatory Working Group, 2003, para 243). This issue was also 
mentioned in the BAcC’s consultation response, which stated that:
Our underlying and deeper concern about cost is that...there may be serious long-term 
consequences for the continued existence of the professional associations which we believe are 
essentialpartners in the delivery of effective statutory regulation. ..the cost of regulation will 
undermine the professional associations which are vital to the success of the regulatory 
partnership as well as to the preservation of individual styles and traditions (British 
Acupuncture Council, 2004b, para 24).
O f all the reasons for opposing statutory regulation the issue of cost was most important to 
practitioners and professional associations alike. The final section of the chapter discusses 
the findings of the analysis, and considers how useful demand theories of 
professionalisation are to explain the regulatory process.
7.6 D iscussion
The sociological literature views statutory regulation as the culmination o f a process of 
professionalisation. This study has found that while all CAM practitioner groups pursued 
professionalisation strategies they did not necessarily seek statutory regulation. Both 
homeopaths and acupuncturists developed many of the features of a mature profession but 
neither actively sought statutory recognition. These findings highlight the fact that not all 
professions make demands for statutory regulation. Other examples of unregulated 
professions might include university lecturers and librarians. There are also cases of 
occupational groups which are regulated but which have not professionalised, in the sense 
used here. Examples of regulated non-professions might include gangmasters, gas 
appliance fitters, and adventurous activity providers who are required to be licensed by the 
state.
The CAM practitioner groups which sought statutory regulation did not necessarily do so 
for the reasons cited in the economic literature (e.g. to extract monopoly rents). O f course, 
income maximisation may have been an underlying motivation, but this was not spoken 
about publicly. This study identified a myriad of benefits of closure. It is perhaps not 
surprising in the context o f the NHS that access to public funding was the most important 
economic benefit associated with occupational closure for CAM practitioners.
The history of medicine charts the battles that have been fought between practitioners over 
definitions of legitimate practice. This study found a general expectation among CAM 
practitioners that statutory regulation would ensure equal treatment vis a vis conventional
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medical practitioners. This may reflect a desire to reverse the dominance of biomedicine 
and orthodox medicine over CAM that has existed for the past 125 years. Some 
stakeholders believed CAM practitioners would gain the confidence and respect o f doctors 
if statutorily regulated. Past experience suggests that demands for statutory regulation are 
more successful if supported by the medical profession. Professional confidence in CAM 
may therefore be a prerequisite to statutory regulation rather than a consequence o f it.
Demand theories treat occupational groups as cohesive entities. The assumption is that 
professionalisation and statutory regulation are in the interests o f all practitioners. In this 
study the evidence suggests that while the leaders o f organised CAM practitioner groups 
favour statutory regulation, they do not necessarily carry the full support of practitioners.
The data in this study consists of the views of leaders of practitioner groups. It therefore 
does not accurately reflect the views of grassroots practitioners but relies on second-hand 
reports. Despite this limitation the study was able to identify a number o f concerns held by 
the wider community of practitioners. There were fears that multi-disciplinary practice and 
individualised approaches might be threatened by the requirements to enter a register and 
conform to standardised modes of practice. Both the leaders of the professional 
associations and practitioners were concerned about the costs o f statutory regulation but 
for different reasons. Associations were worried about their own future. If practitioners 
were required to pay high statutory fees they might opt not to join a professional 
association. Practitioners were concerned that they would have to pay twice — once for 
membership of an association and once for registration — and felt that fees might be 
unaffordable (if similar in magnitude to those charged by the GOsC and the GCC).
In general, a picture emerges of leaders of practitioner organisations driving the process, 
somewhat removed from the concerns or interests of their members. The tension within 
professions between ‘corporatists’, who are prepared to accommodate public policy 
objectives in order to determine standards themselves and police their own ranks, and 
‘liberals’, who value individual entrepreneurialism and wish to remain free from 
interference from government or professional bodies, has been identified elsewhere 
(Tuohy, 1976). Future research should be clear to distinguish between the views, interests 
and concerns of leaders o f professional associations (corporatists) and those o f grassroots 
practitioners (liberals).
Overall, the approach adopted by this study has allowed for an exploration o f the role 
played by occupational groups in achieving statutory regulation. It has provided a fairly 
robust explanatory framework for the development of chiropractic and osteopathy. The 
proposals to introduce statutory regulation for herbalists can also be explained using the
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framework of demand theories o f professionalisation. The herbal profession unified under 
the umbrella of the EHPA and, although they had not established a single register and 
there remained several disaffiliated herbal groups, they lobbied for statutory self-regulation.
Demand theories, however, do not explain why acupuncture is being brought under 
statutory regulation despite the lack of demand for this from practitioner groups. It appears 
there are other factors influencing the policy process which are not revealed by using this 
analytical lens. In the next chapter I use the supply theories o f professionalisation to see 
whether these can further illuminate our understanding of why some CAM practitioner 
groups have gained statutory recognition or are in the process of achieving it.
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C h a p t e r  8
8 TH E SUPPLY OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION
8.1 Introduction
The previous chapter analysed the introduction of statutory regulation for GAM 
practitioners in the UK using demand theories o f professionalisation. It provided some 
useful insights into the process and gave a partial explanation for the differences between 
therapies. This chapter explores whether the application o f supply theories of 
professionalisation to these same cases will provided further illumination and explanation.
Supply theories of professionalisation suggest that professions develop in response to the 
demands of the state. From this perspective it is the state that determines whether 
occupational groups are statutorily regulated. The state is treated as a unified entity by the 
majority of these theories. The ‘state’ is usually understood to include the government or 
executive, the legislature and the judiciary. The term ‘state’ is generally used in this chapter 
though specific reference is also made to the government, or the Department of Health or 
the House of Lords (as applicable). This chapter re-analyses the five cases of acupuncture, 
chiropractic, herbal medicine, homeopathy and osteopathy using the supply theories of 
professionalisation as an interpretive framework (set out in Chapter 5). The focus within 
the data is on government policy documents, parliamentary debate and official statements 
by civil servants and politicians, as well as interviews with government officials and peers.
The chapter examines how and why the state’s approach to the regulation of CAM 
practitioners has changed over time. Sections 8.2-8.4 examine the strategies employed by 
the state and identifies three phases o f state action. In the late 1980s and throughout much 
of the 1990s the state was passive, rewarding aspiring professions who met certain criteria. 
In response to wider concerns about risks to public health the state adopted a more 
proactive approach, supporting professionalisation activities among CAM practitioners. At 
the end of the study period the state’s concerns about over-regulation mean it promotes a 
proportionate approach to risk regulation which emphasises the costs and benefits. Section 
8.5 argues that throughout the period of study a desire to protect consumer choice has 
remained a strong countervailing argument to regulation. Finally Section 8.6 examines how 
the regulation of our five cases has been influenced by state action. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion of the findings. It considers how useful supply theories of 
professionalisation are in explaining which CAM practitioner groups are subject to 
statutory regulation.
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8.2 Setting criteria for aspiring professions
The state’s involvement in CAM has a longer history than can be traced here. The analysis 
begins in the mid-1980s when government Ministers and parliament began to actively 
discuss the regulation o f CAM practitioners. Table 8.8 sets out a chronology of key events 
in the development of regulation.
In the 1980s the Conservative government was aware of the increasing use made of CAM 
by the general public and was coming under pressure to grant statutory regulation to some 
practitioners. Yet the state remained fairly passive at this time, expecting practitioners to 
organise themselves. Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Health Tom Sackville MP 
recalled that:
In 1985, Lord Glenarthur, the Under-Secretary of State in what was then the 
Department of Health and Social Security, outlined the criteria that the Government 
expected professions of non-conventional medicine to fu lfil before being considered suitable for 
statutory regulation (Hansard, 15 January 1993).
The criteria were first articulated in the mid-1980s and elaborated in successive documents 
and speeches.
The criteria that the government set out at this time were that the profession in question 
should be based on a systematic body of knowledge, have in place accredited training 
courses and a credible and appropriate system of voluntary regulation, and agree among 
themselves on the best way forward (General Osteopathic Council, 2000b, para 413).
In 1987 Baroness Trumpington, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Department 
of Health and Social Security, said in a speech to the Royal Society of Medicine that:
Some people argue that it is the Government's responsibility to register alternative therapists.
It may come to that one day, but if  it does it will be because the alternative community has 
been unable to put its own house in order (Trumpington, 1987).
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Table 8.8 Overview of key dates in the regulatory process
Date Description of event or publication
1986 British Medical Association (BMA) report on ‘alternative therapy’ published 
(British Medical Association, 1986)
May 1986 Bill introduced to House of Commons under ten-minute rule on regulation 
of osteopaths and chiropractors
5 Decem ber 1989 King’s Fund Working Party on Osteopathy convened
1991 King’s Fund Working Party on Osteopathy report and draft bill published 
(King’s Fund, 1991)
17 December 1991 Private Members’ Bill on osteopathy introduced to the House of Lords
March 1992 King’s Fund Working Party on Chiropractic convened
7 May 1993 Osteopaths Act passed
1993 Second BMA report on ‘complementary medicine’ published (British 
Medical Association, 1993)
1993 King’s Fund Working Party on Chiropractic report and draft bill published 
(King’s Fund, 1993)
16 December 1993 Private Members’ Bill on chiropractic introduced to the House of Commons
6 May 1994 Chiropractors Act passed
1996 Foundation for Integrated Medicine established (later renamed the Prince 
of Wales’s Foundation for Integrated Health)
1997 Department of Health commissions Exeter University to produce report on 
CAM (Mills and Peacock, 1997)
1999 King’s  Fund announces £1 million grant to Foundation for Integrated 
Health
15 June  1999 Health Act 1999 passed
28 July 1999 House of Lords’ Science and Technology Committee announces call for 
evidence on CAM
2000 Department of Health commissions Exeter University to produce 2nd report 
on CAM (Mills and Budd, 2000)
21 November 2000 House of Lords’ Science and Technology Committee report published 
(House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, 2000a)
March 2001 Government response to House of Lords published (Department of Health, 
2001a)
1 January  2002 Acupuncture Regulatory Working Group (ARWG) and Herbal Medicine 
Regulatory Working Group (HMRWG) constituted
Septem ber 2003 ARWG and HMRWG publish reports (Acupuncture Regulatory Working 
Group, 2003; Herbal Medicine Regulatory Working Group, 2003)
March 2004 Department of Health consultation on statutory regulation of acupuncture 
and herbal medicine published (Department of Health, 2004a)
Ju n e  2004 Department of Health consultation closes
22 December 2004 Department of Health announces grant to Foundation for Integrated Health
February 2005 Department of Health consultation responses published (Department of 
Health, 2005b)
Septem ber 2005 Stone Report on the Future Voluntary Regulatory Structure for 
Complementary Health Care Professions commissioned by the Foundation 
for Integrated Health (Stone, 2005a)
May 2006 Foundation for Integrated Health launch consultation on federal voluntary 
regulation (Jack, 2006)
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The government’s decision to leave it to the professions to get their house in order was not 
universally endorsed. During debate in the House o f Commons in 1993 Elizabeth Lynne 
MP (Liberal Democrat, Rochdale 1992-1997) urged the government to take a more 
proactive role in regulating CAM practitioners, saying:
I  am a little concerned about the statement by Baroness Hooper, in a Lords debate on 
complementary medicine in May 1990, that an appropriate level of maturity is required on 
the part of the relevant professions bfore legislation would be considered. ...W hile I  
recognise the practical difficulties of proceeding along the path of regulation too soon, I  hope 
that the Government will take a more active role to bring the various complementary 
therapies into a statutory framework (Hansard, 15 January 1993).
However, despite such appeals the state remained passive throughout much of the 1990s.
The Labour government elected in 1997 indicated it would not “depart from the previous 
government’s line that it is for the therapies to organise themselves” (Bloomfield, 1997, 
para 54). In May 1999 Tessa Jowell MP, then Minister for Public Health, said that the 
government expected ‘aspiring professions’ to attain statutory self-regulation using the 
provisions of the Health Act 1999, as long as they “met certain conditions” (Department 
of Health, 2000b, pl06).
Under the Health Act 1999 the Council for Professions Supplementary to Medicine 
(CPSM) was replaced by the Healthcare Professions Council (HPC) and its scope was 
expanded to enable it to register more health care practitioners.17 At the time the 
government envisaged that this would provide a route for CAM practitioners to gain 
statutory regulation. The HPC, as the CPSM had done before it, published explicit criteria 
which aspirant health care professions would have to meet in order to come under the 
Council (see Box 8.1). In a sense, the criteria embody the state’s expectations o f a 
profession.
17 The CPSM had a narrower remit having been established to regulate health care professionals working within the NHS.
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Box 8.1 Criteria for a profession seeking regulation by the Healthcare Professions 
Council
Aspirant groups must:
1. Cover a discrete area of activity displaying some homogeneity
2. Apply a defined body of knowledge
3. Practise based on evidence of efficacy
4. Have at least one established professional body which accounts for a significant 
proportion of that occupational group
5. Operate a voluntary register
6. Have defined routes of entry to the profession
7. Have independendy assessed entry qualifications
8. Have standards in relation to conduct, performance and ethics
9. Have Fitness to Practise procedures to enforce those standards
10. Be committed to continuous professional development 
Source: (Health Professions Council, 2005)
The requirement that practise be based on evidence o f efficacy posed a particular challenge 
to CAM (although professions such as music and art therapy, which the HPC regulates, do 
not have a strong evidence base either). In addition, the HPC was not keen to accept CAM 
practitioner groups. According to one Department official:
CAM  therapies don’t have enough in common with the professions that are regulated by the 
HPCCertain criteria that the HPC set for entry into regulation just couldn’t have been 
met. A nd the HPC approach is very much with a profession - 'come to us when you are 
ready’ - the nature of complementary medicine means thy need a lot of support and guidance 
(Sidwell, 2005, para 42).
The HPC is currendy inundated with applications from aspirant professions including 
many new roles such as Anaesthesia Practitioner, Emergency Care Practitioner, Endoscopy 
Practitioner, Medical Care Practitioner and Surgical Care Practitioner (Department of 
Health, 2006c). Consequendy the HPC has not been used to regulate CAM practitioners.
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The government also simplified the process for establishing a new professional council 
under the provisions of the Health Act 1999. Practitioner groups would no longer require 
an Act of Parliament but could establish a council using a Section 60 Order. At the time, 
the Department of Health believed there was “scope for the larger professions to follow 
the Osteopaths and Chiropractors in gaining statutory self-regulation, and this would 
undoubtedly serve their professions well” (Department of Health, 2000b, p i 01). Budd and 
Mills (2000) at the University o f Exeter were commissioned by the Department to produce 
an information pack that set out clearly the steps that practitioner groups would need to 
follow to gain statutory regulation (See Figure 8.4). A robust system o f voluntary regulation 
was widely seen as a necessary condition to statutory regulation. The report made it clear 
that CAM practitioners would need to:
demonstrate they have made substantial progress in setting up voluntary arrangements to 
regulate the entire profession such as robust and transparent registering and regulatory 
ystems; through formal consultation show that thy have the support of the whole profession 
and other interestedparties for statutory regulation (Budd and Mills, 2000, p6).
Similar views were espoused by those giving evidence to the House o f Lords’ Select 
Committee. The Committee reported that, “There was general consensus among our 
witnesses that a good voluntary regulatory structure is needed for each CAM therapy 
before statutory regulation would be further considered” (House of Lords Select 
Committee on Science and Technology, 2000a, para 5.17).
Recognising that not all CAM professions would necessarily wish to pursue statutory 
regulation, the government presented a third option to CAM practitioners - to develop 
voluntary systems of professional self-regulation (Department of Health, 2000b). 
Sponsored by the Department of Health, Budd and Mills (2000) elaborated a model of 
voluntary self-regulation for CAM practitioners (Budd and Mills, 2000, p3). The 
Department left the choice to the practitioner groups as to whether to pursue a voluntary 
or statutory route (Department o f Health, 2000b, p i 01).
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Figure 8.4 Steps through regulation -  flow chart and check list
Existing self-regulated organisations com e together
Single, lead voluntary self-regulating body formed with following elements confirmed and assured
□  Single, independent registering body funded by registration fees
□  Governing Council with lay representation (>33%) and democratically elected members o f  the profession
□  Agreed standards o f  training and minimum levels o f  clinical com petence
□  Independent external accreditation and training courses
□  Evidence o f  Continuing Professional D evelopm ent as pre-requisite for continued retention on the register
□  Evidence o f  adequate levels o f  professional indemnity insurance
□  Publication, dissemination and enforcement o f  appropriate Code o f  Practice and Ethics
□  Publication, dissemination o f  disciplinary procedures and appropriate Fitness to Practice mechanisms
□  Provisions for professional conduct committee hearings
□  Accessible, supportive published mechanisms for dealing with complaints by members o f  the public
□  Provision o f  effective enforceable disciplinary sanctions and publication o f  finding o f  professional conduct 
committees
□  Publication o f  patient information leaflets, Annual Report and audited accounts
D evelopm ent o f  coherent plan for each regulatory option, including a realistic assessment o f  costs per 
practitioner o f  statutory regulation, followed by consultation with practitioner members on the way forward
Consultation with GMC, BMA, King’s Fund and patient representative organisations
Application made for statutory recognition by Order to Privy Council
I f  the Privy Council agrees, Order published in draft for consultation with interested parties at least 3 months
before going to Parliament
If there is widespread support for the proposals, Order debated by both Houses o f  Parliament - 
Secretary o f  State provides Report to Parliament in England and the Scottish Parliament
Source: (Budd and Mills, 2000).
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During this phase the state set the terms under which occupational groups could seek 
statutory regulation. It did this in a number o f ways:
•  establishing criteria which aspiring professions had to meet;
•  broadening the scope of the Health Professions Council (HPC) and 
redefining its criteria for eligibility;
•  simplifying the process for establishing a single council for each therapy;
• elaborating a model of robust voluntary self-regulation.
The Department of Health became more explicit about what it expected of CAM 
practitioners. The professionalisation activities of CAM practitioner groups (described 
more fully in the previous chapter) could therefore be reinterpreted as a response to the 
requirements of the state. Some stakeholders expected the government to take unilateral 
measures to regulate practitioners if practitioners did not “put their house in order” 
(Association of Community Health Councils for England and Wales, 1988, para 99) or to 
remove their common-law freedom to practise (Barnett, 2002, p36), nothing as dramatic 
occurred. In other words occupational groups professionalised in line with the state’s 
demands. It was left to CAM practitioner groups to organise themselves. There followed, 
however, a change in the state’s policy towards CAM practitioners, as we shall see in the 
following sections.
8.3 From professionalism  to risk regulation
8.3.1 Public interest in CAM
In 1999 the House of Lords’ Select Committee on Science and Technology established a 
Sub-Committee to examine Complementary and Alternative Medicine. The Sub- 
Committee published its call for evidence in the summer of 1999. The interest generated by 
the Committee’s activities and its report appear to have prompted the government to take 
more decisive action to regulate CAM practitioners.
The widespread use of CAM therapies was a major driver behind the Lords’ Inquiry. The 
House of Lords’ Select Committee stated officially that, “It is this high level of public 
interest that has prompted our Inquiry” (House of Lords Select Committee on Science and 
Technology, 2000a). Lord Walton confirmed this in interview:
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Now the reason for the Complementary and Alternative Medicine Select Committee Report 
was because the parent Select Committee on Science and Technology... recognised that a 
very large number of members of the population were consulting complementary and 
alternative medical practitioners and thy fe lt at least that this whole issue needed to be 
explored and investigated in the interests of trying to bring some kind of regulatory 
mechanism to bear on the professions involved and also in order to protect the public 
(Walton, 2005).
It is likely that the issue was already on the government’s agenda given the high levels of 
public interest and CAM’s popularity. Yvette Cooper MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary 
of State for Public Health, said when giving evidence to the House of Lords’ Committee:
We very much welcomed your Inquiry into thisfield. It is an area which has, I  think, huge 
popularity for patients, but also where there is wide variation in understanding in quality 
and in provision. I  think that is rightly a matter of concern (Department of Health, 2000c, 
para 14).
The size and nature o f the market made it difficult for the government to leave it 
unregulated. The Chief Executive of the British Acupuncture Council (BAcQ remarked 
that “the government weren’t going to let this world just paddle on, couldn’t, it’s too big” 
(O'Farrell, 2004, para 81) and “it can’t stay as it is, people aren’t going to let it stay as it is” 
(O'Farrell, 2004, para 85).
Department of Health officials thought that rising use of CAM therapies would fuel public 
demands for regulation. In evidence to the House of Lords the Department wrote:
...alongside the increase in popularity, will also come an increasing consumer awareness, 
and that patient themselves will be very keen to know; how is this kite marked; who is it 
regulated by and so on. I  suspect the pressure will come in that direction as well 
(Department of Health, 2000b, para 1883).
The Medicines Control Agency (MCA) also expressed caution about the greater availability 
of herbal medicines in the UK, stating that:
.. .there has been a substantial growth in the traditional Chinese medicine which the M CA 
is vey happy to see in the interests of public choice. However, there is no doubt that the 
safety and quality of these products is not always all that it should be (Department of 
Health, 2000d, para 87).
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Richard Woodfield, Group Manager Herbal Policy at the Medicines and Healthcare 
products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) believed that increased demand had actually 
contributed to a reduction in quality. He said that:
with the growth of popularity of complementary and alternative medicine this had attracted 
people and interests who were not necessarily.. .well trained, experienced, qualified, 
depending on the area, and potentially there is downward pressure on quality (Woodfield,
2004, para 156).
According to the lead civil servant for CAM within the Department of Health, Ministers 
and officials received a steady stream of correspondence and questions on CAM. He 
reported that:
there*s always been quite a heaiy volume of correspondence on C A M .. .Ministerialpost 
bags, routine correspondence,...quite a lot of briefing for debates, PQs [parliamentaiy 
questions], fairly heaiy parliamentary postbag. ..quite routinely we’d be expected to brief for 
debates on Queen’s speeches, [and] debates about health conditions where particular MPs 
would want to say... \well what are you planning to do to use this or that therapy to help 
out in this case’ (Brown, 2004, para 47).
The All Party Parliamentary Committee on complementary and alternative medicine 
(recently renamed the All Party Parliamentary Group for Integrated and Complementary 
Healthcare)18 has been active in keeping CAM on the agenda in parliament. A number of 
its current members served on the House of Lords’ Sub-Committee on CAM including 
Lord Rea, Lord Colwyn and Earl Baldwin of Bewdley. David Tredinnick MP 
(Conservative, Bosworth 1987-present and the current Chair of the All Party Group) is 
perhaps the most vocal member on CAM issues currendy sitting in the House of 
Commons. His frequent questions in the House prompted the former Secretary of State 
for Health Alan Milbum to joke:
I  know that the hon. Gentleman has a certain regard for complementary therapies. I  do not 
think that thy are the talk of the pubs and the clubs in my constitueny, but thy may well 
be in his. One of the reasons why we gave the go-ahead for the additional £1 million fo r  
research] was in the very real hope that he would not raise this issue at every single Question 
Time. Alas, my hopes have been dashed (Hansard, 29 A pril2003).
18 In the 2006 Register o f All-Party Groups the Group declared receipt o f the following benefits: £5000 from the Foundation 
for Integrated Health, £3000 from the General Osteopathic Council, £1200 from the British Acupuncture Council, £1000 
from European Herbal Practitioners Association and £1000 from Nelson Bach.
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Such persistent questioning and debate in parliament, together with the direct lobbying of 
politicians by the public, no doubt contributed to a keen awareness within government of 
the level of public interest in CAM. This in turn contributed to a shift in attitude towards 
the regulation of CAM practitioners from one which allowed practitioners to chose 
whether they professionalised and at what pace, to one which actively encouraged 
practitioners to ‘get their house in order’.
8.3.2 Supporting the professionalisation o f CAM practitioners
During the proceedings o f the Inquiry it is possible to trace a shift in the government’s 
approach. The Chairman of the House of Lords’ Committee, Lord Walton, was critical of 
the Department of Health:
It seems to me to be strange to place the initiative for the development on weak and under­
resourced therapies when a lot can be done to help them, particularly by the department 
which has the brief of protecting the public? (Department of Health, 2000c, para 68).
Department officials responded by claiming that they were pro-active in supporting the 
development of voluntary regulation for CAM practitioners. Andy Smith, Branch Head in 
the Public Health Group, said that:
The Government have pointed the way forward for CAM  professionals to take the 
initiative. The Government are being proactive in encouraging CAM  professionals to take 
this initiative and have supported ongoing work at the University of Exeter. The 
department has been particularly active in the area of professional self regulation 
(Department of Health, 2000d, para 68.).
At this time the government was supporting CAM practitioners to establish nationally 
agreed occupational standards. For example the Department o f Health funded the 
University of Exeter to pilot a validation method for standards within reflexology (Mills 
and Budd, 2000). Healthwork UK (the National Training Organisation for the health sector 
until 2002) was asked to work with a wider range of CAM practitioners to develop 
outcome based standards o f professional competence.19 The Department also played a role 
in shaping the development of voluntary systems o f self-regulation. Between 1999 and 
2004 the Foundation for Integrated Health were funded through a grant from the King’s 
Fund to support the development of regulation among CAM practitioners. The 
Department was represented on the Foundation’s Regulation Core Group and had 
influence over which therapies received grant monies. The Department of Health “were
19 Skills for Health took over responsibility for this work in 2004.
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involved in the decision-making process about who should get what, ensuring the money 
was going to professions where they had evolved with their structures, where they were 
showing clear accountability” (Sidwell, 2005, para 86).
Frances Blunden, Principal Policy Adviser at the Consumers Association, believed the 
government needed to take a more proactive stance, particularly as the practitioners had 
reached an impasse:
you do have to wait a bit but there comes a point in time I  think where.. .it looks as i f  often 
that they are never ever going to agree to come to a common scheme, so there is actually 
something about saying right you’ve got to do this and to give that as a catalyst (Blunden,
2004, para 79).
She went on to argue that if the state wanted to see these groups regulated it would need to 
act as a “promoter and catalyst” in bringing the profession together (Blunden, 2004, para 
107).
In the final evidence session held by the House of Lords’ Select Committee in October 
2000 Yvette Cooper MP, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Public Health, 
admitted that the passive approach was untenable. She conceded that the state needed to 
be pro-active in the process of professionalisation, saying that:
...to  take the approach which says that you willjust waitfor the professions to take their 
time and to become sufficiently mature to provide a self-regulatory framework that we will 
then make statutory at some point down the line, where there are public health issues and 
scfety issues at stake, is perhaps not a position we can hold; because should there be 
professions where thy are not making progress or thy are not going to get there, then 
perhaps we have a responsibility to engage in that process as well (Department of Health,
2000c, para 1880).
She concluded that “it might be sensible to set out a tdmescale and also to set out a 
consultation paper” (Department of Health, 2000c, para 1881). The Minister was 
questioned as to whether the state might impose regulation in such cases. Earl Baldwin of 
Bewdley quizzed her saying:
That sounds almost from your side as if you are setting out those professions where you 
think there might be a risk to the public, and going to the professions and saying “I think 
you must have a statutory rule”. Is that what you are saying? (Department of Health,
2000c, para 1881).
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In reply the Minister made it clear that the government supported the statutory regulation 
of acupuncture and herbal medicine because o f “a potential for harm” (Department of 
Health, 2000c, para 1881).
8 3 3  The potential for harm
Department of Health officials began to distinguish between therapies according to their 
level of risk at the time of the Lords’ Inquiry. One official giving oral evidence to the 
House of Lords’ Committee admitted:
There is a n>ide range of complementaiy and alternative therapies and the message about 
self-regulation is for all of them. But it may be of particular relevance to those which are 
more widely used and those which have the potential to cause harm (Department of Health,
2000d, para 2).
Sir Liam Donaldson, the Chief Medical Officer focused on the risks posed by unregulated 
CAM practitioners, though he played down the magnitude of the problem:
I  do not perceive there is any general serious threat to the public health as a result of the 
present regulatory position, but I  do think it is important that we start to moveforward and 
ensure...thatpractice...is regulated (Department of Health, 2000c, para 1865).
Tublic protection’, or its synonyms such as ‘public safety’ or ‘safeguarding public health’, 
were the most frequently cited justifications for regulation o f CAM practitioners in the 
data. There was a wide range of risks associated with the unregulated practice of CAM. A 
distinction can be made between direct risks associated with the mode of intervention, e.g. 
physical manipulation, ingestive remedies, etc, and those associated with the lack of 
appropriate referral (Stone and Matthews, 1996). The main types of direct risk mentioned 
were concerned with (i) toxicity or contamination - the adulteration of therapeutic products 
with poisonous or otherwise harmful or toxic substances (e.g. steroids in topical herbal 
ointments); (ii) potency - the concentration and strength o f effect o f therapeutic products 
which may in some patients produce adverse outcomes (e.g. liver disease caused by 
ingestion of herb); (iii) invasiveness - the extent to which the treatment or substance enters 
the body either through skin penetration or oral ingestion (e.g. lung collapse due to 
incorrect insertion o f needles); (iv) infection — the transfer or introduction of infectious 
agents into the body (e.g. hepatitis or HIV transmission from unclean acupuncture 
needles); (v) manipulation — direct injury as a consequence of the application of 
manipulative techniques (e.g. from spinal manipulation); and (vi) psychological damage —
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emotional harm arising from abusive or distressing psychotherapeutic relationships (e.g. 
sexual assault by hypnotherapists).
The House of Lords’ report defined an indirect or extrinsic risk as “the risk of omission o f 
conventional medical treatment” (House of Lords Select Committee on Science and 
Technology, 2000a, para 5.54). The following factors were identified in the data as being 
associated with indirect risks: (i) CAM therapies that had an alternative clinical system — 
fears of misdiagnosis, inappropriate treatment and lack of appropriate referral; (ii) lack o f 
skills of a CAM practitioner - words such as ‘incompetent’, ‘unqualified’ or ‘untrained’ were 
used to describe these dangerous practitioners; and (iii) unethical conduct — including 
abuse, overcharging, false or fraudulent claims. Regulation may seek to minimise any or all 
o f these risks.
The House of Lords’ report made a number of recommendations in each of the areas it 
covered: evidence, regulation, professional education and training, research, information 
and delivery. In relation to regulation it recommended that each therapy should establish a 
single, unified regulatory or professional body, that acupuncture and herbal medicine seek 
statutory regulation under the Health Act 1999 and that non-medical homeopaths consider 
doing so in future, that existing health care regulators develop guidelines on competency 
and training for their members, and that conventional health care practitioners should be 
trained to standards comparable to those set out for non-medical CAM therapists (for a 
complete list of recommendations see Appendix 6).
The Lords’ recommendation that acupuncture and herbal medicine should be brought
under statutory self-regulation were based on three criteria: “first, the possible risk to the
public from poor practice; second, a pre-existing robust voluntary regulatory system; and 
third, the presence of a credible evidence base” (House o f Lords Select Committee on 
Science and Technology, 2000a, para V). The House of Lords’ Select Committee added a 
caveat to these criteria suggesting that lack of professional development should not stop 
statutory regulation proceeding if there is a demonstrable risk. In their report they stated 
that:
...i f  a therapy posed significant intrinsic risks and had a poor voluntary regulatory 
structure, it might be worth the Department of Health putting pressure on that therapy to
come under a statutory regulatory system (House of Lords Select Committee on Science and
Technology, 2000a, para 5.54).
The government responded quickly to the Report and accepted the vast majority o f the 
Lords’ recommendations. In their response to the Lords’ recommendations the
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government recognised that many of the CAM practitioner groups had made progress with 
professionalisation but that there was a need for the process to be accelerated. The 
government’s response stated:
Many of the CAM  professions have begun making the changes they need to secure a more 
lasting place in broader health provision. But those changes must now be driven forward 
more decisively. A ll the professions need to adapt and improve and, in doing so, they must 
work together more (Department of Health, 2001a, para 15).
The government’s perception of the growth in use of CAM therapies and their associated 
risks were the main determinants of actions that followed the House of Lords’ Inquiry. The 
shift to a more proactive stance in relation to CAM practitioners appears to stem from the 
government’s concern to protect public health and reduce risks faced by patients seeking 
care from unregulated (and inadequately trained) practitioners. This reflected a wider focus 
on safety and quality of health care at the time (Department o f Health, 1998; Department 
of Health, 2000a). In the Department of Health’s proposal for the statutory regulation of 
acupuncture and herbal medicine, the introduction states:
This Government is committed to increasing public and patient protection and improving 
quality in all healthcare settings. A s interest in complementary medicine grows, so too must 
our focus on public safety and ensuring effective standards (Department of Health, 2004a, 
para 8).
These ideas about risk also reflect wider trends in regulation where reduction of risk has 
become an objective of regulation in and o f itself (Hood, Rothstein et al., 2001). More 
recently the term ‘risk regulation’ has been used to describe regulation that is proportionate 
to the risks posed by the activity (see below).
8.4 Better regulation
There was frequent mention in the data of the need for regulation to be ‘proportionate’, 
‘flexible’ or ‘appropriate’. These concepts derive from the work of the Better Regulation 
Taskforce20 whose objectives are to cut red tape and reduce the amount of ‘unnecessary’ 
regulation. For example the Department o f Health in their response to the House of Lords’ 
Report stated that:
20 The Better Regulation Task Force was established by the government to recommend ways o f reducing the administrative 
burden on businesses and organisations and to ensure regulation was necessary and proportionate. All new policies 
undergo regulatory impact assessment. The Task Force was succeeded by the Better Regulation Commission following an 
announcement in the 2005 budget.
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The Government's overall policy towards better regulation is that it should be both 
proportionate and effective. In other words, the regulation should give customers adequate 
protection, without stifling the commercial services they want (Department of Health,
2001a, para 12).
The government, keen to ensure that the benefits of regulation outweigh the costs, has 
adopted a more conservative approach, preferring voluntary regulation to statutory 
regulation for CAM practitioners. The government's approach to better regulation was 
picked up by the Manager of the Regulation Programme at the Foundation for Integrated 
Health who said “it's not necessary to have SSR [statutory self-regulation] for all the 
groups...it's the Better Regulation Task Force idea...don’t try and crack a nut with a 
sledgehammer” (Jack, 2004, para 106).
The Human Resources Directorate (HRD), which took over responsibility for regulation of 
CAM practitioners within the Department o f Health in 2003, were “not heavily into 
voluntary regulation” but welcomed the Foundation's work in this area (Brown, 2004, para 
251). Indeed, they had no experience o f it, having previously only dealt with existing 
statutory regulators. On the other hand they did not wish to see a proliferation of statutory 
regulators. One official indicated that:
[civil servants] recognise that there are various groups in healthcare that don't really on the 
face of it make a strong case for statutory self regulation. There's no strong wish to 
proliferate statutory self-regulation across the Department (Brown, 2004, para 251).
Furthermore, there were reports that the officials had “some concerns about the fact that 
there are more regulatory bodies up and coming and ...they don't want to see too many o f 
these smaller regulatory bodies” (Jack, 2004, para 110).
Recognising that the majority of CAM practitioners operate as small businesses in the 
private sector, the government was concerned that regulations might stifle economic 
activity. Julie Stone, Deputy Director at the Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence 
(CHRE), explained that “the government views regulation as an economic burden”. From 
their perspective “Professional regulation, whether it costs the government money or 
not,... may be putting a brake on competition or creating a cartel” (Stone, 2005b, para 
112). Consequently new statutory measures are only to be introduced where there is a 
strong public interest argument and the benefits outweigh the costs. Yet the professions 
cannot understand why the government is interested in the costs of regulation when the 
registrants pay for regulation themselves (Stone, 2005b, para 110).
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Influenced by wider government concerns about the burden of regulation, officials at the 
Department of Health wanted “to minimise any new groups”, but that meant “putting in 
additional work to produce credible voluntary self-regulation” (Brown, 2004, para 251). 
The government decided to support the establishment of single voluntary registers in 
preference to introducing legislation to statutorily regulate each of the therapies (beyond 
that to which they were committed).
In 2005 the Department of Health announced a three-year grant o f £900,000 to support 
the continuation of the Foundation’s Regulation Programme. Steve Catling, Head of 
Professional Standards and Pensions at the Department o f Health, was quoted to say:
It is increasingly vital that people trust both healthcare practitioners and the bodies that 
train, licence and regulate them, and the Department of Health is keen to support this 
work through a three-year fund (Prince of Wales's foundation for Integrated Health,
2004).
Whereas previously the development of voluntary regulation had been seen as a step on the 
path to statutory regulation, the Department was now supporting robust systems of 
voluntary regulation as an alternative to statutory regulation.
The ideas of better regulation also favour larger blocks o f professions working together. 
The government’s proposals for an umbrella CAM Council to regulate acupuncturists and 
herbalists indicate support for federal and collaborative models of regulation. The 
Department stated in its proposals for the regulation of acupuncture and herbal medicine 
that:
wherever possible, the Council's statutory committees should take a multi-professional 
approach to their work. The experience of other statutory regulatory bodies demonstrates 
that the majority of issues relating to education, registration, health, discipline and ethics are 
common across healthcare professions (.Department of Health, 2004a, para 121).
The latter observation might also have suggested that the government would propose a 
merging of functions among all health care professional regulators. Although the proposals 
contained in the Department’s review o f non-medical health care professional regulation 
support a shift in government policy towards collaborative regulation in an effort to 
‘reduce the burden of regulation’ (Department of Health, 2006c), it does not appear that 
anything as radical as an umbrella council or federal regulator will be proposed for the 
statutory sector. However, a federal structure is proposed for the voluntary regulation of 
CAM practitioners (Stone, 2005a).
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The application o f the concept of better regulation to the health sector is relatively recent 
(Dixon, 2006). Terms such as ‘proportionate’ have only entered policy debates about the 
regulation of CAM practitioners since 2001. However, concerns about safeguarding 
consumer choice have been around for much longer.
8.5 Consumer choice
Successive governments have been cautious about introducing regulations in the CAM 
market that would restrict consumer choice. The Conservative government spoke about 
balancing ‘consumer protection’ and ‘freedom of choice’ (Trumpington, 1987, p337). They 
believed that consumers:
want to be protected from unsafe and ineffective medicines.. from the charlatan and from 
fraudulent claims. ..it is only i f  we can be protectedfrom such excesses that it is possible for 
us to retain a genuinefreedom of choice (Trumpington, 1987, p336).
In 1987 Tony Newton MP, Minister o f Health, in a speech to members of the Natural 
Therapeutic and Osteopathic Society declared that “The government firmly believes in the 
public’s right of choice and has no wish to restrict the practice of therapies which many 
people undoubtedly find useful” (Association of Community Health Councils for England 
and Wales, 1988).
Similar views were expressed by the 1997 Labour government in the preface to the 
Department of Health’s evidence to the House of Lords’ Sub-Committee which stated 
that, “In matters of regulation, it is the Government’s intention to maintain freedom of 
choice whilst ensuring that appropriate safeguards are in place” (Department o f Health, 
2000b, para 9). It went on to say that “In relation to the regulation of CAM products, the 
Government does not wish to limit consumer choice, but at the same time it wants to 
encourage suppliers to adopt the highest standards” (Department of Health, 2000b, para 
12).
Concern about consumer choice has been particularly prominent in relation to product 
regulation. In giving evidence to the House of Lords’ an official from the Medicines 
Control Agency said:
The UK has taken the lead in urging the need for a proper discussion in Europe to try to 
agree a common approach, i f  at all possible in the interests of promoting an effective 
regulatory regime which provides a levelplaying fieldfor companies and general certainty for 
business...Our overall objective in this is to balance consumer safety and choice 
(Department of Health, 2000d, para 91).
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The Group Manager for Herbal Policy at the MHRA said there were three main 
justifications for regulation of herbal medicine - public health, informed consumer choice 
and a more efficient market that supports responsible manufacturers and practitioners - but 
claimed “public health is ... number one” (Woodfield, 2004, para 48).
The Department of Health wrote, “Potentially, this [the EU directive on traditional 
medicinal products] could provide a legally secure regime effectively balancing consumer 
choice and public safety” (Department o f Health, 2001a, para 69). During debate in the 
House of Lords on the CAM report, Lord Burlison stated for the government “The aim is 
to provide a framework for the effective regulation of traditionally used medicines, 
including herbal remedies, balancing public safety and consumer choice” (Hansard, 29 
March 2001). Speaking critically of the government’s proposals for licensing of herbal 
medicines, David Tredinnick MP said they would “result in restriction of choice, my party 
stands for choice, not restriction and it will prove damaging to the industry as a whole” 
(Hansard, 20 January 2003).
The House of Lords’ Sub-Committee was not convinced by arguments that statutory 
regulation of CAM practitioners would restrict consumer choice (House of Lords Select 
Committee on Science and Technology, 2000a, para 572). The Committee argued that:
Statutory regulation could even have the opposite effect by giving consumers the confidence to 
consult practitioners whom thy might not otherwise consult due to concerns about regulation 
(House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, 2000a, para 573).
In 2004, Dr. John Reid MP, then Secretary o f State for Health, used this argument, “We 
need the regulation of that sector [CAM] because then we can extend patients choice on 
using elements of it” (Hansard, 23 March 2004). Regulation in other markets is often 
designed to correct market failures and by doing so is expected to increase consumer 
choice and confidence.
As this section has demonstrated, policymakers perceive there to be a tension between 
regulation designed to protect patients from unsafe or harmful practice by CAM 
practitioners and a consumer’s right to seek care from whomever they choose.
8.6 The state’s role in the regulation o f CAM practitioners
The previous sections identified three different phases in the state’s interest in CAM 
practitioner regulation. In the beginning the state encouraged professionalisation but did 
not force it upon practitioners, it then acted more decisively to reduce risks to public 
health, and finally, concerned to minimise excessive regulation, it now seeks to ensure any
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regulation is proportionate. The following section considers the extent to which the state’s 
actions can explain the regulation of the five CAM therapies examined in this study.
8.6.1 Osteopathy and chiropractic
Osteopaths and chiropractors pursued statutory regulation at a time when the government 
took a passive approach towards the regulation of CAM practitioners. The government 
criteria set out between 1985 and 1987 shaped the activities of osteopaths and 
chiropractors. Practitioner groups believed that if they could prove they met the criteria the 
state would reward them with statutory regulation. Osteopathy made more progress 
towards meeting the criteria than other CAM therapies and was “closest to getting its own 
house in order” (Association of Community Health Councils for England and Wales, 1988, 
para 67). The chiropractors were not far behind.
The King’s Fund established a Working Party on Osteopathy in 1989 in order to make 
recommendations about the regulation of the profession and to produce a draft Bill. When 
approached by the Fund, the Department gave a “strong indication” that they would give 
serious consideration to a Bill. And that “ ...it would be helpful for somebody like the 
King’s Fund to take an interest” (Maxwell, 2005). After the publication of the report o f the 
King’s Fund Working Party on Osteopathy there were “extensive discussions with the 
Department of Health” involving “several senior civil servants in the Department of 
Health and also Ministers”, at the end of which “they recognised the validity of the case” 
(Walton, 2005). Thus there was tacit government support for the efforts of the osteopaths 
to achieve statutory recognition.
When the Osteopath’s Bill ran out o f parliamentary time because the general election was 
called for 9th April 1992, Baroness Cumberlege, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for 
Health in the Lords 1992-1997, gave an undertaking that the government would do 
something in a new parliament (Maxwell, 2005). In the end Malcolm Moss MP took up the 
Osteopaths Bill in the House o f Commons.
The Fund set up a Working Party on Chiropractic in 1992 to draft the Chiropractors Bill. 
By 1993 the chiropractors were able to demonstrate that they had the support o f the 
majority of practitioners and the medical profession, and that they had developed robust 
systems of voluntary regulation. The recommendations of the Working Party made a public 
interest argument for statutory regulation (Hutchinson, 1994). During the debate of the 
Osteopaths Bill in 1993, David Tredinnick MP declared chiropractors had “put their house 
in order, as requested by the Department” and called for them to be statutorily regulated 
after the osteopaths (Hansard, 15 January 1993).
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There are direct risks associated with both osteopathy and chiropractic, particularly spinal 
manipulation or manipulating someone with malignant disease. In general these risks are 
seen to result from poor or unskilled practice. David Lidington MP, who introduced the 
Chiropractors Bill in the House o f Commons, described the dangers of chiropractic during 
debate in the House of Commons:
.. .there is potential, in untrained hands, to do a great deal of harm. The manipulation of 
necks and backs could be lethal without the proper degree of skill. Even relatively minor 
adjustments to limbs, if  attempted in ignorance, could result in severe damage (Hansard, 15 
Januaiy 1993).
Although risk was mentioned it was not central to the debate or the decision to pass the 
BiU.
Both the Osteopaths Act 1993 and the Chiropractors Act 1994 passed with the support of 
government and opposition MPs. The osteopaths and chiropractors had met the criteria set 
out by the government and their efforts were rewarded with parliamentary support for the 
Private Members’ Bills.
8.6.2 Acupuncturists and herbalists
During the late 1990s when the herbalists were keen to gain statutory regulation they were 
given a document by the Department of Health advising them on what was required. The 
state set out the path that they expected the herbalists to follow. In response the European 
Herbal Practitioners Association (EHPA) were “busy producing all the documents that
they have suggested to us we should put in place [and] putting ourselves in order in such
a way that we can make an application for statutory self-regulation” (European Herbal 
Practitioners Association, 2000b, para 714). It is likely they would have applied under the 
Health Act 1999 either for a single statutory council or to join the newly established HPC 
(European Herbal Practitioners Association, 2000a, para 20). In fact events overtook them.
Instances of adverse events as a result o f the ingestion of powerful herbs or herbs 
contaminated with toxic substances were widely publicised both in the UK and 
internationally, and were seen as credible because of evidence from the MCA and other 
international regulators. There was a general consensus on the potential harm of herbal 
medicines due to their toxicity. For example, the Academy o f Medical Sciences claimed 
“There is indeed substantial evidence of people having come to serious harm, having had 
renal failure, liver disease and having been given steroids in unregulated amounts” 
(Academy of Medical Sciences, 2000, para 1424). Even the Chairman of the EHPA was
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“concerned that there should be no toxicity and that there should be adequate reporting of 
problems” (European Herbal Practitioners Association, 2000b, para 731).
The UK government successfully lobbied for an EU Directive on Traditional Medicinal 
Products (2004/24/EC) which introduced quality and safety standards for manufactured 
herbal products, but which left the regulation of herbal medicine prepared and dispensed 
by practitioners untouched (Woodfield, 2004, para 36). The MHRA considered that, 
overall, reform to bring in effective regulation of herbal medicines depended on consistent 
action in three areas: the introduction o f the traditional herbal registration scheme for 
manufactures over-the-counter products, reform of the Section 12(1) regime (where 
unlicensed herbal medicines are made up by herbal practitioners), and statutory regulation 
of the herbal medicine profession (Woodfield, 2004). The fact that the MHRA continues to 
find evidence of risk to public health from herbal medicines gives greater impetus to the 
introduction of statutory regulation for herbalists.
The recommendations of the House of Lords’ Committee and the response o f the 
Department of Health meant that herbalists, together with acupuncturists, became caught 
up in a much more proactive process facilitated by state officials. The Lords’ Sub- 
Committee was clear that herbal medicine had direct risks associated with it which justified 
statutory regulation.
The risk of harm from acupuncture was much more circumstantial. The direct risks 
associated with acupuncture concerned its invasive nature and the potential for 
transmitting infection. The piercing of the skin with acupuncture needles can transmit 
blood borne disease or introduce infection if proper standards o f hygiene are not observed. 
One or two witnesses giving evidence to the Lords mentioned the possibility o f lung 
punctures. However, there was a lack of any systematic data on adverse events. Cases 
where acupuncture needles had caused a lung puncture were cited by Lord Walton as one 
of the reasons why the Committee recommended the regulation of acupuncture. The 
Committee were determined that protection of the public and defining standards of 
training and care should be principal concerns (Walton, 2005, para 79). During discussions 
within the Acupuncture Regulatory Working Group (ARWG) medical acupuncturists 
apparently claimed to have seen “patients who had been wrongly treated and had problems 
of infection, problems of damage to nerves and all that sort o f thing” (Chan, 2005, para 
44). The Chief Executive of the British Medical Acupuncture Society (BMAS) played down 
the risks associated with acupuncture:
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Acupuncture is pretty safe. We know about the common adverse events. The serious adverse 
events are extremely rare, vanishingly rare. ...I  believe the best use of acupuncture isn't to 
restrict its use to people who just do acupuncture. Because frankly acupuncture isn't a very 
powerful technique relative to modem medicine. .. .in generalpowerful techniques come with 
poweful side effects and you don't have powerful side effects with acupuncture. It's very good 
in a few areas and in other areas it has very mild effects as it appears from all the data 
(Cummings, 2005, para 90).
This position may reflect the timing of the interview. The BMAS were attempting to down 
play the risks of acupuncture by contrasting them with the risks of orthodox medicine. 
They hoped by doing so that government proposals to regulate acupuncturists would not 
result in stringent regulations and training requirements being imposed on its members. 
Doctors and other statutory professionals wanted to be able to continue to practise 
acupuncture without lengthy formal training.
The Department o f Health accepted the case for statutory regulation of acupuncture and 
herbal medicine on the basis o f their level o f professional development and their risks 
(Department of Health, 2001a, para 51). Yet despite this emphasis on risk regulation the 
Chief Executive of the BAcC, representing non-medical acupuncturists, believed that they 
were being encouraged to move to statutory self-regulation because they were “further 
advanced” (O'Farrell, 2004, para 191). The government, together with the Foundation for 
Integrated Health, supported the establishment of independently chaired regulatory 
working groups to facilitate the process of consensus building to develop proposals for 
regulation.
The ARWG was established in 2002 and met under the chairmanship of Lord Chan of 
Oxton for a period of a year. Representatives from four main groups were involved: the 
BAcC, the British Academy of Western Acupuncture (BAWA), the BMAS and the 
Acupuncture Association of Chartered Physiotherapists (AACP) (see Appendix 7 for a full 
list of members). The Terms of Reference for the ARWG were to produce a report which: 
a) examines the options to achieve successful statutory regulation of the acupuncture 
profession as a whole; and b) makes recommendations that will form the basis for wider 
consultation by the Government and subsequently for the legislation that will enable the 
statutory regulation o f the acupuncture profession.
The Department had already been engaged with the acupuncturists prior to the 
establishment of the ARWG:
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We spent quite a bit of time working with different organisations to promote that process of 
coming together, setting up the organisation and some of the other areas and issues that 
professions need to consider when they are going down that track: it is not a simple process 
and it can take considerable time to do so (Department of Health, 2000c).
During 2001 the Department of Health worked with acupuncture groups to determine 
“how to have a proper discussion about regulation” (Chan, 2005). But the discussions 
“were constantly deadlocked...there were continual re-discussions o f points such as 
terminology...and the...importance of the philosophical background” (Chan, 2005, para 
8). This fuelled a growing sense of frustration in the Department of Health. As one official 
admitted “frankly over time it just wasn’t possible to make any lasting progress at all with 
any of these groups until they had got together on a semi-formal basis with an independent 
chairman and lay members” (Brown, 2004, para 245).
The Herbal Medicine Regulatory Working Group (HMRWG) established in 2002 was 
made up of representatives from a range of herbal medicine traditions (see Appendix 7 for 
a full list of members) and met under the chairmanship of Michael Pittilo, Vice Chancellor 
o f the University of Hertfordshire at the time. It had broader terms of reference:
•  produce a report which examines the options for achieving the successful 
statutory regulation of the herbal medicine profession as a whole, and 
makes recommendations which will form the basis for a wider consultation 
by the Government and subsequently for the legislation that will enable the 
statutory regulation of the herbal medicine profession;
•  in the light of these recommendations for the statutory regulation o f the 
profession and the current Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory 
Agency (formerly the Medicines Control Agency) review of Section 12(1) of 
the Medicines Act 1968, make recommendations for assuring the safety and 
quality of herbal remedies supplied under Section 12(1).
The difference from earlier discussions was that the groups were given external impetus by 
the government’s involvement and that of an independent chair and lay members. This 
ensured that professional differences were minimised and greater efforts were made to 
reach a consensus on how statutory self-regulation should operate. Both the HMRWG and 
the ARWG were resourced by the Department — including support for the appointment of 
an external chair to each group, hiring meeting venues, and providing catering and other 
secretarial support. In this regard, compared to other health care professionals, “CAM has 
had a very good deal” (Sidwell, 2005).
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The process was by no means smooth, with continued conflict between practitioners, but 
the Department of Health continued to play an active role. Officials worked behind the 
scenes “ ...encouraging and supporting the acupuncturists to talk to their TCM [traditional 
Chinese medicine] colleagues” (Sidwell, 2005). Having made a public commitment to 
introduce statutory self-regulation for acupuncture and herbal medicine the Department 
were reluctant to give up on the process - “it would have been quite difficult to walk away” 
(Sidwell, 2005, para 103). One official sharing her personal reflections said:
I  think it is very difficult with CAM  because the Department gave CAM  more right from 
the beginning It gave it the two working groups, the support to get through that stage of the 
process and... it would have been quite difficult for the Department having put in that 
support to then withdraw (Sidwell, 2005, para 101).
The impetus within the Department was evident to leaders of the practitioner groups. For 
example Michael O ’Farrell, the Chief Executive of the BAcC, commented that:
the momentum has continued since then [the Douse of Lords’ report], I  mean there has 
been no let up, there’s been changes in personnel within the DoH, continuous changes, but 
the momentum around it has not changed at all (O'Farrell, 2004).
Apparendy O ’Farrell was also “very quick to remind the profession that the Department 
has a lot o f other much greater priorities and if they [the acupuncturists] didn’t get their 
house in order it would eventually stop trying” (Sidwell, 2005). Practitioners’ leaders also 
recognised that the level of support from government gave them a unique opportunity to 
achieve statutory regulation. According to one Department official:
the people at the top of the profession were always very aware of and very appreciative of [the 
support] and had to remind the more difficult practitioner representatives that this was a 
chance that other professions don’t get (Sidwell, 2005, para 101).
8.6.3 Homeopaths
In contrast to herbal medicine, homeopathic medicines were seen to be so dilute as to 
render any direct risks negligible. Conventional health care practitioners found it 
inconceivable that homeopathic products had a pharmacological effect (Academy of 
Medical Sciences, 2000, para 1409). The high dilutions meant that it was impossible for 
them to cause harm, but also impossible to do any good either. The Chairman o f the 
House of Lords’ Sub-Committee admitted that members of the committee had “great 
difficulty in understanding how and if homeopathy works” (Academy of Medical Sciences, 
2000, para 1412). The MHRA were clear it posed little risk; “ ...homeopathic
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medicines...are very much at the safe end of the spectrum; they are very dilute” 
(Department of Health, 2000d). The Society of Homeopaths played down the risks, 
possibly because they were not keen to be statutorily regulated (see previous chapter). They 
claimed “The level o f intrinsic risk from the consultation process and the potentised 
medicines used in homoeopathy is extremely small by comparison [with osteopathy and 
chiropractic]” (Society of Homeopaths, 2000a, p 218). Medical homeopaths claimed that 
homeopathy did pose a “significant overall total risk”, but this resulted from indirect risks 
rather than direct risks of the treatments (see below) (Faculty o f Homeopathy, 
Homeopathic Trust and British Homoeopathic Association, 2000, para 646).
There was much confusion over how to apply the criteria of direct risk of harm to 
homeopathy. For example, a Department of Health official believed it should have been 
classified with herbals and acupuncture as “invasive” because it is ingested (Sidwell, 2005, 
para 21). As their report shows, the House of Lords' Committee recognised that 
“homeopathy was not such a clear case for statutory regulation because homeopathic 
medicines weren’t dangerous by normal definitions”. However, after weighing other 
factors, they were able to recommend that, “perhaps there are good reasons why.. .in due 
course homeopathy...ought to have state regulation” (Brown, 2004, para 343). Other 
reasons why this recommendation was made are explored in the following chapter.
The Committee’s recommendation that homeopathy should be brought under statutory 
regulation at some point was largely based on concerns that patients were not getting 
conventional treatment. Such concerns were emphasised by the medical homeopaths. Peter 
Fisher Vice President of the Faculty and Clinical Director Royal London Homeopathic 
Hospital said that:
The total risk is quite great because of questions such as misdiagnosis, or people being 
discouraged from having effective conventional treatments or being told to stop them 
abruptly. .. The high total risk is related to the fact that it is a therapy that can be applied 
in a lot of different situations (Faculty of Homeopathy, Homeopathic Trust and British 
Homoeopathic Association, 2000, para 646).
The House of Lords’ report concluded that,
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While the practice of homeopathy may itself be free from risk, it does create an opportunity 
for diverting conventional diagnosis and treatment away from patients with conditions where 
conventional treatment is well-established, as some patients seem to see it as offering a 
complete alternative to conventional medicine. Such attitudes mean that homeopaths an in a 
position of gnat nsponsibility. It is imperative that there is a way of ensuring that this 
position is handled professionally, that all homeopaths an registend, that thy know the 
limits of their competence, and that then an disciplinary proceduns with nal teeth in place 
(House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, 2000a).
The Committee had no evidence of the intrinsic risk of homeopathy. In fact it seems they 
were convinced that the dilutions rendered it harmless (and ineffective), but were 
concerned that patients who attended homeopaths might not receive the appropriate 
allopathic treatment.
Consequently, the homeopathy profession’s efforts have been focused on establishing a 
robust system of voluntary regulation (as a precursor to possible statutory regulation in 
future). The work of the Council for Organisations Registering Homeopaths (CORH) has 
focused closely on adhering to the guidance given to groups developing voluntary 
regulation. They are working to establish a single register, an accreditation board, and to 
agree a code o f ethics and practice. These efforts have been shaped in part by the model of 
voluntary regulation set out by Budd and Mills (2000) and reproduced in the House of 
Lords’ Committee Report. The homeopaths have also been given further impetus and 
support through the Foundation’s Regulation Programme, funded initially by the King’s 
Fund and latterly by the Department o f Health. They have also been supported by Skills 
for Health in the development of national occupational standards.
Recent changes in the government’s approach to regulation suggest that despite the House 
o f Lords’ recommendation that homeopaths might at some point become statutorily 
regulated, this is now unlikely. Given the level o f risk posed by homeopaths they would 
likely fail any test of proportionality. Instead, the government is actively subsidising the 
establishment of a robust system of voluntary regulation.
8.7 D iscussion
The preceding analysis has shown that the state’s policy towards CAM practitioners 
changed over time. In the first phase the state decided to regulate CAM practitioners in 
response to professional demands in cases where the practitioners could demonstrate they 
had a body o f knowledge supported by externally validated training courses, had a robust 
system of voluntary regulation and were unified. From the mid-1980s to the late 1990s
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statutory regulation was viewed as a professional privilege, granted to those occupations 
who had successfully organised themselves and mobilised support from the medical 
profession and their members. The role of government at this time was largely passive, 
setting the criteria which aspiring professions had to meet.
The government included in the Health Act 1999 new provisions which it hoped would 
provide easier mechanisms for CAM practitioners to gain statutory regulation. However, 
the route o f joining the HPC was based on a set o f criteria which no CAM therapies were 
able to meet. CAM practitioner groups were encouraged to get ‘their house in order’ and to 
establish voluntary systems of regulation as a precursor to statutory self-regulation. The 
level of disagreement and fragmentation within therapies meant little progress was made. 
The passive approach allowed practitioners to draw their own boundaries between 
different traditions or factions and to professionalise at their own pace.
In the second phase the state’s concern was to protect the public from risks to health, in 
cases where there was direct risk of harm. The increasing use of CAM services by the 
public, together with growing concerns about risks to public health, prompted the 
government to become more proactive in facilitating the regulatory process. The shift to a 
risk-based approach with a primary objective of public protection meant the government 
had to decide which therapeutic practices posed a risk. Risk was used as a criteria for 
determining which therapies should be statutorily regulated. The decision to regulate largely 
depended on the definition of risk adopted rather than evidence of adverse outcomes. The 
Department of Health, following the recommendations of the House of Lords’ Sub- 
Committee, singled out acupuncture and herbal medicine (including traditional Chinese 
medicine and Ayurveda) for statutory regulation because they believed they posed a direct 
physical risk. The state helped the professions to move ahead more rapidly with 
preparations for statutory regulation.
In the final phase the state will only regulate if the benefits outweighed the costs and in a 
way that minimizes the regulatory burden on businesses and providers of services. 
Concerns about over-regulation and ideas about better regulation mean the government is 
more cautious about introducing further statutory regulation of CAM practitioners. Instead 
it is supporting other CAM practitioner groups to develop more robust systems of 
voluntary regulation. It also favours developing federal or collaborative models of 
regulation in which the costs of regulation can be shared (see Chapter 10).
Consumer choice was a strong countervailing argument to regulation. Concerns that heavy- 
handed regulation can place limits on consumer choice have been present throughout the 
debates examined here. The finding that there is a tension between the government’s duty
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to protect the public and its obligation to respond to consumer pressure is largely 
consistent with other research (Kelner, Wellman et al., 2004b).
In general, the findings here suggest that the state was largely passive at the time 
osteopathy and chiropractic were regulated. These professions were rewarded with 
statutory regulation because they met the criteria set by the state. In relation to herbal 
medicine and acupuncture the state introduced statutory regulation in response to concerns 
about risk, and actively encouraged the formation of unified professional groups. 
Homeopathy was not believed to pose any direct risks so was encouraged to develop a 
single voluntary register. The current concerns with better regulation mean the state is now 
encouraging other CAM practitioners to form a voluntary federal regulator. The state is 
unlikely to regulate further CAM practitioners beyond acupuncture and herbal medicine.
The analysis using demand theories o f professionalisation in the previous chapter went 
some way towards explaining why some groups o f CAM practitioners obtained statutory 
recognition while others did n o t The analysis in this chapter has highlighted the important 
role the state plays in shaping the context in which professions develop. The supply 
theories o f professionalisation have provided a more coherent understanding o f why some 
CAM practitioners achieved statutory regulation and others did not.
One of the shortcomings of the supply theories of professionalisation is that the state is 
treated as a single entity. There is no recognition that the state is made up of numerous 
stakeholders, e.g. elected politicians, Ministers, officials and civil servants, and peers, all of 
whom may have different and potentially competing interests. Supply theories also portray 
occupational groups as passive, with little or no autonomy to oppose the state’s will for 
them or to pervert the interests of the state. The next chapter attempts to bring together 
the analysis of the state and of practitioner groups into a more complete analytical 
framework. It adopts a more heterogeneous concept of the state and embraces all actors 
who are active within the policy process.
166
C h a p t e r  9
9 THE POLITICS OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION
9.1 Introduction
The previous two chapters have utilised the demand theories and supply theories of 
professionalisation respectively to analyse the development of professional regulation for 
CAM practitioners in the UK. Both ignore the interplay between state actors, practitioners 
and external actors, and fail to identify possible differences among state actors and between 
professional leaders and grassroots practitioners. This chapter uses ‘personal network 
analysis’, which derives from interest group theories, to re-analyse the regulatory process 
surrounding our five cases of CAM therapies. It is hoped that this perspective will capture 
the dynamic aspects o f the process and provide different insights from those gained using 
demand and supply theories of professionalisation.
The chapter begins with a short introduction to personal network analysis (see Chapter 5 
for more detail) and highlights the main differences from established approaches to policy 
analysis.
Section 9.3 presents maps of the personal networks showing the key actors, the positions 
they occupy and the interrelationships between them. The section includes a discussion of 
the methodological challenges of visualising networks.
Sections 9.4-9.7 analyse four time periods in the policy process. The dynamic interplay 
between actors in the personal policy networks is examined. Finally, Section 9.8 analyses 
the particular role of orthodox medical professionals, consumer representatives and 
academics in the network.
9.2 The CAM policy subsystem
Chapter 5 reviewed the literature on policy subsystems deriving from pluralist accounts of 
power and interest groups theories. Policy subsystems have been variously called policy 
communities, issue networks and advocacy coalitions depending on membership, level of 
integration and resources.
Marsh and Rhodes (1992) presented ideal types of policy subsystems: policy communities 
and issue networks (see Table 5.4). Policy communities have a limited and stable 
membership. Members share basic values and interact with each other frequently. They all 
bring resources and the leaders can deliver members’ support. In contrast, issue networks
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have many members which fluctuate over time. Although there may be a degree of 
agreement there is usually conflict. Members have limited resources and the leadership do 
not have capacity to act with their members support.
According to this typology, the CAM policy subsystem might be classified as an issue 
network. It is highly fragmented, with a large number of groups who fluctuate in their 
participation, a disconnection between leadership and membership, and disagreement 
within and between members. CAM practitioners are generally non-conformist and seem 
to enjoy arguing among themselves. Although there has been some integration over time, 
and contact between groups has become more frequent and structured through the 
seminars and conferences organised by the Foundation for Integrated Health, there are still 
many groups purporting to represent CAM practitioners.
Issue networks are also thought to develop in areas that are o f “lesser importance to 
government, o f high political controversy, or in new issue areas where interests have not 
had the time to establish institutionalised relationships” (Smith, 1993). Again this would 
seem to fit CAM. CAM policy issues and specifically the regulation of CAM practitioners 
can be characterised as low politics. There has been some political controversy over the 
impact o f the EU Directive (2004/24/EC) on the availability of herbal medicines and 
dietary supplements, but not over the regulation of CAM practitioners. CAM policies are 
less important than other health policy issues. CAM has not featured in any party 
manifestos and usually falls under the remit o f one o f the junior Health Ministers. 
Although this is not a new policy issue - political struggles between orthodox and non- 
allopathic practitioners have taken place since the late 19th century - rapid growth in the 
numbers of practitioners and the emergence of new therapies mean there are many new 
players who have not yet coalesced into stable interest groups.
Analysis o f issue networks focuses on organised interests and consequently tends to ignore 
the role of individuals. Despite the presence of organised groups in the CAM issue network 
direct involvement in the policy process has been largely limited to a network o f individuals 
including state actors, who use their formal and informal roles to pursue shared objectives. 
The aim here is to illuminate the role of personal politics in shaping the policy process 
using personal policy network analysis. The relationship between the wider CAM issue 
network and the personal policy network, the focus of this study, is depicted in Figure 9.5. 
While the personal policy network is constituted of individual policy actors, the issue 
network is made up of interest groups or organisations with an interest in CAM. Although 
many of the individuals in the personal policy network are affiliated with organisations in 
the issue network, membership of the two networks does not overlap completely (see
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Figure 9.5). For example some individuals within the personal policy network have an 
affiliation to an organisation outside the issue network (see © in Figure 9.5). Most 
individuals within the policy network have at least one affiliation to an organisation within 
the issue network (see (D) and some have more (see ©). Some organisations in the issue 
network do not have any individual members active in the policy network (see (D).
In the next section the results of the mapping of the personal policy networks are 
presented.
Figure 9.5 Relationship between issue network and personal policy network
Issue network Personal 
policy network
Interest groups
O  Individuals
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9.3 Mapping personal policy networks
Personal policy networks are made up of individuals with a variety o f affiliations (including 
state actors) who interact around a common policy issue, in this case the regulation of 
CAM practitioners. As outlined in Chapter 5, the personal policy network approach adopts 
a heterogeneous concept of the state. There are many different perspectives that make up 
the state including those of elected politicians, those of officials and civil servants, and 
those o f peers. Within each of these categories the views might differ between those in 
opposition and those in power, between back benchers and those on the front bench, 
between senior officials and low ranking civil servants, and between life peers and 
hereditary peers.
The first step in the mapping exercise was to produce a list o f members of the personal 
policy network. Members were identified from the documentary data21 as well as from 
among people mentioned by interviewees.
The next step in the mapping exercise involved identifying other information about the 
members of the personal policy network, such as when they were involved and how 
actively, their affiliations and interrelationships. These data were then used to produce 
maps o f the personal policy networks at different points in time (see Figure 9.6).
The network maps depict the following information graphically:
• membership at different points in time,
•  the roles that each of the individuals has with different organisations -
overlapping colour-coded discs are used to represent different affiliations,
•  the level of involvement in the process - core members, i.e. those with
frequent contact and high levels of engagement, were placed closer to the 
centre and peripheral members, i.e. those with less frequent involvement, 
were placed on the edge,
•  the relationships between individuals - interconnections are depicted by 
clustering individuals or placing them in proximity to one another.
Figure 9.6 shows the individuals involved in the CAM personal policy network at four 
different times — in the early 1990s prior to passing the Osteopaths Act 1993 (A), around 
1997 when the Prince of Wales’s Initiative on Integrated Health was formed (B), around
21 Names were checked against people who submitted evidence to the House o f  Lords Sub-Committee, members of 
committees and working groups, trustees o f key organisations, respondents to the Department o f Health consultation on 
the statutory regulation o f herbal medicine and acupuncture, published books and papers on CAM regulation and media 
reports, letters and articles.
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2000 when the House of Lords’ Sub-Committee on CAM met (C) and around 2003 when 
the Acupuncture Regulatory Working Group (ARWG) and Herbal Medicine Regulatory 
Working Group (HMRWG) reported (D). The key to the names of individuals that are 
included in the personal policy network maps are listed below (for a short biographical 
profile of these individuals see Appendix 8).
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Figure 9.6 Personal policy network maps
Figure A Policy network map circa 1989-1993 - Osteopathy
Figure B Policy network map circa 1997 -  Prince of Wales
Figure C Policy network map circa 2000 -  House of Lords
Figure D  Policy network map circa 2003 -  Regulatory Working Groups
Foundation for Integrated Health — staff, trustee 
Independent — academic, independent chair 
State actor — civil servant, politician, peer 
Consumer organisation
Orthodox medicine -  practitioner, association or 
regulator
BL Bob Leckridge
DP David Peters
DT David Tredinnick
EE Edzard Ernst
FB Frances Blunden
GB Gordon Brown
GC Graeme Catto
GL George Lewith
JC Jonathan Coe
JS Julie Stone
LW Lord Walton
LC Lord Chan
MC Michael Cummings
MD Michael Dixon
MF Michael Fox
MMI Michael McIntyre
MOF Michael O’Farrell
MP Michael Pittilo
MS Mike Saks
MW Maggy Wallace
NC Nigel Clarke
PJ Pamela Jack
PF Peter Fisher
POW HRH Prince of Wales
RM Robert Maxwell
RS Rebecca Sidwell
RW Richard Woodfield
SC Steve Catling
SF Simon Fielding
SG Stephen Gordon
SH Stephen Holgate
SM Simon Mills
TB Thomas Bingham
VH Val Hopwood
□
□
□
Acupuncture 
Homeopathy 
Herbal medicine 
Osteopathy 
Chiropractic
9.3.1 Overview of the maps
Membership
It was clear from the outset that the personal policy network under investigation was a 
small one. In my first interview with the policy lead responsible for CAM policy within the
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Department of Health, Gordon Brown (based in the Public Health Directorate) talked 
about a “sort of inwardness” (Gordon Brown, 2004, para 255). The policy network maps 
include 34 individuals in total. As can be seen in Figure 9.6 A-D the numbers and diversity 
o f those involved in the network has increased over time.
Most members have a long standing interest and involvement in CAM. For example Simon 
Fielding got involved as an osteopath who was keen to see the osteopathy profession 
formally recognised. Even after statutory regulation was achieved he continued to actively 
participate in the network, supporting and advising other groups seeking to professionalise, 
and in a formal capacity as a Trustee of the Foundation for Integrated Health. Some 
individuals maintained an active role despite taking on a new formal role not direcdy 
related to CAM. For example Julie Stone’s interest began as a lawyer and academic, in 
which capacity she wrote about the ethical and legal implications o f CAM (Stone and 
Matthews, 1996). Though she has taken up a formal role at the Council for Healthcare 
Regulatory Excellence (CHRE) she has continued to work on CAM regulation, writing 
articles and books and advising the Foundation on their Regulation Programme.
Other individuals were appointed to positions with little prior interest or involvement with 
CAM but with other relevant experience. For example, Maggy Wallace was appointed as 
the Chair of the Council for Organisations Registering Homeopaths (CORH). She had 
previously worked on regulation of nursing and midwifery and as a World Health 
Organization (WHO) expert on professional regulation. Michael Pittilo was appointed as 
the Chair of the Acupuncture Regulatory Working Group (ARWG) in 2002 (see Figure 9.6 
D). As Dean of St George’s Hospital Medical School he had experience of medical 
education but not directly o f CAM. He first became involved as a member o f the 
Education and Training Working Group for the Prince of Wales’s Initiative on Integrated 
Medicine (see Figure 9.6 B). Even after the end of his tenure as Chair of the ARWG he has 
stayed involved, chairing the Working Group for Acupuncture and Herbal Medicine tasked 
with moving towards implementation of statutory regulation.
There are only a few individuals whose involvement in the policy network was short lived. 
For example, in April 2003 the specific responsibility for regulation o f CAM practitioners 
was transferred to the Human Resources Directorate (HRD) where Rebecca Sidwell 
became the responsible official. Reorganisation at the Department of Health during 2004 
resulted in Sidwell moving posts at which point Steve Catling, Head o f Professional 
Standards and Pensions, took on responsibility for regulation o f CAM practitioners. 
Sidwell’s involvement was entirely limited to her formal role in the process. Sidwell acted in 
her official capacity as a civil servant and was involved for less than 18 months, and had no
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prior interest in or connections with CAM. In contrast some individuals had little or no 
connection to CAM in their official capacity and it seems personal interest and contacts 
primarily account for their engagement in the CAM policy network. For example Sir 
Thomas Bingham, subsequently Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales 1996-2000, who 
chaired the King’s Fund Working Parties on Osteopathy and Chiropractic, was a personal 
friend of Robert Maxwell (Chief Executive of the King’s Fund at the time).
Affiliations
The policy network is made up of individuals whose affiliations span a wide range of 
stakeholders including the civil service and government agencies, the House o f Commons 
and the House of Lords, universities, charitable foundations, consumer organisations, 
professional regulators, practitioner organisations and professional associations. Most 
individuals occupy senior positions as senior executives, trustees, professors, committee 
chairs, board members and directors.
Many individuals served or continued to serve in a number of capacities, thus 
strengthening the interconnectedness of the CAM policy network. For example, Julie Stone 
is Deputy Director at the CHRE and Visiting Professor in Health Care Ethics at the 
University of Lincoln. She is a member of the Foundation For Integrated Health’s 
Regulatory Action Group and was employed by them as a consultant to prepare a report 
on the future of voluntary regulation for CAM practitioners. She is also involved with 
consumer interest organisations. She previously served on the board of the Prevention of 
Professional Abuse Network (POPAN) and is currently a member o f the Clinical Disputes 
Forum Committee.
Identifying an individual’s affiliations to different organisations is an important aspect of 
mapping the personal policy network. Few people have a single interest which they 
represent, even where they hold formal office, but rather are influenced by their various 
allegiances.
Relations
Within the policy network there are both formal and informal connections between 
individuals. Clustering and proximity are used to portray this aspect of the policy network.
At a formal level people are clustered because they work within the same organisation. For 
example Rebecca Sidwell, Gordon Brown and Steve Catling are all civil servants in the 
Department of Health and are clustered together in Figure 9.6 D. Richard Woodfield who 
works for the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) is a civil 
servant and therefore connected with other staff in the Department, but as the main policy
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lead on herbal medicine he was closely involved with the HMRWG chaired by Michael 
Pittilo and of which Michael McIntyre, Chair of EHPA, was a key member.
Other connections are informal and more hidden. For example D r Peter Fisher, who is 
Vice President of the Faculty of Homeopathy, Clinical Director of the Royal London 
Homeopathic Hospital and editor o f the British Homeopathic Journal, is also homeopath 
to the queen and acquainted with Prince Charles. Michael Dixon, Chair of the NHS 
Alliance, a trustee of the Foundation for Integrated Health and Senior Associate at the 
King’s Fund, is a GP who practises complementary therapies and has personal connections 
to HRH the Prince of Wales.
9.3.2 Methodological challenges
There is increasing interest in the application of policy subsystem analysis to health care 
policies and health care reforms (see for example Oliver and Mossialos, 2005). The 
advocacy coalition framework has recently been applied to an analysis of pharmaceutical 
policy reforms in Denmark (Larsen, Vrangbaek et al., 2006). There is, however, little in the 
literature on methods for representing policy communities, advocacy coalitions or issue 
networks graphically. Most studies simply present tables that categorise actors but these do 
not show the interrelationships between actors. Stakeholder analysis depicts the position of 
groups along a two dimensional axis according to their influence or interest in the policy 
issue under analysis (see for example Varvasovszky and McKee, 1998). Weible and Sabatier 
(2005) present a series of network maps showing clusters of actors based on analysis of 
their membership in ally, coordination, and information networks (Weible and Sabatier, 
2005).
The analysis here is at the level of the individual, and therefore seeks to depict not only 
clusters of actors and their relationships but also their associations with different 
stakeholders. The use of colour coded disks to represent an individual’s primary association 
and additional associations allows the depiction of relations and affiliations. This technique 
for representing policy networks would not be possible in most academic publications.
A limitation of the approach utilised here is that the positioning of individuals is largely a 
result of personal judgement. Whereas inclusion of individuals and their position in the 
core or on the periphery are justified, their position vis a vis other actors is based on what 
are judged to be their primary connections. For practical reasons not all interconnections 
can be depicted in the maps.
The process o f developing the maps was useful in clarifying my own understanding of the 
policy process and the role of individuals within it. It provided new insights into the
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relative importance of different players and the significance of particular organisations to 
which they were affiliated. The maps also provide a useful way of depicting the personal 
policy networks and summarising large amounts of information (in the same way that a 
graph or chart conveys numeric data). The following sections analyse the personal policy 
networks in more detail to see what further insights can be gained into the development of 
statutory regulation for different CAM therapies. I examine who was involved, the role 
played by different members and their relationships with other members of the personal 
policy network. The analysis is not strictly chronological but takes a snapshot o f the policy 
process at a particular time and uses it to identify the role of and relationships between 
individuals in the policy network at that time. Past and future events may be discussed 
where these are useful to explain an individual’s involvement in the policy process.
9.4 Peers and politicians assist the osteopaths
In the late 1980s and early 1990s the activity in the field o f CAM regulation was focused on 
the osteopaths. At the centre of the policy network that was mobilised on this issue was 
Simon Fielding, a practising osteopath (see Figure 9.6 A). Fielding was the first Chairman 
of the General Osteopathic Council (GOsC) and has been the Department of Health’s 
special adviser on complementary medicine since 1993.
The analysis in chapter 7 suggested that in the case of the osteopaths the process which 
culminated in the Osteopaths Act 1993 was strongly driven from within the profession. 
Personal network analysis suggests that the energy of one individual was crucial to the 
success of the professional drive for regulation. Nigel Clarke, who later became Chair of 
the GOsC, claimed “Simon Fielding.. .was the man really substantially responsible for 
CAM regulation in this country being statutory at all” (Clarke, 2005, para 5). Fielding was 
frequently mentioned during the debate of the Osteopathy Bill in the House of Commons. 
He was credited with the progress and success o f the Bill and his presence in the public 
gallery was acknowledged (against the rules of parliamentary conduct!). Malcolm Moss MP 
paid tribute to Fielding “for his personal commitment and dedication in seeking to acquire 
statutory regulations for his profession” (Hansard, 7 May 1993). Tom Sackville MP for the 
government said:
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I  also add my congratulations on the sterling work performed by Simon Yielding in the 
profession’s quest for statutory regulation. Mr. Fielding himself an osteopath, has worked 
ceaselessly for that cause virtually all his professional life. He was a key member of the 
King’s Fund Working Party and also played a vital role in persuading my hon. Friend the 
Member for Cambridgeshire, North-East to sponsor his current B ill It is not only fitting 
but justly deserved that he has recently been appointed chairman of the General Council and 
Register of Osteopaths (Hansard, 15 January 1993).
Fielding was not in an official leadership position in a professional association at this time 
but his personal connections were instrumental in achieving the outcome. His relationship 
with Clarke, who became a fellow protagonist in the formation of the GOsC, was 
particularly significant. Clarke recounts their encounter in the mid-1980s; “I met him ten 
years before. We were introduced by a lawyer, we were mutual clients. He wanted to know 
how to go about getting statutory regulation for osteopaths” (Clarke, 2005, para 5). Clarke 
had experience of parliamentary and political affairs through work at the House of 
Commons, for the Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, and at the Conservative Research 
Department. He was working for a public policy consultancy when he met Fielding. He 
recounted how:
In those days I  was doing a lot of political work so I  helped him sort out his campaign, 
work out how he needed to do it, what work he needed to do actually to get anyone to 
support the principle. Things like the King’s Fund exercise in 1989 were a result of that. It 
was the need to get a greater buy in to the idea and to also establish what needed to be done 
in order to provide a structure that was meaningful (Clarke, 2005, paras 5-6).
He continued to support Fielding in the development of the Bill and joined the GOsC at 
its inception as a lay member (1996). He was subsequently appointed as Treasurer in 1997 
and Chair in 2001, in which capacity he is a member o f the CHRE.
Fielding had another important ally — HRH the Prince of Wales. In 1988 Prince Charles 
hosted a lunch at Kensington Palace which was attended by Health Ministers, presidents of 
the royal medical colleges and the President of the General Medical Council (GMQ as well 
as Fielding (Hansard, 15 January 1993). This event was a turning point in winning support 
from the orthodox medical profession. Tom Sackville MP acknowledged the importance of 
the lunch; “At the end of their discussion, the presidents said that they believed that the 
way was clear to proceed with proposals to secure the statutory regulation of the 
osteopathic profession” (Hansard, 15 January 1993).
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Fielding, encouraged by this, sought support for drafting a bill and putting it to parliament. 
He approached Robert Maxwell, then Chief Executive of the King’s Fund, o f which HRH 
the Prince of Wales is the President. Maxwell recalls that “an extremely nice osteopath” 
came to see him “more or less out o f the blue” to ask if the King’s Fund were prepared to 
help “move things on for the osteopaths” (Maxwell, 2005, paras 17-19). They discussed the 
possibility of setting up a high level working party that would do the drafting work for a 
Bill. Maxwell took the idea to the King’s Fund Management Committee for approval. They 
agreed “relatively quickly” to support the working party financially, and to find the people 
to sit on it.
Maxwell approached Tom Bingham, a personal friend whom he had known “since Oxford 
days” who later became Lord Chief Justice (1996-2000) and is now Lord Bingham of 
Comhill. He agreed to chair the Working Party on Osteopathy which was set up in autumn 
of 1989. Bingham proved a terrific choice: committed, determined to go for simple 
solutions, and totally lacking in pomposity or self-importance (Maxwell, 2005). The King’s 
Fund were thanked directly in the discussion of the Bill, which was one of the longest to be 
introduced as a Private Members’ Bill. The bulk o f the Bill was written by the Working 
Party, although the government’s solicitors later revised and re-drafted it.
Towards the conclusion of the process the support of key individuals within the House of 
Commons and House of Lords was vital to the osteopath’s success. Another King’s Fund 
‘friend’, Lord Walton of Detchant, agreed to introduce the Bill in the House o f Lords. Lord 
Walton served as a member of the GMC for 18 years, the last seven as President (Walton,
2005), and as President of the British Medical Association (BMA) until 1982 (succeeded by 
HRH the Prince of Wales). The Bill went before the House of Commons with support 
from David Tredinnick MP and William Cash MP, both members of the All Party 
Parliamentary Group on alternative and complementary medicine. The Bill received 
widespread support but its passage through parliament was interrupted by the general 
election in 1992.
The Bill won a Private Members’ ballot and was reintroduced in the next parliament by 
Malcolm Moss MP. On this occasion there was explicit government support for the 
Osteopaths Bill given by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Health, Tom 
Sackville MP, who it turned out had “a personal, family interest”. He revealed that:
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I  have ju st discovered - to my shame, only a few minutes ago - that my late father was the 
president of the General Council and Register of Osteopaths - [Laughter.] He was a dark 
horse. 1 was aware that he was active in another place in promoting the interests of the 
profession, but the fact that he reached such heights has only ju st come to my attention 
(Hansard, 15 January 1993).
Government support for the Bill meant it had an easy passage. The Osteopaths Act 
became law in May 1993.
Many of the same individuals were involved in the policy network at the time the 
chiropractors were seeking statutory regulation (not shown). The chiropractors were 
“upset” that the osteopaths were moving ahead faster. The King's Fund agreed to convene 
a second Working Party once the work with the osteopaths was finished (Maxwell, 2005, 
para 31). Tom Bingham agreed to chair the Working Party on Chiropractic. The plan was 
to bring forward a second Private Members' Bill to regulate chiropractors.
Ian Hutchinson, who was Chair of the British Chiropractic Association (BCA), played a 
leadership role among the chiropractic profession. David Lidington MP, opening debate on 
the Chiropractor's Bill, acknowledged that “Members o f the chiropractic profession and 
the steering group, under the chairmanship of Ian Hutchinson, have been enthusiastic, 
supportive and full of information” (Hansard, 18 February 1994). Hutchinson wrote about 
his role in the process (Hutchinson, 1994), though his name was not mentioned by any 
interviewee nor is there evidence that he remained involved after this time. Chiropractors 
benefited from the momentum generated by the osteopaths. Hutchinson benefited from 
the network established by Fielding. In introducing the Bill to the House David Lidington 
MP thanked Malcolm Moss MP, who had introduced the Osteopaths Bill, “for blazing a 
trail which I am now able to follow” (Hansard, 18 February 1994).
The policy network map (Figure 1 .A) depicts the central position of Simon Fielding in the 
network in the early 1990s. The analysis suggests he played a crucial role in the osteopathy 
profession successfully gaining statutory regulation. Fielding might be described as a ‘policy 
entrepreneur'.
To sum up, the personal policy network was largely constituted of people with personal 
connections, rather than formal affiliations. The main players included a public policy 
expert (Nigel Clarke), a high profile advocate (HRH the Prince of Wales), the Chief 
Executive of an independent health foundation (Robert Maxwell at the King's Fund), a 
leading lawyer (Tom Bingham), activist politicians (Malcolm Moss MP, David Lidington 
MP, and David Tredinnick MP), and a well respected leader of the orthodox medical
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profession (Lord Walton). The association of a high profile and well respected lawyer and a 
former President of the BMA and GMC, together with sponsorship by the King’s Fund, 
gave legitimacy to the osteopaths’ bid for statutory regulation.
Perhaps crucial was the personal interest of HRH the Prince of Wales (Brown, 2004) who 
himself confessed that he “took a particularly close interest” in the statutory regulation of 
osteopaths and chiropractors (Prince of Wales, 1997). The next section explores in greater 
detail the role of HRH the Prince of Wales in the policy process.
9.5 H R H  the Prince o f Wales
Figure l.B depicts the policy network in 1997 when HRH the Prince of Wales launched his 
personal Initiative on Integrated Health. The royal family have historically been patrons o f 
homeopathic medicine (see Chapter 4), and holistic medicine has long been a personal 
interest of HRH the Prince of Wales. According to his official website he has “nearly 25 
years o f interest and involvement in the field of holistic medicine” (Prince of Wales, 2005a, 
para 9). Michael Dixon of the NHS Alliance believes Prince Charles is the “biggest mover 
behind integrated medicine” (Dixon, 2005a).
On 14th December 1982, in one of Prince Charles’ first major speeches as President of the 
BMA and on the occasion of the 150th anniversary dinner, he expressed his hope of greater 
integration between complementary and orthodox medicine (Prince of Wales, 1982). He 
criticised orthodox medicine for losing “sight of the patient as a whole human being, 
and...reducing health to mechanical functioning” (Prince o f Wales, 1982, para 11). 
Integrated medicine was the “main thrust” during his time as President of the BMA. He 
wanted to bring about a “general cultural change” and a “change in professional views” by 
making a “direct appeal to doctors” (Dixon, 2005a, para 20). It was under his Presidency 
that two contrasting reports were produced by the BMA on alternative medicine (British 
Medical Association, 1986; British Medical Association, 1993) (see below for further 
discussion of the role of the orthodox medical profession).
In 1986 HRH the Prince o f Wales became President of the King’s Fund, by virtue of rules 
set down by an Act of Parliament in 1907 under which the King Edward’s Hospital Fund 
for London was incorporated (Maxwell, 2005). As President he has had some influence 
over its sponsorship and support for the professionalisation of CAM practitioners. Robert 
Maxwell commented that “it was clear from the beginning that complementary medicine 
was one of the fields in which he had a strong interest” (Maxwell, 2005).
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HRH the Prince of Wales convened and chaired a seminar in February 1996 “to review the 
current situation and to discuss what practical steps should be taken to further 
communication and cooperation between all concerned in the provision of healthcare 
services” (Prince of Wales, 1997). It was agreed during this seminar to establish a series o f 
Working Groups on four themes: Research and Development, Education and Training, 
Regulation, and Delivery Mechanisms.
The Prince o f Wales’s Initiative on Integrated Health involved over 80 people over an 18 
month period. The map only depicts those identified members of the personal policy 
network who were involved in the Steering Committee or one of its Working Groups. The 
Steering Committee also formally consulted with “a wide range o f individuals and 
organisations in both the orthodox and complementary healthcare fields, as well as 
providers and consumers” including “the royal colleges, leading researchers, professional 
organisations like the BMA, and some of the leading medical schools and bodies 
representing complementary medical practitioners” (Prince of Wales, 1997, para 20). The 
outcome of the deliberations were published in 1997 (Foundation for Integrated Medicine, 
1997). Prince Charles used the occasion of the inaugural King’s Fund President’s lecture to 
launch the discussion document (Prince of Wales, 1997, para 6). The process was facilitated 
and supported by the Foundation for Integrated Medicine established in 1996.
The Foundation, which later became the Prince of Wales’s Foundation for Integrated 
Health, is a “charity formed at the personal initiative of His Royal Highness, The Prince of 
Wales” (Prince of Wales, 2005b, para 5). Prince Charles’ involvement is financial — he made 
a ‘substantial contribution’ to the £2 million endowment with which it was established 
(Prince of Wales, 2005a, para 12); professional - he is the President of the Foundation and 
personally vetted the appointment o f the first Chief Executive, Michael Fox (Fox, 2004, 
para 57); as well as personal - Prince Charles often refers to the Foundation as ‘my 
Foundation’.
The Foundation has been extremely influential in the development of regulation for CAM 
practitioners (see below). A glance at the policy network presented in Figures l.C and 1.D 
shows that the majority of people have a connection to the Foundation. The list of past 
and present trustees is impressive (see Appendix 9). In a sense the Foundation is the glue 
which holds the policy network together. It explicitly acknowledges this role:
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The Foundation’s great strength lies in its ability to foster networks across conventional and 
complementary boundaries by working alongside professional bodies in both fields, national 
and local governments and the N H S. This web of contacts helps draw together people from 
diverse backgrounds to build bridges, share experiences, exchange information and instigate 
new collaborative projects (Foundation for Integrated Health, 2003).
The influence of the Foundation is in large part due to its President; “the impact o f the 
Foundation has been considerable in this area and that’s been helped with the involvement 
o f the Prince of Wales who has strongly spoken of the importance of better regulation for 
CAM practitioners” (Fox, 2004, para 282). There continues to be close affiliation with 
HRH the Prince of Wales. Sir Michael Peat, who has worked in the Royal Household since 
1993 (most recently as Private Secretary to HRH the Prince of Wales) was appointed 
Chairman in 2005 following the departure o f Dame Lesley Rees. Thus through the 
Foundation, HRH the Prince o f Wales has set up an effective mechanism to push his 
agenda of integrated health and holistic medicine.
Since its launch in 1996, the Foundation has been the main vehicle through which HRH 
the Prince of Wales has participated in the policy network and influenced policy on CAM 
regulation. He has also used other formal roles at the BMA and the King’s Fund, the media 
and informal occasions to push this agenda.
In 1999 the King’s Fund agreed a £1 million grant for the Foundation’s Regulation 
Programme. While there is no suggestion that there was a direct link between HRH the 
Prince of Wales’s role at the Fund and the grant to the Foundation the two organisations 
share a President. Michael Fox, Chief Executive of the Foundation admitted, “it’s very 
unusual for the King’s Fund to give a million pound grant, it’s not chicken feed” (Fox, 
2004, para 151). He went on to say that, “I don’t think they would have given a million 
pounds just because the Prince of Wales thought it was a good idea” (Fox, 2004, para 151). 
A similar admission of indirect influence was mentioned by Graham Hart, a former 
Chairman of the King’s Fund Board, “O f course the Prince of Wales is President of the 
KF [King’s Fund] and was pleased if we could help FIM [the Foundation], But there were 
good policy reasons for the grants” (Hart, 2004). The Foundation used the funds to 
organise seminars on education and training, professional accreditation and ethical 
professional practice, and to establish a number of professional fora chaired by individuals 
who were independent of the professions, each tasked with developing a single voluntary 
system of regulation. The King’s Fund launched its new funding priorities for the Partners 
for Health in London programme in 2004 which includes integrated health as one o f four 
streams.
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There are some 18 speeches and newspaper articles by HRH the Prince o f Wales on the 
theme of integrated health or complementary and alternative medicine on his official 
website. In 2006 he gave the key note address at W HO’s 59th World Health Assembly 
(Prince o f Wales, 2006). He also commissioned economist Christopher Smallwood to 
investigate the contribution which complementary therapies could make to the delivery of 
healthcare in the UK (Smallwood, 2005). This caused considerably controversy and debate. 
Edzard Ernst, Professor in Complementary Medicine at the University o f Exeter, criticised 
the report for being “highly selective in its use of evidence”. He went on to say “it looks 
like the conclusions have been written before everything else. It is based on such poor 
science it’s just hair-raising.” Finally in a direct criticism of Prince Charles, Ernst accused 
him of overstepping his constitutional role (Henderson and Pierce, 2005). Evan Harris MP, 
the Liberal Democrat science spokesman who got involved in the ensuing debate, felt that 
Prince Charles should stay out of public policy discussions. He remarked that:
I f  Prince Charles is going to seek to influence healthcare or science policy especially without 
going through the normal peer review process he must allow himself to he challenged in 
debate or interview, something that he has never done. I f  the Palace believes that it is not 
appropriate for him to lower himself into public debate, then he should stay out of public 
polity (Henderson and Pierce, 2005).
In order to establish more accurately the extent of involvement of HRH the Prince of 
Wales in the policy process a Freedom of Information request was made to the 
Department of Health requesting correspondence on this issue from Clarence House (see 
Appendix 10 for request and full response). In the Department’s reply they clarified that 
the constitutional position of the Heir to throne is the same as that of the Sovereign. They 
wrote that the Sovereign has
the right and duty to counsel, encourage and warn her government and is entitled to have 
opinions on government polity and to express those opinions to her ministers. It is essential 
that these communications are, and remain, confidential, to maintain the political neutrality 
of the Sovereign in public affairs (Department of Health, 2005a).
On these grounds the Freedom of Information request was refused.
The main motivation behind Prince Charles’ interest in the regulation o f CAM practitioners 
is his hope that regulation will facilitate greater integration. In 2003 he acknowledged “if 
the NHS is being encouraged to provide a more integrated approach, then it does, quite 
righdy, require reassurance that complementary medicine is being offered by competent 
practitioners” (Prince of Wales, 2003, para 17). HRH the Prince of Wales was at the centre
185
of the policy network in 1997 when he established the Foundation for Integrated Health. 
Although Prince Charles is “frustrated” and is getting “impatient” because things are 
moving a “bit slow”, his Foundation has had a huge influence on policy (Dixon, 2005a). 
HRH the Prince of Wales used his other formal positions at the BMA and the King’s Fund 
to further this agenda, and used his public profile to keep the issue on the public policy 
agenda.
9.6 Those who sit in another place
Figure 1 .B depicts the policy network at the time of the House of Lords’ Sub-Committee 
on Complementary and Alternative Medicine during the parliamentary session 1999-2000. 
Lord Walton of Detchant, who had served on the Science and Technology Committee for 
ten years, was appointed as Chair of the Sub-Committee. He appears at the centre of the 
policy network map (see Figure l.C). A full list o f members can be found in Appendix 11.
Lord Walton had been a key supporter when the osteopaths attempted to gain statutory 
regulation (see Figure 1A). He presented the Osteopaths Bill before the House of Lords 
following the report of the King’s Fund Working Party on Osteopathy. He also supported 
the passage of the final Osteopaths Bill when it came back to the Lords from the 
Commons. According to Nigel Clarke, who together with Simon Fielding was largely 
responsible for the momentum behind the osteopaths (see above), “Lord Walton ... was 
within his own lights the guiding force for this” (Clarke, 2005).
The membership of the Sub-Committee was determined by the Committee of Selection 
which contains “people from all the political parties and a number o f cross benchers” 
(Walton, 2005). The government, Chief Whip and Ministers are usually involved behind the 
scenes. Names are then put to the House. Among the members o f the Sub-Committee 
were Earl Baldwin and Lord Colwyn, who were Joint Chairman and President of the 
Parliamentary Group on Alternative and Complementary Medicine respectively, and Lord 
Rea, Lord Soulsby, and Lord Winston, who were all registered medical practitioners.
By Lord Walton’s own admission opinions within the Sub-Committee diverged but despite 
this the report, published on 21st November 2000, was a unanimous report. He recounted 
how:
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We almost got to the stage, almost of having a division. Because you can never produce a 
minority reportfor a Select Committee in the House of Cords or the Commons. That is not 
allowed. I f  there is a major difference in opinion then you have to have a division in the 
Committee and have a vote.. .1 mean the Committee consisted of hawks and doves and 
there was one hawk in particular who almost took it to a division but in the end agreed that 
it would be a unanimous report (Walton, 2005, para 143).
The ‘hawks’ presumably refers to the supporters of biomedicine who were opposed to any 
recommendations which might give CAM greater legitimacy, and the ‘doves’ those who 
were overdy in favour of CAM.
The only other people depicted within the core of the policy network are Stephen Holgate 
and Simon Mills, who were appointed as special advisers to the Sub-Committee, Gordon 
Brown, who was the lead civil servant working on the issue and who coordinated the 
government response, and Simon Fielding, who was now an adviser to the Department of 
Health. What is noticeable is that each of the advisers was also connected to the 
Foundation and involved in Working Groups o f the Prince of Wales’s Initiative on 
Integrated Health (see Figure l.B). For instance, Holgate and Mills served as Chairman of 
the Research & Development Working Group and Co-Chairman of the Regulation 
Steering Group respectively.
In such a small policy network getting independent advice was a challenge. As a 
Department official conceded:
There were certain connections. I  mean lefs face it we have a difficulty in the world of 
CAM  as with other specialities, where do we go for expert advice? You have to go to the 
world of CAM  for your expert advice, and inevitably some of those experts were already
well known to the Foundation and working quite closely with it and some of those experts 
were lending a hand to the Inquiry, thy were engaged by the Inquiry and lending a hand.
(Brown, 2004, para 255).
However as the Lords’ Inquiry demonstrated, there are many doctors, academics and 
scientists who can ask very pertinent questions even when they lack expertise in CAM 
(Brown, 2006).
Consequently, the work of the House of Lords’ Sub-Committee was influenced by the 
Foundation. In reviewing their first five years of achievements the Foundation noted how 
the House of Lords’ report “closely mirrored the Foundation’s objectives, set out in its
1997 discussion document” (Foundation for Integrated Health, 2003). For example, the
five key themes around which the Foundation organised its work programme were very
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similar to the topics set out in the House of Lords’ call for evidence issued on 28th July 
1999 (House of Lords’ Select Committee on Science and Technology, 2000b). The 
recommendations of the House of Lords’ Sub-Committee also reflected the Foundation’s 
recommendations on regulation (House of Lords’ Select Committee on Science and 
Technology, 2000a). Although these interconnections existed and there was “sympathy” 
for CAM among some o f the Sub-Committee’s members, they were sufficiently 
independent and robust in their questioning that “they gave them [the Foundation] a good 
run for their money” (Brown, 2004, para 255).
As many as 156 organisations and 45 individuals submitted written evidence to the Sub- 
Committee. As described in the methodology (see Chapter 6) not all of these were included 
in the analysis. Those individuals identified as members of the policy network who 
submitted written evidence or gave oral evidence are displayed on the periphery o f the 
network (Figure l.C). Some individuals were involved in more than one submission. 
Michael McIntyre gave evidence as Chair of the European Herbal Practitioners Association 
(EHPA) and as a Trustee of the Foundation for Integrated Medicine. Professor Edzard 
Ernst submitted written evidence as an individual and prepared the Memorandum for the 
Royal College of General Practitioners.
The selection of who was called to give oral evidence was important in the balance of 
arguments that were heard and of course different weight was given to the written evidence 
of different organisations and individuals. For example Michael Fox, Chief Executive of 
the Foundation for Integrated Health “had a good reception”, in part because o f the 
unique lead the Foundation had taken in developing united self-regulation (Brown, 2004, 
para 255). The Institute for Complementary Medicine (ICM), one o f the few bodies 
representing and registering a range o f therapies, accused the Sub-Committee of having 
given weight to the views of “a so called ‘umbrella’ body representing a limited range of 
CM disciplines”, probably meaning the Foundation, while totally ignoring their own 
evidence (Baird, 2001).
The ICM made other accusations that the process was biased and that the civil service had 
“advised Ministers of the findings of the Sub-Committee before the official publication o f 
the Report” (Baird, 2001). The speed with which the government published its response (in 
March 2001) suggests that the government knew what the major recommendations o f the 
Committee were going to be in advance o f publication. The speed of the response was 
interpreted by some people as an indication of the urgency within the Department to take 
action. The Chief Executive of the British Acupuncture Council commented:
188
What was interesting.. .was the speed at which the government responded.. .my perception is 
that 8 out of 10 of these committees that are set up, the reports come and th y ’re stuffed in 
the drawer. But this was three or four months later, we got a response (O'Farrell, 2004).
The government response was also “immensely supportive. There was hardly anything with 
which they disagreed” (Walton, 2005, para 163). Lord Walton of Detchant, who had 
previously chaired a number of Select Committees, admitted this was “quite unusual” 
(Walton, 2005, paras 165-7).
Several of those interviewed highlighted the importance of the House of Lords’ Sub- 
Committee in the regulatory process. It was credited with raising political interest in CAM 
regulation. Officials at the Department of Health believed that the House of Lords’ Report 
was the main driving force behind the move towards professional self-regulation for CAM 
practitioners. One official said:
without that [the Lords’ Report] I  can’t really see that there would have been the drive 
within the Department because it wasn’t a big enough issue. A nd I  think it was the House 
of Lords’ Report which generated the ministerial interest. A nd without that we wouldn’t 
really be where we are today (Sidwell, 2005, para 15).
Another official expressed similar views that, “the priority like most things in the 
Department was seasonal in the sense that most of it grew out of the Lords’ Select 
Committee Inquiry on CAM which we had to respond to” (Brown, 2004, para 35).
The recommendations of the House of Lords’ Sub-Committee were shaped by a group of 
supportive Lords (the ‘doves’), a sympathetic Chair (Lord Walton of Detchant), and 
advisers who had close associations to the Foundation. The public profile of the Lords’ 
Inquiry gave a forum for stakeholders to present their views, as well as putting the issue 
firmly on the agenda of Department of Health officials and Ministers. The next section 
examines their role in the next stage of the policy process.
9.7 Mandarins and their M inisters
Following the government’s response to the House o f Lords’ Report (March 2001) the 
policy process shifted its focus to the development of proposals for the statutory regulation 
of acupuncture and herbal medicine. The responsibility fell to civil servants and their 
Ministers to determine a process for this. The decision was taken by Hazel Blears MP, then 
the Minister responsible for CAM, to establish two regulatory working groups - the 
Acupuncture Regulatory Working Group (ARWG) and the Herbal Medicine Regulatory 
Working Group (HMRWG) — jointly with the Foundation for Integrated Health. The
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Foundation had already established working groups with independent lay chairs for several 
CAM therapies, including herbal medicine, as part of the Regulation Programme funded by 
the King’s Fund. In January 2002, when the Working Groups began their work, Gordon 
Brown was the civil servant in charge. He is placed at the centre o f the policy network 
together with Pamela Jack, Manager of the Regulation Programme at the Foundation (see 
Figure l.D).
Brown had been in post for a number of years and was well-liked by CAM practitioners 
within the policy network. Michael McIntyre, President of the EHPA referred to him as 
“our Gordon Brown... wonderful man” (McIntyre, 2004). His knowledge of the issues was 
also recognised by the medical acupuncturists (Cummings, 2005, para 152). Brown knew 
the CAM world and developed close working relationships with members of the network. 
Michael Fox, Chief Executive of the Foundation for Integrated Health, commented that 
Brown “knew his way round the territory” and his contribution to the process should not 
be underestimated (Fox, 2004, para 111). According to Pamela Jack, “Gordon was very 
knowledgeable and supportive o f our work so his retirement has been a loss to us. There 
has been a lack of continuity in our contact with the civil service since his retirement” 
(Jack, 2004, para 210). The continuity o f contact with the civil service came to an end with 
Brown’s retirement in August 2004.
Other changes within the Department during this period added to the lack of continuity. 
Yvette Cooper MP, who served as Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Public 
Health from October 1999, was replaced by Hazel Blears MP in May 2002. In June 2003, 
she was moved to the Home Office during a Cabinet reshuffle. John Hutton MP, Minister 
of State for Health 1998-2005, was upset to discover at this time that regulation o f CAM 
practitioners was not under his direct responsibility. Otherwise all policies concerned with 
professional regulation were part of his Ministerial portfolio. He demanded that he should 
be in charge of subsequent policy decisions on the regulation o f CAM practitioners 
(McIntyre, 2004). The transfer of ministerial responsibility was accompanied by a shift in 
internal departmental responsibility. As part o f the overall reorganisation that emphasised 
functional roles and challenged traditional demarcations, responsibility for professional 
regulation was brought together within the Human Resources Directorate (HRD). Rebecca 
Sidwell was appointed within HRD to take responsibility for the regulation o f CAM 
practitioners.
From April 2003, Sidwell and Brown were jointly responsible for the Working Groups 
until they reported in September that year. Subsequently, Sidwell was responsible for 
developing the government’s proposals, organising the public consultation and
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summarising the responses of the consultation. As explained previously, at the end of 
August 2004, as a result of further reorganisation and rationalisation, Sidwell was 
transferred to another post and was not replaced. The responsibility for regulation of CAM 
practitioners was assumed by Head of Professional Standards, Steve Catling. The process 
then stalled in anticipation of the outcome of two reviews into the future of professional 
regulation, which were announced in 2005 and reported in summer 2006 (Chief Medical 
Officer of England, 2006; Department of Health, 2006c). A consultation is underway on 
the proposals o f these reports, which are discussed further in the concluding chapter 
(Department of Health, 2006a).
The herbalists were fortunate to have a civil servant within the Medicine Control Agency 
(later the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency). Richard Woodfield, 
Group Manager Herbal Policy, has been at the MHRA with responsibility for herbal 
medicines since about 1997. As he himself noted “Remarkably for a civil servant IVe dealt 
with herbals all that time though the other parts of my job have constandy changed” 
(Woodfield, 2004, para 24). This allowed the herbalists to build up strong relationships with 
officials.
The close relationship between officials and leaders of CAM practitioner groups within the 
personal policy network was seen by one official as peculiar to CAM. She commented that:
Previously the Department had been resourced to take a more step by step approach with 
the professions. It had done so with chiropractic and osteopatly and I  suppose it was a 
natural continuation of that (Sidwell, 2005, para 107).
She believed the process would have been different if it had been led by the Health 
Regulatory Bodies Branch within HRD from the beginning. In general, support for and 
interest in CAM has increased within the Department of Health since the House of Lords’ 
Inquiry, according to Lord Walton, “they [the Department] are much more sympathetically 
disposed towards the whole area.” (Walton, 2005, para 115).
9.7.1 Independent Chairs
Beyond the civil servants and staff at the Foundation the other core members o f the policy 
network were the chairs and members of the two Regulatory Working Groups. The search 
for chairpersons began in September 2001 with appointments taking effect from January 
2002 (Pittilo, 2004). Professor Michael Pittilo, Vice Chancellor of the University of 
Hertfordshire and formerly Dean at St George’s Hospital Medical School, London, was 
appointed Chair of the HMRWG. Lord Chan of Oxton, a paediatrician, former Director of
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the Ethnic Health Unit in the Department of Health, and Professor of Ethnic Health at 
Liverpool University until his untimely death in February 2006, served as Chair o f the 
ARWG.
Michael Pittilo was approached on Michael McIntyre’s recommendation - they had met 
through the Education and Training Working Group, part o f the Prince of Wales’s 
Initiative on Integrated Health (See Figure l.B) and were both trustees o f the Foundation 
for Integrated Health. Pittilo seems to have quickly established good relations with the 
Department of Health and became widely respected within the policy network as an 
independent and reasonable voice. He had the time to develop consensus around the 
proposals by making presentations at conferences and speaking to the different groups 
involved. Even after the HMRWG had reported he remained involved, talking to the 
medical acupuncturists and representing their concerns to the Department (Pittilo, 2004, 
para 335) and continues to chair the working group of acupuncturists, herbalists and 
traditional Chinese medical practitioners.
Lord Chan was an enthusiastic and committed Chair. He allowed lots of discussion and 
debate within the Group although differences between group members were not fully 
resolved. He was willing to support the Order through the House and to stand up as an 
advocate in favour of regulation (Sidwell, 2005, para 152). As the only peer of Chinese 
origin his selection as Chair was expected to facilitate discussion with the traditional 
Chinese medicine (TCM) lobby but “instead of being sympathetic to their plea for special 
treatment he took a very strong line against them” though he brought them into the 
discussions at an appropriate stage (Brown, 2004, para 673). In fact Lord Chan was not 
willing to include ‘TCM-ers’ in the Group because they were too fragmented (with at least 
six different factions), they wanted their own Working Group and they did not accept that 
regulation was necessary (Chan, 2005, paras 32-36). Some TCM practitioners are members 
of the British Acupuncture Council (BAcC) and therefore were represented in the 
discussions from the outset.
9.7.2 Members
Membership of the Regulatory Working Groups was largely drawn from the leadership of 
the established professional associations that had voluntary registers of practitioners. In 
herbal medicine, except for the Association o f Traditional Chinese Medicine (ATCM) and 
the British Ayurvedic Medical Council/British Association of Accredited Ayurvedic 
Practitioners (BAMC/BAAAP), all o f the organisations represented on the HMRWG were
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already members of the EHPA and were used to cooperating under that umbrella. The 
ATCM subsequently joined the EHPA.
Michael McIntyre, as President of the EHPA, was the main professional stakeholder on the 
Group who had existing links to the key policymakers through his involvement with the 
Foundation (see Figure l.B). He and Amrit Ahluwalia, the Secretary o f the HMRWG, also 
acted as brokers outside the HMRWG “to encourage positive dialogue between 
organisations and make sure everyone is understanding the others point of view” (Sidwell, 
2005, para 145).
In acupuncture, there were two practitioner representatives from each of the four main 
professional organisations: the British Acupuncture Council (Jasmine Uddin and John 
Wheeler), the British Medical Acupuncture Society (Anthony Campbell and Mike 
Cummings), the Acupuncture Association o f Chartered Physiotherapists (Joan Davies and 
Val Hopwood) and the British Academy of Western Acupuncture (Peter Dowds and Paul 
Mayer). Only Mike Cummings and Val Hopwood were identified as active members o f the 
personal policy network. Although the practitioner representatives from the BAcC were 
the official members of the Working Group it was the Chief Executive Michael OTarrell 
who brokered agreement on regulation of acupuncture and therefore was included as a 
core member of the personal policy network (see Figure l.D). O ’Farrell joined the BAcC 
from the private sector where he had worked for Kodak. He was seen as independent, 
“balanced”, a strong leader and was able to establish good relations with officials at the 
Department (Sidwell, 2005, para 100). He was influential beyond his role at the BAcC. He 
did “an awful lot o f work in trying to get the different sides of the profession to talk to 
each other and to talk to the TCM practitioners and the TCM organisations” who had 
largely been excluded from the ARWG discussions (Sidwell, 2005, para 80).
9.73 Reports and recommendations
The civil servants apparently went into the process without a blueprint for regulation. To 
those involved there did not appear to be a clear plan and so members of the policy 
network were actively involved in shaping policy together with civil servants. Rather than 
policy being made behind closed doors and then imposed on the profession, the leading 
representative of the herbalists felt it was made in partnership (McIntyre, 2004). Others, 
however, felt excluded. Representatives of Ayurvedic medicine were extremely unhappy 
with the process, threatening legal action at one point and dissenting from the final report. 
BAMC/BAAAP arrived at one meeting of the Working Group with a lawyer who “issued 
an injunction” against all those present (McIntyre, 2004, para 45). The representatives from
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BAMC/BAAAP maintained that there should be separate regulation for Ayurvedic 
Medicine (Herbal Medicine Regulatory Working Group, 2003, para 49). Traditional 
Chinese medicine practitioners, for whom acupuncture and herbal medicine are both 
integral parts o f their practice, felt excluded from the discussions in the ARWG and that 
the recommendations were not workable for them.
The ARWG and HMRWG made different recommendations about how to structure 
statutory regulatory bodies (discussed in further detail in the next chapter). These reflected 
both the views of the chairs (see below) and leading members of the profession involved 
with the Groups. The proposals for a single General Acupuncture Council reflected a 
compromise within the ARWG with the medical acupuncturists.
The Working Group reports and the consultation went before John Hutton MP for 
approval. The proposals which were put forward for consultation by the Department 
largely reflected the recommendations of the HMRWG i.e. to create a single CAM Council. 
The proposals were met with discontent from the acupuncturists who felt that their 
proposals had been ignored. They even took the non-alphabetical order o f the therapies in 
the title o f the document as a slight!
Ministers were pleased with the progress made towards regulation and, although the issue 
was not a particularly high priority, they were pleased with the publication of the 
consultation and the positive response it received (Sidwell, 2005). The consultation mainly 
focused on questions of how to organise a new CAM Council, the decision having already 
been taken to introduce regulation. Responses from individuals shown on the periphery of 
the policy network map are analysed in the next chapter which focuses on ideas about how 
to regulate CAM practitioners.
9.7,4 Summary
The osteopaths and chiropractors needed political allies in the House o f Commons and the 
House of Lords (see Figure 1 .A) in order to get legislation passed. Because the regulation 
of acupuncture and herbal medicine was government-led, departmental and ministerial 
support has been more significant. Hence the centrality of civil servants to the policy 
network at this stage (see Figure l.D).
Michael McIntyre was the key policy entrepreneur for the herbalists. He established strong 
relations with long-serving civil servants and used the opportunities presented by external 
policy developments in Europe to ensure that herbalists were at the top of the list. The 
development o f proposals was facilitated by an independent ally (Michael Pittilo), whose 
connections with the Foundation, other authoritative individuals within the policy network
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(e.g. Simon Fielding) and with civil servants meant herbalists’ interests remained central to 
the government’s proposals.
Within acupuncture the focus was on reaching consensus between lay acupuncturists and 
medical acupuncturists, a process facilitated by Lord Chan as Chair o f the ARWG and 
outside the formal proceedings by Michael O ’Farrell. There may be a number of reasons 
why their recommendations were not given as much weight by the Department. Firstly, the 
exclusion of traditional Chinese medical practitioners from the ARWG meant their report 
was narrow in focus. Secondly, the MHRA saw that significant improvements in the 
effectiveness of medicines regulation (where unlicensed herbal medicines are made up by 
or for herbal practitioners) were dependent on the introduction of statutory regulation for 
the herbal medicine profession (Woodfield, 2004). Finally, the failure of the medical 
acupuncturists to explain to officials their particular needs and constraints, assuming that 
the case was adequately stated in the report. These factors may have been compounded by 
the absence of a policy entrepreneur from within the profession and the fragmentation of 
the profession.
Much of the progress that acupuncture and herbal medicine have made in preparing for 
statutory regulation can be put down to the active support of civil servants and the 
mediating role of the Working Group Chairs. The policy network from 2003 onwards has 
taken on a more traditional pattern with representatives of organised interests interacting 
and negotiating with officials in the Department, although individuals such as Michael 
Pittilo continue to play an active mediating role in the process.
9.8 Other actors
The focus in the previous section has been primarily on practitioner representatives, 
politicians and civil servants direcdy involved in the policy process. Other actors such as 
orthodox medical practitioners, representatives of consumer organisations and academics 
were also involved in the policy process, but often less directly. This section considers their 
roles in the personal policy network.
9.8.1 Orthodox medical practitioners
There are a number of individuals in the policy network who are orthodox medical 
practitioners (bright green in the maps). Many of these individuals are sympathetic to CAM 
or practise integrated medicine themselves. For example, Michael Dixon is a practising GP 
who uses complementary therapies in his practice, as well as serving as the Chair of the 
NHS Alliance, Senior Associate at the King’s Fund, and Trustee o f the Foundation for
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Integrated Health. Prince Charles is a great supporter of homeopathy and has personal 
links with leading medical homeopaths Peter Fisher, Vice President of the Faculty of 
Homeopathy and Clinical Director of the Royal London Homeopathic Hospital, and 
David Peters, who was a member of the Steering Committee and Chairman of the Delivery 
Mechanisms Working Group for the Prince o f Wales’s Initiative on Integrated Health.
Sir Graeme Catto, President of the GMC, is involved by dint of his formal position and 
knowledge of professional regulation, while Lord Walton of Detchant is included because 
o f the formal positions he has held and personal interest. Although Catto’s direct 
involvement with CAM practitioner groups has been limited to giving advice to the 
Regulatory Working Groups, it is likely that having someone who is open to CAM as 
President of the GMC is indirecdy helpful to the CAM policy network. As we have seen, 
Lord Walton, who in the past had been President of both the GMC and the BMA, became 
an important ally from within the medical profession for the osteopaths and chiropractors. 
Later, as Chair of the House of Lords’ Sub-Committee on CAM, he was able to ensure 
balance between those members who were pro-CAM and those more traditional medics 
who were perhaps more sceptical. These practitioners, active in the personal policy 
network, are not typical of the wider orthodox medical profession.
Interviewees and documents analysed in this study referred to the changing views o f the 
medical profession. There was a sense that earlier antagonisms were waning. Michael 
McIntyre, Chair of the EHPA, recounted how in the early 1980s trainee GPs had been 
“hostile” towards herbal medicine. He felt there had been a “huge sea change” and doctors 
today take a more “positive standpoint”, are interested in where they can train, and in how 
to identify practitioners to which they can refer (McIntyre, 2004). In evidence to the House 
of Lords the Royal College of Physicians and the GMC both recognised that doctors need 
to be familiar with CAM therapies in order to discuss them with their patients (House of 
Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, 2000a, paras 6.71-6.72). Graeme 
Catto, Chairman o f the GMC Education Committee at the time of the House of Lords’ 
Inquiry, went further and suggested that some doctors “will wish to become involved, 
through the special study modules, in undertaking some treatments themselves or 
experiencing, along with patients, what is happening” (General Medical Council, 2000b, 
para 1037).
There has also been a shift in attitudes to CAM among the leadership o f orthodox 
medicine. In 1988, the leaders of the medical profession were encouraged not to block the 
Osteopaths Bill. Following the lunch hosted by Prince Charles attended by Ministers and 
leaders of the profession (mentioned previously), Tony Newton MP, then a junior Minister
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in the Department of Health and Social Security (1982-88), urged the doctors to stand 
aside. According to the Chair of the General Osteopathic Council:
[Newton] quietly behind the scenes suggested that the doctors ought to accept that this was 
going on and they might not like it and they might not agree with it, but the public needed to 
be protected, and therefore standards must be set and there needed to be ways of shoving out 
the snake oils and the charlatans (Clarke, 2005).
This shift is also evident in the different positions taken in the BMA reports on CAM. 
Under the presidency of HRH the Prince o f Wales the Board of Science and Education of 
the BMA published a report on Alternative Therapy in 1986 which was scathing of CAM 
(British Medical Association, 1986). Statements such as “it is apparent that many of those 
who adhere steadfastly to belief in a given ‘alternative’ therapy have halted in their 
intellectual progress” provoked a furious reaction from CAM practitioners and no doubt 
from their President (British Medical Association, 1986, p 63). The report claimed that 
alternative therapists had “much in common with the folk healers o f primitive societies” 
and emphasised the dangers and risks of therapies. In particular it raised concern at the 
risks that arise from:
delaying or denying access to effective medical care by persistence with alternative therapies 
which are without a beneficial effect on the developing disease process at a time when 
orthodox medical treatment is urgently needed (British Medical Association, 1986, p  74).
The second report published in 1993 had a much more conciliatory tone reflected in its 
title - Complementary Medicine: new approaches to goodpractice (British Medical Association, 1993). 
By the time of the House of Lords’ Inquiry, the BMA recommended that:
a single regulating body should be established for each therapy.. .[with] a single register of 
members, open to public scrutiny... a dfined protocol for communicating with medical 
practitioners and other therapists...clearly understood areas of competence...enforceable 
ethical code...well publicised and accessible cornplaints procedures (British Medical 
Association, 2000, p  46).
The Royal Colleges have taken a different position, often emphasising that given the lack 
o f evidence for the efficacy of CAM it should not be regulated. For example, the Royal 
College of General Practitioners continued to “question whether there is need for statutory 
regulation at all as, particularly with herbal medicine, this implies a scientific basis which 
may not be justified” (Baker, 2004).
197
Orthodox medical practitioners have used arguments about indirect risk to defend their 
monopoly over diagnosis. For example, medical homeopaths, although supportive of 
regulation for non-medical homeopaths, were keen to maintain their position. They were 
worried that if  lay practitioners were regulated it might reduce demand for homeopaths 
with medical training. They emphasised the indirect risks associated with non-medical 
practice, and justified their own position by emphasising the importance o f a medical 
diagnosis and medical supervision for the safety of patients. Medical acupuncturists made 
similar claims that “any patient with a new symptom should gain a western diagnosis before 
seeking therapy” (British Medical Acupuncture Society, 2000, para 1007). Arguments about 
indirect risk are not new and have long been viewed as protectionism of professional 
monopoly (see HMSO, 1910). As a result many therapies have positioned themselves as 
complementary to mainstream medicine, e.g. aromatherapy, and make limited claims.
9.8.2 Consumer representatives
The main consumer organisations that comment on health policy in the UK are Which? 
(formerly known as the Consumers’ Association), the National Consumers’ Council and 
the Patients’ Association.22 O f the three organisations Which? has been the most active on 
CAM regulation. Although the National Consumers’ Council published a report on 
professional regulation in 1999 (National Consumer Council, 1999), they have not 
specifically undertaken work relating to CAM practitioners. The Patients’ Association gave 
oral evidence to the House of Lords’ Sub-Committee, but were not mentioned by 
members of the policy network.
The Consumers’ Association (CA) states that it campaigns for “improved protection for 
users of complementary and alternative therapies, particularly where there is a risk of 
physical or emotional harm arising from sub-standard care” (Consumers Association, 2004, 
para 9). The CA recognises that where there are direct risks statutory regulation may be the 
only regulatory option available. It states that:
For some therapies this [\voluntary regulation] may be sufficient where the risks and extent 
of any potential harm are minimal. .However, for some CAM  therapies, there is no real 
alternative to statutory regulation ifpublic protection and safeguarding the public interest are 
to be ensured (Consumers Association, 2004, para 15).
The CA published Health Which? magazine with a regular feature on CAM until recently 
and as Which? continues to publish special consumer reports on CAM (Which?, 2006). In
22 There are many other patient groups related to specific diseases but these were not active in the debates about CAM.
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response to a consumer survey, which revealed a lack information on which to base choice 
of practitioner, the CA commissioned a survey of CAM practitioner organisations in June 
1997 (Bloomfield, 1997). Their position has been that statutory regulation o f all CAM 
therapies is not desirable or practical, that even with protection o f title rogue practitioners 
can continue to practise, and that the government needs instead to produce guidance for 
consumers and fill the “information gap” (Consumers Association, 2000; Department of 
Health, 2000b; Consumers Association, 2004).
Frances Blunden, Principal Policy Adviser at Which?, has a long-standing personal interest 
in professional regulation stemming from her previous job at POPAN (Blunden, 2004), a 
registered charity concerned with the abuse of patients by professionals in the health and 
social care sector (POPAN, 2000, p i 67). She wrote the evidence that POPAN submitted to 
the House of Lords’ Sub-Committee (Blunden, 2004). Blunden felt that practitioners desire 
for regulation was largely self interested “because regulation gives you status...you start to 
have a controlled closed shop effectively so it does give you status, opportunity to bid up, 
all sorts of things like that” (Blunden, 2004, para 95).
Jonathan Coe was appointed Chief Executive of POPAN in 2002. He has quickly become 
an active member of the policy network (see Figure l.D) and has good connections with 
the Foundation, where he represents the consumer perspective at seminars and meetings. 
POPAN has been lobbying for the inclusion of psychotherapy in policy discussions about 
CAM practitioner regulation, and for recognition of emotional harm (POPAN, 2000; Coe, 
2004; Coe, 2005). Psychologists and psychotherapists were excluded from the terms of 
reference o f the House of Lords’ Inquiry because they “made it perfectly clear that they 
regard themselves as being part of conventional medicine, not complementary medicine” 
(National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2000, para 1849). Hypnotherapy and 
psychotherapy have the largest number of complaints made against practitioners by 
patients.23 POPAN emphasise the need for consumer information, effective complaints 
systems with specialist advocacy services, and audit and evaluation o f professional services. 
They have an ally in Julie Stone who was a trustee of POPAN.
There are a number of other small, CAM-specific lobby groups which were active in the 
wider issue network. For example Healthwatch, one of whose patrons is Lord Walton of 
Detchant, who chaired the House of Lords’ Inquiry into CAM, supports and encourages 
scientific testing of conventional, complementary and alternative medicine and therapies. It 
is highly sceptical of CAM therapies that are promoted without any evidence o f efficacy.
23 The lack o f  regulation o f psychotherapy and counselling has long been a concern to consumer organisations such as 
POPAN. The government have recendy committed some funding to try and develop a consensus on proposals for unified 
regulation o f the professions (Coe, 2005).
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Although a charity with aims related to consumer protection and public understanding of 
science, most of its founding members appear to be from the orthodox scientific 
community.
Public mobilisation has focused on the regulation of herbal products. It was the agreement 
on the EU Pharmaceuticals Directive (2001/83/EC) which the UK signed up to in 
October 1994 (and which came into force in January 1995) that precipitated a more active 
public campaign. The herbalists launched a very successful high profile media campaign 
with support from the producers of over-the-counter herbal products and some high 
profile donors to ensure that herbal medicines were excluded from the provisions o f the 
Pharmaceuticals Directive. Richard Woodfield at the Medicines and Healthcare products 
Regulatory Agency (MHRA) recalls that in the mid-1990s:
there was a good deal of controversy about whether or not\ or if  so, how manufactured herbal 
medicines should be included in [the E U  Pharmaceuticals Directive] and there was a major 
controversy and that actually ended with the status quo largely prevailing which meant the 
existing UK regjme for unlicensed herbal remedies (Woodfield, 2004).
The MCA apparendy had to draft in extra people to reply to the letters that they received 
on this topic, and MEPs were deluged with letters (McIntyre, 2004).
The public were again mobilised when the EU Directive on Traditional Medicinal Products 
(2004/24/EC) was being implemented. Although it created a much more favourable legal 
situation than might have resulted from the earlier Directive, commercial interests were still 
concerned that the new rules would limit the availability of herbal medicines, vitamins and 
supplements. The constitution and activities of consumer groups reflect these concerns. 
For example Consumers for Health Choice galvanised consumer pressure in order to fight 
EU legislation. The campaign got funding and support from UK manufacturers and the 
National Association of Health Stores, and through leafleting, celebrity endorsement and 
media coverage was successful in generating large numbers o f letters to MPs and MEPs. 
The Health Freedom Movement is an umbrella organisation formed to coordinate 
opposition to EU legislation. According to its own materials, its membership includes 
complementary medical associations, therapist and practitioner groups, patient rights 
consumer groups, retailers, distributors, manufacturers, the media, publishing companies 
and existing organisations opposed to the EU Directives (Health Freedom Movement, , 
para 4). Like Consumers for Health Choice its specific purpose was to “raise consumer 
awareness about the regulatory threats to complementary and alternative medicine, and to 
rally the public’s support to fight their implementation” (Health Freedom Movement).
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Other than Frances Blunden and Jonathan Coe, few representatives o f consumer 
organisations have been active in the policy network. The common positions of POPAN 
and Which? may reflect the fact that Blunden has had formal roles in both organisations 
during the period o f study.
9.8.3 Academics
The knowledge base to support CAM therapies is highly contested. Consequently, 
academics have become embroiled in debates about its safety and harms, its efficacy and 
causal effect. Yet the position of academics has largely been on the periphery of the policy 
network (see Figures 1.A-D).
A number of academics have established an interest in CAM research. Edzard Ernst was 
appointed as Professor in Complementary Medicine at the University of Exeter in 1993. He 
has written extensively about the need to establish the efficacy of CAM treatments using 
rigorous scientific research methods. Although he published on this subject throughout the 
period of study, his relationship with other members of the policy network has been 
controversial with frequent spats in the media. His opinion that there is little or no 
evidence for most complementary therapies has won him few friends among CAM 
practitioners. He has also been critical of the Foundation’s work, particularly o f the 
Department of Health funded guide for patients (Pinder, 2005). Most recently he leaked 
details o f the Smallwood Report on the cost effectiveness of CAM treatments 
commissioned by the Prince of Wales. Consequently, he is depicted on the periphery o f the 
personal policy network and never penetrates to the core. His closer allies are to be found 
among the orthodox medical profession and consumer organisations such as Healthwatch 
who cite his research.
George Lewith established the Complementary Medicine Research Unit at Southampton 
University in 1995. The Centre has established a reputation for conducting high quality 
clinical research on efficacy of CAM therapies and the role of the placebo effect, and has 
attracted funding from established sources including the Department o f Health and the 
NHS (Lewith, 2005). Lewith’s main influence has been on policies related to research and 
development. He was involved in the Prince o f Wales’s Initiative on Integrated Health, 
gave evidence to the House of Lords, and hosted a visit to Southampton by members of 
the Sub-Committee. Val Hopwood (President o f the Acupuncture Association of 
Chartered Physiotherapists until 2005/6) works with him as a Research Fellow, and 
Stephen Holgate (who was a specialist adviser to the House of Lords’ Sub-Committee) is
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MRC Professor of Immunopharmacology at the University o f Southampton and another 
o f Professor Lewith’s collaborators.
Mike Saks is Pro-Vice Chancellor (Research and Academic Affairs) at the University o f 
Lincoln. His academic research as a sociologist focuses on professionalisation and CAM 
(Saks, 1986; Saks, 1991; Saks, 1994). He was a member of the Prince of Wales’s Initiative 
on Integrated Health (see Figure 1 A) but has not remained involved with the Foundation. 
He did not give evidence to the House of Lords. He has few active links within the core of 
the policy network, although he has recently been appointed onto the Department of 
Health Complementary and Alternative Medicine Research Policy Committee.
Simon Mills, Director of the Centre for Complementary Health Studies, University o f 
Exeter is also a member of the Council of the Foundation for Integrated Health. Together 
with Sarah Budd he co-authored a series of reports for the Department o f Health which 
were extremely influential in highlighting the inadequacies of voluntary regulation, but 
which also set out options for how regulation should develop (Budd and Mills, 2000; Mills 
and Budd, 2000). He was later appointed a special adviser to the House of Lords’ 
Committee (see Figure l.Q .
Finally, Julie Stone (in her role as Visiting Professor in Health Care Ethics at the University 
o f Lincoln) uses her academic affiliation to continue to write about CAM regulation in a 
personal capacity (Heller, Lee-Treweek et al., 2005; Stone, 2005a). Her direct involvement 
in the policy network is mostly through her other associations with the Foundation or 
CAM practitioners (see Figure l.B and l.Q . Stone combines her professional legal 
perspective with an understanding and knowledge of CAM practitioners and a consumer 
orientation from her involvement with POPAN. She has persistently argued that statutory 
regulation is not appropriate for most CAM therapies, but that “the form of regulation 
needs to reflect the differences between individual therapies and their respective harms, 
since different therapies require different levels of regulation” (Stone, 2000, p286). She has 
challenged others’ “somewhat uncritical assumption that statutory regulation of health 
professionals provides the best or only acceptable form of patient protection” (Stone,
2000, p286).
She is critical of the pursuit of statutory self-regulation by CAM practitioners and writes:
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For most therapies, the rush towards statutory regulation as opposed to professionalisation is 
misguided. 'Rather than binding themselves within an inappropriate statutory straitfacket, 
most therapies should continue working towards accreditation and the development of 
national standards of training and competence. Consumers will be best protected by a 
dynamic, ethics led approach to voluntary self regulation in which standards of practice and 
visible and effective disciplinary procedures are given higher prominence than the pursuit of 
professional status (Stone, 1996).
In  evidence to the House of Lords she argued that there is no justification for mandatory 
licensing of all CAM practitioners because the therapies do not pose an inherent risk of 
serious harm, and that any harm is equally capable o f occurring in a statutory context 
(Stone, 2000). She has advocated instead for a well-publicised voluntary system.
Academics have had a limited influence on the policy process with only one or two within 
the core of the personal policy network. They have played different roles depending on 
their research agendas and their position on different policies. Ernst can be seen as the 
thorn in the side for many practitioner organisations and the pro-CAM lobby. In contrast, 
although Lewith also advocates for scientific research he is seen as an ally o f those in the 
policy network. Among those working on regulation specifically, Saks’s sociological 
perspective has had a weaker influence compared to Stone’s legal perspective. The 
application of Stone’s more prescriptive and normative research may have been easier for 
policy-makers to understand than descriptive and theoretical research.
9.9 D iscussion
As shown in Chapters 7 and 8, theories of professionalisation have some value in 
explaining why the regulation o f CAM practitioners has taken the form it has in the UK. 
Yet, their exclusive focus, on either CAM practitioner groups or the state, means the role 
of individual actors in the policy process is overlooked. CAM regulation is not the stuff of 
traditional high politics where powerful external interests are at play or where significant 
cross-governmental interests are at stake. It is a small somewhat incestuous community 
made up of a tight network of individuals who hold key positions in different organisations 
with little organised or vocal opposition. CAM has therefore been a particularly fitting 
policy context in which to study the policy process using personal network analysis. As 
discussed in the conclusions, further applications o f this approach to other areas o f policy 
with similar characteristics would help to determine its wider relevance.
This chapter has shown how analysis of personal policy networks can illuminate the 
dynamic relationships between individuals, including people from outside practitioner
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organisations and government circles. The analysis enables a deeper exploration of how the 
policy process operates in practice, and exposes the diversity o f roles played by individuals. 
It challenges both theory and empirical analysis that assumes professional organisations 
and the state are unified entities. The state does not operate in a vacuum, and policies are 
not the product of a rational policy process (though some have described it in such terms 
(Simon, 1947)). The process of policy-making is a messier affair. As Greer noted in his 
recent analysis o f devolution and health care policy:
Civil servants, academics, the press, and other politicians can all affect the outcome by 
shaping the politicians* impression of the costs and benefits of a polity and thereby influence 
whether the politician will adopt the proposal in response to political opportunities and 
problems (Greer, 2004, p  13).
To his list I would add practitioners and professionals, consumer organisations and royalty. 
The personal network analysis has tried to examine these interactions in the policy process.
The analysis identified key individuals who acted as policy entrepreneurs or policy brokers. 
These individuals usually had a range of formal roles in different organisations, but also 
informally pushed the policy agenda forward or mediated between different interests and 
individuals. Policy analysis focused at the level o f organisations might have overlooked 
these people and the crucial role they played in the policy process. The study threw up one 
very surprising finding. It revealed a significant role for HRH the Prince of Wales in the 
policy process. Officially the Sovereign (and by default the Heir to the Sovereign) may 
advise their Ministers privately but their neutrality must be preserved. Controversially it 
seems that HRH the Prince of Wales has played an active and public role in shaping policy. 
His influence on other areas of public policy in which he has a personal interest such as 
architecture, organic farming and the environment would be worthy of further analysis.
Representatives of consumer organisations and academics were also active within the 
personal policy network but played a less significant role. The issue of CAM practitioner 
regulation has not been a priority issue for consumers, and this is reflected in the activities 
of consumer organisations present in the wider issue network. The rhetoric around 
regulation is dominated by concerns to protect the public, and yet ironically consumers 
(and their representatives) have had little influence or voice in the policy network.
Despite enthusiasm for evidence-based health policy (Murray and Lopez, 1996; Murray and 
Frenk, 2001) most academic research has a limited influence on policy (Cookson, 2005). 
The analysis here found that few academics penetrated the core o f the policy network or 
influenced the development of regulatory policy. Some academics through their other
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formal or informal affiliations interacted with other members of the policy network. 
However, the academic whose views were opposed to those held by the majority of the 
members of the policy network was side-lined.
In this chapter the use of personal policy network analysis has deepened our understanding 
of the policy process as experienced by the actors within it. However, the actions and 
interactions between individuals examined here cannot be said to explain why statutory 
regulation occurred in some cases. The concluding chapter discusses the value of the 
personal policy network approach and considers its application to other areas of policy. In 
the next chapter we turn to the second part of the research question, which asks why the 
model of professional self-regulation was adopted for CAM practitioners.
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C h a p t e r  1 0
10 IDEAS ABOUT PROFESSIONAL REGULATION
10.1 Introduction
The previous three chapters have focused on the question o f why particular GAM therapies 
in the UK have been statutorily regulated. We now turn to the question o f why regulation 
has taken the form that it has. There are many approaches to regulation (as was shown in 
Chapter 3) and yet the preferred policy in the UK has been to adapt the medical model of 
professional self-regulation. Like other healthcare professionals before them, some CAM 
practitioners have achieved legal rights to control entry to the profession and been granted 
protection of title by the state. This chapter seeks to explain why the medical model has 
dominated regulatory policy. Following theories about the role of ideas in shaping the 
regulatory process developed in Chapter 5, this chapter examines the ideas about models of 
regulation promoted by CAM practitioner groups, the state and other key individuals in the 
policy network.
Section 10.2 begins by presenting the medical model of professional self-regulation. This 
‘ideal type’ has been modified and applied to other health care occupations over the past 
century (see Chapter 4 for more on the history of the professions). It is also currently 
undergoing reform. Section 10.3 examines ideas about protection of tide and presents 
discussions about how this would apply to CAM practitioners. While the General Medical 
Council (GMC) regulates a single profession, other statutory regulators including the 
Health Professions Council (HPQ and the Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMQ regulate 
several professions. Section 10.4 analyses the debates about whether CAM therapies should 
be regulated as individual therapies or under a joint or federal arrangement. Finally, many 
CAM practitioners practise more than one therapy and there are large numbers of statutory 
health care professionals who also practise CAM. Section 10.5 examines the options that 
have been discussed to accommodate this.
Section 10.6 examines ideas about the appropriate governance structures o f regulators. The 
discussion is largely focused on the representation o f professionals and the lay public. 
There appears to be a growing consensus among professionals and policy-makers on this 
issue. Any profession setting up a new register must determine what the entry requirements 
are. Section 10.7 analyses the debates about the level and type of standards that a 
registering body should require of new registrants and existing practitioners wishing to 
register.
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Section 10.8 takes a closer examination o f the views o f orthodox medical practitioners, 
representatives of consumer organisations, and academics in order to try to identify 
alternative ideas to the medical model. The final section draws on the theoretical literature 
on policy ideas and paradigms and discusses why there was so little exploration of 
alternative models of regulation within the policy network.
10.2 T h e m edical m odel o f  professional regulation
The history of professional regulation in health care can be traced back to the Medical Act 
1858 when doctors gained statutory recognition (see Chapter 4 for historical background). 
In some senses the GMC, which the Act established, is the UrmodelF4 o f professional self­
regulation. Freidson viewed the medical profession as the “prototype upon which 
occupations seeking a privileged status today are modelling their aspirations” (Freidson, 
1970, pxviii).
The original functions of the GMC set out in the Medical Act 1858 were:
•  the oversight of medical education and the examinations leading to qualification;
• the registration of qualified practitioners and the publication o f the Medical 
Register;
• the removal from the Register o f practitioners convicted of felony (Section 29);
• the prosecution o f unqualified practitioners who had presented themselves as 
licensed;25
• the publication of a British pharmacopoeia.
The functions of the GMC as set out in the Medical Act 1983 and which apply today are:
•  Setting the standards of good medical practice which society and the profession 
expect of doctors throughout their working lives;
•  Setting the content of basic medical education and assuring its quality, promoting 
high standards and coordinating all stages of medical education;
• Administering systems for the registration and licensing of doctors to control their 
entry to, and continuation in, medical practice;
24 In German *TJr-” is used as a prefix denoting original, first or primary for example “Urmensch” meaning prehistoric man. 
“Modefl” is German for prototype or pattern. The use o f  “Urmodell” captures the idea o f an ideal type or original model 
o f medical regulation to be captured in a single compound noun.
25 Today those who hold themselves out as registered practitioners, i.e. use, or imply, any o f  the prohibited tides or 
descriptions, are prosecuted through the courts.
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• Dealing firmly and fairly with doctors whose fitness to practise is questioned (Chief 
Medical Officer of England, 2006).
The statutory governing body (the Council) is accountable to the Privy Council.26 It has a 
professional majority (made up of a mixture o f elected and appointed professional 
members) and lay representatives.
The GMC first introduced reforms to undergraduate medical education in 1993 (since 
updated see General Medical Council, 2003), and explicit standards o f practice in 1995 
(recently revised see General Medical Council, 2006). Performance was added to conduct 
and ill health as part of fitness practice in 1995, and the fitness to practise procedures were 
streamlined in November 2004. Changes to the composition of the Council increased the 
proportion of lay members. Revalidation, however, remained an intention rather than a 
reality, despite earlier plans to introduce it by 1st January 2005 (Catto, 2006).
The government created the Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence (CHRE) to 
promote best practice in professional self-regulation, and under Section 29 of the NHS 
Reform and Health Care Professions Act 2002 gave it powers to refer cases to Court where 
the decisions o f fitness to practise committees were judged unduly lenient (Department of 
Health, 2000e; Department of Health, 2001b). The CHRE’s role was not universally 
welcomed by regulators, even though the presidents of the statutory councils each 
automatically have a seat on the CHRE.
Despite these changes to its constitution (e.g. increasing lay membership), its Committee 
structure and its fitness to practise procedures, the fundamental functions and elements of 
the GMC have not changed. Other regulators that were subsequently established have 
copied the Urmodell in most respects, though there is great variation in the size, scope, 
income, governance and operations of these bodies (see Allsop, Jones et al., 2004 for 
detailed information on each of the health care professional regulators in the UK).
In 2005 the government launched two internal reviews into professional regulation: the 
first headed up by the Chief Medical Officer to look at the future o f medical regulation, 
and the second addressing the regulation o f non-medical health care professionals (Chief 
Medical Officer of England, 2006; Department of Health, 2006c). This was not the first 
time that medical regulation had come under scrutiny. In 1975 the Merrison Committee 
was set up to undertake a review of medical regulation. The Committee actually reaffirmed
26 Draft rules require the approval o f the Privy Council. In practice that means that each House of Parliament must pass a 
resolution in favour o f the relevant statutory instrument (Allsop, Jones et al., 2004).
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the principles of self-regulation. Professional self-regulation remained largely unchallenged 
until as recently as 1997 (Department of Health, 1997).
Adverse publicity surrounding a number of high profile failures by the GMC to identify 
and discipline errant doctors brought renewed pressure to enhance public accountability of 
regulators. Cases such as the deaths of babies undergoing surgery at Bristol Royal Infirmary 
were first reported in the media in 1995.27 In 1998 the government challenged the 
professions to demonstrate that professional self-regulation deserved the public’s 
confidence (Department o f Health, 1998). The reports of several public inquiries raised 
serious questions about the ability o f doctors to police themselves. In particular, the report 
o f the public inquiry into the deaths in Bristol, chaired by Sir Ian Kennedy and published in 
2001, was a turning point in the discussion of professional self-regulation (Bristol Royal 
Infirmary Inquiry, 2001).
Public inquiries were also held into the cases of individual doctors (Ayling, Neale, Kerr and 
Haslam and Shipman). In January 2001 Dame Janet Smith was appointed to chair a public 
inquiry into the murders committed by D r Harold Shipman between 1972-1998. The 
Inquiry’s Terms of Reference required:
[an examination of] the performance of the functions of those statutory bodies, authorities, 
other organisations and individuals with responsibility for monitoringprimary care provision 
... and to recommend what steps, if  any, should be taken to protect patients in the future 
(Department of Health, 2004b).
Most of the interviews I conducted preceded the publication o f her 5th Report in 
December 2004 that dealt with these issues. Interviewees expected her to make some 
radical suggestions about the future o f professional regulation and recognised the 
significant impact the case had on professional regulation. For example, the Manager of the 
Regulation Programme at the Foundation for Integrated Health stated that the Shipman 
case “has changed the public perception of regulation and of health professionals, o f the 
risks involved and so on” (Jack, 2004, para 398). Dame Janet recommended that the 
adjudication function be given to an independent body, revalidation should be 
strengthened to include an evaluation o f fitness to practise, and that elected members be 
replaced with appointed medical members (Department of Health, 2004b). She did not 
recommend an increase in the proportion of lay members.
The government’s proposals for future reform of the GMC and other health care 
professional regulators are still awaited at the time o f writing. However, some reflections
27 Private Eye had revealed the scandal earlier but this was not widely reported.
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on the implications of this study for the future of professional regulation are presented in 
the final chapter. In the following sections of this chapter, I examine some o f the main 
debates about the model of regulation for CAM practitioners within the policy network. I 
examine the prevalent and dominant ideas about protection of title, structure, dual 
registration, governance and entry identified in the data.
10.3 Protection o f title
Fundamental to the Urmodell was the protection o f title. This meant that unqualified 
practitioners could not legally present themselves as registered. The alternative option for 
regulating the practice of non-registered practitioners is to restrict certain practices or the 
use o f techniques, sometimes called protection of function.28
The General Osteopathic Council (GOsQ spoke publicly about the benefits that statutory 
protection of title would bring, “the ultimate sanction o f striking a practitioner off the 
statutory register now has real teeth as the practitioner.. .will be unable to practise under 
the professional title of osteopath” (General Osteopathic Council, 2000b, para 416). It was 
also the basis of their business case for setting up the GOsC. Without protection of title 
there would be no compulsion for practitioners to register and therefore no guarantee of 
the number of members who would pay fees to the new council (Clarke, 2005, para 13). 
The European Herbal Practitioners Association (EHPA) and the Faculty of Homeopathy 
both expressed concerns that under a voluntary scheme anyone could practise and call 
themselves a herbal practitioner “without a day’s training” (European Herbal Practitioners 
Association, 2000, para 715) or a homeopath “after reading an article on homeopathy in 
the Daily Mail or the Mirror” (Faculty o f Homeopathy, 2000, para 665). This was a familiar 
argument made by CAM practitioner groups about the problems of voluntary regulation 
(Brown, 2004). However, it should be recognised that statutory protection of title does not 
prohibit anyone from practising the therapy under another name as only the title is 
protected (see below).
The non-medical or lay homeopaths, through the Council for Organisations Registering 
Homeopaths (CORH), are working towards establishing a single voluntary register. The 
Chair, Maggy Wallace, felt that if the benefits o f protection o f title were properly 
understood by the profession they would be pursuing statutory regulation. She said that:
28 Among statutorily regulated professions only dentists and midwives have protection o f function.
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protection of title is actually the single biggest issue and i f  we actually had the debate with 
the profession now on statutory or voluntary and people really understood that protection of 
title can only be achieved through statutory regulation, my personal view is that the majority 
of the profession would go for statutory regulation (Wallace, 2004, para 145).
As it is the new homeopathic register faces a challenge to attract registrants. It will have to 
set the fee at a level that practitioners are willing to pay, and ensure that its register is well 
publicized so that it becomes the single authoritative source to which patients turn when 
seeking a homeopath (Gordon, 2006).
The Urmodell does not offer functional closure because it does not restrict the common law 
right to practise medicine, and therefore its ability to protect the public from unqualified 
practitioners is limited. The House of Lords noted that following the establishment of the 
GOsC practitioners who were not admitted to the new register continued to practise under 
titles such as ‘osteomyologists’ or ‘cranio-sacral practitioners’ (House of Lords Select 
Committee on Science and Technology, 2000a, para 5.31). The limitations of protection of 
title are acknowledged by other state actors. Gordon Brown, the lead official for CAM at 
the Department, said there will always be “breakaway groups” (Brown, 2004). He 
questioned the feasibility of enforcing protection o f title, given the lack of clarity about 
who was responsible for pressing charges against an unregistered practitioner and 
wondered “Is it bluff or is it real?” (Brown, 2004, para 471). His frank response to the 
problem was that:
While you can prosecute someone who uses a professional title you cannot stop them 
practising under a different, nonprotected title. Ultimately, therefore, you just have to live 
with ... the rogue ones and gradually over time, as patients learn how to identify the bona 
fides or legitimate practitioners...the rogue ones are going to lose patients, th y’re going to 
lose support and gradually you wear them down and weed them out (Brown, 2004, para 
479).
Since the interview the General Chiropractic Council (GCC) has successfully prosecuted a 
number o f unregistered practitioners (General Chiropractic Council, 2005b; General 
Chiropractic Council, 2005c).
Representatives of consumers’ organisations tended to be critical of the Urmodell. The 
Consumer’s Association (CA) recognised that statutory regulation did not offer full 
protection to consumers because:
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only the title, not the practice, m il he protected, so that those who use the techniques hut do 
not use the protected title will still he able to practise outside the consumer protection 
provisions of the statutorily-regulated sector (Bloomfield, 1997).
Frances Blunden, Principal Policy Adviser at Which?, went further to suggest that 
practitioners who had been struck off statutory registers (such as by the GMC) were able to 
continue to treat patients in these unregulated sectors such as CAM — “getting the same 
access to vulnerable people” (Blunden, 2004, para 45). Short of the police taking out an 
injunction, there was nothing that could be done to stop such people setting up practise as 
a therapist. The CA were also critical of voluntary self-regulation. They noted that 
voluntary bodies do not have powers to suspend therapists while complaints are 
investigated, nor can they stop therapists from practising if they are found guilty of 
malpractice (Consumers Association, 2004, para 14).
The Acupuncture Regulatory Working Group (ARWG) debated protection of function. 
Members decided that it was “probably unachievable” because of the problems of defining 
acupuncture {vis a vis other skin piercing modalities), and because acupuncture is widely 
used by practitioners who would not wish to register (Acupuncture Regulatory Working 
Group, 2003, para 148). Medical acupuncturists were concerned that they would be forced 
to dual register with the GMC and a new council in order to use the title ‘acupuncturist* 
(British Medical Acupuncture Society, 2004, paras 110-112). They were also suspicious of 
assurances that practice would not be restricted and wanted specific mention made in new 
regulations that it did not restrict the right of doctors and other regulated professionals to 
practise acupuncture (Cummings, 2005, para 238). There was some confusion about the 
difference between protection of title and the protection o f function among practitioners, 
with some believing that statutory self-regulation would make it illegal for non-registrants 
to practise Chinese herbal medicine (Register of Chinese Herbal Medicine, 2000, p i78). It 
was taken as given that once herbalists were statutorily regulated they would be given 
exclusive rights to dispense restricted potent herbs.29
Protection o f title was also seen as a means of making it clearer to the public which 
practitioners were qualified. A well-publicised voluntary register was also believed to 
provide some public protection, but only if the public were educated about which 
registering organisation they should contact. The Department official in charge of CAM 
regulation stressed the importance of each voluntary registering organisation having a
29 Section 12.1 of the Medicines Act 1968 provided the legal basis for herbal practitioners to treat patients following a 
persona] consultation. In addition a list of potent herbs restricted to the use o f herbal practitioners and prohibited from 
inclusion in over-the-counter herbal products without a full medicines license was created (SI 1977/2130) (McIntyre, 
unpublished) but ‘herbal practitioner’ was never defined.
212
communication strategy. Although she admitted such a system was “never going to be 
watertight” (Sidwell, 2005, para 139). The Department saw it as the duty o f professional 
regulatory bodies to “provide high quality information that members of the public need” 
(Department of Health, 2000d, para 122). Although some politicians called for the 
government to provide the information (Parliamentary Group for Alternative Medicine, 
2000, p 165; Tredinnick, 2000, p290), the lack of regulation made it difficult for the 
Department to be confident in the information it could provide to the public (Department 
of Health, 2000c, para 80).
The main focus of discussion among herbalists was over the designations to be protected. 
Practitioners were keen that the distinct identities of western herbalists, traditional Chinese, 
Tibetan and Ayurvedic medical practitioners should be preserved, and that the titles 
available should reflect this (Herbal Medicine Regulatory Working Group, 2003, para 231).
Debates on protection of title are partly influenced by the nature of the therapy and its 
history. Herbalists use of potent herbs is a well-defined practice that can be restricted, 
whereas it is more difficult to limit the use o f dry needling given other similar uses by 
tattooists. Within herbalism there are a number of traditions, each eager to maintain its 
unique professional identity through protection o f specific titles. In homeopathy and 
acupuncture there are a significant number of practitioners who are already statutorily 
regulated that wish to retain the right to use the protected titles. The use of titles and 
different views about the standards of training and practice required to be a competent 
acupuncturist were central to disagreements between the leaders of the non-medical and 
medical acupuncturists. These debates among CAM practitioners reflect the importance of 
titles for trading purposes, and their fear that they will be excluded from the economic 
benefits of closure. Use of a protected title also confers status and legitimacy on 
practitioners and is closely bound up with professional identity.
10.4 A  single or joint council
The Urmodell is based around a single council. The alternative to regulating each therapy 
individually is to bring several therapies under a joint or umbrella council.30
During the 1980s attempts were made to establish a multi-therapy register. The Institute 
for Complementary Medicine (ICM) established in 1982 administered the British Register 
of Complementary Practitioners Council o f Complementary Medicine (Institute for
30 Nurses, midwives and health visitors are regulated by a joint council, the Nursing and Midwifery Council (formerly the 
United Kingdom Central Council for Nursing, Midwives and Health Visitors). The Healthcare Professions Council 
(formerly the Council for Professions Supplementary to Medicine) is an umbrella Council with specialist committees for 
each of the therapies that it regulates.
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Complementary Medicine, 2000). It was unable to attract the majority of CAM 
practitioners, and most established therapies sought to pursue a strategy of establishing a 
single regulatory body following indications from the government that this was their 
preferred approach (Association of Community Health Councils for England and Wales, 
1988). In the mid-1980s the government no longer believed that CAM practitioners could 
unite sufficiently and indicated they would review the case for regulation on an individual 
basis (Trumpington, 1987).
In the early debates among osteopaths and chiropractors the Council for Professions 
Supplementary to Medicine (CPSM) was considered as a possible route to statutory 
regulation. The CPSM was set up to provide state registration to practitioners such as 
physiotherapists, chiropodists and radiographers working in the NHS. As the vast majority 
o f osteopaths and chiropractors practised in the private sector (and largely do so today - 
see Chapter 2) the CPSM was not appropriate. Furthermore, both groups of practitioners 
wished to continue to operate independently of the medical profession, with the ability to 
diagnose and treat problems without referral or delegation of care from doctors (unlike the 
therapies regulated by the CPSM). Osteopathy and chiropractic were determined to retain 
their separate identities. The idea of pursuing statutory regulation jointly was discussed 
when the King’s Fund Working Party was established, but it was deemed “too 
complicated” in terms of governance arrangements, and negotiating support from all the 
groups involved (Maxwell, 2005). Lord Walton went on record saying that, “the two 
professions were so separate in so many ways that there was no chance of having a single 
regulatory authority” (General Chiropractic Council, 2000b, para 497).
Osteopathy and chiropractic were supported by parliament to establish individual councils, 
although the differences between the two therapies were and remain somewhat opaque to 
the general public. Elizabeth Lynne MP (Liberal Democrat, Rochdale 1992-1997) was 
critical o f the lack of a definition of osteopathy in the Osteopaths Bill, and said that “Only 
after detailed consultation was it decided that there were sufficient differences between 
osteopathy and chiropractic for them not to be covered by the same Bill” (Hansard, 15 
January 1993). Although the government did redraft the original Bills introduced by Lord 
Walton, the content of the final legislation was largely based on the earlier drafts produced 
by the King’s Fund Working Parties. So the earlier decision taken by the King’s Fund to 
deal with the two therapies separately also influenced the process. It is unlikely that the 
same decision would be taken today. One official at the Department reflected on how 
much attitudes have changed:
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I  don’t think that could have survived today. I  mean the mood is different today. ..there’s 
very much a move these days to have larger blocks of professions working together and that 
just wouldn’t have happened today (brown, 2004,para 175).
Having established their own regulatory body, the osteopaths favoured a single council for 
other CAM therapies:
the majority of the larger professions within CAM  would wish to maintain their autonomy 
and their right to self-determination. I  suspect the establishment of a credible ystem of self­
regulation under a single body will be most appropriate (General Osteopathic Council,
2000b, para 413).
The HMRWG suggested that the GOsC and the GCC might consider joining the proposed 
CAM Council. The potential benefits presented were “the promotion and regulation of 
interdisciplinary working” and shared costs (Herbal Medicine Regulatory Working Group, 
2003, para 172). For osteopaths at least the proposal was “politically appalling... not 
sensible at the moment” (Clarke, 2005, para 85). The GOsC noted in their formal response 
that, “we see that the CAM Council could potentially be extended to other, as yet, 
unregulated complementary alternative medicine” (General Osteopathic Council, 2004, 
para 9, emphasis in original). Although Norma Morris, Chairman of the GCC, accepted the 
logic of merging with other regulators, she maintained that:
professions are very individual and a lot of our success in getting people to register and getting 
chiropractors to cooperate in raising standards is because of this feeling thy have of their 
individuality andpersonal recognition (General Chiropractic Council, 2000b, para 497).
The proposal to include osteopaths and chiropractors was not carried forward by the 
government, despite some Departmental support for the idea.
In order to speed up the process for individual therapies to gain statutory regulation the 
government created provisions within the Health Act 1999 which would allow them to join 
the newly constituted HPC, or to establish a single council using a Section 60 order 
(precluding the need for primary legislation). The HPC however was institutionally-bound 
by its predecessor and failed to broaden the criteria, or their interpretation, suffidendy for 
CAM practitioners to meet them (Sidwell, 2005, para 44). Both acupuncture and herbal 
medicine considered but rejected the idea of joining the HPC (Department o f Health, 
2004a, para 51). The ARWG were put off by the precondition that new groups were to 
have functioned as a mature profession for several years prior to application. It was felt this 
might mean a further delay of several years (Acupuncture Regulatory Working Group, 
2003).
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Ministers initially supported a single council for each therapy because they were wary of 
existing umbrella CAM organisations. Yvette Cooper MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary 
o f State for Public Health, told the Lords’ Sub-Committee that she “would be personally 
uneasy about going too rapidly towards umbrella organisations that do not have sufficient 
concentrated expertise or thoroughness when it comes to regulating a particular area” 
(Department of Health, 2000c, para 44). Because regulation of emerging CAM therapies 
was new the government felt it was important “to ensure that there really is the proper 
expertise and proper level o f detail within that area” (Department of Health, 2000c, para 
44). The House of Lords recommended against umbrella groups on a number of grounds, 
but were particularly concerned about multi-therapy practice. They suggested that:
Umbrella bodies may also give a cloak of respectability to practitioners who may have 
minimal training in one or more of the different therapies. They may also encourage multi­
therapy practitioners who want to mix a number of different therapies without being 
properly trained in one or more of them (House ofTords Select Committee on Science and 
Technology, 2000a, para 5.67).
The government accepted the House of Lords’ recommendation, stating that “The 
Government ... strongly encourages the regulating bodies within each therapy to unite to 
form a single body to regulate each profession” (Department of Health, 2001a , para 49).
The acupuncturists expressed a strong preference for a single council. The ARWG report 
stated that:
The Working Group has decided that the acupuncture profession would, at this stage, be 
best served by a free-standing statutory regulatory body for acupuncture... The regulatory 
process necessary to achieve this m il.. .enable the widest take up of registration and be the 
most effective way of dealing with the large number of unregulated practitioners by virtue of 
its clarity of focus (Acupuncture Regulatory Working Group, 2003, para 168-9).
The British Acupuncture Council (BAcC) reiterated this position in response to the 
government’s proposals to establish a shared or umbrella council. In its view a single 
council would:
provide the best guarantee of the preservation and enhancement of the educational standards 
which have characterised the development of professional acupuncture in the UK and 
would...have greater direct influence and control over all users of acupuncture techniques, 
not just the acupuncturists on its register.. .both the acupuncture and herbal medicine 
professions face significant and considerable challenges in achieving their own immediate 
aims for professional unity, and that for each, the creation of a coherent profession is a 
precondition of a successful future joint enterprise (British Acupuncture Council, 2004b, 
para 28).
The ARWG considered proposals from the HMRWG to establish collaborative regulation 
with a structure similar to that o f the HPC but these were rejected in favour of a single 
council (Acupuncture Regulatory Working Group, 2003, para 163).
The acupuncturists objected to a joint council with the herbalists on the grounds of costs. 
The BAcC feared that the fees from acupuncturists would be used to offset the higher 
costs of regulating herbal medicines (O’Farrell, 2004, para 157), and that they would incur 
the costs of creating an unnecessarily large regulatory structure (British Acupuncture 
Council, 2004b, para 26). Interestingly, the medical acupuncture representative on the 
ARWG was supportive of a joint council with the herbalists primarily because he thought it 
would save money (Cummings, 2005, para 100). The BAcC were strongly opposed to a 
general CAM Council “because of the potential for stuffing everything under one 
umbrella”. They felt that if they were grouped together with other CAM therapies that were 
generally viewed as inferior this would diminish their status vis a vis other health 
professions. They would be considered to be “below the salt” (O’Farrell, 2004, para 177).
Herbalists came out in favour o f a shared or umbrella council. They believed it would yield 
economies of scale resulting in lower fees and better resources to carry out regulatory 
functions, enable individual professional identity and professional autonomy to be 
maintained, and promote work across professional boundaries (European Herbal 
Practitioners Association, 2004, para 9-14). The HMRWG recognised that while “separate 
councils promote the status and development of individual professions, they militate 
against interdisciplinary working” (Herbal Medicine Regulatory Working Group, 2003, para 
174). It seems the concerns o f traditional Chinese medical practitioners were influential in 
the final proposals. A shared council would give traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) 
statutory identity and make it easier to bring TCM practitioners into the process (Lampert, 
2004, paras 24-29). The Chair o f the HMRWG, Michael Pittilo was also influential. He was 
“Totally and utterly committed to a shared CAM Council” and “felt from the beginning
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that that was the right way to go. I think it’s a nonsense to have a proliferation of small 
individual councils” (Pittilo, 2004, para 53).
There are conflicting accounts as to whether the Department suggested that the ARWG 
and the HMRWG discuss the option o f a shared CAM Council. Certainly, by creating 
separate regulatory working groups for each of the therapies, the Department o f Health 
established a process that militated against discussion between the therapies. N or does it 
appear that the Foundation for Integrated Health, who joindy established the Working 
Groups, had a strong view either way. Pamela Jack, Manager of the Regulation Programme, 
said “I don’t think we had any strong views initially about whether they should be joint or 
single councils but the precedent was the osteopaths’ and chiropractors’ approach” (Jack, 
2004, para 114). However, she admitted that through involvement with the groups issues 
such as the high fees paid by osteopaths and chiropractors, the small number of herbalists 
and the “TCM issue where you’ve got a large number o f traditional Chinese medicine 
practitioners that practice both” led them to support a joint council (Jack, 2004, para 114).
Similar arguments appear to have shaped the government’s proposals, produced by the 
Department, which came out clearly in favour o f a shared or umbrella council. The 
Department favoured an umbrella council because “other therapies can be added, as and 
when”, though a Department official admitted that she couldn’t see that happening in the 
near future (Sidwell, 2005, para 32). An umbrella council would also accommodate 
traditional Chinese medicine and other practitioners, who practise both therapies, without 
requiring them to register with both bodies (Sidwell, 2005, para 41).
In official documents the Department highlighted the economies of scale associated with a 
joint council. In response to concerns from practitioners they emphasised that a joint 
arrangement would result in lower fees. For example the proposals state that:
the Health Departments recognise the cost benefits to practitioners of a shared Council for 
the herbal medicine and acupuncture professions. Representations received by the 
Departments suggest that the cost of statutory regulation is a key concern for practitioners, 
particularly those who have not been involved with the two regulatoy working groups 
(Department of Health, 2004a, para 54).
Data on the number of practitioners registered with other regulators and their fees were 
used to support this position. For example osteopaths and chiropractors have 3,225 and 
2,019 registrants and charge £750 and £1000 respectively. Estimates prepared by the 
HMRWG suggested the annual registration fee would be £262 based on a shared council 
for herbal medicine and acupuncture. Estimates prepared by the ARWG based on a
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separate council for acupuncture practitioners suggested they would need to charge an 
annual registration fee of £322 per fully registered practitioner (Department of Health, 
2004a, para 56).
The CHRE also came out strongly in favour of a shared council, believing it to be the best 
model to meet the needs of patients, the public and practitioners, to ensure the regulator 
has adequate resources to fulfil its statutory functions, and “to cope with emerging 
regulatory demands” (Council for the Regulation of Healthcare Professionals, 2004, para 
25-31).
Homeopaths favoured a single regulatory body. The CORH is actively working towards 
establishing a single voluntary register for homeopaths, though it has suggested the 
homeopathy profession might consider joining a shared statutory council at some point in 
future (Council o f Organisations Registering Homeopaths, 2004b, para 18). Commenting 
on the proposals for the regulation of acupuncture and herbal medicine, the CORH 
favoured a structure that gave each profession greater autonomy whilst “benefiting from 
shared services, such as offices, secretariat and computer systems” (Council of 
Organisations Registering Homeopaths, 2004b, para 26). The Society of Homeopaths were 
clear that the model of regulation should give “each grouping full representation and 
independent management of its regulatory and standard setting procedures” (Society of 
Homeopaths, 2004, para 52).
There were mixed views among existing regulators on whether therapies should be 
regulated by a single council or a shared council. Graeme Catto, President o f the GMC, had 
his personal doubts about the need for a proliferation o f separate councils but did not 
readily acknowledge that alternative models already existed. He stated:
There has to be an argument about rationalisation or at least decent cooperation and 
coordination between them. You simply can't have an independent regulator for eveiy new 
technique or new technology that emerges (Catto, 2005, para 35).
Catto was also sceptical of the expansion of the General Dental Council (GDC) to include 
dental hygienists and dental practitioners. Interestingly, the nurses and midwives who have 
experience of a joint model were very positive about the idea o f a umbrella council for 
CAM. Indeed, the Royal College of Nursing was one of the few organisations giving 
evidence to the House o f Lords’ Sub-Committee that supported an umbrella council (Royal 
College o f Nursing, 2000). It gave a quite lengthy testament as to why this was a good idea, 
citing the following benefits: “economies of scale; sharing good practice; the patients’
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perspective and potentially from the NHS point o f view, it might be easier to relate to one 
organisation” (Royal College of Nursing, 2000, para 547).
The United Kingdom Central Council on Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visitors (UKCC) 
was ahead of other statutory regulators in its ideas about collaborative regulation:
One thing the Council is increasingly coming round to is the view that because...healthcare 
practitioners are working in teams rather than individuals, the notion of overarching 
legislation to cover regulation would seem to be a hgical and sensible step. How fa r in the 
future that might occur, one does not know (UKCC, 2000b, para 586).
Finally, the Royal College of Midwives recommended that the CAM Council adopt a 
similar system as that in place for nurses and midwives, “enabling practitioners of different 
therapies to remain appropriately regulated in respect of their individual skills and 
competencies, but also facilitating the pooling of resources for cost-efficiency” (Royal 
College o f Midwives, 2004, para 56).
The Consumers’ Association has espoused the benefits of both a single register for each 
therapy, and latterly the virtues of an umbrella CAM Council, on the grounds that they 
make it easier for patients to find out which practitioners are ‘safe’ and which ones are not 
(Consumers Association, 2004, para 21; Coe, 2005, para 28). The idea of a single federal 
voluntary regulator is also promoted by consumer organisations as a means of enhancing 
informed consumer choice (Coe, 2005, para 55). Interestingly the Foundation for 
Integrated Health, which originally supported the development of single registers is now 
promoting a federal voluntary regulator. The Manager of the Regulation Programme 
admitted that:
A.s time has gone on ... I  think we can see that there may be opportunities for more 
integration of the different groups that would lead to more.. .ynergy or cost saving (Jack,
2004, Para 318).
She went on to justify the investment that had been made in developing single voluntary 
registering bodies for each therapy. Jack argued that:
bfore you can bring the different professions together under one roof, you have to have a 
profession in the first place and so.. .there is something about the people within the groups 
going through this process that helps in the formation and development of an organised 
profession (jack, 2004, para 323).
The question at the heart of these debates is whether separate regulators are necessary in 
order to maintain separate identities, whether separate identities add value to the care and
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treatment o f patients (Clarke, 2005, para 83), or whether they enhance the status and 
reputation of practitioners. An individual council for each therapy was favoured by 
practitioners, keen to preserve their autonomy, whereas government was keen to promote 
the idea of a shared council, in the interests of minimising the number of regulators. Those 
practitioners who practise more than one CAM therapy, such as traditional Chinese 
medical practitioners, only supported the shared model if having their own regulator was 
not feasible.
10.5 Dual registration
Multi-disciplinary practice is generally becoming more common in health care. The 
boundaries between professions are increasingly blurred. Yet the system of professional 
regulation characterised by the Urmodell is based on professional silos. The premise was that 
a doctor, once trained, was competent to do what a doctor did. There was no definition of 
the scope of activity or what competencies were required to perform those activities. 
Consequently doctors, and other statutorily regulated practitioners, have been able to 
practise CAM without training. The onus has been on individuals to prove they are 
competent. The Urmodell gave doctors scope to define and redefine the boundaries of their 
practice. These boundaries have shifted over time and some activities have been ceded to 
other professionals.
Dual registration has existed to a limited extent between dentistry and medicine (e.g. 
maxillofacial surgeons), and there are a handful o f osteopathic doctors with dual 
registration o f the GMC and the GOsC. Yet there are currently no formal mechanisms laid 
down which govern how regulators cooperate in cases regarding fitness to practise 
concerning dual registrants. Graeme Catto, President of the GMC, did not seem unduly 
concerned at this lack of formality and felt there were no significant difficulties in linking 
with other regulators and “making sure we don’t fall over each other” (Catto, 2005, para 
24). He did then go on to cite two cases where “people have fallen through the crack” 
(Catto, 2005, para 26). Gynaecologist Rodney Ledward was struck off the medical register 
for serious professional misconduct but “popped over to Ireland and continued to work as 
a pharmacist”, while Richard Neal, also a gynaecologist, had been barred from practice in 
Canada but was able to register and practice for 14 years in the UK before being struck off 
(Dyer, 2000).
CAM practitioners frequently practice more than one modality. Multi-therapeutic or multi­
disciplinary practice poses particular challenges for regulation. Transregulatory issues also 
arise because there is widespread practise of CAM therapies among statutorily regulated
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professionals. As was discussed earlier, the preference for a joint or umbrella council was in 
part driven by a desire to facilitate multi-therapeutic practise. From the practitioners, 
perspective transregulatory arrangements are important because they determine what 
standards need to be met, grant the right to use a title, and may require multiple fees to be 
paid.
The ARWG proposed that statutorily regulated practitioners would join the register but 
that their existing regulator would remain their primary regulator (i.e. for disciplinary 
matters, educational standards, revalidation and continuing professional development). 
This distinction between registering and regulating functions had not been made before 
and it was not clear how it would work in practice. The government was clearly opposed to 
any changes to the current arrangements and stated that it did “not favour dual registration 
and will therefore not make it a requirement for healthcare practitioners who work across 
professional boundaries.” (Department of Health, 2004a, para 112). It went further than 
this and actively discouraged practitioners from dual registration claiming that 
“practitioners who choose to follow this approach will need to recognise the risk of 
creating confusion about which regulatory body would respond if their fitness to practise 
were called into question” (Department o f Health, 2004a).
Suggesting that practitioners chose their regulator has major consequences that the BAcC, 
at least, felt had not been fully explored (British Acupuncture Council, 2004b, para 72). It is 
not clear whether the Department envisaged a “hierarchy of regulators” in which some are 
“more equal than others”, i.e. some regulators could require registration in order to practise 
the discipline (British Acupuncture Council, 2004b, para 72). The alternatives would be to 
allow dual registration but define who decides which regulator will handle the fitness to 
practise and under what circumstances, to have a single disciplinary mechanism for all 
health care practitioners, or to create legal access to a protected title for specialist 
registrants e.g. ‘medical acupuncturist’ or ‘homeopathic doctor’ under existing statutory 
councils. The EHPA rightly recognised that:
This question about which Council a doubly-qualified practitioner... should register with 
and to which Council that practitioner’s registration fee is payable, is an as yet unresolved 
question that goes far wider than the CAM  sector since multidisciplinary working is 
becoming a feature of the N H S (European Herbal Practitioners Association, 2004, para 
72).
The medical acupuncturists’ main interest was in maintaining the right to use the title 
‘acupuncturist’ (see above). At the time of the House of Lords’ Inquiry, the British Medical
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Acupuncture Society (BMAS) were resistant to dual registration: “We believe...that medical 
practitioners should still clearly be regulated by the GMC and we would feel uneasy about 
having to register as acupuncturists under any other statutory organisation” (British 
Medical Acupuncture Society, 2000, para 996). They were loathe to have to register with a 
body which they felt would be dominated by non-medical acupuncturists, to have to meet 
educational standards which did not take into account prior medical training or required 
additional training, or to have to pay two sets of registration fees. But during the 
discussions of the ARWG it became clear that in order to be able to promote themselves as 
acupuncturists they would need to be registered with the new regulatory body.
Proposals were developed that accommodated their demands. The BMAS would retain the 
ability to set educational standards, its members would pay a reduced fee to be listed on the 
acupuncture register, and would be able to use the title ‘acupuncturist*. The Department’s 
opposition to dual registration presented them with the possibility of “being faced with 
prosecution for continuing to practise in name as an acupuncturist” (British Medical 
Acupuncture Society, 2004, para 110). Consequently, the BMAS has been lobbying the 
Department of Health to alter its proposals so that this situation is avoided.
The medical acupuncturists found allies among the medical homeopaths. Although dual 
registration is not yet an issue for medical homeopaths it would arise in future were 
homeopathy to become statutorily regulated. In commenting on the proposals for dual 
registration the Faculty of Homeopathy, which represents medical homeopaths, states:
There should be no dual regulation but dual registration would be open to anyone who was 
regulated by any of the other statutory regulating bodies. ..as long as thy are also able to 
demonstrate the required level of education (through membership of an accredited body such 
as the BM AS or Vacuity in the case of homeopathy) (Vacuity of Homeopathy and British 
Homeopathic Association, 2004).
Lay acupuncturists opposed the government’s proposals on different grounds. They feared 
that without dual registration there would be no clear standards governing the use of 
acupuncture techniques by statutorily regulated professionals (British Acupuncture Council, 
2004b). Currently, statutorily regulated healthcare professionals (such as doctors, nurses 
and midwives) who practise CAM therapies are encouraged to self-regulate their practice. 
They are left to judge for themselves whether they are competent, and must take personal 
responsibility for ensuring they are adequately trained (General Medical Council, 2000a, 
p96; UKCC, 2000a, p227).
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The herbalists did not support dual registration but wanted the new council to be given 
statutory powers to set educational standards, accredit courses, and provide continuous 
professional development for other statutorily regulated professionals wishing to practise 
herbal medicine and acupuncture (European Herbal Practitioners Association, 2004, para
52). The EHPA claimed that such an approach was in line with the Bolam test31 that 
expects a professional to meet standards that are in line with a responsible body of opinion 
(European Herbal Practitioners Association, 2004, para 26). It was also supported by the 
government, which thought the CAM Council would “provide professional leadership to 
all healthcare professions in the area of standards for the practice o f herbal medicine and 
acupuncture” (Department o f Health, 2004a, para 111). The role would also involve giving 
expert input in fitness to practise cases on issues relating to the practice of herbal medicine 
and acupuncture.
The Consumers’ Association also believed that doctors, nurses and other health 
professionals who practise CAM modalities should be registered with the proposed CAM 
Council. The argument made in support of this was that “the public will...trust their 
doctor if they are doing this [acupuncture or herbal medicine], and they’ll assume that 
they’re competent, properly qualified, meeting all the right standards” (Blunden, 2004, para
53). Dual registration would require practitioners “to meet standards o f professional 
knowledge and competence” and “ensure that they had proper training” (Consumers 
Association, 2004, paras 11 & 45). The Prevention o f Professional Abuse Network 
(POPAN) also supports dual registration because “going to, say, the GMC, to complain 
about an acupuncturist, is counter-intuitive” (Coe, 2004, para 70).
The frequency of multi-therapeutic practice among CAM practitioners has brought 
transregulatory issues to the fore in designing regulation. The desire among statutorily 
regulated practitioners to not only continue to practise CAM therapies (as they can without 
registration) but also to use the protected titles and promote these activities has added a 
further complication to the issue of dual registration.
10.6 Governance
The Urmodell is based on a largely paternalistic model of regulation: ‘doctor knows best’. 
Control of regulation is delegated to the profession, hence self-regulation. Professions 
dominate the council and committees and carry out the functions of the regulator, such as
31 The Bolam test defines the standard o f care required of a doctor or any other person professing some skill or competence. 
The case was that o f Bolam v Friem Hospital Management Committee (1957). The judge in giving direction to the jury 
said negligence could be determined as follows: “A doctor is not guilty o f negligence if he has acted in accordance with a 
practice accepted as proper by a responsible body o f medical men skilled in that particular art”.
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setting standards, adjudicating in fitness to practise hearings, and so on. During the past 15 
years the Urmodell has come under increasing scrutiny from the public, the media and the 
government. There is a growing consensus about the need for an adjudication function 
independent of the profession, and for increased lay representation on council and 
committees. Professions are now expected to share control with lay representatives. CAM 
practitioners are no exception.
The composition of the GMC has changed considerably since its establishment (Chief 
Medical Officer o f England, 2006). Although data from different accounts are not entirely 
consistent, the broad trends are similar. The GMC had 24 members when it was 
established, of whom the majority (18) represented the universities and Royal Colleges 
while the remainder were professionals appointed by the Privy Council (6). An amendment 
in 1886 allowed general practitioners to elect five doctors by postal vote. The first lay 
member was introduced in 1926 (Irvine, 2006). The Council almost doubled in size to 47 
members by 1974 (Chief Medical Officer of England, 2006). Following the Merrison 
Committee and the Medical Act 1978 the GMC expanded to 93 members, o f whom just 
seven were lay. The majority were elected medical members (Irvine, 2006). By 1995 lay 
membership had increased to 25. They sat alongside 25 appointed medical members and 54 
elected medical members (Allsop and Mulcahy, 1996, p75). Reforms implemented in 2003 
reduced the size of the Council to just 35 members, of whom 40 percent were lay 
members. All the medical members were elected, and the university representatives were in 
the minority.
When the GOsC was created it was heralded as a model o f modem professional regulation. 
According to a Department of Health official “It is a model not only for CAM 
professionals but other healthcare professionals to consider” (Department of Health, 
2000d, para 36). Malcolm Moss MP, sponsor o f the Bill, said it “broke new ground” and 
called it “a landmark for future legislation” (Hansard, 15 January 1993). The GOsC’s 
governance structures reflected the government’s views of best regulatory practice at the 
time (Hansard, 15 January 1993). A Department of Health official, commenting on the 
Osteopaths Act 1993, stated that “There is much greater emphasis on accountability to the 
public and transparency in the way in which the scheme works and the need to win public 
confidence” (Department of Health, 2000d, para 36).
The Osteopaths Act 1993 included provisions for there to be a greater proportion of lay 
representatives on the GOsC than were on the GMC at the time. In fact 12 out o f the 24 
seats on the Council were elected by the profession from among registered osteopaths,
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thus retaining 50 percent representation.32 The government also maintained the tradition of 
having medical interests represented on the governing bodies o f other health care 
professions by requiring at least one lay member to be a registered medical practitioner. 
The Act also made registration conditional on the registrant being in good physical and 
mental health, created three committees to carry out the fitness to practise procedures (the 
investigating committee, the professional conduct committee and the health committee), 
required the Council to publish an audited set of accounts annually, and made registration 
subject to post-registration training.
The government had already set out their intentions in Supporting doctors, protecting patients 
that professional regulatory bodies should be open, transparent, accountable and fair 
(Department of Health, 1999). In their response to the House o f Lords* Report the 
government re-stated this view: “professional self-regulation works best when it operates as 
an open and transparent partnership between the profession, patients and the wider 
public,, (Department of Health, 2001a, para 49). These ideas which informed some of the 
recent reforms to the GMC also shaped the proposals for the composition of a CAM 
Council for acupuncture and herbal medicine.
The HMRWG report recognised that lay representation on all committees was important 
and recommended that 40 percent of the Council would be made up of lay members, and 
that there would be at least two on each statutory committee and professional advisory 
group established by the Council (Herbal Medicine Regulatory Working Group, 2003, para 
170). The Department suggested that the new body should:
work in partnership with employers, education providers and other regulatory bodies for 
health and social care professionals and services; consult registered practitioners, employers, 
education providers, patients and the public in making or varying polity, standards and 
rules; have regard to the dffering considerations affecting the herbal medicine and 
acupuncture professions and the individual traditions within the professions (Department of 
Health, 2004a, para 77).
The government also proposed that the Chair of the CAM Council be a lay person, in 
order to “ensure that the Council is well-equipped to carry out its fundamental function of 
safeguarding the health and well-being of patients and the public” (Department of Health, 
2004a, para 90). The government believed that an independent Chair would be better able
32 In addition to the 12 elected osteopath members eight members were appointed by the Privy Council and one by the 
Secretary o f State, with three members appointed by the Council’s Education Committee (representing the interests of 
training institutions).
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to arbitrate between different interests and traditions among CAM practitioners. It claimed 
that:
A  lay Chair w ill... have equal regard for the differing considerations effecting the herbal 
medicine and acupuncture professions and the individual traditions within the professions.
This impartiality will be particularly important i f  the Council is required to consider any 
issues on which the individual professions or traditions may not be in agreement 
(Department of Health, 2004a, para 90).
The suggestion that there should be not only significant lay representation but also that a
lay member should chair the Council is a major departure from the Urmodell and the
principles of self-regulation. Perhaps the level of fragmentation among CAM practitioners 
necessitates such a role.
Nigel Clarke, originally appointed as a lay member to the GOsC before becoming its Chair, 
explained the benefits of lay representation during oral evidence to the House o f Lords. He 
said:
...the main thing that ley members have brought is independence...independence has been 
very important as the profession has come together from a disparate group of regulatory 
bodies who do not always seem to have had a lot of love for each other previously. Lay 
members do not have that background and cannot be conceived as partisan in relation to one 
previous regulatoiy body or another (General Osteopathic Council, 2000b, para 431).
The independent chairs of the regulatory working groups were vital to prevent all out 
battles between factions within herbal medicine and acupuncture. Michael McIntyre, 
President of the EHPA, said that the Chair acted as the “referee” and the lay people were 
the “linesmen” during discussions of the HMRWG (McIntyre, 2004, para 69). Accroding 
to the Manager of the Regulation Programme at the Foundation for Integrated Health, the 
acupuncturists also worked well together under the ARWG and they recognised the benefit 
o f having an independent lay chair and lay people (Jack, 2004, Para 94). Yet Michael Pittilo, 
who was Chair o f the HMRWG, expressed a personal and contrary view: “I think we’ve 
gone overboard on lay representation and I’m very, very worried about that in all areas” 
(Pittilo, 2004, para 251).
Another criticism of lay representation is that lay members do not necessarily represent the 
consumer or public interest. Often lay members are representatives o f other healthcare 
professions or educational interests. Both the BAcC and the EHPA were worried that lay 
representatives would be drawn from health and social care professions. According to the 
BAcC this “creates the very real possibility that orthodox western medical professionals
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could in theory represent a block vote of almost half o f the Council membership” (British 
Acupuncture Council, 2004b, para 60). Instead they wanted to see “people of broad 
ranging skills and backgrounds”, especially patient support groups and consumer groups 
(British Acupuncture Council, 2004b, para 61) This view was shared by the EHPA who 
said “lay members should have varied backgrounds so that lay representation is not 
weighted in favour of orthodox medicine” (European Herbal Practitioners Association, 
2004, para 60).
A key preoccupation among CAM practitioners, reflecting earlier debates within the 
orthodox medical profession about representation for general practitioners on the GMC, 
was that regulatory bodies should reflect the diversity o f practice. They felt the governing 
structures should represent fairly the different traditions within a particular therapy, for 
example herbal medicine. The composition of the proposed CAM Council became a major 
point of contention in the government’s consultation on the statutory regulation o f 
acupuncture and herbal medicine. The different traditions within CAM have also 
clamoured for their own representatives in the governance structures of regulators. Smaller 
groups wanted to be fully represented, while more established practitioner groups felt this 
would give disproportionate voice to these groups. The BAcC recognised it would not be 
appropriate to have representatives of each tradition within the Council as this would 
undermine the governance role of the Council (British Acupuncture Council, 2004b, para 
57). The EHPA suggested that when the number of registered practitioners in a tradition 
reached a defined number they would become eligible for representation on the Council.
Although the Urmodell assumes professional dominance o f the governance arrangements 
and control o f regulatory functions, in practice the early GMC was dominated by 
educational interests and those of the Royal Colleges. Most professional members were 
appointed by the Privy Council. They were not elected representatives of the profession or 
o f elements within it. When the GMC introduced an annual retention fee in the early 1970s 
it sparked demands for representation from doctors, many of whom refused to pay. The 
Merrison Committee of Inquiry was appointed primarily to resolve this issue, and paved 
the way for the Medical Act 1978 which expanded the Council and created a majority of 
elected professional members (Irvine, 2006). The recommendation of Dame Janet Smith 
was to replace elected members of the GMC with appointed members reversing the policy 
o f the 1970s. This suggestion has been taken up by the Chief Medical Officer in his recent 
report (Chief Medical Officer of England, 2006) Recommendation 43). It would clarify the
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role of a professional association (which represents the interests o f practitioners) and that 
o f a regulator (which should operate in the public interest with professional input).33
CAM is fragmented and practitioners have a tendency to retrench into factions when 
disagreements arise. Lay representatives and independent Chairs have been essential in 
assisting CAM practitioners to reach a consensus on regulation. It therefore seems 
appropriate that any new regulatory bodies should also have strong lay representation. The 
government’s response to the consultation on the future of health care professional 
regulation will hopefully clarify standards of best practice with regards to the composition 
and governance of regulatory bodies. The future o f professional regulation is discussed 
further in the concluding chapter.
10.7 Controlling entry to the register
When a register is first established transitional arrangements are usually put in place in 
order to facilitate the entry of existing practitioners and those in training to enter the 
register. New rules cause disruption, particular to those who entered the profession under 
earlier rules, so compensation or transitional arrangements are needed, in order for 
regulation to be deemed fair (Wolfson, Trebilcock et al., 1980). Once the register is up and 
running the main route of entry is via graduation from accredited courses. During the 
transitional phase there are a number o f options open to a regulator to assess the 
competence of new registrants, such as through examination, a personal professional 
portfolio, or accreditation of prior learning or experience.
Much of the discussion by CAM practitioners focused on the issue of ‘grandparenting’ (or 
‘grandfathering’). This was variously defined. The ARWG defined grandparenting as 
“Options for assessing and registering existing practitioners” (Acupuncture Regulatory 
Working Group, 2003, para 48). Others defined ‘grandparenting’ as providing automatic 
entry to the register for existing practitioners (Society of Homeopaths, 2004, para 142; 
Wallace, 2004, para 165; Clarke, 2005, para 41). All agreed that explicit standards should be 
defined and individual registrants should demonstrate that these had been met (Society of 
Homeopaths, 2004, para 142).
Opinions within the GOsC were divided on how to establish the new register. Nigel 
Clarke, who sat on the shadow Council, recalled that:
33 The Osteopaths Act 1993 and the Chiropractors Act 1994 blurred the distinction between a professional association and a 
regulator by including promotion and development o f the profession among the Councils’ statutory duties. The Royal 
Pharmaceutical Society o f Great Britain also has a dual role although it is likely that this will be separated in the near future.
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The first question of Council, the fundamental question, was: did we register people on the 
grandfather clause or did we try and establish some other mechanism for determining safety 
and competence for the first register. A nd that was a momentous decision (Clarke, 2005, 
para 35).
Interestingly, it was the osteopathic members rather than the lay members who wanted to 
make people prove their competence (Clarke, 2005, para 37). The decision was taken that 
“there would not be a grandfather clause...we would not just take anybody who called 
themselves an osteopath before” (Clarke, 2005, para 41). They put in place a set o f “tight 
criteria” against which individual applicants were judged on the basis of a personal 
portfolio. Clarke described the system as “almost a form of revalidation from scratch” 
(Clarke, 2005, para 41). I f  people did not pass the first stage of the application process 
there was an interview and an assessment of clinical competence. I f  registration was still 
refused the applicant had the right of appeal. This proved a lengthy and expensive process 
and some practising osteopaths were refused registration.
Practitioners were keen that registers be inclusive. The ARWG argued that “inclusivity is 
the best guarantee of standards and public safety” (Acupuncture Regulatory Working 
Group, 2003, para 317), and the EHPA stated “The process of Registration should be 
made as inclusive and helpful as possible” (European Herbal Practitioners Association, 
2004, para 94). In particular, practitioners stressed the need to reach out to those who were 
not currendy registered, such as traditional Chinese medical practitioners, who use 
acupuncture as part of their practice but were not involved in the ARWG. The ARWG 
recommended:
that in order to achieve the greatest level of inclusivity on the new Register, there will need to 
be stfficient time to identify and inform practitioners working outside the current voluntarily 
and statutorily regulated bodies of the existence of the Register. This will be a considerable 
challenge, since there are many practitioners in this group for whom English is not theirfirst 
language (Acupuncture Regulatory Working Group, 2003, para 317).
On the other hand, standards need to be high enough to ensure that registered 
practitioners are capable of safe practice. “In order to ensure that the principle of 
inclusivity does not lead to a dilution of standards, the qualifying period will be only one 
factor in determining entry to the Register” (Acupuncture Regulatory Working Group, 
2003, para 320). The ARWG proposed the following arrangements:
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a comprehensive application process from which individual assessment levels can be 
determined for each registrant; a practice history identifying both current and past practices 
aimed at meeting a qualifying standard for entry to the register, provisionally set at three 
years practice from the last five years; a comprehensive peer-reviewed self-audit process for 
both safe clinical practice and professional conduct (Acupuncture Kegulatoy Working 
Group, 2003, para 319).
Other checks on language competence, criminal record, child protection registers, and 
physical and mental health were also discussed as part of the screening and registration 
process.
Surprisingly, the government's consultation document said very litde about how entry to a 
new register would be determined. It recommended that the following categories of 
practitioner be eligible for registration under ‘grandparenting' arrangements: i) herbal 
medicine and acupuncture practitioners in practice prior to the opening of the register, 
regardless of their affiliation to any professional association; ii) herbal medicine and 
acupuncture practitioners in training in the UK during the transitional period; iii) 
practitioners who trained overseas and wish to begin practising in the UK during the 
transitional period. The primary requirement for registration was that practitioners prove 
that “they have been engaged in the lawful, safe and effective practice for three out of the 
five years prior to the opening of the Register (or its part-time equivalent)'' (Department of 
Health, 2004a, para 150). No proposals were put forward as to how this might be assessed.
The government’s proposals set the bar for entry lower than the Working Groups had 
recommended. According to the BAcC:
Both Working Groups...agreed that ‘three years from five' would only be a part of the 
requirement and that there should be a \hurdle ’ of some sorts to filter out those who do not 
meet the agreed standards (British Acupuncture Council, 2004b, para 103).
The government only suggested that applicants demonstrate additional training or 
experience or take a test of competence if they were unable to satisfy the ‘three out of five' 
criteria. The experience of the osteopaths (described above) indicated that consultation on 
the transitional arrangements would be important to ensure support from practitioners. Yet 
there was “no mention...on the methods of processing applications or description of the 
process and cost of identifying what counts as safe, legal and effective practice” (British 
Acupuncture Council, 2004b, para 103).
The CORH has not yet published the details of its grandparenting arrangements for the 
new voluntary register for homeopaths, but has rejected automatic entry. It is likely,
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however, that members of existing registers will find it easier to meet the criteria for entry 
(Wallace, 2004, para 165). The preference appears to be to have a simple system of initial 
entry with registration subject to agreed continuous professional development 
requirements. Over time this would ensure that everyone on the register is up to date and 
safe to practise.
There was clearly a preoccupation among practitioners with grandparenting arrangements. 
Clarke illustrates the point well:
the single most important thing about regulation is actually who you let on the register in the 
first place. A nd what standards thy have to display to get there and what must do to
maintain their standards. Those are the things that really matter (Clarke, 2005, para 85).
Many CAM practitioners have had litde or no formal education, particularly those who 
learned traditional medicine as apprentices, but may have practised for years. Their 
livelihood and ability to continue to operate as a business depends on successful 
registration. Such fears are in part generated by the experience o f osteopaths, where some 
practitioners were not admitted to the register. Leaders of practitioner groups on the other 
hand want to raise the bar and ensure a high level of training among registrants. This may 
be tied up with their desire for enhanced professional reputation and economic closure. 
Despite entry criteria being critical to the effectiveness of regulation in protecting the 
public, the government left the setting o f the standards for entry to the professions. The 
governments proposals for acupuncture and herbal medicine actually set a lower threshold 
for entry than that suggested by practitioner groups.
10.8 Other ideas about professional self-regulation
The ideas examined in the previous sections are all concerned with how to organise 
professional self-regulation. Debate mainly focused on how aspects of the medical model 
could be adapted and applied to CAM practitioners. There was almost no discussion of 
alternative models to professional self-regulation by CAM practitioner groups or the state. 
The House of Lords’ Select Committee was largely silent on how to regulate CAM 
practitioners. It considered there to be two options, statutory self-regulation and voluntary 
self-regulation. It briefly considered the different routes to statutory regulation, via a single 
Act or under the Health Act 1999. General regulations that apply to CAM practitioners 
were dted in the report having been laid out in the Department of Health’s written 
evidence. But these regulations were not the subject of discussion. The possibility that 
these could be strengthened or changed was not countenanced. The focus was firmly on 
voluntary versus statutory self-regulation.
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This suggests a lack of ideas in the policy stream, to use Kingdon’s term. The following 
section analyses the ideas put forward about professional self-regulation and its alternatives 
by orthodox medical practitioners, consumer representatives and academics.
10.8.1 Orthodox medical practitioners
Existing regulators supported the idea of professional self-regulation for CAM 
practitioners. In a sense to question this model would bring into question their own right to 
self-determination. The UKCC admitted their bias: “as a regulatory body, we would say 
that self-regulation works, would we not?” (UKCC, 2000b, para 587). Graeme Catto, 
President of the GMC, admitted “It is perfectly clear if you look at the medical model, that 
it is no longer sufficient, never was” (Catto, 2005, para 14). He went on to say “I don’t 
think there is an alternative here. If there is an alternative nobody else has come up with 
it.” (Catto, 2005, para 94). Despite recognising the weaknesses and failings o f the Urmodell 
there appeared to be a lack of ideas about any alternatives.
The focus of debate among regulators was on improving the Urmodell, not its abolition. 
One alternative that was briefly discussed was external regulation. This was seen as 
complex, however, and it was thought would lead to conflicts of interest, especially where 
the state is involved in the financing and delivery of services. Catto believed that:
I f  you don't go for some kind of.. .professionally led regulation then you have got to think 
what you wouldput in its place. A nd i f  you start going down that line you have got to have 
external regulation. A ll the evidence is that external regulation becomes increasingly 
complex (Catto, 2005, para 7)
He therefore concludes that:
[the] future of health care regulation for the foreseeable future is secure until someone puts 
up a better model and thy haven't. So changing the existing one and making it more fitfo r  
purpose is where we should be putting our efforts (Catto, 2005, para 100).
Others were also staunch defenders of self-regulation. Lord Walton, Chair of the House of 
Lords’ Sub-Committee and a former president o f the GMC (1982-1989), declared that he 
would defend professional self-regulation “to the death”, though it should be “carefully 
monitored by the lay public and by parliament” (Walton, 2005, para 172). He went on to 
laud self-regulation, quoting Lord Hailsham:
that great Lord Chancellor ...[who] said that professional self-regulation is one of the 
glories of a civilised society but that such professional self regulation must invariably take 
account of informed lay opinion and advice. I  agree (Walton, 2005, para 171).
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Among orthodox medical practitioners self-regulation was seen as the model o f regulation, 
albeit tempered by lay representation to ensure public accountability. External regulation by 
the state was rejected. Institutional blinkers meant that few alternatives were seriously 
considered.
10.8.2 Consumer representatives
The Consumers Association criticised the Department for its narrow viewpoint, suggesting 
it was influenced by the professionals and was not interested in meeting its stated objective 
o f public protection. Frances Blunden, Principal Policy Adviser at Which?, said that:
Part of the problem.. .is they [the Department of Health] have taken very much a 
professional stance; it's about bringing the profession together, getting the profession to work 
when actually they sometimes need to turn it on the head and say what do we need to protect 
the public? (Blunden, 2004, para 71).
Representatives of consumers organisations were keen that any system of regulation should 
make it easier for consumers to obtain information, make complaints, and contribute to the 
development of codes of practice. The CA described a system of regulation that would, in 
their opinion, meet the interests o f consumers:
A  consumer agenda here might include moves towards a single register for each therapy with 
agreed core competencies that all must have, externally-accredited training institutions and 
courses, the involvement of users both in drawing up codes of practice and in monitoring 
compliance with them pro-actively, truly independent elements within the disciplinaiy 
mechanisms and greater openness about theirfindings. A nd it would be good to see therapies 
take on board the idea of an independent Ombudsman, preferably one covering the whole 
sector (Bloomfield, 1997, para 58).
They did not make a blanket suggestion for greater lay representation on professional 
councils and committees, but suggested that the involvement of lay or independent people 
in the disciplinary procedures could help complainants feel that their case had been 
properly heard (Bloomfield, 1997, para 26). The National Consumer Council made similar 
recommendations in its more general report on health care regulation (National Consumer 
Council, 1999).
Interestingly, the CA suggested strengthening professional codes o f practice. The CA 
proposed that an adequate code for CAM practitioners should cover:
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the legal obligations of practitioners, the limitations on treatment that a particular therapy 
can offer or claim to offer, expected professional conduct towards patients, how therapists 
should relate to medical practitioners and what kind of information should (and what 
claims should not) be given to patients. It should include requirements to keep good records, 
to preserve patient confidentiality, to have decent premises, to advertise services andfees in a 
reasonable fashion and to deal with patients’ complaints property. It should also be clear 
that practitioners can be disciplined i f  thy fa il to comply with the code (Bloomfield, 1997, 
para 21).
They proposed that codes should be the subject of public consultation to ensure both 
public and professional support, and suggested that given the many common elements a 
combined code of practice for CAM practitioners could be developed (Consumers 
Association, 2004, para 71).
Models of regulation which create a single point of contact for consumers were also 
welcomed. For example, ideas such as an independent Ombudsman and a single 
independent complaints procedure for all health professions were proposed by consumer 
organisations (Blunden, 2004, para 145; Coe, 2005, para 9).
The Consumer’s Association were one of the few organisations to propose an alternative to 
professional regulation. They suggested that other consumer protection measures might be 
more appropriate to protect patients such as “through trading standards agencies, the 
police, those kinds of consumer protection approaches” (Consumers Association, 2000, 
para 832). These ideas put forward by consumer representatives were not widely discussed 
by other stakeholders.
10.8.3 Academics
One potential source of new ideas entering the policy stream is academia. As we saw in the 
analysis of the policy network in the previous chapter, most academics remained on the 
periphery with one or two exceptions. Julie Stone, through formal roles at the Foundation 
and the CHRE, operated within the core of the policy network. She is also the only 
academic in the policy community to have contributed ideas to the debate about how to 
regulate CAM practitioners. Others contributed to the wider debate, in Kingdon’s 
terminology the ‘problem stream’, rather than putting suggestions for regulation in to the 
‘policy stream’.
Unlike most others in the policy network, Stone took up the challenge of trying to “devise 
appropriate models of regulation capable of responding to a very different therapeutic 
relationship” (Stone, 1996, para 8). Her idea (with Matthews) o f ‘patient self-responsibility’
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was picked up by other members o f the policy network, particularly consumer 
representatives (Stone and Matthews, 1996). The idea is that “The public also have a role in 
protecting themselves by ensuring that they consult suitably regulated practitioners” (Stone, 
2000, p287). The government’s role would be to ensure that consumers have access to 
reliable information about qualifications and voluntary registers on which to base their 
choice of practitioner.
This idea was picked up by the House of Lords’ Inquiry which took evidence specifically 
on information provision, and resonates with the views o f consumer organisations who 
have called “for the government to accept some responsibility for the information gap and 
produce similar guidance for consumers” (Bloomfield, 1997, para 61). The Department 
have actually implemented a number of policies to improve consumer information on 
CAM, including commissioning Complementary Healthcare: a guide for patients from the 
Foundation for Integrated Health (Pinder, 2005), establishing a national electronic library 
for health on CAM, and including information on certain therapies on NHS Direct online.
Stone also suggested some additional safeguards to enhance public protection: “there 
should be a mandatory requirement for all registering bodies within a therapy to inform 
other such bodies when they have erased a practitioner from their register” (Stone, 2000, 
p287). She also recommended that personal liability insurance should be mandatory for 
practising CAM practitioners (Stone, 2000, p284). As was seen in Chapter 3 mandatory 
disclosure and liability insurance could increase the ability o f consumers to make informed 
choices and to be compensated in cases of negligent care. Largely these strategies are 
complementary to systems of voluntary or statutory professional self-regulation. They do 
not present radical alternatives.
10.9 D iscussion
The medical model of regulation, despite widespread criticism, has dominated policy 
discussions about how to regulate CAM practitioners. Debate has focused on adjustments 
to the Urmodell rather than alternatives to it. The GOsC and the GCC were modelled 
closely on the GMC. Osteopaths and chiropractors were heavily involved in drafting the 
Private Members’ Bills which became the basis for legislation. Although the government 
redrafted the Bills, the model implemented did not fundamentally deviate from the 
Urmodell Some adjustments were made, including increased lay representation, public 
reporting, mandatory continuing professional development (in other words revalidation), 
and published standards of practice. Similar provisions were included in subsequent 
reforms of established health care professions.
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Perhaps more surprising is that the Acupuncture Regulatory Working Group (ARWG), 
when asked to develop a model of regulation in 2002, proposed a model for a General 
Acupuncture Council that for all intents and purposes was a replica of the GMC. There 
were one or two innovative aspects to the proposals, in particular a register of medical 
acupuncturists which would permit use o f tide but not require dual registration with the 
General Acupuncture Council. It also took on board some o f the reforms either proposed 
or implemented at the GMC, such as increased lay representation, changes to the fitness to 
practise procedures, etc.
The Herbal Medicine Regulatory Working Group (HMRWG) was more in tune with 
government thinking. It proposed two alternative models that were akin to the NMC or the 
HPC: a joint council with acupuncture, or else an umbrella council under which 
acupuncture and herbal medicine would initially be regulated with provisions for other 
CAM therapies to join in future. This model of collaborative regulation was designed to 
benefit from economies of scale and scope and according to estimates would be more cost- 
effective, thus reducing the fees charged to practitioners. Even so, it is difficult to argue 
that this was a radical departure from the Urmodell. Under either structure the profession 
would be responsible for setting standards of education and practice, control entry to a 
register and use of protected tides, hold at least half of the seats on the Council and most 
committees, and implement disciplinary procedures. So even in 2003, by which time more 
cases of misconduct by doctors had come to light and were under investigation or subject 
to public inquiry, the Working Groups proposals largely reproduced the medical model of 
professional self-regulation.
Organisational decision-making has been likened to a garbage can into which many 
problems and solutions are dumped or a policy soup (Cohen, March et al., 1972; Kingdon, 
1984). According to Kingdon (1984), decisions depend on the convergence of a number of 
streams. The analysis of policy debates about models of regulation for CAM practitioners 
suggests there was a lack of ideas about other regulatory options in the policy stream. 
It could be argued that there was a lack of policy imagination. Those regulatory strategies 
that were proposed were not readily picked up by politicians. For example ideas to 
strengthen consumer protection measures or to establish an independent system of 
complaint did not resonate with the central players in the policy network, many of whom 
were medical practitioners. Consequently there was only one dominant idea: professional 
self-regulation.
Other theories of the policy process focus on the importance of bureaucratic routinisation 
or on historical institutionalism. They generally favour incrementalism. As has been noted
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elsewhere, “Policy-makers are rarely if ever presented with a blank state, and the field of 
professional regulation is no exception” (Wolfson, Trebilcock et al., 1980, p i 88). Policy­
makers appear to have prioritised regulatory approaches with which they were more 
familiar, that would face less opposition from organized professional interests and that 
fitted with existing institutional structures, because they perceived these to be easier to 
implement.
For officials in the Department of Health the medical model of regulation was perhaps an 
easy off-the-peg policy option. When Department officials were asked to come up with a 
design for the implementation of statutory regulation for acupuncture and herbal medicine, 
the policy ideas were shaped by precedent. Firsdy, most of the officials in the team were 
familiar with the institutional models of statutory regulation that existed for other health 
care professionals. Secondly, the decision was taken in response to recommendations by 
the House of Lords’ Sub-Committee that were framed in terms of statutory self-regulation. 
Finally, the regulatory working groups were asked to examine the options for achieving the 
successful statutory regulation o f the herbal medicine/acupuncture profession as a whole. 
In other words, there was never a time in the policy process when alternatives to statutory 
self-regulation were considered. This suggests that the model of professional self-regulation 
was the only idea. This view was shared by Julie Stone, Deputy Director at the CHRE:
One might even go as fa r as to suggest it showed a bit of a want of imagination that that 
was the only regulator/ model up for grabs. But in fairness it was the only regulatory model 
for ‘real’ professionals, real health care professionals, that had been on the table since the 
1850s (Stone, 2005b, para 32).
It was not a matter of bureaucrats choosing an easy and familiar policy option from among 
alternatives. It seems the officials responsible for professional regulation within the 
Department were trapped in a 19th century paradigm.
The fact that policies were modelled on existing regulators and informed in their design by 
the experience of other professions may be an important reason as to why more radical 
alternatives were not considered. Existing arrangements for professional regulation appear 
to have coloured the views o f those in the policy network and restricted the regulatory 
options considered. Representatives of orthodox medicine appeared institutionally bound 
by their own experience of regulation. Those in the system seemed to find it difficult to 
think outside the box. Although legislative changes under the Health Act 1999 meant that 
other CAM practitioner groups were unlikely to follow exactly the route taken by 
osteopaths and chiropractors, it was felt that “we can learn from what they did, we don’t
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have to do exactly the same thing” (Jack, 2004, para 364). Acupuncture and herbal 
medicine both examined the osteopaths’ and chiropractors’ experience of setting up a 
register (Acupuncture Regulatory Working Group, 2003, para 394).
The structures and arrangements in place for orthodox health care professions were also 
used to inform the ideas about CAM practitioners. For example, changes to the fitness to 
practise procedures of the GMC were the basis for those proposed for the CAM Council 
(Department of Health, 2004a, para 187), while the structure of the HPC and the NMC 
provided a template for a shared CAM Council (Brown, 2004, para 357; Stone, 2004, para 
31) and the federal voluntary structure proposed by the Foundation (Jack, 2006, para 34). 
The example of the relationship between the GMC and the GDC was cited when 
discussing transregulatory arrangements (Cummings, 2005, para 67-70). Even when 
developing voluntary systems, CAM practitioner groups were eager to track developments 
in statutory regulation and be mindful of some of the problems that were encountered 
(British Acupuncture Council, 2000, para 765; Society of Homeopaths, 2000b, para 687; 
Wallace, 2004, para 157; Stone, 2005b, para 32).
The models implemented and those proposed for the regulation of CAM practitioners 
differ only incrementally from the medical model of professional self-regulation. The 
government could have strengthened existing measures or introduced new regulations of a 
different nature, but it didn’t. Although it is not possible from the analysis here to say 
conclusively why other models of regulation (such as those outlined in Chapter 3) were not 
considered, it does appear that professional self-regulation was the one that was most 
familiar to those involved in the policy network. Despite the wider political events, which 
could be characterised as a crisis in professional regulation, the medical model of regulation 
remained the dominant idea. External shocks were not sufficient to precipitate a paradigm 
shift or third-order, major non-incremental change (Hall, 1993).
The final chapter draws together the major themes of the study, and concludes with a 
discussion of the implications o f these findings for regulatory policy in the UK and for 
health policy research in general.
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C h a p t e r  11
11 CONCLUSION
11.1 Introduction
The study has focused on the regulatory process that led to the decisions to statutorily 
regulate certain CAM practitioners in the UK. Although previous research has examined 
the professionalisation of CAM practitioners (Saks, 1994; Cant and Sharma, 1996) it has 
done so mainly from the perspective of the practitioners. Recently published research in 
Canada examined the views of government officials on the role of the state and whether 
CAM should be integrated with conventional medical care (Kelner, Wellman et al., 2004b). 
Here I have employed four different analytical approaches to explain why the regulatory 
process for CAM has taken the form that it has. These different approaches have enabled 
the role of practitioners, the state, other policy actors and ideas to be examined.
In this chapter I review how useful the different analytical approaches have been in 
answering the research questions posed at the beginning o f the study: why are some CAM 
therapies statutorily regulated and others not, and why was the model of professional self­
regulation chosen to regulate CAM practitioners? I discuss some of the challenges and 
limitations encountered during the research process and explore the implications for 
further research. Finally, the aim of the study was to inform policy discussions about 
regulation of CAM practitioners and the future of professional regulation in the UK. 
Reflections on what insights can be drawn from the study about these policy issues are 
discussed in the final section o f this chapter.
11.2 The analytical framework revisited
11.2.1 Demand theories
Demand theories of professionalisation (summarised in Chapter 5) predict that statutory 
regulation is the culmination of activities by practitioner groups in pursuit of occupational 
closure. In other words, professionalisation occurs because occupational groups demand it. 
This is in contrast to supply theories of professionalisation (see below), whereby 
occupational groups ‘supply’ professionalisation in response to external pressure (e.g. from 
the state). Demand theories were largely able to explain the cases of osteopathy and 
chiropractic, and to a lesser extent that of herbal medicine, where practitioner groups came 
together to establish themselves as a unified profession with a common goal o f achieving
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statutory regulation. However, the theories were not applicable in the cases of acupuncture 
and homeopathy. The study’s findings suggest a number of limitations to the explanatory 
value o f demand theories of professionalisation.
Firstly, statutory regulation is not the inevitable culmination of professionalisation. 
Theories o f professionalisation connected with functionalist approaches suggest that 
whether occupational groups achieve statutory recognition depends on how advanced they 
are in the transition from occupation to profession. All the therapies examined here were 
well advanced on the path towards professionalisation. Yet neither the acupuncture 
profession nor the homeopathy profession explicidy expressed a desire to be statutorily 
regulated, despite being developed as professions in other respects.
Secondly, income maximisation is not the primary motivation for occupational groups to 
seek occupational closure. The leaders o f CAM practitioner groups recognized that there 
might be economic benefits arising from increased public confidence, a greater willingness 
among GPs to refer patients, and possible changes in NHS purchasing policies. The 
experience o f chiropractors and osteopaths, however, coloured the expectations that other 
CAM practitioners had o f the economic benefits o f statutory regulation. Chiropractors and 
osteopaths, once statutorily regulated, enjoyed some increased referrals from primary care, 
but they were not integrated into the NHS as had been expected. Among CAM practitioner 
groups social status and reputation were perceived as more important than the economic 
benefits of closure. Protection of tide was seen as crucial to the profession’s ability to 
maintain its reputation (among the public and with conventional health care professionals). 
It meant practitioners whose practice brought the profession into disrepute could be 
disbarred from using the professional tide.
Thirdly, a profession or defined occupational group is not a unitary actor (see Greer, 2004, 
pp48-50 for an interesting discussion of the three faces of the medical profession). The 
views o f leaders or elites among occupational groups are rarely representative o f the 
majority of practitioners. Demand theories of professionalisation often portray the 
occupational group as having a unified interest. Grassroots CAM practitioners were 
concerned with maintaining their autonomy as independent practitioners, in contrast to the 
leadership’s interest in enhancing the standing of the profession. Practitioners believed that 
standards of training and practice would stifle creativity and innovation. Furthermore they 
were opposed to being required to pay large registration fees. Such extreme polarisation 
may be unique to CAM. CAM practitioners are by their nature a non-conformist bunch 
who are suspicious of any suggestion of government interference in their practise. At times 
they have seen regulation as part o f a conspiracy by the leaders o f their own profession, the
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orthodox medical profession and government to stifle or subvert the practice of CAM. 
This study did not examine the views of practitioners directly but was limited to the 
perceptions of leaders. It is possible that the leaders of practitioner groups distorted or 
exaggerated the views of practitioners, and such stark differences in opinion might not exist 
in reality.
Finally, statutory regulation may not necessarily result from the mass mobilisation of 
members of an occupational group. Given the supposed benefits o f occupational closure, 
theory would expect practitioners to form interest groups to lobby for statutory 
recognition. Statutory regulation was not even an explicit objective o f professionalisation 
for acupuncturists. Where regulation was professionally demanded, in the cases of 
osteopathy, chiropractic and herbal medicine, it did not come about as a direct result o f 
mass mobilisation. As the personal network analysis demonstrated (discussed below), 
policy entrepreneurs from within CAM formed strong alliances with others outside CAM. 
The only example of professional mobilisation was among the members of the British 
Medical Acupuncture Society (BMAS) in response to the Lords’ Report. Although there 
was a public campaign mounted in opposition to the European Union (EU) Directive on 
Traditional Medicinal Products which involved herbalists, the issue at stake was the 
availability of unlicensed herbal products and not the regulation o f herbalists per se.
Demand theories have further limitations. By focusing on the actions of occupational 
groups they overlook the constraints under which occupational groups operate. In 
particular they ignore the government’s influence on how successful an occupation is in 
pursuance o f their goals. Demand theories conceive of the state as passive and neutral in 
matters o f policy. This study found that the state played a much more active role in the 
professionalisation and regulation o f CAM practitioners.
11.2.2 Supply theories
Supply theories of professionalisation predict that professionalisation is a response by 
occupational groups to state demands. In the cases of acupuncture and herbal medicine the 
study found that these theories provided a strong explanatory framework. Even in the 
cases of osteopathy and chiropractic where the state’s role was largely passive, it still shaped 
the context in which practitioner groups made their claims to statutory regulation. The 
study found that government-wide approaches to regulation influenced the approach taken, 
and as these changed so did the approach to the regulation of CAM practitioners. The 
study identified three main phases.
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In  the first period, from 1985-1999 under the Conservative government and during the 
early years o f the Labour government, the interests o f the state were aligned closely with 
professional interests. CAM practitioners organised themselves and were subsequently 
‘rewarded’ with statutory regulation. This partly appears to confirm the hypothesis derived 
from the demand theories of professionalisation that the state responds to the demands of 
professional groups. However, statutory regulation was only introduced if practitioner 
groups met certain criteria set out by the state. The criteria shaped the approach pursued by 
osteopaths and chiropractors. Another explanation for what occurred, therefore, is that the 
professions were actually responding to the demands o f the state. Thus supply theories of 
professionalisation have some explanatory value during this period. But compared to how 
involved the state was in the professionalisation of acupuncture and herbal medicine (see 
below), the state was largely passive during this phase and relied on the practitioners to ‘get 
their house in order’. The government’s activities at this time were limited to generating 
data and information to help them understand the CAM market better (Thomas, 1995; 
Mills and Peacock, 1997; Luff and Thomas, 1999).
It appears that the state’s approach to the regulation of CAM practitioners shifted from a 
passive approach to a more proactive one around the time of the House o f Lords’ Sub- 
Committee on Complementary and Alternative Medicine in July 1999. The Lords’ Sub- 
Committee’s call for evidence included a question on regulation and risk:
Are there areas of complementary and alternative medicine where lack of regulation causes 
unacceptable risk to the public? Are there practicable forms of regulation that wouldprovide 
protection without unduly restricting patient choice? (House of Lords Select Committee on 
Science and Technology, 2000b).
The government’s decision to introduce statutory regulation for acupuncturists and 
herbalists, following the recommendations of the Lords’ Report, was based on a concern to 
protect the public from the risks associated with toxic herbal medicines and contaminated 
acupuncture needles. It did so although there was almost no evidence regarding the scale of 
the problem. Internationally there were a few well-publicised incidences of contaminated 
herbal medicines (laced with heavy metals, animal derivatives or restricted active 
ingredients such as steroids), and adverse reactions caused by the toxicity o f particular 
herbal products due to lack of standardisation and quality assurance processes during 
production. Between 1999 and 2003 the government was pro-active in supporting the 
formation of unified professions among acupuncturists and herbalists, upon which the 
successful implementation of statutory regulation depended.
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Having justified its action in relation to acupuncture and herbal medicine on the basis of 
direct physical risks (from prescribing and dispensing herbal medicines and skin piercing 
with needles), the government could not defend any proposals which did not 
accommodate traditional Chinese medical practitioners (who combine both activities). 
Their inclusion has resulted in delays to the implementation of statutory regulation for 
acupuncture and herbal medicine.
Homeopathy, unlike herbal medicine and acupuncture, was not seen to pose a direct risk to 
human health because the dilutions o f homeopathic medicines are so great. The orthodox 
medical profession claimed homeopathy posed serious indirect risks because it operated as 
a discrete clinical discipline, and therefore might result in patients not seeking conventional 
medical treatments. Interestingly, although the Lords' suggested homeopathy should be 
considered for statutory regulation on these grounds, the government did not accept these 
arguments. The government chose instead to encourage homeopaths to improve their 
system of voluntary regulation.
The decision to use risk as the criteria for determining which CAM therapies to regulate 
also reflected wider government policy. Although a regulatory state had been emerging in 
the UK since the 1980s, it was in the 1990s that the regulation of risk increased. In the 
1980s financial regulators were created as part of the process o f privatisation.34 In the 
1990s new regulatory agencies were created to monitor and enforce standards in public 
services.35 In health, agencies with regulatory functions were created to ensure the safety, 
quality and cost-effectiveness of health services (e.g. the National Patient Safety Agency, 
the Commission for Health Improvement, the National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 
etc.). The UK government, like its counterparts in other countries, felt the need to respond 
to growing public concerns about the hazards of modem society (characterised as the risk 
society by Beck, 1992). Public scares, fuelled by the media, surrounding the risks to human 
health posed by BSE-infected beef, mobile phone masts and toxic waste dumps resulted in 
the introduction of new regulations.
More recently there has been a backlash against the growth o f risk regulation. It is not 
possible to eliminate risk, but trying to do so may lead to a diminution of responsibility. 
The most recent publication from the Better Regulation Commission states that:
34 For example the creation of the Office o f Telecommunications (1984), the Office o f Gas Supply (1986), the Office of  
Electricity Regulation (1989) and the Office o f Water Services (1989) were all part o f privatisation acts.
35 For example the establishment o f the Office for Standards in Education (1993).
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We want to challenge the easy assumption that governments can and should manage all 
risks. We want to see a new understanding between government, regulators, the media and 
the public that we all share a responsibility for managing risk and that, within the right 
circumstances, risk can be benficial and should be encouraged (better Regulation 
Commission, 2006).
In the final phase, from 2003 up to the present, the dominant concern has been to ensure 
the cost-effectiveness o f regulation. The principles of better regulation set out by the Better 
Regulation Task Force (proportionality, accountability, consistency, transparency and 
targeting) have been applied to the regulation of CAM practitioners.
The idea of better regulation originally emerged in response to worries about whether 
regulation placed an unnecessary burden on small and medium sixe enterprises, thus 
putting a brake on economic growth. The costs o f regulation to the state and the burden 
on the public sector have also come under increasing scrutiny (Public Sector Team 
Regulatory Impact Unit, 2001). Objections to the growth of regulation have resulted in a 
series of government reviews (Hampton, 2005). Since 2002 regulatory impact assessments 
must be completed for “all policy changes, whether European or domestic, which could 
affect the public or private sectors, charities, the voluntary sector or small businesses” 
(Better Regulation Executive, 2006). Departments are encouraged, as part of an 
assessment, to consider alternatives to command and control regulation (i.e. legislation) 
such as no intervention, information and education, self-regulation, or incentive-based 
structures. The fact that other CAM practitioners are pursuing voluntary self-regulation as 
an alternative to statutory regulation rather than as a step towards it, is clearly driven by the 
government’s agenda to minimise new legislation. Indeed, the government is actively 
supporting the development of voluntary self-regulation for other CAM practitioners by 
subsidising the costs o f the process (through a grant to the Foundation for Integrated 
Health).
The state has demanded different things of different practitioner groups at different times. 
In each case studied here the professional groups have responded to the demands made 
upon them (to ‘get their house in order’, to professionalise, to unify and to reach consensus 
on standards, etc.). It appears then that the supply theories of professionalisation provide a 
useful explanatory framework for understanding the development of the regulation of 
CAM practitioners. But there are also some limitations to supply theories of 
professionalisation.
Firstly, the findings here suggest that the state interest is not fixed or deterministic but that 
it changes over time. The state’s interest in the regulation of CAM practitioners ebbed and
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flowed. Some of the supply theories believe that the interests of the state are based on 
economic and structural factors which are largely unchanging. Findings here suggest it is 
more dynamic. Although the study did not directly seek to explain what influenced the 
state, some factors have been identified.
The growth in the use of CAM and in the number of practitioners providing CAM partly 
contributed to CAM’s rise up the policy agenda. The popularity of CAM with the public 
meant there were greater demands for its availability on the NHS, but also potentially more 
opportunity for people to be harmed. Public health scares in the media about contaminated 
and toxic herbal medicines, and general fears about blood borne infections associated with 
needle contamination, heightened the focus on the risks o f CAM. External factors also 
played a role. For example proposed changes to EU legislation, with major implications for 
the availability of unlicensed herbs in the UK and the legality of herbalists’ practise, 
prompted a public campaign orchestrated by commercial interests including health food 
stores and herbal manufacturers. Changes in government thinking about business 
regulation also had a significant bearing on regulatory policy in other areas of government, 
and the health sector and CAM were not immune from this. This study found the state’s 
interest to be malleable and dependent on a whole host of external and internal political 
factors.
Secondly, there is not a single state interest but several competing state interests. The study 
found that the state acted patemalistically to protect the public but was also concerned with 
protecting consumers’ rights to chose and practitioners’ freedom to practise. In an effort to 
promote the public interest the government was faced with the option of restricting access 
to unlicensed CAM medicines and unlicensed CAM practitioners. But it also believed it was 
against the public interest to over-regulate and place limits on consumer choice and 
freedom to practise. The state has a tricky balance to strike between professional interests, 
public protection, consumer choice and its own self interests. As the balance between these 
competing interests changes so too does the approach taken by the state with regard to 
regulation.
Finally, the supply theories view the state as a single homogeneous entity when in fact it 
has many facets. The term ‘state’ can be used to encompass the legislature, the executive 
and the judiciary. Ultimately it is comprised o f individuals such as MPs and peers, Ministers 
and government officials, etc. By treating the state as homogenous, supply theories of 
professionalisation may fail to recognise the tensions between state actors and the impact 
on the policy process of competing interests. Policy is also shaped by discussions and 
debates beyond the formal legislative process which are ignored if analysis only focuses on
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the actions of the state. Personal policy network analysis may be one possibility of 
addressing this deficiency.
11.23 Policy networks
Political science research in health care has tended to focus on the influence o f the medical 
profession. Despite the vast range of different views that exist not only between but within 
well-established corporatist bodies such as the British Medical Association (BMA) the 
medical profession is often portrayed as a single interest group. The nature of the CAM 
policy network demanded a different analytical approach. Personal policy network analysis 
was used to examine the role of individuals, each with a variety of formal and informal 
affiliations and some with a long-standing interest and involvement in the issue.
CAM is not the stuff of high politics. It does not feature on the agendas o f Ministers or in 
Prime Minister’s questions. It does not consist o f highly mobilised coalitions of organised 
interest groups. The CAM policy network consists of a small group of influential 
individuals, policy entrepreneurs and advocates who built strong alliances with civil 
servants and others from within the medical profession, statutory regulators and 
parliament. Perhaps the most unexpected individual found at the core o f the policy 
network was HRH the Prince of Wales. Although Prince Charles is known to be a public 
advocate of holistic medicine, the analysis revealed the extent to which he is actively 
involved in promoting the issue of CAM and its regulation privately.
The analysis was helpful in illuminating the central role that individual policy entrepreneurs 
from within CAM played in the policy process. The findings here support political theories 
which give individuals a central role in the policy process (see Chapter 4). In osteopathy, 
chiropractic and herbal medicine there were individuals, sometimes but not always in 
positions of formal leadership, who engaged with others in the policy network and actively 
promoted the profession. Their energy and enthusiasm appear to have driven forward the 
regulatory process. These were not charismatic leaders who were able to mobilise mass 
support from practitioners, but rather entrepreneurs who were able to capitalise on their 
personal contacts and affiliations to pursue particular policy objectives. Despite the focus 
on policy entrepreneurs and policy brokers (Kingdon, 1984) in the theoretical literature on 
policy process there has been little empirical analysis of their role in shaping health policy.
In any policy arena civil servants are an important audience for policy advocates. There 
were two civil servants who had a long-standing involvement in issues of CAM regulation, 
one at the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) and the other 
at the Department o f Health. They both knew the stakeholders and their peculiarities well
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in their respective policy areas. They were also known to the leaders of the CAM 
practitioner groups. A challenge for anyone wanting to influence policy and have their ideas 
heard and considered is knowing who to talk to on the inside. For those outside the civil 
service it can be quite impenetrable and yet access is crucial. Individuals from CAM 
practitioner groups were at an advantage, having established an on-going dialogue with 
government officials.
Reorganisation at the Department of Health in 2003 resulted in the responsibility for CAM 
regulation moving to the branch responsible for professional regulation. Consequently 
policy on CAM regulation had to compete with other more pressing priorities. Further 
reorganisation in 2004 resulted in there being no civil servant with full-time responsibility 
for CAM, which left CAM practitioners without anyone on the inside who understands 
them. This has further changed the dynamics o f the policy network. The government may 
yet introduce legislation to regulate acupuncture and herbalists, but the final legislative 
proposals will probably be influenced more by wider ideas about regulation than by specific 
proposals advocated by the CAM policy network. This shows how contingent the policy 
process is on the strength of the individual relationships that exist between those within the 
state (e.g. civil servants) and members of policy networks and communities.
Traditionally the medical profession has been the dominant interest group shaping health 
policy. Although not central to the analysis here, the study found that CAM has some 
powerful allies within orthodox medicine. These alliances were clearly important to those 
therapies that successfully gained regulation, namely osteopaths and chiropractic. For 
example, senior figures from the orthodox medical profession were involved with the 
King’s Fund Working Parties, the Prince of Wales’s Initiative on Integrated Health, in 
supporting the Private Members’ Bills, the House of Lords’ Sub-Committee, and as 
trustees of the Foundation for Integrated Health. These individuals brought legitimacy to 
the claims of CAM practitioners. Yet there remain divisions within the medical profession 
over the regulation of CAM practitioners.
Some doctors are of the opinion that the government should not ‘regulate rubbish’, as this 
would give legitimacy and status to unproven CAM therapies and might increase the 
likelihood of it receiving NHS funding. Others believe that regulation is needed in order to 
stop patients getting the ‘wrong treatment’: anything, as they see it, which a CAM 
practitioner provides. During evidence sessions of the House o f Lords’ Inquiry parts of the 
medical profession were keen to emphasise the indirect risks associated with homeopathy 
and called for its regulation. Some therapies are more acceptable to the orthodox medical 
profession because the body of knowledge on which they are based has more in common
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with allopathic medicine. For example, there is a plausible scientific explanation for the 
effect of acupuncture connected with endorphin stimulation and the active ingredients 
within herbal medicines are the basis for modem pharmaceuticals. In contrast, controversy 
remains surrounding homeopathy. Leaders of the medical profession are disparaging of a 
therapy for which they believe there is no scientific basis (Baum, Ashcroft et al., 2006).
Personal policy network analysis was useful for illuminating the policy process surrounding 
CAM practitioner regulation, and the role of individuals within it. There were also a 
number of limitations. Firstly, although the role o f individuals was clearly identified as 
being important, it is not possible to claim that regulation resulted from their actions. 
Personal policy network analysis may therefore be more useful as a descriptive framework 
than an explanatory one. Secondly, it does not allow the contribution of a particular policy 
advocate or entrepreneur to be measured or weighted. For example, was it the enthusiasm 
of Simon Fielding, an entrepreneurial osteopath, or the support of the Prince of Wales that 
accounted for the osteopaths’ success in gaining statutory regulation? Whereas in some 
interest group analysis the number of members or the amount o f financial resources are 
used as proxies for influence there was no objective measure of influence within the 
personal policy network analysis used in this study. Instead the researcher’s judgement was 
relied upon to interpret information on the number of affiliations and to determine the 
strength of individual’s relationships with other members of the policy network. Thirdly, 
the approach gives prominence to the leaders o f organisations, who tend to be most 
actively involved with civil servants. This means little is known about the views of 
practitioners. In CAM the level of fragmentation and disunity within practitioner groups 
means the views of leaders are unlikely to be representative of their members. However, 
the personal policy network approach makes no claims that the views of individuals are 
representative. Finally, as a methodology it relies heavily on attribution by interviewees and 
by the researcher. In this study the aim was not to folly specify every member of the 
network at a particular point in time but to identify the main actors involved. Mapping 
based on interviews and documents was used to identify potential candidates for inclusion. 
Their inclusion and the position of individuals towards the core or periphery o f the 
network relied on an assessment of their formal position in relation to the policy at a 
particular point in time. Thus the scope of each network map was limited by the time 
period to which it related and the focus of policy activities depicted. Future research studies 
could be more explicit about the inclusion and exclusion criteria used for determining 
network membership.
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I would expect personal policy network analysis to be useful in a policy arena that is low 
profile, isolated and somewhat fragmented. Such an arena would have few organised 
corporatist interest groups, individuals would occupy positions in several organisations, and 
relationships would be fluid. Further empirical research is needed to test my hypothesis 
that the approach adopted here is applicable to other policy domains which share 
similarities to the CAM policy network. In a different policy arena where interest groups 
are more unified this approach might not be appropriate.
In conclusion, personal policy network analysis combines the strengths of personal 
interaction approach and formal network analysis. It allows an examination of both the 
inter-relationships between actors and also their formal affiliations, both o f which are 
important to a fuller understanding of a particular policy’s genesis and development. 
Personal policy network analysis has illuminated an important dimension of the policy 
process: that is, individuals matter.
11.2.4 Ideas and institutions
Policymakers may pursue different regulatory strategies depending on their understanding 
of how appropriate or effective different regulatory tools are (they have many at their 
disposal, as outlined in Chapter 3). They may also chose to implement those regulatory 
strategies through different institutional arrangements. In order to address the second 
research question - why did the regulation of CAM practitioners take the form that it did - 
the analysis drew on theories that posit that ideas are central to policy-making. Ideas can 
take different forms. In periods of normal policymaking the adoption of new ideas will 
often only result in incremental change. For example, policymakers faced with a particular 
problem will select from among alternative policy options (ideas) in the ‘policy stream’ 
(Kingdon, 1984). According to Hall (1993), policymakers operate within a policy paradigm. 
He defines this as:
a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals ofpolity and the kind 
of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems thy  
are meant to be addressing (Hall, 1993, p279).
The presence of this framework of over-arching ideas, similar to an ideology, limits the 
flow of ideas to those that are consistent with the paradigm.
The study found that neither CAM practitioner groups nor state actors appear to have 
considered alternative regulatory tools in any systematic way. The discussions were largely 
limited to whether self-regulation should be enforced, that is backed by legislation to make
250
registration mandatory in order to use a protected tide, or not. The Urmodell o f professional 
self-regulation was the dominant idea. This suggests that it would take a ‘third order 
change* for the government to shift from self-regulation to a consumer protection 
approach, or to adopt one of the other regulatory tools. A few ideas did circulate in the 
policy network about other strategies, such as improving consumer information about 
CAM practitioner’s associations, mandating personal liability insurance, and using other 
incentive based mechanisms such as subsidising accredited education courses. I f  
policymakers were operating in a policy paradigm of self-regulation it would explain why 
these ideas were not widely taken up. Another explanation would be that policymakers 
simply lacked the knowledge or imagination of how other regulatory tools might be 
applied.
Historical institutionalists would argue that the lack o f alternatives is because policy is 
constrained by existing institutions, in this case professional regulators. Theories of 
bureaucratic routinisation on the other hand would suggest that because civil servants are 
used to dealing with professional regulators, it is easier for them to continue with a model 
that is familiar. Interest group theorists would argue that the alternative ideas are associated 
with less influential interest groups or individuals: those who support the dominant idea of 
professional self-regulation are also those with the loudest voice.
Although alternatives to self-regulation were not extensively considered, ideas about the 
institutional and organisational arrangements for implementing professional self-regulation 
were widely debated. The King’s Fund working parties on osteopathy and chiropractic 
were set up to determine whether there was a case for statutory regulation for each therapy. 
The draft bills produced were largely modelled on the Medical Act, but there were some 
important differences. For example the Osteopaths Bill proposed significant lay 
representation on the General Osteopathic Council, regular public reporting to ensure 
public accountability, and revalidation and revised fitness to practise structures to ensure 
standards of practice were maintained. These ideas subsequently led to changes to the 
organisation of statutory health care professional regulators beyond CAM, such as the 
General Medical Council (GMC).
At the time proposals were being developed for the regulation o f acupuncture and herbal 
medicine other regulatory strategies were given almost no attention. The Regulatory 
Working Groups were set up with the purpose of examining the options, but they limited 
their considerations to the structure and design of a professional regulator. At this time 
concerns about the costs o f regulation prompted the HMRWG to propose an option to 
establish a joint council with the acupuncturists. The government’s proposals for
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acupuncture and herbal medicine favoured an umbrella council under which other 
therapies could be regulated in future. These ideas are concerned with organisational 
structures, but do not question the fundamental approach to regulation.
Ideas about regulation more generally from outside health care also shaped policy. The 
state’s ideas about risk were important to the decision to regulate acupuncture and herbal 
medicine. The analysis using the supply theories o f professionalisation (see Chapter 8) 
highlighted the importance of ideas about risk and regulation to the way the state 
approached the issue of regulation o f CAM practitioners. Latterly the paradigm of 
professional self-regulation has been challenged by the paradigm of better regulation. 
Because most CAM practitioners operate as small businesses, government had to assess the 
economic impact of regulation and minimise the regulatory burden on practitioners. This 
meant that the proposal to establish a joint or shared CAM Council for acupuncture and 
herbal medicine was promoted because it was a cost-effective option. Ideas of better 
regulation also influenced the policy decision as to whether to regulate other CAM 
practitioners at all. In order to minimise unnecessary regulation, and to stop over­
regulation, a different approach to the regulation of CAM practitioners emerged which 
favoured collaborative regulation, voluntary regulation and consumer information.
Although not explicitly part of the analytical framework applied in the other chapters, ideas 
appear to play an important role in all aspects of the policy process. The analysis in Chapter 
10 examined the ideas that were being debated about the form regulation should take. It 
was unexpected that ideas also had value in explaining which therapies were subject to 
regulation (analysed in Chapters 7-9). State-centric theories, such as supply theories of 
professionalisation, have been criticised for neglecting ideas. The analytical framework 
could benefit from further refinement to incorporate the observation from other policy 
analysis that the “flow of ideas is an important dimension of the process in which policy is 
made” (Hall, 1993, p290). This finding suggests that future health policy research examine 
not only the role of actors but also of ideas within the policy process.
11.2.5 Integrating the analytical frameworks
The different components of the analytical framework have each illuminated a particular 
aspect of the policy process in relation to one or more of the different CAM practitioners 
groups examined here. How do these components fit together? Are there inter­
relationships between them? Can a synthesis provide further insights into the policy 
process?
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Reflecting on the findings of the research presented here it is possible to identify ways in 
which each of the different elements o f the analytical framework interact and inform each 
other. For example the level of passivity/activity of the state provided opportunities for 
CAM practitioner groups to be more active in demanding statutory regulation. As 
previously noted, the state created the policy space into which CAM practitioner groups 
were able to place their demands. The criteria and expectations set by the state provided 
the basis on which the osteopaths and chiropractors made a successful case. Conversely, 
the state is the audience for demands by professional groups. Professionalisation can occur 
on a voluntary basis without interaction with the state, but if a profession seeks closure 
through statutory regulation then it necessarily brings it into contact with the state. In this 
study the osteopaths and chiropractors needed the support firstly of MPs and subsequently 
of government in order to successfully realise their ambitions for statutory professional 
regulation. Analysis of professionalisation in future could benefit from integrating both the 
perspectives of demand and supply theories of professionalisation.
Furthermore, the relative influence of professional representatives and state actors within 
the policy networks reflects to some extent the level o f passivity/activity of professional 
groups and the state in general. For example, during the early phase when the state was 
passive the personal policy network had professionals at the core. These individuals were 
effective in creating momentum and support for the osteopaths’ and chiropractors’ 
demands among politicians and within government. As the state became more active the 
role of civil servants within the personal policy network increased in importance. Whether 
professionalisation is demanded by the profession or supplied in response to the state’s 
interests appear to influence the membership and the level of influence different actors 
have at different times. Personal network analysis can also help to illuminate further the 
dynamics at play in the policy process, complementing the demand and supply theories o f 
professionalisation. For example, personal policy network analysis revealed the extent to 
which individual professionals, rather than organised corporate interests, were driving the 
process o f professionalisation. It showed how leaders of the profession were not 
necessarily acting as representatives but rather as policy entrepreneurs. Similarly personal 
policy network analysis revealed the heterogeneity o f state interests and the importance of 
the continuity of relationship with particular civil servants on the ‘inside’. Later in the 
policy process the interactions between the state and professional groups became more 
formalised, though the efforts of individuals continued to play a crucial role in the progress 
that these groups made in agreeing a system of statutory regulation. Personal policy 
network analysis added a further layer of interpretation to the policy events examined in 
this study.
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The role of ideas was examined in Chapter 10. This component o f the analytical framework 
was used to examine the research question about the model of regulation adopted, rather 
than which therapies were statutorily regulated. Yet as discussed above, ideas were also 
important in shaping the state’s actions, the activities of different practitioner groups and 
the membership of the personal policy networks.
For example, as the idea of risk became more important to the state in determining which 
therapies should be regulated, it resulted in the acupuncturists being drawn into the process 
and homeopaths being sidelined. Interpretations o f risk led to the demands of some 
professionals being given greater prominence than others. Finally, the imperative for the 
state to act in the face of risk meant the policy process was less open to influence by 
individuals within the personal policy network at this time. It appears that ideas can either 
facilitate or restrict whether the claims of particular groups are considered, and the ability 
o f different individuals to influence the policy process.
During the latter phase of the study the state’s position in relation to CAM practitioners 
was heavily influenced by ideas that held sway across government, in particular the ideas of 
risk-based regulation and better regulation. The priority became minimising the burden of 
regulation on the state and ensuring regulation was proportionate to risk, rather than the 
elimination of risk at all costs. The force of this idea, as well as the wider review of 
professional regulation, resulted in the introduction of statutory regulation of 
acupuncturists and herbalists stalling. The ideas about regulation held by professional 
groups (examined in Chapter 7) suggest that the lack of consensus about the benefits to the 
profession prevented unified action to lobby for statutory regulation in the case of 
homeopaths. Thus ideas were significant in shaping both the demands of professional 
groups and the state’s response to them.
The explanatory value of each of the components of the analytical framework appears to 
vary over time and between cases. Thus by re-examining the same data using a number of 
different analytical lenses we are able to build up a richer and deeper understanding of the 
policy process and how it changes.
11.3 Research questions and m ethods revisited
One always has the benefit of hindsight at the end of a research project to consider how 
one might have done it differently. A number of choices had to be made about case 
selection, data sources, and the process of analysis (see Chapter 6). These choices all 
shaped the final study. Here I reflect on the strengths and weaknesses of the research 
design and methods.
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113.1 Case selection
The story of CAM regulation has not been a straightforward one to reconstruct. There are 
a plethora o f therapies that are usually classified as CAM, but many therapies do not see 
themselves that way. Some would rather define themselves as being complementary and 
not alternative. Some, such as osteopaths and chiropractors, do not define themselves as 
either ‘complementary* or ‘alternative* to medicine. The use of terminology here is 
significant. The fuzziness of the boundaries between conventional medicine and CAM 
means any discussion of the regulation of CAM practitioners requires careful definition. 
Here the study was limited to five therapies — acupuncture, chiropractic, herbal medicine, 
homeopathy and osteopathy.
The therapies selected were chosen because they are the most popular and because they 
were at different stages in the regulatory process. On a spectrum of therapies they are, 
however, some of the best established, most widely recognised and most accepted (at least 
by the public if not by the medical profession). Crystal therapy is often the example used 
when one wants to illustrate the quirkiness of some CAM therapies. It certainly lies at the 
other end of the spectrum from acupuncture. Limiting the cases to five was a necessity: any 
more would have rendered the task unmanageable given time and space constraints. The 
five therapies chosen are not typical o f CAM as a whole, however. This means generalising 
the findings to all CAM practitioners is difficult.
Beyond the therapies examined here there are others that are widely practised and where 
discussions about regulation are taking place, such as aromatherapists, Bowen therapists, 
cranial and cranio-sacral therapists, massage therapists, naturopaths, reflexologists, Reiki 
practitioners and yoga therapists. The debates are largely confined to the practitioner 
groups at this stage. Analysis of internal discussions within these therapies would be 
interesting, particularly to examine in greater depth issues identified in this study such as 
differences between leaders and members, the presence of policy entrepreneurs, and what 
if any external allegiances they are building. These other cases would not, however, have 
provided the opportunity to analyse the state’s perspective or interactions with a wider set 
of actors.
113.2 Sampling
The fragmented nature of CAM means there are many competing organisations and 
interests within each CAM therapy. The main players in the medical profession are familiar 
to most people. Consolidation means there is a single dominant professional association, 
the BMA, a single registering body and regulator, the GMC, and specialist educational and
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professional interests represented by the Royal Colleges. In CAM the playing field is more 
crowded. As shown in Chapters 4 and 7, professional associations have been established by 
graduates of different private schools which often teach a particular approach to the 
therapy. Splinter groups have been established following disagreements among members. 
Specialist bodies have been established to represent particular traditions, such as Ayurveda. 
Consolidation has taken place to some extent, but the voluntary nature o f this process 
means that no sooner than some of the established bodies agree to cooperate or indeed 
formally merge then there are new groups breaking away. In addition, CAM is practised by 
statutorily regulated health care professionals such as doctors, nurses, midwives, etc. Given 
the extent of such practice, particularly in acupuncture and homeopathy, these groups and 
the issues they raise were included in the study. This complex array of organisations can 
leave one dizzy at times, reeling at the many acronyms and frequent name changes (see 
note on terminology).
The plethora of different stakeholders and interest groups meant the sampling approach 
had to be narrowly specified in order to identify a manageable number o f interviewees. 
Given my interest in the policy process my priority was to identify those individuals who 
were engaged with policy debate about the regulation of CAM practitioners. The use o f 
snowballing as a sampling technique starting with the lead civil servant enabled me to 
identify key informants. However, this approach may have resulted in the exclusion of 
some views, particularly of minority groups that do not have access to or interaction with 
civil servants. Furthermore, such an approach limited the extent to which opposing views 
were heard. Although direcdy asked about ‘enemies’ as well as ‘allies’, interviewees named 
few individuals who they regarded as sources o f opposition . Finally, it is difficult to know 
whether the same list of interviewees would have been generated had I interviewed 
someone other than the civil servant first. With this sort of sampling one has to start 
somewhere but remain mindful of the potential bias this might bring to the sample. On 
reflection the civil servant was probably well placed, having interacted with a range of 
people from different therapies over a number of years. Had I begun with the Chair o f a 
CAM practitioner organisation, whilst they would have been familiar with individuals 
within their own therapy they might not have been able to name individuals from other 
therapies. Given my interest in understanding how relationships between members of 
professional associations and state actors shaped the policy process it was important to 
ensure both were represented in the sample.
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113.3 Data analysis
Using a mix of inductive and deductive approaches to data analysis enabled theory to be 
informed by the accounts of those involved and to test established theories presented in 
the literature on professional regulation. However, such an approach can encourage code 
proliferation.
The use of a qualitative software programme (NVIVO) provided a useful means of 
organising data, and was a powerful tool to aid the retrieval of qualitative data. The 
decision not to use coding to generate quantitative data on the number o f mentions meant 
that it was not possible to convey the strength with which particular views were held. 
However, the software did enable patterns to be analysed by type of stakeholder or type of 
therapy. Overall, there were significant benefits of using the software to handle large 
amounts of documentary data.
Code proliferation remains a particular risk when doing qualitative research as a lone 
researcher. Working as a sole researcher meant that it was not possible to cross-check 
interpretations or coding reliability. In this situation the importance of clear definitions for 
each code was essential. In the initial phase of analysis I created a lot of codes and 
subcodes which had to be consolidated before the final phase o f analysis. During this 
period o f consolidation I was able to reflect on the key themes that were emerging from 
the data and to use theory to shape the final analysis. The time period over which the 
research was conducted meant this was possible. In more time sensitive projects and where 
multiple researchers are involved a more structured and limited coding schema would be 
preferable.
11.3.4 Personal network analysis and mapping
In writing up research it is usual to present the process as linear. While it might appear 
from the order of the chapters presented here that the personal policy network was an a 
priori theoretical framework, this adaptation of existing theories in fact developed during 
the data collection and analysis when it became clear that the role of individuals was 
significant. If one were to design a research study in which one applied personal network 
analysis a priori the method of sampling might well be different from that employed here.
Personal policy networks were mapped during the analysis (see Chapter 9). This led to the 
identification of further key individuals in addition to those already interviewed. With more 
time it may have been useful to have interviewed other members o f the personal policy 
network in addition to the original sample of key informants in order to verify the 
membership of the networks and the level of influence. This study made no attempt to
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quantify the density or strength of relationships between individuals. Other studies have 
attempted to do so on the basis of the number of mentions by or contacts with others in 
the network. This would only be meaningful as a measure o f influence if the sample was 
representative o f the policy network or data was collected from all members of the 
network. Such attempts to quantify the influence of individuals within networks are 
interesting developments that deserve consideration in designing future studies of this sort.
113.5 Other questions and future research
Interest in and research on CAM is growing. Much of current research is designed to 
establish the efficacy of particular treatments using rigorous methods. Historically, a lack of 
research skills among CAM practitioners, identified as a problem by the House of Lords’ 
Sub-Committee, has limited the amount of high quality primary research. Furthermore, 
many CAM practitioners were, and still are, sceptical o f ‘scientific’ methods such as 
randomised control trials, believing that the holistic and individualised nature of many 
treatments and the therapeutic effect of the practitioners means CAM therapies cannot be 
appropriately tested using such methods. The Department o f Health now provides 
financial support for the development o f research capacity in CAM.
From a regulatory perspective, more systematic research specifically on safety issues is 
needed. The portrayal in the media of CAM practice is predominantly o f a safe and natural 
approach to health. In fact, currently, there are few measures of risk. Adverse events are 
not systematically recorded, nor are incidences of misdiagnosis or missed diagnosis, 
omission of conventional treatment, or false claims. The claims that CAM practitioners 
pose indirect risks cannot therefore be systematically substantiated by evidence. While the 
evidence base on efficacy is growing, there is little interest in safety and quality research 
among CAM practitioners. Analysis of advertising claims (including the internet), 
complaints that are received by professional bodies, and legal cases (including those that 
settled out of court) would be useful data to understand the nature of the ‘risks’ faced by 
consumers of CAM services.
There is some research into the provision of CAM within the NHS but this is mostly 
descriptive. There would be value in health services researchers examining the design and 
quality of integrated services that already exist to inform future developments. There is 
some descriptive data on purchasing of CAM, but more research is needed to measure the 
cost-effectiveness of treatments to inform commissioners’ decision-making. From a 
regulatory perspective it would useful to understand to what extent lack o f regulation is a 
barrier to integration and purchasing of CAM services. Examining whether other regulatory
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strategies would be acceptable, or whether statutory professional self-regulation is 
necessary to provide adequate safeguards for providers and commissioners of health 
services, would also be useful.
There have been many surveys conducted to measure utilisation of CAM, each employing a 
slightly different definition of CAM (see chapter 2). It would be more useful if such 
information were regularly gathered in a standardised national population survey. Future 
General Household Surveys could usefully ask about visits to complementary therapists 
alongside questions on visits to GPs, specialists and hospital stays. Questions should be 
designed to overcome some of the methodological problems identified here. From a 
regulatory perspective, more in-depth research to determine whether patients are making 
informed choices is needed: for example, how did they find the practitioner, did they ask 
about qualifications, do they know about the registering bodies, where would they 
complain, etc. If  patient ‘self-responsibility' is to be encouraged we need to track whether 
information is actually reaching those using CAM services. High levels of public awareness 
are a prerequisite for voluntary regulation to be effective. It would also usefully inform an 
assessment of the need for further regulatory measures including mandatory disclosure.
Building on earlier research which collected data on the number o f CAM practitioners, a 
more in-depth census to collect data on demographics of the workforce (e.g. gender, age, 
etc), training and qualifications, work setting, number of hours worked, and income and 
practice modalities is needed. Unless the target of regulation is understood it is unlikely to 
have the desired consequences. An inspection regime, such as that operated by the 
Healthcare Commission for private health care providers, would not be feasible if many 
practitioners operate from consulting rooms at home. If  the majority of CAM practitioners 
practise more than one therapy then this would provide a robust justification for having a 
common regulatory framework rather than profession-specific standards as are currently 
being developed. Any future system of regulation is dependent on the ability of those who 
practise to afford the costs of regulation, whether this be registration fees to obtain a 
licence or the costs of accredited training courses. In this respect data on the average 
income of CAM practitioners would inform the development of regulation.
Finally, very little is known about the practice of CAM by statutorily regulated 
professionals. Detailed information on training in and practise of CAM by statutorily 
regulated professionals should be routinely collected either by employers (e.g. the NHS), 
regulators, or professional bodies. Research could be commissioned to gather these data.
The study has thrown up a number of broader issues that suggest empirical research 
beyond the policy domain of CAM. A number of these have already been mentioned in the
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review of analytical approaches above. Firstly, this study has suggested an active role in 
policy-making by HRH the Prince of Wales. Is this unique or has he been active in other 
areas o f public policy? Secondly, wider trends in regulation such as risk regulation and 
better regulation have had a significant influence on regulatory policy in this domain. Have 
these ideas infected other areas of health policy and what impact are they having? Thirdly, 
few alternatives to professional self-regulation were seriously considered. Are other models 
of regulation more acceptable in other occupational areas? Having reviewed the research 
findings, the analytical approach and the research design, in this final section of the 
conclusions I consider what the implications of the findings are for regulation o f CAM 
practitioners and health care professional regulation in general.
11.4 H ow  to regulate CAM practitioners?
The study was not normative: it did not set out to say whether or not there should be 
regulation of CAM practitioners, or if so how it should be organised. I t sought to explain 
why regulatory policies took the form they did. In Chapter 3 I set out some of the different 
regulatory strategies available to policymakers and discussed examples of how these 
regulations applied to CAM practitioners in other countries. Through analysis o f the 
regulatory process I have become aware of my own ideas about how CAM practitioners 
could be regulated. In this section I reflect back on the applicability of those strategies. In 
doing so I remain mindful of the peculiar nature of the CAM market (see Chapter 2).
Many of today’s CAM therapists have more in common with the medical men (and 
women) of the 19th century than they do with modern health care professionals. Although 
the therapies studied here have professionalised, there remains disunity among practitioner 
groups. Beyond the ‘Big 5’ the picture is different again. Practitioner groups are even 
smaller and more highly fragmented. Though there is litde hard data, it is generally thought 
that the majority of practitioners operate on a part-time basis, are self-employed and 
operate out of rented consulting rooms. There is, however, a great deal of diversity: 
therapists work in hotels, health clubs and beauty parlours, but also provide care in 
hospices and in GP surgeries. There are new therapies or “hybrids of existing 
therapies...appearing every day” (Jack, 2004, para 300). This makes it an extremely 
challenging environment in which to introduce effective regulation.
11.4.1 Command and control
Command and control regulation (or legislation) can be used to provide legal backing to 
occupational groups, giving them protection o f title, restricting the use of certain
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procedures or activities, making registration mandatory, or giving legal force to their 
disciplinary processes. These are the legal elements that distinguish self-regulation from 
enforced or statutory self-regulation and have been the main focus o f policy discussions 
analysed in this study. The success of self-regulation (statutory or voluntary) is predicated 
on the existence o f a single, unified, functioning professional body which can achieve 
consensus among the majority o f practitioners about standards of entry to a register and 
the titles to be protected. As has been observed, the majority of CAM practitioners are not 
yet in this position. In the cases of acupuncture and herbal medicine the process of 
unification has required external impetus and resources to try and accelerate the process. 
Final agreement between the professional bodies, including traditional Chinese medical 
practitioners, is still being brokered before legislation can be introduced.
The use o f reserved procedures legislation also requires that the technique or activity can 
be restricted to a clearly and legally defined group of people. The government are in the 
process o f reforming Section 12(1) of the Medicine Act 1968, which applies to unlicensed 
herbal remedies made up to meet the needs of individual patients. The lack o f any legal 
definition of a herbalist has in effect meant that anyone has been able to make up and 
supply an unlicensed herbal medicine under Section 12(1). The proposed reforms intend to 
address this legal uncertainty by restricting the supply o f unlicensed herbal products to 
registered herbalists and other statutorily regulated professions. The regulation of herbal 
products is therefore dependent on the introduction of regulation of herbalists. Other 
CAM practitioners, such as naturopaths, homeopaths, and nutritional therapists, who 
currently dispense unlicensed herbal medicines as part of their practice will no longer be 
able to do so. This will increase the pressure on government to extend statutory regulation 
to other CAM practitioners. This policy is against the general direction observed in this 
study whereby the government is keen to reduce the legislative and regulatory burden.
A slightly different legal approach might afford greater opportunities for practitioners to 
become statutorily regulated without a significant legislative burden. It is similar to an 
approach adopted in Norway and Denmark and being considered in Ireland which 
combines statutory accreditation of professional associations with voluntary registration by 
individual practitioners. In Norway the law requires professional organisations who wish to 
seek ‘approved’ status to have professional standards and codes o f practice in place, 
complaints procedures and sanctions, and guidance on compliance with data protection 
and informed consent. In addition, individuals who register must be legally recognised as 
self employed, an employee or partner in a firm, have the necessary liability insurance, and 
prove they are fit to practise. The law also sets out rules on marketing and information
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disclosure. This legislative solution places the onus on professions to self-organize but puts 
in place minimal standards to ensure public protection. It is a model that the four UK 
health departments may wish to consider.
Alternatively a system of licensing similar to that for Heilpraktiker in Germany could be 
considered (see Chapter 3). The licensing examination in Germany tests basic knowledge of 
anatomy and public health, and ensures practitioners know the limits of competence and 
legal practice. Those wishing to specialise in a particular therapy have to meet certain 
additional requirements. This would assure minimum safety requirements while supporting 
multi-therapeutic practice.
11.4.2 Self-regulation
The current plethora o f voluntary professional associations representing CAM practitioners 
is bewildering for the consumer (as it is for the reader!), and does not provide any 
guarantee of quality. A glance through the Yellow Pages shows the diversity of logos used 
by CAM practitioners affiliated to professional associations. Even chiropractors, who are 
statutorily regulated, advertise their membership o f the British Chiropractic Association 
(BCA) or the McTimoney Chiropractic Association rather than giving their General 
Chiropractic Council (GCQ registration number - a much more important assurance of 
quality for the consumer. The proposals for a federal voluntary regulator aim to address 
this, though the details are still to be worked out (Jack, 2006).
Voluntary associations or guilds, in other sectors of the economy, use accreditation to 
provide an assurance of quality to consumers. Accredited providers can use the logo o f the 
accrediting body in advertising and marketing. Consumer education reinforces this. In 
some cases, insurance or warranties may require work to be carried out by accredited 
providers. A well-known example of this is CORGI, founded in 1970 as the ‘Confederation 
for the Registration of Gas Installers’. Gas installers were affiliated to CORGI on a 
voluntary basis until 1992 when it became a legal requirement for anyone installing or 
repairing gas fittings or appliances to be registered. CORGI (renamed the Council for 
Registered Gas Installers) was given the task by the Health and Safety Executive of 
maintaining a mandatory register of competent gas installers in the UK.
Drawing on the experience in other sectors, a successful system of accreditation might 
comprise the following:
•  Passing an examination which tested basic knowledge e.g. of legal 
requirements, how to identify red flag events, and other core components 
common to any therapy;36
• Providing evidence that the practitioner meets standards o f practice and 
fitness to practise requirements, holds valid liability insurance, has no 
criminal record, etc.
Accreditation of CAM practitioners would enable private insurers and NHS purchasers to 
establish policies to fund only services provided by accredited practitioners. Contracting 
requirements and clinical governance rules might mean that any providers treating NHS- 
fiinded patients would only be able to employ or sub-contract accredited CAM 
practitioners. Referrals from GPs and other health care professionals might also be limited 
to accredited CAM practitioners. Public education would be needed so that consumers 
understood what accreditation meant, and what issues to consider when choosing a CAM 
practitioner. Consumer Direct, a government funded body, could usefully provide a fact- 
sheet on choosing a CAM practitioner similar to advice on choosing a solicitor. This 
information could be included in publications such as the Yellow Pages.
Certification, a similar model to accreditation but backed by the force of law, would ensure 
that only individuals who met the requirements o f the regulator could legally use the title 
‘certified’ or ‘registered’ with any CAM designation.
11.4.3 Incentives
The government, through its grant to the Foundation for Integrated Health, has in effect 
provided a positive subsidy to reduce the costs of professionalisation for CAM 
practitioners. Although the process is heavily dependent on the goodwill and time of the 
practitioners who have participated, it has enabled each of the therapies involved to benefit 
from the leadership of an independent chair. In addition, the government has given indirect 
financial support to acupuncture and herbal medicine by supporting the Regulatory 
Working Groups which met in 2002-2003, and since 2006 the working group which brings 
together acupuncturists, herbalists and traditional Chinese medical practitioners to prepare 
for statutory regulation. Given the slow pace with which voluntary self-regulation is 
developing even with these subsidies, it is perhaps worth considering how else incentives 
might be used.
36 In the UK core competencies for complementary therapists have already been identified by Skills for Health.
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Any new registering body must ensure the affordability of the fees. I f  practitioners are not 
willing to pay the fees they will continue to practise without registration, thus reducing the 
effectiveness of regulation in terms of public protection and standards. The institutional 
model that is needed to deliver robust professional self-regulation, even when shared 
between more than one profession, is expensive. I f  the full costs of establishing and 
operating the regulator fall to its registrants/members, as they do for other health care 
professionals, this is likely to result in high fees. Unlike health care professionals who are 
employed in the NHS, where fees are in effect taken out of salary, most CAM practitioners 
will have to make this a cost of doing business. These costs will either be passed to 
consumers in the form of higher prices, will result in more practitioners working full-time, 
or in fewer practitioners working. If  one adds to these the costs that might be incurred by a 
practitioner if accredited training courses are longer and more expensive than those that are 
currently available, this model is likely to have a major impact on the market in CAM 
services. Government may have to consider subsidising the establishment costs o f new 
regulatory bodies, or more radically have a single regulator with fewer of the profession- 
specific functions but a larger pool of potential registrants.
In addition to the costs of joining a professional association which are already tax 
deductible, the government could extend tax relief to course fees for accredited training 
courses and/or the costs of indemnity insurance. These would provide incentives to 
practitioners to participate in continuing professional development, and to ensure that they 
had sufficient insurance protection should any harm be caused to the patient.
11.4.4 Market harnessing controls
In the UK since April 2002, Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) have been fully responsible for 
commissioning health services for patients (though the introduction of practice-based 
commissioning is set to change this again). Through the specification of contracts PCTs 
could require providers of CAM services to comply with certain standards or specifications. 
For example, they could include a requirement that all contracted practitioners have liability 
insurance. In future it is more likely that PCTs will hold contracts with large third-party 
providers, who might as part of their services offer access to CAM practitioners. It would 
therefore be for the third party provider to ensure that the standards they required of the 
CAM practitioners were sufficient to satisfy the terms of their contract with the PCT.
The provision of CAM services by conventional health care professionals could also be 
regulated through contractual agreements (either directly with employers or in nationally 
negotiated contracts). Employment contracts could specify the requirements that would
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need to be met in order for professionals to practise CAM (e.g. training standards), and set 
out rules governing the circumstances in which CAM can be offered (e.g. palliative cancer 
care).
The premises from where CAM practitioners conduct their business could also be subject 
to regulation and licensure. In England independent health care providers are required to 
register with the Healthcare Commission. However, currently this regulation only applies to 
private acute and mental health hospitals, clinics where services are provided by medical 
practitioners, and establishments which provide any services from a list of treatments.37 
Registration, inspection and accreditation of facilities could be required of clinics where 
CAM practitioners operate. However, as many CAM practitioners work in single-handed 
practices, treat clients in their homes or at their place of work, or rent consulting rooms, 
such a system is likely to be unworkable in practice.
11.4.5 Disclosure
Most CAM practitioners in the UK currently operate subject to a number o f general 
trading provisions as well as a voluntary advertising code which contains specific rules 
governing health claims. The monitoring and enforcement of compliance with these 
marketing requirements is currently weak and relies largely on complaints being lodged. If 
enforcement were to be stepped up trading standards officers, who are currently 
responsible for enforcement of these provisions, may require additional training or, given 
the scale of the task, dedicated officers might need to be recruited. Stricter rules governing 
the claims that practitioners can make and further professional guidance on advertising 
could be introduced, backed up by disciplinary procedures or legal penalties for failure to 
comply. Disclosure requirements could be extended for CAM practitioners to include valid 
certificate o f insurance and proof of training and qualifications.
It is not easy to envisage how literature distributed to patients in a clinic or claims made in 
adverts posted on websites could be monitored, other than by promoting greater awareness 
among practitioners and among consumers about the standards and how to make a 
complaint. The guidance published for Chinese medical practitioners by the Trading 
Standards Institute makes clear the requirements of existing legislation and could be 
replicated for all CAM practitioners (Trading Standards Institute, 2006). In addition, 
education about these legal provisions and how they apply to CAM practitioners could be a
37 Providers who supply medical treatment under anaesthesia or sedation; dental treatment under general anaesthesia; 
obstetric service and in connection with childbirth, medical services termination o f pregnancies; cosmetic surgery; 
treatment using prescribed techniques and technologies e.g. laser and intense pulse light therapy, hyperbaric oxygen 
chambers, private dialysis, IVF and endoscopy; or treatment or nursing (or both) for persons liable to be detained under 
the Mental Health Act 1983 must register.
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compulsory component of all accredited training courses, or knowledge of the law and its 
application to CAM practitioners could be made a condition of accreditation or licensing.
The Kerr-Haslam report suggested that statutorily regulated professionals working within 
the NHS should get written prior approval from their ‘team’ to use new or unorthodox 
treatments. This level of disclosure is something that most employers would require in 
order to satisfy their clinical governance requirements, but it is not clear whether these 
recommendations have been implemented. However, disclosure alone does not provide 
any assurance to employers or patients that these professionals are adequately trained to 
provide that particular therapy. In the UK, although there are training courses for doctors, 
nurses, etc., these courses are not accredited and there are no requirements to prove 
competency in order to practise. In Germany, on the other hand, there are recognised 
specialist qualifications in CAM for doctors, with regulations defining the standards 
required. Doctors are allowed to use protected titles if they have the appropriate specialist 
qualification. Specialist CAM qualifications for statutorily regulated health professionals 
would ensure levels of competence and might allow access to protected titles without 
having to meet the full requirements required of non-medical CAM practitioners. This 
would alleviate the concerns of the large numbers o f doctors, nurses and other healthcare 
professionals who use acupuncture that the current proposals for the statutory regulation 
of acupuncturists do not directly address their circumstances.
11.4.6 Rights and liabilities
Patients already have the ability to sue a CAM practitioner for negligence. The problem 
with reliance on such a system is that it does not prevent the harm from occurring, it 
requires the plaintiff to have access to legal (and financial) resources to pursue the case, 
there must be sufficient evidence to prove negligence, and finally the defendant, if found 
guilty, must have sufficient assets to meet the compensation award. Some of these issues 
are no different to the limitations of medical negligence. However, many CAM 
practitioners in the UK do not have personal liability insurance. They are self-employed 
and practise from home or out of rented consulting rooms, and are unlikely to have assets 
to cover the legal costs or compensation awarded. To address this personal liability 
insurance could be mandatory for practising CAM practitioners (Stone, 2000, p287). An 
additional problem is the ability to define what constitutes negligent practice. The Bolam 
test is usually applied, which expects a professional to meet standards that are in line with a 
responsible body of opinion. In most CAM therapies there is no single statutory body 
which sets out standards of practise. In fact the body of knowledge that defines the therapy 
is often highly contested, making the test more difficult to apply.
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11.4.7 Public compensation
Given the difficulties of obtaining compensation through the courts, an alternative would 
be to set up a complaints scheme with an Ombudsperson which would give patients the 
right to redress for harm caused by CAM practitioners (Bloomfield, 1997, para 58). Patients 
would give up the right to sue the CAM practitioner in return for financial compensation.
In summary, there are many possibilities as to how regulatory tools could be used in the 
UK to ensure the safety of patients, promote a more effective market in CAM services, and 
raise the standards o f training and practice by CAM practitioners. These ideas have 
emerged as a result o f the research process, and I believe are worthy of further research 
and discussion.
11.5 The future o f professional self-regulation
There have been many changes and reforms to the systems of statutory regulation of health 
care professionals, but none has sought to radically alter the fundamental form o f the 
original medical model of professional self-regulation. The main functions remain: to set 
educational standards for entry to a register, and to remove registrants who are deemed 
unfit to practise. Since the Health Act 1999 changes to statutory professional regulation can 
be made by an Order in Council rather than primary legislation (Allsop, Jones et al., 2004).
The future of professional regulation is currendy under debate. After the publication of the 
Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report Sir Liam Donaldson, the Chief Medical Officer (CMO), was 
asked by Ministers to review arrangements for protecting patients from harm caused by the 
poor performance of doctors (Chief Medical Officer of England, 2006). The Department 
of Health also established an internal review led by Andrew Foster, former Director of 
Workforce at the Department of Health, to look at non-medical professional regulation 
(Department of Health, 2006c). It examined how new and extended professional roles 
should be regulated and what changes are needed in the structure, functions and number of 
healthcare regulators. A government consultation on the recommendations of the two 
reports closed in November 2006 and the response is awaited.
The Donaldson Report and Foster Review make numerous recommendations concerning 
the organisation of professional self-regulation, too many to summarise here. Although 
there was no mention of complementary therapists or the practice of CAM by doctors in 
the reports, they indicate the direction o f regulatory policy. I briefly discuss the implications
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of the recommendations of these two reports for the regulation of CAM practitioners in 
future.
Firsdy, the reports see regulation as necessary to ensure that the practice o f health care 
professionals is safe and meets acceptable standards. In this sense professional regulation is 
intended to reduce risk. The CMO commissioned research on regulatory frameworks used 
in other high-risk industries such as nuclear power, off-shore oil and civil aviation, and 
concluded that “Regulation in these industries may be expensive but the fruits, in terms of 
quality and safety, far outweigh this cost” (Chief Medical Officer of England, 2006, p.x). 
The term ‘risk-based regulation’ is also used, meaning that regulatory efforts should be 
focused where “risks are higher or a supervisory framework is lacking”. Unless CAM 
therapies are assessed as posing a significant risk to patients they are unlikely to be 
statutorily regulated. This fits with wider government policy on risk and regulation (Better 
Regulation Commission, 2006). Regulation is no longer about regulating all possible risks 
but rather about regulation being proportionate to risk.
Secondly, both reports talk about ‘light-touch regulation’ and emphasise the importance of 
the principles of better regulation. However, the CMO concludes that because o f the risks 
of medicine and the historical context of regulatory failures regulation “cannot be left solely 
to professionalism, market forces or luck” (Chief Medical Officer o f England, 2006, pi 67). 
He therefore makes the case for further reform of the GMC and for strengthening 
regulation. The requirement on government departments to ensure that regulation is cost- 
effective and to consider alternative strategies to legislation might, however, result in 
different strategies and institutional forms being proposed. Finding an appropriate balance 
between the costs of regulation and acceptable levels of risks will be a challenge for all 
regulatory policies going forward, including those related to CAM practitioners.
Thirdly, the reports affirm the need for greater public accountability. The CMO 
commissioned research on approaches to medical regulation in other countries (Allsop and 
Jones, 2005). He concluded that although there is no ‘blueprint’ the general trend is that 
“regulatory bodies are becoming more accountable, lay involvement is much increased and 
adjudication is often an independent function” (Chief Medical Officer o f England, 2006, 
p>7). There appears to be a growing consensus on these issues in the UK. Both reports 
recognised that the election of professional members to the councils supported the public 
perception that the councils act in the interests of the profession. They recommended that 
either all (Donaldson) or some (Foster) of the professional members should be appointed 
by a body such as the Public Appointments Commission. Foster invited comments on 
whether the councils should have lay or professional majorities (the eight regulators of
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non-medical professionals currendy have small, varying professional majorities) (King’s 
Fund, 2007 forthcoming). Any future proposals for the regulation of CAM practitioners 
will need to demonstrate that the regulatory bodies are accountable to the public.
Fourthly, both reports recommended that the complaints process be simplified and 
disciplinary proceedings made more independent. These are broadly in line with the 
Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report, which recommended that adjudication should be made 
independent of the profession. It envisaged that the profession would still receive, process 
and investigate complaints and decide prima facie whether there is a case to answer, but that 
the adjudication would be by an independent panel (Department of Health, 2004b). Both 
reports agreed that it should be clearer and easier for complaints to be lodged. Foster 
proposed that there be a single portal through which all complaints can be made, 
irrespective o f who ultimately deals with them. Both voluntary and statutory bodies with 
responsibilities for enforcing standards of practice of CAM practitioners will need to 
ensure that their disciplinary procedures are both fair and independent. A single complaints 
portal has been suggested for CAM practitioners by consumer organisations, and would 
help to ensure that complaints were dealt with fairly.
The Donaldson report recommends that more regulatory responsibilities be devolved to a 
local level including the ability to deal with the initial investigation stage of any complaint. 
Only serious cases would be referred up to the central council. It is not clear how 
devolution can apply to professionals (such as CAM therapists, physiotherapist, dentists 
and pharmacists) who work independently in private practice or as independent contractors 
however. Consequently it is not envisaged that there will be local mechanisms for dealing 
with complaints concerning CAM practitioners.
Fifthly, the reports both recommend that requirements for revalidation be introduced or 
strengthened. Foster proposed that revalidation for non-medical healthcare professionals 
be based on the Knowledge Skills Framework introduced as part of Agenda for Change. In 
Donaldson’s report revalidation would rely in part on the NHS appraisal procedures, but in 
addition doctors would have to be re-certified for inclusion on the GP and specialist 
registers against standards set by the relevant Royal Colleges or specialist associations. 
Following earlier criticisms o f the GMC’s proposals for revalidation, Donaldson 
emphasised that the appraisal should be summative (involving judgement against criteria 
and the possibility of failure) and not solely formative (educational) (King’s Fund, 2007 
forthcoming). Reliance on the NHS as both a source of data to monitor performance and 
to provide a mechanism for revalidation does not fit with the policy to increase the 
plurality of providers in the NHS, at least in England. The Donaldson Report did recognize
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that doctors who work on short term contracts or under locum arrangements provide 
“special challenges for regulation” (Chief Medical Officer of England, 2006). The system 
will have to rely on disclosure by locum agencies and those employing fly-by-night 
surgeons to the GMC. The extent of agency work in nursing and among many other health 
care professionals is not likely to diminish, and new models of provision will make reliance 
on employers more rather than less challenging. Where practitioners are self-employed, as 
the majority of CAM practitioners are, these arrangements will not be workable. For these 
practitioners these responsibilities will still primarily fall to the regulators. CAM regulators 
will need to demonstrate that the mechanisms for revalidation are both summative and 
formative. It is unlikely that achievement of a minimum number o f continuing professional 
development credits will be sufficient in future.
One issue that the reports were expected to address was the number of regulators. The 
Donaldson Report was silent on this issue. The Foster Review identified a number of 
benefits of consolidation, but in the end ruled out reducing the number o f existing 
regulators on “practical grounds” (Department of Health, 2006c). There are of course 
strong institutional and professional interests in maintaining the status quo. The report 
recommended the issue be reviewed in 2011. It was hoped that “collaboration and 
harmonisation” between regulators might preclude the need for structural changes. New 
health care professions will be required to join an existing council, and over time more 
common structures will be developed under the auspices of the CHRE. It is therefore 
unclear where this leaves the proposals for a CAM Council. It seems unlikely that the 
government will wish to create another regulator. It is possible that earlier proposals that 
CAM practitioners join the Health Professions Council (HPC) might be resurrected for 
acupuncturists and herbalists, even though proposals for a new CAM Council have already 
been consulted on. The emphasis on collaboration suggests that the government will 
continue to support the establishment of a federal structure for voluntary regulation of 
CAM practitioners.
In addition to these observations about how wider approaches to health care professional 
regulation might affect CAM practitioners, the findings o f this study provide some useful 
insights into the likely direction that reforms to the regulation o f health care professionals 
might take.
First, it is unlikely that we will see a radical shift away from the current model of regulation, 
i.e. professional self-regulation sanctioned by the state. Within the health sector there 
remains a strong commitment to self-regulation. Other regulatory strategies were largely 
not considered. This study has shown that occupational groups will defend their right to
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self-determination. Professional regulation is seen as vital to professional identity as is 
having one’s own register and governing council. Regulation is the battleground where 
jurisdictional claims are won and lost. Demarcations between professional groups and sub­
specialties are likely to be fiercely defended. It will therefore remain a controversial political 
arena with strong resistance to reform, despite the changing reality of work roles.
Second, the number o f regulators is likely to reduce rather than increase. Although 
professionals will want to keep their own single regulatory body, there will be increasing 
pressure for existing regulators to take on new professions and in extremis to merge. The 
proposals for a CAM Council reflected the government’s wish not to see a proliferation of 
professional regulators. It was designed so that other CAM practitioner groups could be 
added in the future. As highlighted above, this will bring the state into conflict with 
professional groups.
Third, government will favour self-regulation over external regulation and seek to minimise 
the introduction of new regulations. After a period of growth in regulation, which created 
the ‘audit society’ or regulatory state, there is now an emphasis on responsive or light-touch 
regulation and a desire to reduce the burden of regulation on both businesses and the 
public sector. This study found that the state is actively supporting self-regulation, and 
preferring to invest in the development of voluntary regulation rather than introduce 
statutory regulation for CAM practitioners. It is unlikely that external regulation will be 
introduced to control the practice of individual health care professionals at a time when the 
government is trying to reduce the size of the Department of Health, the number and size 
of independent regulators and arms-length bodies (Department of Health, 2006b) and 
place limits on spending on non-clinical services.
Fourth, entry to a register and maintenance of registration (or licence to practise) will 
depend on meeting explicit measurable standards. Although much o f the debate in CAM 
was about ‘grandparenting’ and entry to a new register, some of the issues are common to 
registration and revalidation of existing health care professionals. CAM practitioners 
registered by the proposed CAM Council will have to demonstrate that they are fit to 
practise: in good mental and physical health, no criminal record and no child protection 
issues. They must also demonstrate competence obtained through specific training. They 
will also be expected to have liability insurance and language competence for initial entry to 
the register. It is likely in future that there will be a standard set of requirements that all 
health care professionals will have to meet in order to register and be re-licensed. In CAM, 
requirements for re-certification have been set by and implemented by the regulator.
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Fifth, regulators will have to become more overtly accountable to the public. The inclusion 
o f a statutory duty to promote the profession in the constitutions of both the GOsC and 
the GCC caused confusion about the respective roles of regulatory and professional 
bodies. In order to ensure the public interest is sufficiently reflected by regulatory bodies a 
number of measures, highlighted in proposals for CAM practitioner regulation, are likely to 
be applied to other health care professional regulators. These include establishing direct 
accountability to parliament (as opposed to Privy Council), publishing annual reports and 
audited accounts, increasing lay representation on councils and committees (to form half o f 
the membership or a slight majority), appointing all professional members (replacing 
members who were previously elected), and appointing a lay chair. Although there is little 
evidence that lay representation is more effective, such reforms are likely to win greater 
public support and may re-establish the legitimacy of regulatory structures. There will also 
need to be a clear separation of professional representative functions, so professional 
associations will continue to have an important role in this respect.
Sixth, new professional roles will have to unify and organise themselves in order to be 
taken seriously as ‘aspirant’ professions. Foster recommended that “Any new profession 
coming into statutory regulation should be regulated by one of the existing regulatory 
bodies, most likely the HPC” (Department of Health, 2006c, p42). The Foster report talks 
about setting criteria that new professions will have to meet. These would apply across all 
regulators, not just to the HPC. In the early period of this analysis the state expected CAM 
practitioners to ‘get their house in order’. Osteopathy and chiropractic did so successfully, 
but the state had to actively invest in the development of acupuncture and herbal medicine. 
No CAM practitioners were able to meet the criteria set by the HPC. The problem with 
this approach is that it relies on the professional group to organise itself. I f  there are risks 
associated with the practice the public are unlikely to find it acceptable that these 
practitioners remain unregulated, and the government may have to invest in their 
development. Although currently many of the people recruited into these new roles (such 
as anaesthesia practitioner, emergency care practitioner, endoscopy practitioner, medical 
care practitioner and surgical care practitioner) are from existing statutorily regulated 
professions, in future this may not be the case.
Seventh, new and innovative forms of regulation are needed to deal with practitioners 
whose activities cross existing professional boundaries, such as those taking on extended 
roles. The regulation of extended roles has much in common with the debates about how 
to regulate the practice of CAM by statutorily regulated professionals. For example, a 
medical acupuncturist is currently not required to meet any defined standards in order to
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practise acupuncture, although this may be his or her main professional activity. The 
government rejected the idea proposed by the Acupuncture Regulatory Working Group 
(ARWG) that there should be a second tier of registration for medical acupuncturists 
already regulated by the GMC or another statutory regulator. It indicated that dual 
registration was neither desirable nor necessary. Interestingly, the Foster report introduces 
the idea o f ‘distributed regulation,, but it remains unclear how the distribution o f regulatory 
functions would work in practice. For example, would practitioners have to meet the 
revalidation requirements of both regulators in order to use the protected titles? Having a 
mechanism for setting standards o f training and practice in order to practise a specialist 
interest or perform an extended role (beyond those that are established by existing Royal 
Colleges) may be necessary to protect the public from poor standards of care, and would 
better enable providers to meet clinical governance requirements.
It would be premature to sound the death knoll on professional self-regulation. The 
survival o f institutions depends in part on their ability to adapt to changing circumstances. 
The GMC, despite controversy at its establishment and serious questions about its 
competence since, has reformed and survived. But the regulatory challenges are mounting, 
and further incremental changes to the medical model o f professional self-regulation may 
not be sufficient.
There is a dearth of ideas about alternative regulatory approaches. The majority of 
recommendations in the Foster Review and the Donaldson Report proposed minor 
changes to self-regulation, the distribution of regulatory functions, and the institutional 
arrangements for regulatory bodies. Other than a brief mention of financial incentives 
associated with premiums charged by insurers providing liability cover, other regulatory 
mechanisms were not considered. Existing institutional structures act as powerful 
conservative forces, and appear to have constrained the flourishing of alternative ideas. 
Despite commitment to the principles o f better regulation, the use of regulatory impact 
assessment across government, and an emphasis on light-touch or responsive regulation, 
the dominant idea is that regulation be carried out by professionally-led bodies.
It is doubtful in the present climate whether a new CAM Council will be created. Even if it 
is, the process for including other therapists will be slow and cumbersome. It will require 
practitioner groups within each therapy to unify and establish a consensus about standards 
of education and practice. The proliferation of new CAM therapies means that if  regulation 
is to reach beyond the practitioners of osteopathy, chiropractic, acupuncture and herbal 
medicine it will have to take a radically different form. The answer may lie in a fuller 
exploration of alternatives to professional self-regulation such as disclosure and trading
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standards. While use by the public continues to grow, and the number of practitioners and 
training courses burgeons, there will be pressure on government to act. Reconciling the 
government’s duty to protect the public with its desire to reduce the regulatory burden and 
maintain consumer choice will be challenging.
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Appendix 1. G lossary  of therap ies 
A cupuncture
Originating from China, acupuncture involves inserting small needles into various points in 
the body to stimulate nerve impulses. Traditional Chinese acupuncture is based on the idea 
o f 'qi' (vital energy) which is said to travel around the body along 'meridians' which 
acupuncture points affect. Western acupuncture uses the same needling techniques but is 
based on affecting nerve impulses and central nervous system. Acupuncture is used in the 
West as an anaesthetic-agent and also as an analgesic (House of Lords Select Committee on 
Science and Technology, 2000a). The definition of acupuncture produced by the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) for inclusion in Medline reflects some of the variations in 
practice: “Treatment of disease by inserting needles along specific pathways or meridians. 
The placement varies with the disease being treated. It is sometimes used in conjunction 
with heat, moxibustion, acupressure, or electric stimulation” (National Institutes of Health, 
2006).
Chiropractic
In the modem British context chiropractic is used almost entirely to treat musculo-skeletal 
complaints through adjusting muscles, tendons and joints and using manipulation and 
massage techniques. Diagnostic procedures include case histories, conventional clinical 
examinations and x-rays (House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, 
2000a). Originally it was based on the idea that 'reduced nerve flow' led to disease. The 
NIH definition perhaps reflects the situation in the US where chiropractors as a profession 
are more widely recognised: “Spinal adjustments made by a chiropractor to relieve 
pressures on the spinal cord for improvement of health” (National Institutes of Health, 
2006).
Herbal medicine
Herbal medicine or phytotherapy is a system of medicine which uses various remedies 
derived from plants and plant extracts to treat disorders and maintain good health (House 
of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, 2000a). It relies on the principles 
of pharmacology. A survey of UK herbal practitioners, who represent only a small 
proportion of herbal use in the UK, indicated that the most frequently treated conditions 
were premenstrual syndrome, irritable bowel syndrome, ec2ema and arthritis (Barnes, 
1998). There is widespread use of herbal medicine among naturopaths and those who 
practice nutritional medicine and a large over-the counter market.
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Hom eopathy (also hom oeopathy)
Homeopathic medicines are produced through a process of serial dilution and vigorous 
shaking ("potentiation"). The dilutions are repeated so many times that there is less than 
one molecule per dose and it is suggested that benefit is from the energetic life force of the 
original substance (National Institutes of Health, 2006). Homeopaths believe that the 
dilutant retains a memory o f the original substance ("the memory of water") (Ernst and 
Dixon, 2004). Homeopathic remedies use highly diluted substances that if given in higher 
doses to a healthy person would produce the symptoms that the dilutions are being given 
to treat. When assessing the patient homeopaths often take into account a range of 
physical, emotional and life style factors which contribute to the diagnosis (House o f Lords 
Select Committee on Science and Technology, 2000). Homeopathy is employed mainly for 
mental, infectious and rheumatological disorders (Colin, 2000). According to a survey of 
professional organisations the four most important medical indications are respiratory 
problems, menstrual complaints/pre-menstrual syndrome, arthritis/rheumatic conditions 
and irritable bowel syndrome (Long, Huntley et al., 2001).
O steopathy
Osteopathy is a system of diagnosis and treatment, usually by manipulation, that mainly 
focuses on musculo-skeletal problems. A few schools claim benefits across a wider 
spectrum of disorders. Historically it differs from chiropractic in its underlying theory that 
it is impairment o f blood supply and not nerve supply that leads to problems. However in 
practice there is less difference than might be assumed. Mainstream osteopathy focuses on 
musculo-skeletal problems; but prior to osteopathy gaining statutory protection o f title, 
other branches of this therapy purported to diagnose and treat a range of disorders. One 
such branch is known as cranio-sacral therapy (House of Lords Select Committee on 
Science and Technology, 2000).
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A ppendix  2. L ist o f d o cu m en ts  included  in th e  d o cu m en tary  a n a ly s is
Subm issions to  Department of Health consultation (18)
BAAB DH Consultation response FIH DH consult response full text
BAcC DH consultation response GDC DH consultation response
BHA FacHom DH consultation response GOsC DH consultation response 070604
BMAS DH consultation response NPSA DH consultation response
CA DH consultation response jun04 RC Midwives DH Consultation response
CHRP DH consultation response RC Ophthalmologists DH consultation
CORH DH consultation response RCGP DH consultation response
EHPA DH consultation response June 0 RPSGB DH consultation response
EHPA MHRA consultation response MLX SocHom DH consultation response 0504
Emails (7)
FIH Regulation Update 0104 FIH Regulation Update 0504
FIH Regulation Update 0204 FIH Regulation Update 0604
FIH Regulation Update 0304 KF Graham Hart email
FIH Regulation Update 0404
Parliamentary debate and reports (12)
HoC Chiropractors bill 1st Reading HoC Osteopaths bill 3rd Reading
HoC Chiropractors bill 2nd Reading HoC Parliamentary Qs 180406
HoC Chiropractors bill 3rd Reading HoC Tredinick 240196
HoC GOsC Written Answer 110500 HoC Tredinick various
HoC Osteopaths bill 1st Reading HoL Debate on CAM report 290301
HoC Osteopaths bill 2nd Reading Lord Walton HoL debate on CAM
Oral and written evidence to  House of Lords Science and Technology Committee (87) 
t
AACP HoL written GCC HoL written supp
AcadMedSci HoL oral GDC HoL oral
AcadMedSci HoL written GMC HoL oral
Ayurvedic MA HoL written GMC HoL written
BAcC HoL oral GOsC HoL oral
BAcC HoL written GOsC HoL written
Baum HoL written GOsC HoL written supp
BAWA HoL written Healthwatch HoL oral
BCA HoL written Healthwatch HoL written
BCMA HoL oral Healthwork HoL oral
BCMA HoL written Healthwork UK HoL written
BDA HoL oral Horn MA HoL written
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BDA HoL written ICM HoL written
BMA HoL oral Integrated Med Gp HoL written
BMA HoL written Lewith HoL written
BMAS HoL oral NHS Alliance oral evidence HoL
BMAS HoL written NHS Alliance written evidence
Brit Coll Nat Osteo HoL written NHS Confed HoL written
Brit Sch Osteo HoL written NICE HoL oral
Budd HoL written NIMH Denham HoL written
CA HoL oral PA HoL oral
CA HoL written Pari Gp CAM HoL written
CHI HoL oral Patient Concern HoL written
CHM&HCLtd HoL written POPAN HoL written
CMAssoc Suppliers HoL written RC Anaesthetists HoL written
Coll Chiro HoL written RCCM HoL oral
Consumers for Health Choice HoL writ RCGP HoL oral
CPSM HoL written RCGP HoL written
DH HoL oral 1 RCHM HoL written
DH HoL oral II RCN HoL oral
DH HoL written RCN HoL written
Eastern Med Tibb Pract Assoc HoL wri RCOG HoL written
EHPA HoL oral RCP Edin HoL written
EHPA HoL written RCP HoL written
Ernst HoL written RCPaed and Child Health HoL written
FacHom, Horn Trust, BHA HoL oral Royal Colleges HoL oral
FacHom, Horn Trust, BHA HoL written Royal London Horn Hosp HoL written
FIH HoL oral Soc Horn HoL oral
FIH HoL written Soc Horn HoL written
FIH HoL written supp Stone HoL written
FTCM HoL written Tibb NMF HoL written
GCC HoL oral Tredinnick HoL written
GCC HoL written UKCC HoL oral
UKCC HoL written
Interviews (22)
Becky Sidwell interview Michael Dixon telephone
Frances Blunden Interview Michael Fox Interiew
Gordon Brown interview Michael McIntyre Interview
Graeme Catto Interview Michael O’Farrell Interview
Jonathan Coe Interview Michael Pittilo Interview
Julie Stone Interview Mike Cummings interview
KF Niall Dickson interview Nigel Clarke Interview
Lord Chan Interview Pamela Jack Interview
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Lord Walton Interview 
Maggy Wallace Interview 
Michael Dixon interview
Richard Woodfield Interview 
Robert Maxwell Interview 
Stephen Gordon interview
Articles and letters in the published media and journals by individuals (36)
Baum letter to POW BMJ 100704
BBC Case notes Homeopathy
BBC R4 Other Medicine 1
BBC R4 Other Medicine 2
BBC R4 Other Medicine 3
BBC R4 Other Medicine 4
BBC Row over Smallwood 240805
BMA press release 011199
BMJ News on DH acu and herb prop
CHRP Stone CM regulation BMJ 1996
Ernst BMJ Herb Med 181003
FIH Fox BMJ letter 091004
FIH PR consultation on fed structure
FIH PR DH grant 2005
Guardian Ernst Integral risk 160805
Guardian Horton letter 081005
Guardian POW cost review CAM 240805
Guardian POW cost study 61005
Memos (31)
Acupuncture documents 
Analysis
Australia herbal recall
BMA documents
CA documents
Chiropractic documents
CHRP Documents
Consumer herbal interest groups
Contacts
DH consultation responses 
DH documents
Documents suggested by interviewees 
EHPA documents 
EU Herbal Directive 
Evidence systematic reviews
Guardian Dixon letter 240805 
Independent FIH bk Ernst 60205 
Observer Ernst savages homeo 181205 
Osteo article Standen 1993 
POW Daily Mail integrated 200502 
POW Guardian comp 280204 
POW NHS Mag Integrated 050100 
POW PR Smallwood report 1005 
POW Telegraph homeo 211097 
POW Telegraph integrated 180403 
POW Times comp 301200 
Stone BMJ article BMJ author replies 
Telegraph FIH pat guide 091004 
Telegraph POW comments on CM 131005 
The Times Bueno 100200 
The Times POW cost letters 290805 
The Times POW cost study 240805 
Times letter docs vs CAM 230506
FIH documents 
FIH Trustees 
HoL Committee Members 
HoL List of Witnesses 
Homeopathy documents 
International literature 
Interviewee biographies 
Julie Stone documents 
KF documents 
MHRA documents 
POW affiliations 
Questions for RK 
Regulating TCM in Singapore 
REMINDER OF PROGRESS 
Themes and preoccupations 
US NAS report on CAM 2005
Published documents (35)
ACHCEW Briefing on CAM FIH consultation on fed structure
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Acupuncture RWG FIH federal consultation 2006
BMA book 1986 FIH Guide for patients 2005 extract
BMAS Annual Report 2004 FIH Reg Prof Info App Apr 05
CA article on CAM regulation FIH Setting the agenda for the futur
CA prof reg 21 st C 1998 FIH student guide extract 2005
CA Which guide to CT GMC Developing Risk-based Regulation
CORH Accreditation Proposals GMCdeveloping_medical_regulation_200
CORH Codes of ethics and practice No Herbal Medicine RWG
CORH consultation doc HoL 6th Report on CAM 211100
DH consult on acup and herb 2004 KF Annual Review 2003-04
DH consult on acup and herb response KF Chiro Working Partyf
DH response to HoL report 2001 KF Osteo Working Partyf
EU Directive Trad Herb Med Apr 04 MHRA Consultation document MLX299
Exeter DH 2nd report 2000 NCC prof reg health care
Exeter DH Info Pack 2000 POW Smallwood Report CAM NHS 1005
FIH A Way Forward 1997 Wallace WHO Guide
FIH Article from NT
Speeches (29)
BAAC Farrell VSR seminar 0905 POW BMA install 070782
BAcC Bishop FIH KF conf Apr 04 POW BMA Millennium 061100
BMAS Cummings FIH KF conf Apr 04 POW FIH Cancer 240604
CHRP Stone FIH KF conf Apr 04 POW FIH Integrated 111203
CHRP Stone VSR seminar 0905 POW FIH Integrated 140599
CORH Gordon FIH KF conf Apr 04 POW FIH Regulation 191102
DH Sidwell FIH KF conf Apr 04 POW FIH strategy 220503
DH Sidwell FIH seminar 2003 POW Integrated 280598
FIH Jack VSR Seminar 0905 POW Integrated Writers 160999
FIH VSR Seminar panel 0905 POW KF Integrated 211097
MHRA Woodfield FIH KF conf Apr 2004 POW KF President 150600
NIMH Denham FIH KF conf Apr 4 POWWHA 230506
POPAN Coe FIH KF conf Apr 04 RCPsych HoL written
POPAN Coe FIH KF conf full text Apr Reg CHM Lampert FIH KF conf Apr 04
POW BMA CAM 141282
Web (13)
C4HC appeal letter ICM background
Dr Foster Ethics Cttee 010604 ICM proposals for single Act 2001
Dr Foster website 030205 ICM response to HoL 2001
EHPA briefing SSR Herbalists 2001 POPAN website comp ther 030205
EHPA circular SSR Herbalists 1999 POW web on FIH 080205
Healthwatch web POW website health work 1205
HFM appeal letter
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A ppendix  3. List o f in terv iew ees and  d a te s
Gordon Brown, civil servant, Department of Health, 17th August 2004 at Skipton 
House, Department of Health, London.
Frances Blunden, Principal Policy Adviser, Which? 8th October 2004 Consumers 
Association, London
Graeme Catto, President of the GMC, 1st March 2005 at King’s College, London,
Lord Chan of Oxton, House of Lords, 16th March 2005 at private office, Milbank, 
Westminster.
Nigel Clarke, General Osteopathic Council, 14th March 2005 at GOsC, London.
Jonathan Coe, Chief Executive, POPAN, 12th April 2005 at POPAN, London.
Mike Cummings, Medical Director, BMAS, 3rd March 2005 at LSE
Michael Dixon, Chief Executive, NHS Alliance
Telephone interview 15th February 2005
Face to face 15th March 2005, at the Liberal Club J-
Michael Fox, Chief Executive, Foundation for Integrated Health, 19th October 2004 at 
the Foundation for Integrated Health, Holloway, London
Pamela Jack, Regulation Programme Manager, Foundation for Integrated Health, 21st 
September 2004 at the Foundation for Integrated Health, London.
Robert Maxwell, telephone interview, 13th May 2005
Michael McIntyre, Chairman, EHPA, Wednesday 27th October 2004 at the King’s Fund, 
London.f
Mike O’Farrell, Chief Executive, British Acupuncture Council, 28th September 2004 at 
the British Acupuncture Council, London
Michael Pittdlo, Vice Chancellor, University of Hertfordshire, 29th September 2004 at the 
University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield
Becky Sidwell, civil servant, Department of Health, 1st March 2005 at the LSE, London.
Julie Stone, Deputy Director, Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence, 22nd March 
2005 at CHRE, London.
Maggy Wallace, Chair Council for Organisations Registering Homeopaths, 14th October 
2004 at the LSE, London
Lord Walton of Detchant, House of Lords, 24th February 2005 at the House o f Lords.
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Richard Woodfield, European Policy Manager, MHRA, 15th December 2004 at the 
MHRA, London.
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A ppendix  4. S am ple  interview  sc h e d u le
Why does the level of state intervention in the regulation of CAM practitioners differ 
between activities in the UK? For example why are some practitioners statutorily 
regulated, why are some encouraged (by the state) to establish voluntary professional 
regulation and others are free to establish voluntary associations?
What factors have resulted in the different policy responses? What has been the role of 
different stakeholders in the policy community in influencing these responses?
Why does the model of professional self-regulation dominate policy ideas?
Why regulate? What persuasive arguments are there for regulating CAM practice? 
Why regulate some therapies and not others?
Why the medical model of regulation?
Has there been a change in policy? If so why?
What has been your strategy? Who are your allies and who are your enemies?
Prelims
Clarify the nature of the research and the purpose that the interview data will serve. 
Clarify whether the interview will be anonymous or assigned.
Ascertain time available for the interview and the format of the questions (e.g. semi 
structured).
Establish whether the individual gives consent for the interview to be recorded.
Any questions?
Introductions
Name, position in the organisation
What was your role in the HRWG? How long did you hold the position?
Why did you take on the role?
Had you been involved with or had an interest in CAM previously? 
Reasons/Justification
Why regulate CAM practice/herbal medicine? What in your view are the most 
persuasive arguments for regulating CAM practice?
Why do you think regulation is needed? What is the purpose of regulation? Is that true 
for all CAM therapies? Why regulate some therapies and not others?
[If mention ‘protect public" or some such phrase then probe]
What do you understand by public harm? What risks do you think the public should be 
protected against?
Types of regulation
What sort of regulation would be the most appropriate? Why?
What are the weaknesses of voluntary self-regulation?
What are the perceived benefits/weaknesses of statutory regulation?
What do you perceive as the benefits /outcomes of regulation to be? What are the costs 
or potential disbenefits? Who is most affected by the policy?
Structure and organisation 
How should regulation operate?
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What do you think of DH proposals to establish a single statutory CAM council for the 
regulation of all practitioners? What is your view of the ARWG proposals to establish 
separate Councils?
Do you think regulation should be different for those with a recognised health 
qualification practising CAM such as doctors, nurses and physiotherapists and those 
without?
Who should regulate? What is the role of professionals, lay members, etc.
What should the regulators do? What functions should they perform?
Why the medical model?
How influential was the approach taken by osteopaths and chiropractors in establishing 
a single professional council?
Why do you think this model of regulation has been adopted?
Were other approaches considered?
Was any consideration given to how other country’s regulate TCM practitioners? 
Policy process
What have been the main drivers for establishing statutory regulation for herbalists? 
What was your role and that of the HRWG in the development of professional 
regulation for herbalists?
Who were your allies and who were your enemies?
How have differences between interest groups in herbal medicine come together? 
Which organisations/individuals would you say have had a significant influence?
Apart from yourself/your organisation, who would you consider to be the other key 
stakeholders with an interest in or influence over the professional regulation of CAM 
practitioners?
Supplementary questions:
What or who has most influenced your thinking on these issues? Have your 
views/changed over time?
How do you think professional regulation might change in the future and why?
Conclusions
Any other comments?
Thank for the time.
Explain next steps/follow up.
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Appendix 5. Final list of co d es  used  in analysis o f docum ents and interviews
MAIN CODE SUBCODE DEFINITION
Professional Evidence that CAM practitioner groups
strategy are actively pursing strategy of 
professionalisation, past or existing 
activities, proposed activities only if 
proposed by the profession themselves
Professional associations Evidence of establishment of professional
organisations involved in regulation, 
when were they established and how do 
they relate formally to other organisations 
e.g. umbrella body__________________
Body of knowledge Evidence of activities to establish body of 
knowledge and evidence base for CAM 
practice such as national occupational 
standards, scientific journal or research
standards Evidence of activities to establish unified 
standards of practice e.g. national 
occupational standards among CAM 
practitioners.
Training courses Growth in number of training courses on 
offer and number of educational 
establishments offering CAM courses
Voluntary accreditation of The presence of a system of accreditation
training of courses meeting certain minimum 
standards
Established voluntary 
regulation
The presence or absence of systems of 
voluntary regulation
Code of ethics Presence of a code of ethics or standards 
of practice
Complaints Existence of a formal public complaints 
procedure
SSR Explicit statement of SSR as an objective
Public demand Public demand for regulation
Mobilisation Measures of influence such as financial 
resources, public mobilisation, or 
representativeness of practitioners
Mobilisation/Unified among The extent to which groups of CAM
practitioners practitioners were organisationally 
unified in order to pursue 
professionalisation
Mobilisation/Unified among 
practitioners/Fragmented
Use of words ‘fragmented’ or 
‘fragmentation’ to describe CAM 
practitioner groups
Mobilisation/Unified among Use of the term consensus to describe
practitioners/Consensus within group dynamics of CAM 
practitioner groups
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MAIN CODE SUBCODE DEFINITION
Mobilisation/Unified among 
practitioners/Divisions
Disagreements or differences about 
knowledge base, approaches and setting 
within a particular CAM therapy, e.g. 
between traditional and western 
acupuncture, Ayurvedic and western 
herbal medicine, etc.
Mobilisation/Unified among 
practitioners/Diverse
Divisions within CAM generally between 
different therapies (NOT within CAM 
therapies which would be under code 
‘divided’)
Mobilisation/Unified among 
practitioners/Unified
Use of terms unity, unified, united in 
relation to state of CAM practitioner 
groups
Mobilisation/Unified among Division between those who practice who 
practitioners/Medical vs. non are medically qualified and those who 
med practice and are considered lay or non­
medical
Mobilisation/Active in 
seeking SSR
Examples where regulation was initiated 
by the practitioners groups
Professional
identity
How CAM practitioner groups perceive 
the advantages and disadvantages of 
gaining professional status.
Benefits Perceived benefits of professionalisation 
to CAM practitioners
Benefits/Access Regulation will increase access to CAM 
services for patients particularly on the 
NHS
Benefits/Recognition Regulation will increase status, 
legitimacy and recognition of the 
profession, including by orthodox 
medical profession
Benefits/Public confidence Regulation will lead to increased public 
confidence in and understanding of CAM 
practice
Benefits/Interest group Regulation will enable CAM 
practitioners to operate as a more 
effective interest group
Benefits/interests of 
practitioners
General view that regulation to the 
benefit of practitioners but also specific 
benefits to practitioners of achieving 
closure.
Benefits/interests of
practitioners/Dispensing
rights
Statutory regulation (particularly of 
herbalists) would ensure restricted access 
to potent drugs by limiting dispensing 
rights
Disadvantages Perceived disadvantages of 
professionalisation to CAM practitioners
Disadvantages/restrict access Regulation will reduce numbers of 
practitioners and as a consequence reduce 
access and consumer choice
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MAIN CODE SUBCODE DEFINITION
Disadvantages/domination Regulation will reduce autonomy and 
bring CAM practitioners under the 
domination of doctors
Disadvantages/standardisation Regulation will restrict freedom to 
of practice practice therapy individually through
standardisation of practice
Disadvantages/threatened Regulation provokes fear among CAM 
practitioners or feel threatened by it in 
general
Disadvantages/expense Regulation may lead to increases in costs 
for individual practitioners
Market failure Arguments made to justify the regulation 
of CAM practitioners which relate to 
market failure
Choice Regulation should support informed 
choice rather than restrict choice
Consumer information Problems of lack of consumer 
information and the need for regulation to 
enhance informed choice of CAM 
consumers
Protection of title The contribution of protection of title to 
better consumer choice
Risk regulation Arguments made to justify the regulation 
of CAM practitioners which relate to 
minimisation of risks to public health
Public protection Ideas relating to why regulation is
important. Patient safety, public 
protection and safeguarding public were 
all used to search documents for relevant 
passages._________________________
Size of problem Understanding of the size of the problem
adverse events Discussion of adverse events
Types of risk How risk is defined
Indirect risks Risks that arise as a result of a person 
consulting a CAM practitioner but not 
from the treatment itself
Indirect risks/Alt clinical Risk that because therapy based on
system alternative clinical system will not get 
appropriate treatment
Indirect risks/unskilled Risk that arises because the practitioner is 
not skilled
Indirect risks/insurance Risk that the CAM practitioner does not
have any personal liability insurance, in 
the event of suing for damages_______
Indirect risks/Conduct Risk of misconduct by the CAM
practitioner
Indirect risks/Appropriate Risk that the CAM practitioner does not
referral know the limits of their competence and
does not appropriately refer to other
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MAIN CODE SUBCODE DEFINITION
Indirect risks/Misdiagnosis
health practitioners, may delay or deny 
access to orthodox treatment
Risk that the CAM practitioner will 
misdiagnose the illness (and 
consequently inappropriate treatment 
recommended)
Indirect risks/False claims Risk that the CAM practitioner makes 
false claims or at least claims benefits 
beyond the evidence
Indirect risks/Conflict of Risk that the CAM practitioner will not
interest act in the interests of patients because of 
a conflict of interests such as financial 
gain from selling a product
Direct risks Risks that are inherent in some way to the 
therapy or arise as a direct result of the 
application of the treatment.
Direct risks/Physical Risk of direct physical harm to the patient 
caused by the CAM practitioner
Direct risks/Physical/invasive Risk associated with the invasive nature
of the CAM therapy (especially of 
________________________ acupuncture needling).______________
Direct risks/Physical/potency Risk associated with the strength of the
CAM treatment (usually herbal medicines 
________________________ or other remedies)___________________
Direct risks/Physical/toxicity Risk associated with the contamination or
poor quality of CAM products (usually 
herbal medicines or natural remedies)
Direct
ri sks/Phy sical/Infection
Risk of infection through application of 
CAM technique (usually acupuncture 
needling)
Direct risks/wrong use Risk arising from the misuse of certain 
treatments, i.e. no evidence for use on 
certain illnesses/ patients
Direct risks/emotional harm Risk of direct emotional or psychological 
harm to the patient caused by the CAM 
practitioner
Direct risks/Contraindications Risk of interactions with other
medications or treatments
Direct risks/unintended Risk of unintended effects of the CAM
effects treatment due to poor research and/or 
understanding of the treatment 
mechanism
Evidence Evidence base needed in order to justify 
regulation
Policy
networks
How does the policy community operate, 
how was the policy initiated and by 
whom.
policy community Descriptions of who is involved in the 
policy process
324
MAIN CODE SUBCODE DEFINITION
Key individuals Role of key individuals in shaping the 
policy process
Key individuals/HRH POW Role of HRH Prince of Wales in shaping 
policy process
With government Relationship with government
With orthodox Relationship with orthodox medicine
With Foundation Relationship with the Foundation
With public and consumers Relationship with the public and 
consumers
With members Relationship of professional bodies with 
members
Stakeholders/GB
Interviewees
People suggested by GB for Round 1 
interviews
With regulators Relationship with regulators
Style of 
process
The style of the policy process, how the 
policy process is described by actors
Speed Speed at which policy process moved
inclusive The extent to which the process of 
developing regulation is inclusive and 
consultative
top down Examples where regulation policy was 
initiated or actively shaped by state or 
government actors including government 
support for legislation
top down/house Use of the phrase ‘get one’s house in 
order’ or similar
State as creator Examples where government has played 
an active role in the creation of CAM 
practitioner groups
Ideas Ideas about regulation
Types of regulation Ideas about the type of regulation
Types of regulation/Voluntary Ideas about voluntary regulation (as
opposed to statutory or mandatory)
Types of regulation/Self 
regulation
Ideas about the role of professional self- 
regulation (as opposed to external or state
________________________ regulation)___________________
Types of regulation/Statutory Ideas about statutory regulation, its
advantages and disadvantages and 
whether it is appropriate for CAM 
practitioners_________________
Types of Protection of title or protection of
regulation/Protection of title function
Types of Consumer protection legislation
regulation/ Consumer governing advertising, marketing and
Protection claims that are made by products. Can be
enforced through trading standards
officers.
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MAIN CODE SUBCODE DEFINITION
Types of
regulation/information
Mandatory information for patients and 
the public about qualifications, insurance 
status, prices, etc.
Types of regulation/Liability Ideas about the role of liability and 
mandated insurance
Types of
regulation/Guidelines
Clinical guidelines to regulate the 
appropriate use of CAM for different 
patients (especially within the NHS)
Types of regulation/Education Official guidelines or standards of
training for orthodox medical
practitioners practising CAM and CAM 
practitioners
Types of Ideas about the role of incentives
regulation/incentives
How to structure Ideas about how a regulatory body should 
be organised and structured include 
whether there should be lay 
representation, mono-disciplinary or 
multi professional, what subcommittees
How to structure/Shared 
Council
How to structure/Single 
Council
Bring together different CAM therapies 
under a single regulatory body 
Ideas about whether to have a Single 
Council for each therapy
How to Allow practitioners registered with one
structure/Transregulatory statutory body to be regulated in their
practice of other modalities through 
cooperation across regulatory bodies or 
have dual registration.______________
Functions Ideas about the functions that regulatory 
bodies should perform in relation to the 
practice and practitioners
Functions/Occupational Set minimum standards of practice
Standards (rather than standards for training)
Functions/Trainings
education
Set standards for training and education.
Functions/T raining~ Set requirements for continuing
education/CPD professional development
Functions/Trainings Set training standards which include
education/integration with 
medicine
biomedical training
Functions/Discipline~ Draw up codes of conduct, ethical codes
conduct and implement disciplinary procedures
Functions/Research Promote and fund research
Functions/Register Register practitioners
Functions/Information
provider
Provide information
Functions/accreditation accredit training courses
Functions/Health and Safety Check practitioners and facilities meet 
Health and Safety standards
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MAIM CODE SUBCODE DEFINITION
Functions/Insurance Provide mechanisms for ensuring/ 
providing indemnity insurance held by 
practitioners
Functions/Complaints Have in place complaints procedure for 
patients and the public
Functions/Language Check language capabilities of 
practitioners
Functions/Professional Represent professional interests
representation
How Ideas about how regulation should 
operate. Not the institutional 
arrangements but rather the descriptors of 
the process of regulation. Normative
How/Accountable Regulatory mechanisms must ensure 
public accountability
How/Responsive Regulatory mechanisms must be 
responsive and flexible to changing 
circumstances
How/Proportionate Regulatory mechanisms must be 
proportionate, should avoid over­
regulation
How/Public confidence Regulatory mechanisms must have the 
confidence of the general public
How/Objective Regulatory mechanisms must operate 
objectively and with independence
How/T ransparent Regulatory mechanisms should be 
transparent
How/Accessible Regulatory mechanisms must be 
accessible to the public and patients
How/Fair Regulatory mechanisms should operate 
fairly, especially in disciplinary 
proceedings
How/Effective Regulatory mechanisms should be 
effective
How/consultative Regulatory bodies should develop 
policies and rules in consultation and 
collaboration with other stakeholders
How/Fair representation Structure governing board of regulatory 
body so that it is representative of all 
interests within the profession
Outcomes Ideas about the outcomes of regulation
Outcomes/ Quality The benefits of statutory regulation will 
be to ensure safer and high quality CAM 
practitioners
Outcomes/Competence Positive benefits of regulation helping to 
enable patients to access competent CAM 
practitioners
Outcomes/Integration Integration as a possible outcome of 
regulation
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MAIN CODE SUBCODE DEFINITION
Which therapies Ideas about which CAM therapies should 
be regulated and which ones not
Source Where do ideas come from?
Source/modelled Path of regulatory development is 
modelled explicitly on existing regulation 
either of osteopaths and chiropractors, or 
other longer established professions.
Source/comparisons Model of regulation is developed based 
on understanding of what goes on in 
another country. Comparative policy 
development.
Current The current situation of CAM practice in
situation the UK as described by actors
Consumer demand Utilisation levels of CAM and consumer 
demand for therapies
Research Current state of research among CAM 
therapies
Medical education Current role of CAM in the medical 
curriculum
Legal Current legal situation of CAM in the UK
Legal/Scope of practice Scope of practice currently permitted by 
UK law
Legal/Local authority 
licensing
Provisions to require licensing of 
premises by local authorities for certain 
activities
NHS provision The integration of CAM in NHS 
provision, or the availability of CAM on 
referral from the NHS
Numbers of practitioners Descriptions of number of practitioners
working patterns Patterns of employment of CAM 
practitioners
Evidence base The presence of absence of an evidence 
base
Context Contextual factors which have played a 
role in the development of regulation for 
CAM practitioners (external to the direct 
policy process)
UK policy developments Other areas of government policy which 
have interacted with the development of 
policy on CAM regulation
EU policy developments Developments in EU policy in relation to 
CAM, traditional medicines, professional 
mutual recognition, etc which have had 
an impact on national debates about 
regulation
Major events Key events or publications which are 
identified by interviewees as being 
significant factors in the development of 
professional regulation
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A ppendix 6. R ecom m endations on ‘Regulation’ and ‘Education and  training’. 
Extract from the  H ouse of Lords’ Sixth Report 
Regulation (Chapter 5)
6. We recommend that, in order to protect the public, professions with more than one 
regulatory body make a concerted effort to bring their various bodies together and to 
develop a clear professional structure (para 5.12).
7. We recommend that each of the therapies in Group 2 should organise themselves under 
a single professional body for each therapy. These bodies should be well promoted so that 
the public who access these therapies are aware of them. Each should comply with core 
professional principles, and relevant information about each body should be made known 
to medical practitioners and other healthcare professionals. Patients could then have a 
single, reliable point of reference for standards, and would be protected against the risk of 
poorly-trained practitioners and have redress for poor service (para 5.23).
8. It is our opinion that acupuncture and herbal medicine are the two therapies which are at 
a stage where it would be of benefit to them and their patients if the practitioners strive for 
statutory regulation under the Health Act 1999, and we recommend that they should do so. 
Statutory regulation may also be appropriate eventually for the non-medical homeopaths. 
Other professions must strive to come together under one voluntary self-regulating body 
with the appropriate features outlined in Box 5, and some may wish ultimately to aim to 
move towards regulation under the Health Act once they are unified with a single voice 
(paras 5.53 and 5.55).
9. We recommend that each existing regulatory body in the healthcare professions should 
develop clear guidelines on competency and training for their members on the position 
they take in relation to their members' activities in well organised CAM disciplines; as well 
as guidelines on appropriate training courses and other relevant issues. In drawing up such 
guidelines the conventional regulatory bodies should communicate with the relevant 
complementary regulatory bodies and the Foundation for Integrated Medicine to obtain 
advice on training and best practice and to encourage integrated practice (para 5.79).
10. We encourage the bodies representing medical and non-medical CAM therapists, 
particularly those in our Groups 1 and 2, to collaborate more closely, especially on 
developing reliable public information sources. We recommend that if CAM is to be 
practised by any conventional healthcare practitioners, they should be trained to standards
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comparable to those set out for that particular therapy by the appropriate (single) CAM 
regulatory body (para 5.83).
11. We recommend that the MCA find a mechanism that would allow members o f the 
public to identify health products that had met the stringent requirements of licensing and 
to differentiate them from unregulated competitors. This should be accompanied by strong 
enforcement o f the law in regard to products that might additionally confuse the customer 
with claims and labelling that resemble those permitted by marketing authorisations (para 
5.93).
12. We strongly recommend that the Government should maintain their effective advocacy 
of a new regulatory framework for herbal medicines in the United Kingdom and the rest of 
the European Union, and urge all parties to ensure that new regulations adequately reflect 
the complexities o f the unregulated sector (para 5.95).
13. We are concerned about the safety implications of an unregulated herbal sector and we 
urge that all legislative avenues be explored to ensure better control of this unregulated 
sector in the interests of the public health (para 5.97).
14. We support the view that any new regulatory regime should respect the diversity of 
products used by herbal practitioners and allow for simplified registration o f practitioner 
stocks. Nevertheless, any such regime must ensure that levels of quality and assurance of 
safety are not compromised (para 5.98).
Professional T rain ing and E ducation  (Chapter 6)
15. Establishing an independent accreditation board along the lines o f the British 
Acupuncture Accreditation Board is a positive move. Other therapies with fragmented 
professional representation may wish to use this as a model (para 6.20).
16. We recommend that CAM training courses should become more standardised and be 
accredited and validated by the appropriate professional bodies. All those who deliver 
CAM treatments, whether conventional health professionals or CAM professionals, should 
have received training in that discipline independently accredited by the appropriate 
regulatory body (para 6.33).
17. We suggest that the CAM therapies, particularly those in our Groups 1 and 2, should 
identify Continuing Professional Development in practice as a core requirement for their 
members (para 6.34).
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18. We consider that it is imperative that higher educational institutions and any regulatory 
bodies in CAM liaise in order to ensure that training is adequate for registration. If extra 
training is required after academic qualification to ensure fitness to practise, this should be 
defined by the appropriate professional body, which should then implement appropriate 
mechanisms in order to see that this objective is achieved (para 6.40).
19. We recommend that training in anatomy, physiology and basic biochemistry and 
pharmacology should be included within the education of practitioners of therapies that are 
likely to offer diagnostic information, such as the therapies in Groups 1 and 3a. Although it 
may be useful for other therapists to understand basic biomedical science, there is no 
requirement for such in-depth understanding if the therapy being practised is to be used as 
an adjunct to conventional medicine (para 6.43).
20. We recommend that every therapist working in CAM should have a clear understanding 
of the principles o f evidence-based medicine and healthcare. This should be a part of the 
curriculum of all CAM therapy courses. An in-depth understanding of research methods 
may be even more important for those therapies that operate independently of medical 
supervision, and which attempt to make a diagnosis and to cure complaints rather than for 
those which offer relaxation or aim to improve the general quality of life o f patients. 
Therefore training in research and statistical methods may be particularly appropriate for 
practitioners o f therapies in Groups 1 and 3a. But we consider that an understanding o f 
research methods and outcomes should be included in the training of all CAM 
practitioners. It is important that all of those teaching these courses should understand 
these principles (para 6.49).
21. We recommend that all CAM training defines limits of the particular therapist's 
competence as clearly as possible in the state of current knowledge. Training should also 
give students clear guidance on when a patient should be referred to a primary care 
physician or even directly to secondary hospital care (para 6.52).
22. We recommend that all CAM therapists should be made aware of the other CAM 
therapies available to their patients and how they are practised. We do not think it should 
be assumed that CAM practitioners competent in one discipline necessarily understand the 
others (para 6.54).
23. We conclude that there should be flexibility for training institutions to decide how to 
educate practitioners. It is the relevant professional regulatory body of a specific CAM 
therapy that should set objectives of training and define core competencies appropriate to
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their particular discipline, and we so recommend. We do not advocate a blanket core 
curriculum (para 6.61).
24. We recommend that, whether subject to statutory or voluntary regulation, all healthcare 
regulatory bodies should consider the relevance to their respective professions of those 
elements set out in paragraph 6.55 (para 6.62).
25. We recommend that therapies with a fragmented professional organisation work with 
Healthwork UK to develop National Occupational Standards, and we encourage the 
Department o f Health to further support Healthwork UK’s activity with such therapies; we 
believe that this would be of long-term benefit to the public (para 6.70).
26. We recommend that familiarisation should prepare medical students for dealing with 
patients who are either accessing CAM or have an interest in doing so. This familiarisation 
should cover the potential uses of CAM, the procedures involved, their potential benefits 
and their main weaknesses and dangers (para 6.77).
27. We recommend that every medical school ensures that all their medical undergraduates 
are exposed to a level of CAM familiarisation that makes them aware o f the choices their 
patients might make (para 6.79).
28. We recommend that Royal Colleges and other training authorities in the healthcare field 
should address the issue o f familiarisation with CAM therapies among doctors, dentists and 
veterinary surgeons by supporting appropriate Continuing Professional Development 
opportunities (para 6.85).
29. The General Osteopathic and Chiropractic Councils, and any other regulatory bodies, 
should develop schemes whereby they accredit certain training courses aimed specifically at 
doctors and other healthcare professionals, and which are developed in conjunction with 
them. Similar schemes should be pursued by dentists and veterinary surgeons (para 6.95).
30. We recommend that the UKCC work with the Royal College of Nursing to make CAM 
familiarisation a part of the undergraduate nursing curriculum and a standard competency 
expected of qualified nurses, so that they are aware of the choices that their patients may 
make. We would also expect nurses specialising in areas where CAM is especially relevant 
(such as palliative care) to be made aware of any CAM issues particularly pertinent to that 
speciality during their postgraduate training. The Royal College of Nursing and the UKCC, 
as they do not provide CAM training themselves, should compile a list o f courses in CAM 
that they approve, in order that nurses who wish to practise in this field can obtain 
guidance on appropriate training (para 6.106).
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Appendix 7. M embership of the  A cupuncture Regulatory Working Group and  the 
Herbal Medicine Regulatory Working Group
Acupuncture Regulatory W orking Group
Lord Chan, Chair 
Stephen Halpem, Secretary 
Acupuncture Professional Representatives
Joan Davies, Acupuncture Association of Chartered Physiotherapists 
Val Hopwood, Acupuncture Association of Chartered Physiotherapists 
Peter Dowds, British Academy of Western Acupuncture 
Paul Mayer, British Academy of Western Acupuncture 
Jasmine Uddin, British Acupuncture Council 
John Wheeler, British Acupuncture Council 
Anthony Campbell, British Medical Acupuncture Society 
Mike Cummings, British Medical Acupuncture Society 
Lay m em bers
Mercy Jeyasingham, Lay Member 
Alaba Okuyiga, Lay Member 
Kathleen Wood, Lay Member 
Observers
Gordon Brown, Complementary Therapies Team, Department of Health
Rebecca Sidwell, Health Regulatory Bodies Branch, Department of Health (from April 
2003)
Pamela Jack, The Prince of Wales’s Foundation for Integrated Health
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Herbal Medicine Regulatory Working Group
Professor R Michael Pittilo, Chairman and Lay Member 
Andrew Chevallier, Vice Chair 
Amrit Ahluwalia, Secretary 
H erbal Professional Representatives and Alternates
Dee Atkinson/Peter Conway, College of Practitioners of Phytotherapy
Jill Davies/Peter Jackson-Main, Association of Master Herbalists
Alison Denham/Trudy Norris, National Institute of Medical Herbalists
Peter Jackson-Main/Jill Davies, European Herbal Practitioners Association
Dr Song Xuan K e/Geoff Most, British Society of Chinese Medicine
Dr Nick Lampert/Emma Farrant, Register of Chinese Herbal Medicine
D r Graeme Litchfield/Ifanca James, International Register of Consultant Herbalists
Elizabeth Lyden/Ed Berger, Unified Register of Herbal Practitioners
Dr N Moorthy/Dr Athique, Ayurvedic Medical Association
Professor Huijun Shen/Ji Dong Wu, Association of Traditional Chinese Medicine
Dr S Warrier/Dr D Gunawant, British Association of Accredited Ayurvedic Practitioners 
and British Ayurvedic Medical Council
Lay M embers
Sally Homsby, Lay Member
Robert Johnstone, Lay Member
Mee Ling Ng, Lay Member
N on-H erbal Professional B ody Representatives
Professor Bill Dawson, Royal Pharmaceutical Society and Lay Member
D r Catherine O ’Sullivan, Education Committee, European Herbal Practitioners 
Association
Herbal M edicine Sub-Com m ittee
Michael McIntyre, Chair 
M embers
Dee Atkinson
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Bill Dawson
Professor H Shen
Dr S Warner
Amrit Ahluwalia
Stakeholder Representatives
Gordon Brown, Complementary Therapies Unit, Department of Health
Rebecca Sidwell, Health Regulatory Bodies Branch, Department of Health (from April 
2003)
Pamela Jack, The Prince of Wales’s Foundation for Integrated Health 
Michael McIntyre, European Herbal Practitioners Association
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A ppendix  8. B iographical de ta ils  o f m em b ers  o f th e  policy netw ork
Thom as Bingham , Baron Bingham  of Comhill, KG, PC: Lord Chief Justice of 
England and Wales 1996-2000, Chair King’s Fund Working Party on Osteopathy and 
King’s Fund Working Party on Chiropractic; formerly practised from Fountain Court 
Chambers in London; Chairman of the British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law; High Steward of the University o f Oxford
Frances Blunden: Principal Policy Advisor, Which? Formerly Director of POPAN 
(Prevention of Professional Abuse Network); formerly worked at National Consumer 
Council; active member o f her local Community Health Council; lay member of the 
Council for Professions Supplementary to Medicine (2001-2002); consumer representative 
on the Clinical Disputes Forum.
Gordon Brown: civil servant at the Department of Health, policy lead on complementary 
therapies within the Public Health Directorate; retired August 2004.
Steve Catling: civil servant at the Department of Health; Head o f Professional Standards 
and Pensions, Department of Health
Professor Sir Graeme Catto MD: Professor in the College of Life Sciences and Medicine, 
University of Aberdeen; President of the General Medical Council appointed by the 
Council of Heads of Medical Schools 2001 took office on 1 February 2002; Formerly Vice- 
Principal at King's College London, Dean of the Guy's, King's and St Thomas' Medical & 
Dental Schools and Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University of London; knighted in 2002 for 
services to medicine and medical education; member of the GMC Council (November 
1994-present); honorary physician with an interest in renal medicine; a member o f the 
Council for the Regulation of Healthcare Professionals; a member o f SE London Strategic 
Health Authority.
Lord Chan of Oxton: Appointed to the Lords’ in 2001; died aged 65 in February 2006; 
only peer of Chinese origin; Professor o f Ethnic Health Liverpool University; lecturer and 
consultant at the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine; formerly lecturer and consultant 
paediatrician at the University of Singapore; formerly director o f the Leeds-based NHS 
Ethnic Health Unit (1994-1999); Director of two successive north-western primary health 
trusts; Contributed to the Commission on the Future of Multicultural Britain; Member of 
the Press Complaints Commission (2002-2006); Chairman o f the Overseas Christian 
Mission
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N igel Clarke: Chair of the General Osteopathic Council (since May 2001); a lay member 
GOsC since its inception and Treasurer (1997-2001); member o f the Council for 
Healthcare Regulatory Excellence; trustee of the Prince o f Wale’s Foundation for 
Integrated Health; senior partner of Learned Lion Partners ; formerly at the Special 
Programmes Unit of the CBI, the House o f Commons, Conservative Research 
Department
Jonathan Coe: Chief Executive POPAN (Prevention o f Professional Abuse Network)
M ichael Cummings: full-time Medical Director o f the British Medical Acupuncture 
Society (BMAS) since 2000; an honorary clinical specialist at the Royal London 
Homeopathic Hospital; formerly a medical officer in the Royal Air Force (RAF); Member 
Acupuncture Regulatory Working Group; Member, Steering Group on statutory regulation 
o f acupuncture, herbal medicine and traditional Chinese medicine practitioners.
D r Michael Dixon: Devon GP for 21 years; Chair o f NHS Alliance (since 1998); Senior 
Associate at the King's Fund; Honorary Senior Fellow in Public Policy at HSMC 
Birmingham University; Honorary Senior Lecturer in Integrated Healthcare at the 
Peninsula Medical School; Member, Steering Group on statutory regulation of 
acupuncture, herbal medicine and traditional Chinese medicine practitioners.
Professor Edzard Ernst: Laing Chair in Complementary Medicine, University of Exeter 
(1993-present), qualified doctor (Germany); training in acupuncture, autogenic training, 
herbalism, homoeopathy, massage therapy and spinal manipulation; formerly Professor in 
Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation (PMR) at Hanover Medical School and Head o f the 
PMR Department at the University of Vienna.
Simon Fielding OBE: trained as an osteopath; first chairman o f the General Osteopathic 
Council; Department of Health special adviser on complementary medicine since 1993; 
trustee of Demelza House Children’s Hospice; Co-Chairman of the Regulation Steering 
Group and Member of Steering Committee, Prince of Wales’s Initiative on Integrated 
Medicine.
Peter Fisher: Vice President of the Faculty of Homeopathy; Clinical Director for the 
Royal London Homeopathic Hospital, Editor of British Homeopathic Journal.
Michael Fox: Chief Executive of the Foundation for Integrated Health (1998-2005); 
previously worked in NHS for 21 years latterly as Chief Executive o f City and Hackney 
NHS Trust and before that a FHSA; trustee for a mental health charity; non-executive 
director of the Medicines & Healthcare products Regulatory Agency.
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Stephen Gordon: Vice-chair of the Council of Organisations Registering Homeopaths; a 
member of the British Acupuncture Accreditation Board; founder, and current general 
secretary of the European Council for Classical Homeopathy; former Director, Society o f 
Homoeopaths; Member o f Regulation and Education and training Working Group, Prince 
o f Wales’s Initiative on Integrated Medicine;
Stephen Holgate: MRC Clinical Professor of Immunopharmacology, University of 
Southampton; Trustee of the Prince’s Foundation for Integrated Health; Honorary 
Consultant Physician, Southampton General Hospital; Chairman Research and 
Development Working Group and Member of Steering Committee, Prince o f Wales’s 
Initiative on Integrated Medicine; special adviser to the House of Lords S&T Sub- 
Committee on CAM 2000 — 2001; established Royal College o f Physicians sub-committee 
on complementary medicine.
Valerie Hopwood: Research Fellow, Complementary Medicine Research Unit, University 
o f Southampton; Member, Steering Group on statutory regulation of acupuncture, herbal 
medicine and traditional Chinese medicine practitioners; Member, Acupuncture Regulatory 
Working Group; Education Officer, Acupuncture Association o f Chartered 
Physiotherapists; Member of Education and training Working Group, Prince o f Wales’s 
Initiative on Integrated Medicine.
H R H  the Prince of Wales: Patron or President of around 380 organisations; President of 
the King’s Fund (from 1st January 1986- present); President of the British Medical 
Association (1982-1983); personally founded 15 charities including The Prince’s 
Foundation for Integrated Health (since 1993).
Pam ela Jack: Standards Programme Manager (formerly Regulation Programme Manager) 
at the Foundation for Integrated Health (2000-2006); a background in Health Promotion 
and Health Service Management.
D r Bob Leckridge B.Sc M.B., Ch.B., M JF.Hom., F.F.Hom : President of the Faculty 
of Homoeopathy (1998-2005); Associate Specialist at Glasgow Homeopathic Hospital; 
qualified general practitioner; National and International Clinical Examiner for the 
MFHom (Membership of the Faculty of Homeopathy) exam (1993 — present)
George Lewith: Founder Complementary Medicine Research Unit, Southampton 
University; Senior Research Fellow within the Department of Primary Care, Southampton 
University; Member of the Research & Development Working Group and Steering 
Committee, the Prince of Wales’s Initiative on Integrated Health; Co-Director, Centre for 
the Study of Complementary Medicine, Southampton; Hon Senior Lecturer, University of
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Southampton; established Royal College of Physicians sub-committee on complementary 
medicine
Robert Maxwell: Chief Executive King's Fund (1980-1997); Chair Gloucestershire 
Partnership NHS Trust; Governor of the National Institute of Social Work; Member of the 
Prince of Wales Advisory Group on Disability; Trustee, Joseph Rowntree Memorial 
Foundation and World Health Organization Special Adviser on a number o f assignments 
and President of the Association for Quality in Healthcare
M ichael McIntyre: Chairman, European Herbal Practitioner Association; Chair 
Herbal/Traditional medicine stakeholder group (2005-); Principal School of Chinese 
Herbal Medicine; herbalist trained in western herbalism, traditional Chinese herbal 
medicine and acupuncture; formerly president o f the National Institute of Medical 
Herbalists; Member of Education and training Working Group, Prince of Wales’s Initiative 
on Integrated Health.
Simon Mtills M CPP, F N IM H , MA: Director of Centre for Complementary Health 
Studies, Exeter University; special adviser to the House of Lords S&T Sub-Committee on 
CAM; herbal medicine practitioner; co-author with Sarah Budd of reports for Department 
of Health; Chair Reflexology Forum, hosted by FIM; Co-Chairman of the Regulation 
Steering Group and Member of Steering Committee for The Prince o f Wales’s Initiative on 
Integrated Medicine; Chairman, British Herbal Medicine Association; Secretary, European 
Scientific Cooperative On Phytotherapy (ESCOP); past President of NIMH; first President 
o f CCAM (1986)
M ichael O'Farrell: Chief Executive of the British Acupuncture Council; Chair, Chinese 
medicine stakeholder group (2005-); formerly senior manager with the Eastman Kodak 
Company.
Professor David Peters: Professor of Integrated Healthcare and Clinical Director of the 
School of Integrated Health at the University o f Westminster; Trustee o f the Prince’s 
Foundation for Integrated Health; a medical doctor; a registered osteopath (1987); a 
member o f the Faculty o f Homeopathy; formerly a GP at Marylebone Health Centre; 
Lecturer in general practice at St Mary’s Hospital Medical School; Member of the Steering 
Committee and Chairman of the Delivery Mechanisms Working Group, the Prince of 
Wales’s Initiative on Integrated Health; Chair o f the British Holist Medical Association
Michael Pittilo: Principal o f Robert Gordon University in Aberdeen; Chair, Steering 
Group on statutory regulation of acupuncture, herbal medicine and traditional Chinese 
medicine practitioners (2005-); Chair Herbal Medicine Regulatory Working Group (2002-
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2004); formerly Vice Chancellor University o f Hertfordshire, Hatfield; formerly Dean of 
Joint Faculty of Healthcare Sciences, Kingston University and St George’s Hospital 
Medical School; Member of Education and training Working Group, Prince of Wales’s 
Initiative on Integrated Medicine; Trustee Prince o f Wales’s Foundation for Integrated 
Health.
Professor Mike Saks PhD: Pro-Vice Chancellor (Research and Academic Affairs), 
University of Lincoln; formerly Dean of the Faculty o f Health and Community Studies at 
De Montfort University; Chair of the Research Council for Complementary Medicine; 
member of the National Cancer Research Institute Complementary Therapies Clinical 
Studies Development Group; member of the Expert Panel for the Department of Health 
National Centre for Research Capacity Development Personal Awards Scheme and the 
new Department of Health Complementary and Alternative Medicine Research Policy 
Committee. Member of Delivery Mechanisms Working Group, Prince of Wales’s Initiative 
on Integrated Medicine;
Rebecca Sidwell: civil servant at the Department of Health; led on CAM regulation within 
the Health Regulatory Bodies Branch within the Human Resources Directorate (April 
2003-August 2004)
Julie Stone: Deputy Director o f the Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence (until 
January 2007); Visiting Professor in Health Care Ethics at the University of Lincoln, School 
of Health and Social Care; member of the Clinical Disputes Forum Committee; Member, 
Steering Group on statutory regulation of acupuncture, herbal medicine and traditional 
Chinese medicine practitioners; member of, and consultant to, the Prince of Wales’ 
Foundation For Integrated Health Regulatory Action Group; formerly Lecturer in Ethics 
and Law, Birmingham; Member of Regulation Working Group, Prince o f Wales’s Initiative 
on Integrated Health; barrister by training; formerly worked for Hempsons Solicitors,.
David Tredinnick MP: Conservative MP for Bosworth since 1987; Joint-Chairman of 
the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Integrated and Complementary Healthcare since 
2002 (formerly Treasurer 1989-2002); Member of Standing Committees for the 1993 
Osteopaths’ Act and the 1994 Chiropractors’ Act.
Maggy Wallace: Chair CORH (until 2006); consultant on a range of professional 
standards issues in health and education; Formerly Director of Standards Promotion, 
UKCC; Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Clinical Governance Board, North 
Hampshire Hospitals Trust
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Lord Walton o f Detchant: Appointed to the House of Lords in 1989; Patron of 
Healthwatch; Former member of Council for POWFIH; President of the BMA; President 
of the GMC 1982-1989 (7 year limit); member of the General Medical Council for 18 
years; Chair of the Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology subcommittee on 
CAM; Member o f the Lords select Committee on Science and Technology; formerly a 
neurologist, Dean o f Medicine at the University of Durham; President of the Royal Society 
of Medicine; President o f the World Federation o f Neurology.
Richard Woodfield: Group Manager, European Support And Review O f Herbal Policy, 
MHRA (Medicines)
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A ppendix  9. T ru s te e s  of th e  P rince of W ales’s  F oundation  for In teg ra ted  Health
Chairman
Sir Michael Peat began his career as an accountant at KPMG, before joining the Royal 
Household in 1993.He has held the tides of Keeper of the Privy Purse, Treasurer to HM 
The Queen and Receiver General of the Duchy of Lancaster. He was appointed as Private 
Secretary to HRH The Prince of Wales in 2002. He is a trustee to the Royal Collection 
Trust and Historic Royal Palaces Trust.
T rustees
N igel Clark is managing director of Weber Shandwick/GJW Public Affairs. Previously 
director of GJW Government Relations Limited, of Primary Care Group Holdings pic and 
a researcher in politics and industry. He has been chair of the General Osteopathic Council 
since May 2001, having been a lay member since its inception. He is now also a non­
executive member o f the new regulators authority.
D r M ichael D ixon has been a full-time GP for 18 years. He was a co-founder of the Mid- 
Devon Commissioning Group and the National Commissioning Movement and, since 
1998, he has been chair of the NHS Alliance. His national appointments include roles on 
the National Quality Taskforce and Cabinet Committee on Bureaucracy. He is an honorary 
research fellow at Exeter University, has published a number of papers on complementary 
medicine and is currendy part of a group researching into the therapeutic relationship.
Simon Fielding OBE originally trained as an osteopath and was the principal architect of 
the Osteopaths Act 1993. He was the first chairman of the General Osteopathic Council 
and has been the Department of Health's special adviser on complementary medicine since 
1993. He is also a trustee of Demelza House Children's Hospice.
Rosalind Mary Foster is a barrister with a practice in the field of professional regulation 
and discipline. She was Recorder of the Crown Court 1982 - 1998. With a special interest in 
ethics and medicine, she was closely involved in the development o f new performance
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procedures for doctors at the General Medical Council. She has presented hundreds of 
medical and dental conduct cases to the Privy Council and High Court, including cases 
concerned with confidentiality, consent, abuse of the professional relationship, indecency 
and fraud.
N icholas Gold is Managing Director at IN G  Investment Bank. He has previously worked 
at Touche Ross & Co. and as a solicitor at Freshfields. He is a fellow of the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants, a council member of RADA and is chair o f their Finance and 
General Purposes Committee.
Stephen Gordon has practised homeopathy since 1981 and is a past chair o f the Society of 
Homeopaths. He is vice-chair o f the Council of Organisations Registering Homeopaths, a 
member of the British Acupuncture Accreditation Board and is a founder, and current 
general secretary of the European Council for Classical Homeopathy.
Professor Stephen H olgate is MRC clinical professor of immunopharmacology at the 
University of Southampton. He is a member of several government committees, and a past 
member of the NHS Central Research & Development Committee. He was an advisor to 
the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology enquires into 
complementary and alternative medicine 2000 - 2001.
M ichael M cIntyre is a herbalist trained in western herbalism, traditional Chinese herbal 
medicine and acupuncture. Formerly president of the National Institute of Medical 
Herbalists, he currendy chairs the European Herbal Practitioners Association.
Professor David Peters is clinical director of the School o f Integrated Health at the 
University of Westminster. Formerly a GP at Marylebone Health Centre and lecturer in 
general practice at St Mary's Hospital Medical School, he is also a registered osteopath and 
a member of the Faculty of Homeopathy.
Michael Pittilo is the pro vice-chancellor of the University of Hertfordshire. His career in 
higher education has also included being the Dean at the Faculty of Health and Social
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Sciences at Kingston University and St. George's Hospital Medical school; Dean with 
responsibility for Multi-professional Education and Training, and Dean with responsibility 
for post-graduate taught courses, both at St. George's; and appointments abroad. He is a 
fellow of many organisations including the Institute of Biology, the Royal Society of Health 
and the Royal Society of Medicine, and is a writer, researcher and speaker on healthcare 
issues
Anne W adsworth is a director of Anne Wadsworth Associates, a government and public 
affairs consultancy specialising in health and environmental matters. A former journalist, 
she has extensive experience o f working in both public and private sectors and has been 
involved in the integrated healthcare initiative since its conception.
Robert Wilson is Chairman of Nelsonbach, Britain's largest producer of natural medicine. 
He has spent the majority o f his working life involved in the world of complementary and 
alternative medicine. He is Chairman of BHMA (British Homeopathic Manufacturer 
Association) in the UK. He is a board member of ECHAMP, the European Coalition for 
Homeopathic and Anthroposophic Medicine and Products. Robert is also a Trustee of the 
Scottish Civic Trust.
Source: (Foundation for Integrated Health, 2005)
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A ppendix  10. F reedom  o f Inform ation re q u e s t
Linda Percival 
Customer Service Centre 
Department of Health 
Richmond House 
79 Whitehall 
London SW1A 2NL
Department of Social Policy
Tel 020 7955 7515 
Fax 020 7955 6803 
Email: a.Dixon@lse.ac.uk
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE
18 September 2007
Dear Ms Percival 
Freedom of Information Act
I am writing to make a request for information under the Freedom of Information 
Act 2000.
I would like to know:
How many letters have been received by the Secretary of State for Health or 
Ministers of Health from HRH The Prince of Wales or his private office at 
Clarence House concerning integrated health or complementary and alternative 
medicine?
When were these letters dated?
Can copies of correspondence since 1990 between the Secretary of State for 
Health or Ministers of Health and HRH the Prince of Wales on this subject be 
made available under the FOI Act?
If so please could you make the copies available to me either in hard copy to 
the above address or electronic copies to my email address.
Yours sincerely
Ms Anna Dixon
Lecturer in European Health Policy
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Our ref: T 06026534
Ms Anna Dixon 
Department of Social Policy 
Houghton Street 
London 
WC2A 2AE
Richmond House 
79 Whitehall 
London 
SW1A 2NS
Tel: 020 7210 3000
24 August 2005
Dear Ms Dixon
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION -  COMPLEMENTARY AND ALTERNATIVE 
MEDICINE
Thank you for your letter of 23 May requesting, under the Freedom of Information Act, 
details of correspondence betw een HRH the Prince of W ales and Health Ministers on 
the subject of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM).
I am writing to advise you that the Department of Health can neither confirm nor deny 
that it holds the information you requested a s  the duty in section 1(1 )(a) of the 
Freedom of Information Act 2000  d oes not apply, by virtue of section 37(2) of that Act. 
However, this should not be taken a s  conclusive evidence that the information you 
requested exists or d oes not exist.
In considering the balance of the public interest in this ca se , w e have considered the 
general public interest in disclosure and the fact that op en n ess  in governm ent can  
increase public trust in and engagem ent with the government. However, there are 
also a number of key public interest considerations in favour of neither confirming nor 
denying that the information is held in this ca se . It is a  fundamental constitutional 
principle that communications betw een the heir to the throne and governm ent 
Ministers, including the fact a s  to whether any such communications are held by the 
department, are essentially confidential in nature. The Heir to the throne is in the 
sam e constitutional position a s  the Sovereign in relation to com m unications with the 
government: the Sovereign has the right and the duty to counsel, encourage and 
warn her government and is entitled to have opinions on government policy and to 
express those opinions to her ministers. It is essentia l that th ese  comm unications 
are, and remain, confidential, to maintain the political neutrality of the Sovereign in 
public affairs.
As the Heir to the throne is in the sam e constitutional position, any com m unications 
between him and government ministers, including those betw een their respective  
private secretaries, are, like those of the Sovereign, likely to remain sensitive b ecau se  
they could, at a later date, be taken to show a lack of political neutrality. In this case ,
/
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the fact of whether or not there have been  any such com m unications, or more 
specifically whether any such communications are held by a  department for the 
purposes of the Act, is a lso  confidential. Knowledge a s  to whether or not there w ere 
communications on a particular subject at a particular time would betray that essentia l 
confidence and, in turn, could affect the political neutrality of HRH the Prince of 
W ales, his relationship with Government Ministers, or could prejudice the diplomatic 
activities of the monarch and the heir.
W e have therefore concluded that the public interest in neither confirming nor denying 
whether w e hold any information of the type requested by you outweighs the public 
interest in disclosing whether w e hold any such information.
If you are unhappy with the way the Department of Health has handled your request 
you may ask for an internal review. You should contact the Section Head of the 
Freedom of Information group at the Department of Health, quoting the reference 
number above:
Jill Moorcroft 
Skipton House  
80 London Road 
London 
SE1 6LH
If you are not content with the outcom e of the internal review, you have the right to 
apply directly to the Information Com m issioner for a decision. The Information 
Commissioner can be contacted at:
Information Commissioner's Office
Wycliffe House
Water Lane
Wilmslow
Cheshire
SK 95A F
Yours sincerely,
Victoria Lindsay 
Custom er Service Centre 
Department of Health
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Appendix 11. M embership of th e  House of Lords Select Committee on Science 
and Technology Sub-Com m ittee I
Inquiry on Complementary and Alternative Medicine
Earl Baldwin of Bewdley (co-opted)
Lord Colwyn (co-opted)
Lord Haskel 
Lord Howie of Troon 
Lord Perry of Walton 
Lord Quirk 
Lord Rea
Lord Smith of Clifton (co-opted)
Lord Soulsby of Swaffham Prior (co-opted)
Lord Tombs
Lord Walton of Detchant (Chairman)
Specialist advisers
Professor Stephen Holgate, Clinical Professor of Immunopharmacology, University of 
Southampton
Mr Simon Mills, Director of the Centre for Complementary Health Studies, University of 
Exeter.
Declared interests in relation to this inquiry
Earl Baldwin of Bewdley—  Joint Chairman of the Parliamentary Group on Alternative 
and Complementary Medicine; patron of the Natural Medicines Society; patron of the 
National Federation of Spiritual Healers.
Lord Colwyn—  President of the Parliamentary Group on Alternative and Complementary 
Medicine; President, Natural Medicines Society; President, Arterial Health Foundation; 
patron of the Research Council for Complementary Medicine; patron of the Blackie 
Foundation; patron o f the Foundation for Traditional Chinese Medicines; patron of the 
National Federation o f Spiritual Healers; Council Member of the Medical Protection 
Society; Chairman, Dental Protection Ltd; member of the Royal Society of Medicine.
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Lord Rea —  Former NHS general practitioner; former lecturer in Social (Public Health) 
Medicine at St Thomas’s Hospital Medical School; Fellow of the Royal Society of Medicine 
(former President of Section o f General Practice); Hon. Secretary o f National Heart Forum 
(former Vice-Chairman); Chairman of All-Party Parliamentary Food and Health Forum; 
Treasurer of All-Party Parliamentary Group on Drug Abuse; Trustee of Action Research; 
Medicinal Cannabis Foundation; Patron of Connect Foundation for Mental Health; Vice- 
Patron of Child Psychotherapy Trust, MIND.
Lord Soulsby of Swaffham Prior— President, Royal Society o f Medicine (until 18 July 
2000); member of a committee which advises the British Veterinary Association on, among 
other things, alternative medicines and practices.
Lord Tom bs—  Chairman, Goldsmiths Education Committee, which sponsors courses for 
A-level science teachers, including a course on complementary and alternative medicine.
Lord Walton of D etchant—  Former Professor of Neurology and Dean of Medicine, 
University of Newcastle upon Tyne; former Warden, Green College, University of Oxford; 
former President, BMA, Royal Society of Medicine, GMC, Association o f British 
Neurologists and World Federation of Neurology; occasional neuroscience adviser to a 
pharmaceutical company; patron, Action for Disability, International Spinal Research 
Trust, National Head Injuries Association (Headway), North Northumberland Day 
Hospice, Oxford International Biomedical Centre, Tuff-In’ Appeal (cystic fibrosis), 
Radcliffe Medical Foundation; Vice-Patron, Brendoncare Foundation; President, Hampra, 
Neurosciences Research Foundation; Vice-President, Epilepsy Research Foundation, 
Guideposts Trust; Life President, Muscular Dystrophy Group of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland; member of the King’s Fund Working Party on Osteopathy and 
Chiropractic.
Lord Winston— Practising medical academic, occasionally using complementary 
techniques —  particularly acupuncture —  for patients. Currently conducting a trial of the 
effect o f trace elements on human fertility and miscarriage.
349
